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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines patterns of technological change in the UK dairy farming sector between 
1994 and 2016. It aims to illuminate the extent to which, and ways in which, powerful buyers, 
such as supermarkets, have influenced observed trends of market concentration and production 
intensification in dairy farming within value chains for liquid milk.  
By applying an evolutionary perspective, the thesis considers both the rate and the direction of 
technological change. Dairy farms are regarded as ‘socio-technical systems’ that can be 
‘reproduced’ in a ‘dynamically stable’ manner. Positive feedbacks resulting from interactions 
between systems’ components serve to stabilise reproduction, while interactions between 
different groups of actors present opportunities for disruption of the process of reproduction. 
The analysis draws upon conceptual tools from the literatures on value chain analysis 
(‘sanctions’ and ‘trust’) and the social construction of technology (‘framings’) in order to permit 
an exploration of reproduction as an inherently-contested process of ‘negotiation’. This 
analytical approach may have wider application within other agricultural and non-agricultural 
value chains, characterised by powerful – or oligopolistic – buyers.  
Through an in depth case study analysis of 16 UK dairy farms – and a quantitative analysis of a 
broader dataset of over 350 UK dairy farms – key patterns of technological change are revealed. 
The intensification and homogenisation of production amongst farms that supply supermarkets 
directly is attributed to: the degree of price variation within the market (with supermarkets 
paying considerably higher, more stable prices than other buyers); the higher degree of ‘trust’ 
that exists within supermarket value chains, resulting in longer, more collaborative 
relationships (compared with the value chains of other buyers); and the practice of 
benchmarking within supermarket supplier pools (often undertaken by reference to production 
costs). Significantly, these factors have both a direct influence upon the production approaches 
of farms that supply supermarkets, and an indirect influence on other farms, suggesting that the 
influence of supermarket power may be more pervasive than implied by previous analyses.  
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Furthermore, the findings also call into question the long-run sustainability of supermarket 
value chains, as currently constituted, in the face of biological and economic shocks and 
stresses. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
 
This thesis aims to identify the extent to which, and ways in which, powerful buyers, such as 
supermarkets, influence technological change amongst their suppliers. These issues will be 
examined through a study of the value chain for liquid milk in the United Kingdom (UK), 
which will: characterise patterns of technological change exhibited by UK dairy farms; ascertain 
the influence of buyers’ demands upon such patterns (as distinct from other influences); and 
determine the mechanisms through which such influence is secured. The findings of this study 
will suggest policy recommendations regarding the future of the UK dairy sector, which has 
recently been a source of considerable debate (see below, Section 1.1). 
 
Although it is based upon an examination of the UK dairy farming sector, the study aspires to 
make a broader contribution to theories of technological change and power, which may be 
applied to the understanding of similar processes within other sectors of the economy, in 
particular those that are characterised by the concentration of power amongst a small number 
of large organisations. Such processes are of particular relevance given the globalised nature of 
the modern economy, the prominent role played by multinational corporations within it, and 
the potential consequences of this for prosperity, equality, and sustainable development (Crotty 
et al 1998; Gereffi et al 2001). 
1.1 Background  
The impact of retail market concentration upon the food and agriculture sector has emerged as 
a subject of considerable public interest. It is often suggested that, due to their power, 
supermarkets are able to capture a disproportionately large share of the retail price of food 
products, therefore exerting significant pressure upon suppliers and producers upstream. 
Because larger, more intensive producers may be better able to withstand such market 
conditions (Lang & Heasman 2004) the concern is that supermarket power may contribute 
towards a homogenisation and intensification of production, and a corresponding lack of 
diversity (and resilience) across the agricultural sector, with potentially negative consequences 
for environmental, economic and/or social sustainability. 
 
Within the UK dairy farming sector, specifically, repeated crises have prompted a debate 
regarding the nature of the relationship between technological change in dairy farming (an 
intensification in production) and ongoing structural changes within the dairy farming sector (a 
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reduction in farm numbers and an increase in farm sizes) as well as within the wider value 
chain for milk (a concentration within the processor and retailer markets; see Section 2.2).  
 
On the one hand it could be that supermarkets have driven a process of intensification in UK 
dairy farming, through their engagement in successive rounds of ‘price wars’, and through the 
use of milk as a ‘loss leader’ (House of Commons 2004, Ev34); practices that have depressed the 
farmgate price of milk, meaning that only the largest, most intensive farms, benefitting from 
economies of scale, have been able to survive. On the other hand, a 2012 analysis by the 
Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board (AHDB) implied that the ongoing viability 
of UK dairy farms is not reliant upon the widespread adoption of an intensive, large scale 
production model, but that “... milk can be produced efficiently from any of the major systems 
that are currently practised … [and] moreover, efficient milk production is possible at almost 
any scale of production”(DairyCo 2012a, p.4). By implication, it may be that the intensification 
of dairy farming has not been a response to market conditions, but is merely the continuation of 
a longer-running trend towards fewer, larger, more productive farms (Empson 1998, p.78) due 
to incremental improvements in farming technologies, including advances in genetics, 
veterinary science, and agronomy (Brassley 2000; Bieleman 2005; Lampe and Sharp 2015).  
 
Given the strong – often competing – interests and perspectives of the various contributors to 
this debate, there is a risk that discussions regarding the future direction of the dairy sector may 
become increasingly polarised, with views on either side being reduced to simplified, “linear” 
accounts of change (Brooks et al 2009). Such accounts were exemplified by a 2013 strategic 
report by the National Farmers Union (NFU), which proposed that the UK dairy farming sector 
should respond to recent challenges through a narrow focus upon efficiency improvements, 
aimed at increasing the UK’s milk production in order to compete within emerging markets for 
dairy products, such as China (NFU 2013; see Section 2.3.1).  
 
Rather than viewing observed changes in the dairy sector as the uniform response of a single 
dependent variable (i.e. technological change) to the action of a single independent variable 
(e.g. ‘buyer power’ or ‘scientific advances’), this thesis aims to enrich the debate by providing 
an alternative perspective to such linear accounts. In so doing, it hopes to offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the processes described above and, accordingly, a more useful set of policy 
recommendations. 
1.2 Thesis Structure 
In order to explore the issues introduced above, this thesis will begin, in Chapter 2, by 
describing in greater detail the economic, social and environmental context within which the 
debate surrounding the UK dairy farming sector is currently situated.  
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Chapter 3 will review a range of theoretical perspectives that have been applied within studies 
of innovation and technological change across a range of sectors, including agriculture. 
Theoretical approaches to power and its role within value chains for agricultural products will 
also be reviewed. This will contribute to the development a theoretical foundation upon which 
to construct a framework for analysing the influence of buyer power upon processes of 
technological change within UK dairy farms, which will be outlined in Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 5 will provide an overview of dairy farming technologies and of the actors and 
governance conditions within the UK value chain for liquid milk. This will delineate the 
elements that will be included within the analysis and how the analytical concepts discussed in 
Chapter 4 will be applied. This overview will also serve to ‘bound’ the study, forming a basis 
for the data collection and case study approach that will be adopted in this study, which will be 
described in greater detail within Chapter 6.  
 
The results of the analysis of these case studies will be summarised in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
These findings, and the ways in which they serve to answer the research question, will be 
discussed in greater depth in Chapter 10, which will also enumerate the knowledge claims 
made within this thesis and provide an account of the strength, limits and generalisability of 
these claims. Chapter 11 will conclude with an overview of the empirical contributions made in 
this study, the predictions and policy implications associated with these findings and their 
broad contributions to theory, reflections on the methodology adopted within the study, and 
areas for further research. 
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Chapter 2: 
Policy Context 
 
 
This chapter provides a high-level summary of the economic, social and environmental context 
within which the debate regarding recent and possible future trends in the UK dairy farming 
sector is situated, and within which policy is formulated. It first outlines the economic, social 
and environmental significance of UK dairy farming, before considering trends and structural 
changes in the sector between 1994 and 2016. Finally, it highlights the potential economic, social 
and environmental implications of a continuation of these trends. 
 
The purpose of this summary is not to propose explanations of how this set of conditions has 
emerged, nor to offer predictions of the future based on current conditions. Neither does it aim 
to critically examine current policy approaches. Instead, the intention is to provide an indication 
of the importance of the issues that this thesis is centred around, and to which it aims to 
contribute. 
2.1 Dairy Farming: Economic, Social and Environmental Significance  
2.1.1 Economic Significance 
The significance of dairy farming to the UK economy demonstrates the importance of 
understanding the future shape and direction that the sector may take. In 2011 dairy farming 
was “the single largest agricultural sector in the UK”, accounting for 16% of UK agricultural 
production by value (House of Commons 2013, p.4). In 2016, the total value of milk produced in 
the UK was £3,296m. This was greater than the total value of poultry meat produced (£2,246m), 
and just over a quarter of the total value of the output of all UK livestock (£12,686m; Defra 
2017a, p.31-32). 
 
Total UK milk production for the year 2015/6 was 14,829m litres (AHDB 2016, p.18), making it 
the third largest producing country in the European Union (EU) after Germany and France 
(ibid. p.20). In 2013 the UK was the tenth largest producer of milk in the world (ibid. p.22).  
 
Out of the total volume of milk produced in the UK in 2015, 6,856m litres were directed towards 
the liquid milk market, and 7,419m litres were allocated for the manufacture of dairy products. 
Although this study is focused on the agricultural production of liquid milk for drinking, raw 
milk produced by UK dairy farms serves as a significant material input into the broader dairy 
products manufacturing sector, the gross value added (GVA) of which was £2bn in 2015 
(compared with the largest UK manufacturing sector – beverages – which had a GVA of £6.6bn 
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in 2015; Defra 2017b, p.12). A robust dairy farming sector is of strategic significance to the UK’s 
trade balance for dairy products (of which more below, 2.3.1).  
2.1.2 Social Significance 
In 2016, 26,256 individuals were estimated to have been employed in the dairy farming sector in 
England alone.1 Because it is generally less exposed to seasonal fluctuations in labour demand 
than many other agricultural sectors (such as, for example, horticulture), dairy farming relies 
relatively less upon “seasonal unskilled” labour and more upon individuals in permanent or 
full time employment, who can provide “24-7 attention year-round, relatively high levels of 
skill and an acquired knowledge of the farm and animals” (RABDF 2017, p.4). Out of those 
working in dairy farming in England in 2016, 11,188 were reported to be full time farmers, 
partners, directors and spouses; 3,978 were part time farmers, partners, directors and spouses; 
and 5,681 were regular full time workers. 
2.1.3 Environmental Significance 
Agriculture – and the farming of livestock in particular – has a profound impact upon the 
environment (see Figure 2a). Indeed, in 2006, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 
concluded that the livestock sector is “one of the top two or three most significant contributors 
to the most serious environmental problems, at every scale from global to local” (UN FAO 2006, 
p.xx). 
 
 
Figure 2a: Environmental Footprint of UK Agriculture 
 
 
Source: Defra (2017a), p.79 	
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/structure-of-the-agricultural-industry-in-
england-and-the-uk-at-june  
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Chart 11.1 Agriculture’s environmental footprint 
 
Source: Collated by Defra 
Land use 
6. Between 1990 and 2016 agricultural land use has remained relatively stable (Chart 11.2) with little 
change in the proportion of land used for grassland (67%) and crops (25%).  The area of uncropped 
land fell sharply in 2008 due to the abolition of set-aside.  Since then the area has fluctuated around 
that level, influenced by factors such as commodity prices and weather conditions. 
 
Chart 11.2 Agricultural land use 
 
                                                                                                                                 Source: Defra, June Survey of Agriculture 
 
(a) Grassland includes temporary and permanent grasslands, sole rights rough grazing and common rough grazing areas 
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With regard to the UK dairy farming sector, a lifecycle analysis of the impacts associated with a 
single litre of milk – from production, to processing, packaging, retailing, final consumption, 
and transportation between each of these stages – suggested that “agricultural production 
contributes the largest proportion of environmental impacts for most environmental themes” 
(Foster et al 2007, p.vii). According to the Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs 
(Defra), key environmental impacts of dairy farming in England include (Defra 2012, p.36): 
• Loss of biodiversity due to intensive grassland and maize management  
• GHG emissions, including methane, nitrous oxide, carbon dioxide  
• Water pollution by nitrates, phosphates, coliform bacteria, silt, pesticides and 
veterinary residues 
• Biodiversity loss and GHG emissions arising from forest and savannah conversion 
driven by the use of soy and palm derived feedstuffs from the tropics and South 
America 
• Soil structural degradation  
• Nitrification leading to biodiversity loss and acidification as a result of atmospheric 
ammonia emissions 
• Water use in areas and periods of high water stress  
• Depletion and pollution of ground and surface waters by remote feed and fodder 
production 
• Use of GM crops in dairy feed. 
2.2 Structural Changes in the UK Dairy Sector 1994-2016 
Structural changes to the dairy sector since the abolition of the Milk Marketing Board (MMB) in 
1994 – with regard to farming, processing and retailing – can be summarised as: 
• A reduction in farm numbers, an increase in average herd size, and an increase in the 
volume of milk produced per cow  
• A concentration in processor market 
• A concentration in the retail market, accompanying a shift by consumers from doorstep 
delivery to supermarket purchase of milk. 
 
This section outlines these trends in greater detail. 
2.2.1 Concentration in Production 
Since 1994 there has been a concentration in the UK dairy farming sector. Farm numbers 
declined steadily after the MMB was dissolved, more than halving between 1995 and 2010, from 
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35,741 to 15,716 (Hawkins 2011, see also Figure 2b). In 2016 there were 13,227 dairy farms 
operating in the UK2 and UK dairy farm numbers were reducing at a rate of 2.5% year-on-year.3 
 
The total number of dairy cows in the UK also declined post-1994, showing a 27% reduction 
from 2.6m in 1996 to 1.9m in 2015 (Bate 2016, p.3), with cow numbers remaining at 1.9m for 
2016 (Defra 2017a, p.14). The decline in the overall number of cows has been less pronounced 
than the reduction in farm numbers, meaning that average herd sizes (i.e. cows per farm) 
increased across the period 1996 to 2016 from 75 to 143. 
 
Despite the reductions in farm numbers and overall cow numbers, total UK milk production 
levels increased between 1994 and 2016 due to considerable increases in milk yields per cow 
(Hawkins 2011). In 1994/5 the total milk produced in the UK was 13,755m litres, rising to 
14,829m litres in 2015/16.4 Average yields per cow5 in 1995/6 were 5,512 litres per cow, rising 
to 7,9426 litres per cow in 2015/16.  
 
Figure 2b: Trends in GB dairy sector 1995 to 2011 
 
 
 
Source: DairyCo 2013a, note: figures exclude Northern Ireland 	
2 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/farming-data/producer-numbers/uk-producer-
numbers/ accessed 15/3/18 
 
3 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/producer-numbers/ 
accessed 16/3/18 
4 http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/supply-production/monthly-milk-
production/#.WqpV6BTmz5o  
 
5 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/average-milk-yield/  
 
6 provisional figure 
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The net result was that, compared with 1994, in 2016 there were fewer, larger dairy farms, 
producing more milk per cow. 
 
This development represents the continuation of a longstanding trend towards fewer, larger, 
higher output herds. For example, in 1940 there were some 138,490 registered producers of milk 
in England and Wales, with an average of just 15 cows per herd and annual yields of 2,355 litres 
per cow (Empson 1998, p.78).  
2.2.2 Concentration in the Processor Market 
Prior to the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), the UK dairy sector 
was largely protected from international competition, with the MMB providing a guaranteed 
milk price for farmers. Post-accession, trade restrictions within Europe were reduced and, 
ultimately, abolished. The MMB proved incompatible with the European Union (EU) regime 
(Empson 1998) and was dissolved in 1994. 
 
Before 1994, the UK dairy sector was effectively “state regulated”, with the MMB purchasing all 
milk and acting as “the monopoly broker of milk between producers and processing 
companies” (Banks and Marsden 1997, p.386). The abolition of the MMB therefore represented a 
substantial loss of economic power for farmers in favour of private sector milk buyers. Post-
1994, processors such as Robert Wiseman seized the opportunity for expansion offered by 
market liberalisation, as farmers were no longer required to sell to the MMB. Large brokers at 
the time included the Milk Group and United Milk Producers, which later developed 
processing capacity as United Milk (subsequently going into receivership).  
 
Since 1994, the processor market has come to be dominated by a small number of large players: 
in 2011/12 the seven largest milk buyers purchased 80% of milk produced in the UK (DairyCo 
2013b, p.4).  
 
In the period since 2011 there has been further consolidation in the market. In 2012, major 
processor Arla Foods and dairy co-operative Milk Link merged, and Müller UK (part of the 
German based Müller Group) purchased Robert Wiseman (then one of the largest UK 
processors). The result was that Arla and Müller UK had “an estimated combined raw milk 
requirement of just under half (48%) of Britain’s 11.5bn litres annual milk production” (DairyCo 
2013b p.4). In 2015, further consolidation took place as Müller purchased Dairy Crest’s dairy 
business, with 660 farmers transferring their supply from Dairy Crest to Müller in the process.7 
Processors are now regarded as the ‘gatekeepers’ to the UK milk market.8 	
7 https://www.fginsight.com/news/news/name-change-for-Müller-wiseman-as-dairy-crest-deal-
completed-8918  
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2.2.3 Concentration in Retail Market and Changes in Consumer Practices 
Whereas doorstep delivery had dominated the market for liquid milk during the days of the 
MMB (Banks and Marsden 1997, p.392), market liberalisation accompanied a change in 
consumers’ purchasing habits. In 1980, “doorstep deliveries still accounted for 89% of 
household sales of milk” (Dewick and Foster 2011, p.4). By 1995, doorstep delivery accounted 
for 45% of the retail milk market, and by 2015 this had declined to just 3% of the market by 
volume (Bate 2016, p.3; AHDB 2015, p.60), with shoppers choosing to purchase milk from 
supermarkets instead.  
 
According to a 2011 report from the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRA), 
“Liquid milk retail is concentrated in supermarkets, which account for 85% of sales” (House of 
Commons 2011, p.7). At the time of writing, it is possible that this proportion is even higher, as 
the same report suggested that doorstep delivery accounted for 7% of sales. 
2.3 Potential Implications of, and Policy Responses to, Observed Trends 
2.3.1 Potential Economic Implications 
The current economic predicament of the dairy farming sector was summarised above (2.1). 
Potential economic implications of future patterns of development are broad and varied. 
However, much recent attention has focused upon the possible impacts upon the UK trade 
balance for dairy products. 
 
The UK currently operates a trade surplus in raw milk and milk powders, albeit a larger trade 
deficit for manufactured dairy products (in particular cheese; see Table 2a). With farms exiting 
the sector at a high rate (see above, 2.2) some have expressed concerns that, over the longer 
term, this may result in a reduction in total UK milk production, which might incur increased 
trade deficits as domestically-produced milk currently destined for the domestic manufacturing 
sector may be redirected instead to the domestic liquid market. For example, the RABDF has 
suggested that “with UK self-sufficiency for dairy products at only 77% and ambitions from 
New Zealand and Ireland among others to increase their exports to the UK, a decline in 
domestic dairy production … could lead to long-term displacement of domestic production 
from imports.” (RABDF 2017, p.4)  
  
	
8 Personal communication, DairyCo representative 2 December 2014 
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Table 2a: UK Dairy Trade Balance  
 Imports Exports 
Raw milk 
(millions of 
litres) 
2013 187 501 
2014 185 586 
2015 185 586 
Butter (’000 
tonnes) 
2013 106 45 
2014 95 51 
2015 106 50 
Cheese (’000 
tonnes) 
2013 468 125 
2014 469 134 
2015 494 152 
Cream (’000 
tonnes) 
2013 22 44 
2014 30 34 
2015 30 21 
Milk powders 
(’000 tonnes) 
2013 67 88 
2014 66 125 
2015 61 146 
 
Source: AHDB 2016, p.43 
 
In response to concerns surrounding the long term impacts of this farmer exodus from the 
sector, which is often attributed to the effects of low farmgate prices for milk, a voluntary code 
of best practice for contractual relationships9 in the dairy industry was introduced (‘The Code’) 
in 2012, aimed at improving the economic viability of producers and rebalancing power within 
the dairy supply chain (DairyUK et al 2013) by ensuring that: 
 
“Contracts between producers and purchasers must set out either a clear price, or a clear pricing 
mechanism (such as a formula) or a price notification process (the process by which the processor 
notifies the producer of the price), such that at any given point in time, a producer can be certain 
of the base milk price that will be paid for the milk produced.” (ibid. p.2) 
 
 
Following the introduction of the Code, it was believed that “in excess of 85-90% of milk 
volume in the UK” was covered by the Code (Newbery 2013, DairyCo 2013c).  
 
 
An alternative interpretation of observed trends (outlined above) is that the increases in yield 
per cow and herd size at the farm level (and the resulting increases to national milk output, 2.2) 
could result in continued expansion in overall milk output, which has the potential to reduce 
the UK’s current trade deficit for manufactured products and to improve its position with 
regards to dairy exports (assuming commensurate increases in processing capacity). Indeed, the 
strategy for the dairy sector proposed by DairyUK and others in 2014 is one of aggressive 
expansion in production capacity to “wipe out the trade deficit, by displacing imports and 
exporting where it makes business sense” (DairyUK et al 2014, p.7). This strategy was 
underpinned by the expectation of increased demand for meat and dairy products in 
developing nations, notably China (Garnett 2007, p.24). 
 	
9 https://www.nfuonline.com/assets/6570  
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The National Farmers Union (NFU) developed a similar vision of a more competitive UK dairy 
sector, based around improvements in efficiency of production and greater synergies 
throughout the supply chain, with one recommendation for farmers being to “increase output, 
through improving technical efficiency and expansion”(NFU 2013, p.7). 
 
Such questions regarding the future competitiveness of the UK dairy sector on the global stage 
have come into sharper focus following recent political developments, including:  
• The 2014 Russian embargo on imports of cheese following the imposition of trade 
sanctions in response to the annexation of Crimea10 
• The abolition of EU quotas for milk in 2015, which was widely predicted to increase 
milk production within the EU with milk prices falling accordingly (IPTS 2009). 
Looking ahead, this increased competition may introduce a new challenge to the 
economic viability of UK milk production, and some studies suggest that UK milk 
production will decline (IPTS 2009; Drew Associates 2008). 
• The UK’s decision to exit the EU, following the referendum of 2016, which may 
exacerbate the challenges facing UK producers, within a current climate of 
protectionism (Lang, Millstone and Marsden 2017). 
2.3.2 Potential Social and Environmental Implications 
The potential social and environmental implications of recent trends are often interconnected 
and will therefore be considered alongside one another. 
 
At one extreme, some commentators suggest that the trends outlined above (2.2) represent a 
homogenisation of production approaches, converging on a ‘megadairy’ model of production 
(Lundgren 2011). Further, they express concerns regarding: 
• The environmental impacts of such models, resulting from importing huge quantities of 
concentrated feed from off farm. Such feeds are often derived from soy or palm grown 
in the tropics, resulting in biodiversity loss and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to 
forest and savannah conversion (Defra 2012, p.36), or are derived from crops that might 
otherwise have been used to feed humans (Garnett 2007) 
• The standards of animal welfare associated with increasingly intensive farming 
practices (Jackson 2013; Soil Association / WSPA 2011; CIWF / WSPA 2010) 
• The use of antibiotics within intensive production systems, with the associated threat of 
antimicrobial resistance (Jackson 2013) 
• The local environmental impacts that may be associated with more intensive 
production approaches (as seen, for example, in the Environment Agency’s refusal in 	
10 https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21696571-land-where-european-cheese-banned-one-man-
dares-make-his-own-war-and-cheese  
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2010 of an application for a proposed 8,100 cow mega-dairy in Nocton, Lincolnshire; 
House of Commons 2011, p.36)  
• The future viability of small family farms, and the broader impact on rural 
communities and the rural economy, in the face of the emergence of increasingly 
largescale, more intensive systems of production (Villarreal Herrera 2017, p.5). 
 
 
By contrast, however, others argue that “... milk can be produced efficiently from any of the 
major systems that are currently practised in Britain … Moreover, efficient milk production is 
possible at almost any scale of production”(DairyCo 2012a, p.4). This contrasting vision of the 
future is, therefore, associated with quite different environmental impacts.  
 
Further, there is a risk that the complexity of such issues may be lost within mainstream 
debates, which may threaten to simplify arguments along lines such as ‘small is [inevitably] 
beautiful’ or ‘big is [inevitably] bad’ (Schumacher 1974). In practice, the above issues are all 
strongly contested. 
 
This is demonstrated by considering just a single aspect of the potential environmental 
implications of increasingly intensive farming models, namely, GHG emissions including CO2 
and CH4. On the one hand it has been claimed that emissions associated with more intensive 
farms may be lower per litre of milk produced, because an intensive farm may produce the same 
volume of milk as an extensive farm, albeit from fewer cows (therefore producing less methane 
per litre of milk; Garnett 2007; Foster et al 2007). A counter argument suggests that the methane 
emissions for each high-output cow are, nevertheless, higher than for each low-output cow, due 
to their higher-protein diets, and the larger volumes of food they consume. Moreover, high-
output cows have a shorter productive lifespan, meaning that intensive farms experience a 
higher turnover of livestock and, consequently, a more frequent need for heifers (i.e. methane-
producing, non-milk-producing cows) to replace these shorter-lived animals (ibid.). 
 
The potential environmental implications of the trends already observed are made more 
uncertain by the current instability surrounding the future of environmental regulation of 
agriculture in the UK. In the UK, minimum environmental standards for dairy farming have 
been promoted through the Single Payment Scheme (SPS), introduced in 2003 under the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), with farmers qualifying for subsidy under the SPS for 
adherence with “statutory management requirements” (SMRs) and standards of “good 
agricultural and environmental conditions” (GAECs); known as “cross compliance”. SPS was 
replaced in 2015 under the CAP reforms by a new Direct Payments Scheme, which, while 
broadly preserving the cross compliance requirements, made 30% of the subsidy dependent on 
farms adhering to “greening requirements”, which went beyond cross compliance requirements 
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by introducing requirements for crop diversification, and the preservation of areas of 
permanent grassland and “ecological focus areas” (Defra 2013, p.9-10). However, the UK’s 
decision to exit the EU, following the 2016 referendum has resulted in considerable uncertainty 
regarding the future regulation of food and agriculture in the UK. 
 
Finally, recent UK food policy has been legitimated by the concept of “sustainable 
intensification”, or “simultaneously raising yields, increasing the efficiency with which inputs 
are used and reducing the negative environmental effects of food production” (Foresight 2011, 
p.35). Although improving the efficiency of milk production can coincide with meeting 
environmental sustainability objectives (Defra 2012, p.15), increased intensity of production is 
often at odds with environmental sustainability, meaning that satisfying “the need to produce 
more from less” is not straightforward  (House of Commons 2012, p.29). For example, although 
larger herds may be more profitable and efficient this may come at a cost to biodiversity 
(Dewick and Foster 2007, p.25-26). The requirement for, and meaning and adequency of, 
“sustainable intensification” within farming practice (Foresight 2011; NFU 2013) therefore 
remains a source of some dispute.  
2.4 Summary 
As outlined already, the purpose of this chapter is not to offer a position as to the validity of 
any of the above arguments, but to demonstrate that the economic, social and environmental 
outcomes associated with different production approaches are contested and expected to differ. 
This emphasises the importance of understanding the directions in which dairy farming is 
currently moving, which is the area of knowledge that this study aims to contribute to. An 
understanding of the directions that development will take, and the influence of buyer power 
upon such development, may provide an important contribution towards the current policy 
debate. 
 
  
		
14	
 
Chapter 3: 
Literature Review  
 
 
This chapter considers a range of theoretical perspectives applied within studies of innovation 
and technological change in a range of sectors, including agriculture (3.1 – 3.4). It also considers 
some theoretical approaches to power and in particular its role within value chains for 
agricultural products (3.4 – 3.5). The purpose of this review is to establish a theoretical 
foundation on which to construct a framework for analysing the influence of buyer power upon 
patterns of technological change within UK dairy farms (which will be outlined in Chapter 4), 
and to further refine the research question that this study is aimed at answering (3.7). 
3.1 Induced Innovation 
The theory of induced innovation has provided a popular explanation for the generation of new 
agricultural technologies. In brief, induced innovation theory holds that: 
 
“a change in the relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to innovation and to 
inventions of a particular kind – directed at economising the use of a factor that has become 
relatively expensive” (Hicks 1932, pp.124-5).  
 
 
Technological change is therefore induced by changes to factor input prices so that if, for 
example, the price of labour increases then activity will be directed towards the development of 
labour-saving technologies.  
 
One of the most influential formulations of the induced innovation hypothesis was developed 
by Hayami and Ruttan (Hayami and Ruttan 1971) who suggested that, throughout the history 
of agricultural development, mechanical technologies have, broadly, served as a substitute for 
labour, whilst biological and chemical technologies have served as a substitute for land. They 
famously illustrated this through a comparison of the agricultural histories of the United States 
(which, they suggest, was characterised by the substitution of machinery for labour) and Japan 
(which was characterised by the substitution of chemical and biological inputs for land; 
Olmstead and Rhode 1993, p.102).  
 
Further, Hayami and Ruttan suggested that changes in technology are induced not only by 
“conditions of factor supply” but also by “product demand” (Olmstead and Rhode 1993, p.101) 
as well as “as a result of exogenous advances in the state of science and technology” (Hogg 2000 
p.50). Similar perspectives have focused more heavily on the role of market demand in 
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inducing technological change, holding, for example, that “the rate of technological innovation 
of a given commodity in a market economy is responsive to the market demand for that 
commodity in the economy” (Lin 1992, p.14). 
 
The potential relevance of such approaches to the current study is clear: the debate surrounding 
the recent and future direction of the UK dairy farming sector is centred on the question of 
whether (and how) farmers’ technological approaches are influenced by market signals (such 
as, for example, farmgate prices for milk, paid by powerful buyers). However, some critiques of 
induced innovation theory suggest that it may not offer the most useful theoretical basis in 
which to ground this study. 
3.1.1 Critiques of Induced Innovation 
The theory of induced innovation has attracted criticism regarding its treatment of the process 
and sources of technological change. These (related) critiques can be summarised as follows: 
• Induced innovation places the process of innovation inside a “black box” (Ruttan 1997, 
p.1521). Put differently, new technologies may appear as “manna from heaven” 
(Freeman 1994; Scherer 1999, p.53): factor prices are regarded as the drivers of 
innovative activity, but the capacities to act upon such drivers are entirely taken for 
granted. In reality, however, technologies may not be available ‘on demand’, ready and 
waiting to be deployed as the necessary conditions arise. Instead, some underlying 
process of ongoing innovative activity (e.g. research and development) must be taking 
place, which leads to the question of how this activity is directed and sustained.  
 
• A further consequence of the ‘black-boxing’ of the innovation process is a potential 
disregard for where innovative activity is located and by whom it is performed. If new 
technologies appear “like manna from heaven” then there is a risk that the sources of 
such innovation may also be taken for granted. Given that this study is interested in 
determining whether (and how) buyer power influences technological change, it may 
be important to identify and characterise sources of that change including, for example, 
whether technologies are generated on the farm or whether they are developed by third 
parties, or whether they are developed as a result of collaboration between groups of 
farmers, and between farmers and third parties (such as extension agencies or, 
potentially, buyers). Pavitt, for example, famously described mature sectors, such as 
agricultural production, as “supplier-dominated” sectors, by contrast with newer 
sectors (Pavitt 1984). By this, he meant that agricultural producers do not typically 
generate innovations themselves but instead adopt the innovations generated by input 
“suppliers” (which may be private firms, research bodies or public agricultural 
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extension services). In the context of this study a theoretical perspective is required that 
understands technological change as incorporating: 
 
(a) The adoption and application of technologies (including both technological 
artefacts and processes) that have been developed by external suppliers or 
consultants. In the case of dairy farming this includes third parties that produce: 
• ‘Hardware’ – e.g. agricultural inputs such as feed, genetic resources, 
veterinary medicines, milking machines, etc, or  
• ‘Software’ – e.g. knowledge/skills inputs such as guidelines or best practice 
regarding animal husbandry or grassland management. 
 
(b) The development of new technologies  (both technological artefacts and processes) 
by farmers themselves (which may include, for example, entirely new technologies 
or novel / context-specific approaches to implementing or adapting existing 
technologies that have been developed by third parties). 
 
(c) Farmer-farmer and farmer-third party interaction and/or knowledge exchange. 
3.2 Studies of the Diffusion of Agricultural Innovations 
Another popular approach to understanding technological change in agriculture involves the 
study of the diffusion of innovations (Griliches 1957; Feder and Umali 1993). Diffusion is “the 
process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among 
the members of a social system” (Rogers 1983, p.34). The popularity of this theoretical 
approach, with regards to the study of technological change in agriculture, may be related to 
the above observation that agriculture is a “supplier-dominated” sector (i.e. that farmers are 
typically “users” of technologies developed by other actors; Diederen et al 2003). Such studies 
have aimed to account for the successful / unsuccessful uptake by farmers of particular 
technological artefacts or approaches, such as conservation agriculture (Knowler and Bradshaw 
2007), organic agriculture (Burton et al 2003), and artificial insemination (Howley et al 2012), or 
of ‘innovation’ more generally (Diederen et al 2003). 
 
However, the objectives of diffusion studies are often quite different from those of this study, 
meaning that there may be some potential challenges to applying a diffusion perspective. For 
example, “population” models of diffusion typically seek to understand how, when and why a 
technological innovation achieves widespread adoption (or not) amongst a population of users, 
often attributing diffusion to “an endogenous process of information propagation” (Diederen et 
al 2003 p.330). Within such studies analysis may centre upon rates of technological innovation 
and adoption, and on the categorisation of users as, variously, “innovators”, “early adopters”, 
		
17	
the “late majority” and “laggards”, depending upon the timing of their adoption (Rogers 1983, 
p.22). By contrast, this study is more concerned with identifying how and why different users 
select between different (not necessarily specified) technological approaches (involving multiple 
technologies). The relevant unit of analysis for the present study is therefore the farm and/or 
sector rather than the artefact, and the focus is upon the mechanisms underlying (rather than 
rates of) technological change. 
 
By contrast, other diffusion studies – categorised broadly as “decision theoretic models of 
innovation”– seek to account for the contribution of a range of distinguishing variables towards 
farmers’ decision making, with farmers assumed to exhibit profit maximising behaviour 
(Diederen et al 2003 p.330). Such variables may include farm size, location, farmer education, or 
age (Sunding and Zilberman 2001, p.231-4), the role of availability of labour, equity, and 
attitude to risk (Abadi Ghadim and Pannell 1999), the amount of technology used in the 
production process, the opportunities for product differentiation within the sector, the degree 
and type of regulation (Diederen et al 2003, p.332), or farmers’ motivations, values, objectives 
and behavioural influences (Howley et al 2012, p.172). The aims of such studies are closer to 
those of this study. 
 
Some valuable conceptual insights have emerged from the diffusion literature, which may be of 
relevance to the needs of this study, namely that the speed of diffusion of a technological 
innovation may depend whether it is perceived as having “greater relative advantage, 
compatibility, trialability, observability, and less complexity” relative to alternatives (Rogers 
1983, p.16).  Of particular relevance are: 
• Compatibility, or “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as being consistent 
with the existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters” (ibid. p.15). 
Indeed, Feder and Umali observe the importance of compatibility with adopters’ needs, 
suggesting that: “Most agricultural technologies introduced in the last three decades, 
and the high-yielding varieties (HYVs) in particular, are in fact a package of interrelated 
technologies (for example, fertilizer, herbicides, and chemicals). Accordingly, one major 
focus in the literature in recent years has been the investigation of the decision-making 
process characterising choice of the optimal combinations of the components of a 
technological package over time” (Feder and Umali 1993 p.216). Moreover, Diederen et 
al suggested that “many innovations… do require adjustments to local circumstances 
and adaptations to specific uses” (Diederen et al 2003, p.329), while Wilson stresses “the 
importance of compatibility of technological innovations with existing values, past 
experiences and needs” (Wilson 2007, p.56). 
 
• Complexity, or “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as difficult to 
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understand and use” (Rogers 1983, p.15); and 
 
• Trialability, or “the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with on a 
limited basis ... Ryan and Gross (1943) found that every one of their Iowa farmer 
respondents adopted hybrid-seed corn by first trying it on a partial basis” (ibid.). 
 
 
Finally, diffusion studies have also sought to model “bandwagon effects” in which “the sheer 
number of organisations adopting an innovation can cause a bandwagon pressure, prompting 
other organisations to adopt this innovation” (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, p.487). Such 
effects may be of interest to this study, given the concerns expressed within mainstream 
discussions regarding the ‘homogenisation’ or convergence of farming approaches upon more 
intensive modes of production (see above, Chapters 1 and 2). 
3.3 Evolutionary Perspectives: A Coupled Model 
Evolutionary theories of innovation were developed partly in response to the shortcomings 
associated with ‘linear’ models of technological change (Brooks et al 2009); both “demand-pull” 
perspectives and “science-push” perspectives (Dosi 1982). 
 
Drawing on the work of Chris Freeman and Keith Pavitt, the evolutionary perspective is 
focused on the ongoing processes of “search” and “selection” within firms, based in turn 
around firms’ “routines” (Ruttan 1997, p.1522). It aims to provide “a more realistic description 
of the internal working of the black box” (ibid.), in which technological change is regarded as an 
ongoing and dynamic process.  
 
Rejecting the assumptions underpinning neoclassical economic theories – including the 
assumptions of perfect information and rational actors – evolutionary theorists prefer to depict 
“boundedly rational” actors who engage in “satisficing” behaviours (Leiponen and Drejer 2007 
p.1222; Ruttan 1997, p.1522). The attraction of this approach, from the perspective of the current 
study, is that it explicitly assumes (and aims to explain) a degree of variability in the abilities of 
different actors to respond to input changes. This perspective may therefore provide a platform 
from which to interpret structural changes in the dairy sector that appear to arise from (and 
result in) a non-uniform response by farmers to market developments (i.e. in which some 
farmers drop out of the market, while others change their production approaches, while others 
adhere to their established production approaches).  
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From an evolutionary perspective, the relationships between generators and adopters of 
technologies may be significant. Hence, there is a need to identify and characterise the sources 
of technological change (as outlined above, 3.1.1). Although they are often regarded as discrete 
processes, an evolutionary perspective argues that there are interactions between the generation 
and the adoption of technologies. This is typically described as a “coupled” process in which the 
generation of new technologies results from ongoing interactions between “technology-push” 
and “demand-pull” (Dosi 1982). Therefore, within a coupled model, factor input price change 
cannot be the sole determinant of innovative activity. In a coupled view, adoption decisions are 
necessarily constrained by the available range of technologies, which itself is dependent upon 
the extent of current scientific and technical knowledge. At the same time, however, the search 
for new scientific knowledge may be directed to some extent by the demands of the market 
(either real or perceived). The relative power of market participants is therefore a factor that can 
be readily incorporated into an evolutionary perspective, which is once again attractive given 
the aims of this project. 
 
As adopters of technologies, agricultural producers may represent ‘demand-pull’ in this 
context, whilst ‘technology-push’ may be represented by the available range of technologies 
produced by technology suppliers. Further, the influence that producers are able to exert upon 
the generation of technology may depend to some extent upon the relative power of producers 
versus suppliers, and the mix of public sector versus private sector suppliers (Sunding and 
Zilberman 2001). 
3.3.1 Technological Regimes, Paradigms and Trajectories 
One of the most commonly-cited articulations of technological change as a coupled process was 
developed by Giovanni Dosi (von Tunzelmann et al 2008). Dosi’s view of technological change 
was centred on the notions of the “technological paradigm” (a concept similar to Nelson and 
Winter’s “technological regime”11; Nelson and Winter 1982) and the “technological trajectory”.  
 
A technological paradigm, Dosi suggested, is analogous to Kuhn’s conception of a scientific 
paradigm (Dosi 1982), namely, it is “an ‘outlook’, a set of procedures, a definition of the 
‘relevant’ problems and of the specific knowledge related to their solution” (ibid, p.148). 
Moreover, Dosi suggested that “economic and institutional factors” play a role in the “selection 
and establishment” of technological paradigms, which, having been established, develop 
through “the interplay between endogenous economic mechanisms and technological 
innovations” (ibid.).  	
11 NB: This study regards the terms ‘technological paradigm’ and ‘technological regime’ as, essentially, 
interchangeable and will, for the sake of consistency, use the latter (unless directly quoting an source).  
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A technological paradigm therefore serves to define both the ‘relevant’ problems that 
technological progress is aimed at solving (which might be thought of as the ‘goals’ of 
technological progress, see below 3.3.6), and the practical approaches to solving those problems.  
 
It is important to note that, as a coupled model of technological change, this perspective does 
not deny the role of movements in factor input prices. Instead, it holds that such “inducement 
mechanisms … are likely to be fundamental [factors] influencing both the rate and direction of 
technological progress, but within the boundaries defined by the nature of technological 
paradigms” (Dosi 1988, p.226-7).  
 
For Dosi, a technological trajectory is “the direction of advance within a technological paradigm” 
(Dosi 1982, p.148) or “the pattern of ‘normal’ problem solving activity (i.e. of ‘progress’) on the 
ground of a technological paradigm” (ibid. p.152).  
3.3.2 Levels of Analysis 
The Dosian perspective is not without its critics. One objection is that it is unclear whether the 
concept of a technological regime is intended to be applied at the firm-level or sector-level of 
analysis (Teece 2008, p.510).12  
 
This relates in turn to a broader question of whether evolutionary approaches have focused too 
frequently upon the analysis of sector-level trends at the expense of explaining sub-sector-level 
heterogeneity. For example, Leiponen and Drejer suggest that, paradoxically, “in addition to the 
view of firms as boundedly rational local searchers, the evolutionary economic theory of 
industrial dynamics also has generated the notion of technological regimes [paradigms] that are 
assumed to apply at the level of industries” (Leiponen and Drejer 2007, p.1222). 
 
They contrast the approach of evolutionary scholars (what they refer to as the “regime 
literature”) against that of scholars writing within the strategic management tradition, 
suggesting that the former have generally studied innovation behaviours at the level of 
industries, focusing on differences in approaches to and patterns of innovation between 
different sectors of the economy (which “portrays firm behaviour as largely industry specific”, 	
12 For example, Malerba and Orsenigo’s definition of “technological regimes” is strikingly similar to Dosi’s 
“technological paradigms”: “The technological environment defines the nature of the problems that firms 
have to solve in their innovative activities, the incentives and constraints to particular behaviours and the 
basic dynamics [sic] mechanisms of evolution of firms, technologies and industries… the technological 
environment at a given time is … the technological regime” (Malerba and Orsenigo 1993, p.46). However, 
despite this broadly similar definition, their attention appears to centre largely on sectors as the relevant 
unit of analysis. 
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ibid. p.1223). By contrast, the strategic management literature “specifically focuses on the 
differences across firms and their implications for firm performance” (ibid.).  
 
Through an empirical study of Community Innovation Survey (CIS) datasets for Denmark and 
Finland, Leiponen and Drejer found evidence of considerable intra-industry heterogeneity in 
firms’ innovative activities, with “only about half of the observed industries [having] a 
dominant innovation regime13, defined as 50% or more of the firms in an industry being 
affiliated with the same regime” (ibid. p.1224). Their findings suggest that “regimes are not 
industry-level constructs but operate at the level of industry subgroups or even individual 
firms” (ibid. p.1233). 
 
A related criticism levelled against the Dosian approach is that the concept of a ‘trajectory’ (i.e. 
singular) as the direction of advance within a paradigm introduces the potential for a 
deterministic conception of technological progress, which may overlook the range of possible 
approaches towards solving a particular problem from a particular starting point, and the 
contribution of a range of factors towards that diversity of approaches. For example, MacKenzie 
and Wajcman have argued that: 
 
“If we find technologists operating within a paradigm – taking one technical achievement and 
modelling future work on that achievement – it becomes tempting to treat this as somehow self-
explaining and discuss it in terms of mechanical analogies such as following a technical 
‘trajectory’. But to do this would be to miss perhaps the most fundamental point of Kuhn’s 
concept of paradigm: the paradigm is not a rule that can be followed mechanically, but a 
resource to be used. There will always be more than one way of using a resource, of developing 
the paradigm. Indeed groups of technologists in different circumstances often develop the same 
paradigm differently ... much can be hidden by considering the further development of a 
paradigm as simply a ‘technological trajectory’.” (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999, p.14) 
 
 
Again, this objection appears to centre on the level of analysis at which the concepts of ‘regime’ 
and ‘trajectory’ can be (and are in practice) applied.  
 
How damaging are these critiques to the Dosian approach? Do they undermine the value of 
technological regimes and trajectories as analytical tools? 
 
Certainly, although Dosi describes technological trajectories as “the pattern of ‘normal’ problem 
solving activity” (Dosi 1982 p.152, authors italics) or “the direction of advance within a 
technological paradigm” (ibid p.148, authors italics), it is clear that there is rarely a single 	
13 NB: Leiponen and Drejer appear to use the terms “innovation regime” and “technological regime” 
interchangeably, viewing the “regime” as “a useful concept to characterise firms’ industrial operating 
environment” (Leiponen and Drejer 2007, p.1221) 
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solution to any given technological problem, and definitely not one that can be known in 
advance. Indeed, Dosi himself states that the paradigm defines “notional opportunities of future 
technical advance” (Dosi 1997, p.1534, author’s italics), and it seems obvious that he envisaged a 
trajectory not as a single solution but as incorporating a “cluster” of overlapping approaches. 
 
For example, he argued that progress within a paradigm is based on “technological and 
economic trade-offs” specific to the paradigm (Dosi 1982, p.148): 
 
“A technological trajectory … can be represented by the movement of multi-dimensional trade-
offs among the technological variables which the paradigm defines as relevant. Progress can be 
defined as the improvement of these trade-offs. One could thus imagine the trajectory as a 
‘cylinder’14 in the multidimensional space defined by these technological and economic variables. 
(Thus, a technological trajectory is a cluster of possible technological directions whose outer 
boundaries are defined by the nature of the paradigm itself).”  
(Dosi 1982, p.154) 
 
 
It is reasonable to assume that the same set of economic and technological variables may be 
traded-off against each other in numerous possible ways, meaning that the trajectory of 
development may – at a more granular level of analysis – incorporate many possible 
configurations of these trade-offs at the sub-sector level, which would differ according to the 
relative ‘weight’ that firms accord to different economic and technological factors.  
 
If the above criticisms do not undermine the utility of Dosi’s conceptual approach, then they do 
at least highlight that care must be taken when deploying such analytical tools. Indeed, von 
Tunzelmann et al observed that “it might be dangerous to consider technological paradigms as 
prescriptive, as many firms are innovative precisely because they are able to move out of the 
paradigms they are currently in … [which] highlights the complex way in which technological 
	
14 NB: This notion of the trajectory as a ‘cylinder’ itself raises some challenges. The first of these involves 
the difficulty of visualising a “multi-dimensional space”, let alone what a three-dimensional shape (a 
cylinder) would look like within that space. The second (related) question concerns the issues of time and 
dynamics. Presumably the perimeter of the cylinder in cross-section represents the ‘outer boundaries’ of 
the trajectory, which are determined by the paradigm, whereas the height of the cylinder represents the 
dimension of time. In other words, the cylinder is a dynamic representation of a trajectory. Indeed, one 
might further imagine the radius of the cylinder increasing or decreasing over time, due to changes in 
trade-offs between technological and economic variables selected by the paradigm, so that the cylinder 
might appear as a series of ‘funnels’ connected to one another. However, if trajectories are being 
represented dynamically, this raises the question of why the paradigm itself is not also being represented 
dynamically, and along the same timescale, but is instead defined as a (presumably temporally static) 
“multidimensional space”. The notion of a paradigm as a static entity, with the trajectory being the 
dynamic representation or expression of that paradigm seems inconsistent with Dosi’s earlier definition of 
paradigms and trajectories, and indeed the entire philosophical approach underlying evolutionary theory. 
Instead, it seems sensible (and more consistent with Dosi’s own definition of the terms) to modify or 
rework Dosi’s visual description, depicting the paradigm as a cylinder (or, more specifically, a prism) 
within which multiple trajectories operate (as smaller overlapping and interacting prisms).  
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paradigms guide, but do not determine,15 choices” (von Tunzelmann et al 2008, p.480; author’s 
italics). 
 
Moreover, it is suggested that the analyst must take care to be explicit about the analytical 
level(s) at which these tools are being deployed. Smith et al argued that the regime concept can 
– and should – be applied at various levels of analysis (from artefact, to firm, to sector etc), 
provided that the analyst takes care to be explicit and consistent in this application: 
 
“The term ‘regime’ is used as a short-hand for a series of complex, nested real world phenomena 
… Regimes exist across different empirical scales… [for example] At a relatively high level of 
aggregation, the electricity-generating regime is dominated by rules and practices relating to 
centralised, large-scale (usually thermal) power technology and high voltage alternating current 
grid infrastructures … At the lower level of aggregation of individual power technologies, the 
electricity generating regime as a whole spans a variety of nested subordinate regimes, such as 
that based on the coal-fired steam turbine, the nuclear fuel cycle, large-scale hydro-electricity or 
gas-fired combined cycle turbine systems … Clearly, there is a need carefully to distinguish in 
any given context between what constitutes the ‘nested’ and the ‘spanning’ regime, and to be 
precise in the empirical application of the concept.” (Smith et al 2005, p.1493) 
 
 
Indeed, the technological regime is, broadly, the way in which a particular problem (or societal 
function) is defined and the approach taken to its solution. Such problems / functions can be 
general and far-reaching (i.e. cross-sector) – e.g. the disposal of waste or the generation and 
distribution of power – or more specific and localised (e.g. at the individual firm or even the 
user level). 
 
In spite of the potential ambiguities outlined above, the evolutionary perspective – and the 
concepts of regimes and trajectories – may provide a useful theoretical context within which to 
situate this study, because: 
• It avoids the potential oversimplifications associated with linear accounts of change, 
viewing change instead as progress towards goals that are defined (and constantly 
redefined) by the interactions between a range of interrelated factors 
• It understands that future technological change is therefore contingent upon current 
and past changes (and that it may therefore differ from firm-to-firm) 
• It permits the topic to be approached at multiple analytical levels in order to more 
effectively analyse the above. 
 
 
	
15 NB: It is notable that Dosi himself often uses the term “determines” (e.g. Dosi 1982, p.152; Dosi 1997 
p.1534: “(each ‘paradigm’) determines the notional opportunities of future technical advance”) 
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Compared with neoclassical perspectives, such as induced innovation theory, evolutionary 
perspectives may therefore provide a more useful theoretical outlook from which to approach 
the analysis of patterns of technological change within the UK dairy sector. 
 
However, although evolutionary theory encourages us to view technological development not 
as the product of either ‘science-push’ or ‘market-pull’, but rather as the product of both these 
and other (e.g. social, economic, technological or structural) factors, there remains a need to 
determine the respective relative contributions made by these various factors towards 
technological change, in order to enrich the analytical potential of the theory itself, as well as 
the quality and value of policy advice derived from its application. As a ‘circular’ model of 
technological change, an evolutionary perspective may present the analyst with the dilemma of 
(a) identifying a ‘starting point’ for the analysis, and (b) determining the respective relative 
contributions towards technological change made by the various interacting components of the 
model. In other words, the application of an evolutionary model to real world problems may be 
limited by the extent to which it is able “to differentiate more from less important links and 
interdependencies” (Millstone 2010, p.294).   
3.3.3 Technological Change: Continuity and Discontinuity 
There are at least two related and recurring themes that intersect the evolutionary perspectives 
outlined above, which may be of particular relevance to the interests of the present study.  
 
The first is that “history matters” (Freeman and Soete 1997, p.240). Where firms (or farms) can 
go may be conditioned to some extent by where they have already been: “what a firm can do 
depends heavily on its past history of development of competences and on how they are 
organised” (Malerba and Orsenigo 1993, p.46), and technological learning in firms is cumulative 
in nature (Bell and Pavitt 1993, p.168), meaning that “technological search and choice in firms 
are therefore constrained by what they… have already learned, and their technological activities 
tend to follow a ‘trajectory’” (Pavitt 1987, p.186). 
 
Technological change is therefore not a straightforward, frictionless response to a single 
external stimulus (such as a change in market prices or an advance in scientific knowledge). 
Instead it may be limited, shaped or guided by prevailing bodies of knowledge and accepted 
modes of problem-solving. Such bodies of knowledge may themselves be embedded within 
technological artefacts currently in use, as well as in the individuals and firms that use and 
develop those artefacts. Put differently, bodies of knowledge that inform technological search 
and selection may be either “codified” or “tacit” (Polanyi 1967; Cowan et al 2000). This in turn 
		
25	
implies that it may be useful to adopt an analytic approach that can operate at different levels of 
aggregation, from the level of artefacts, to groups of individuals, to firms, sectors and so forth. 
 
Having said that, the second theme is that the bodies of knowledge – both tacit and codified – 
and modes of thinking that serve to highlight relevant societal problems (as well as approaches 
to their solution) are dynamic and evolving and, crucially, are open to influence by technological 
and economic factors (Dosi 1982). In other words (and of particular relevance to the interests of 
this study) buyers – and especially powerful buyers – may have some ‘say’ in how 
technological regimes are established and how they subsequently evolve. 
 
Although at first glance the above statements may appear potentially contradictory they can be 
thought of as parallel strands of work, which view technological change as being characterised 
by periods of continuous (i.e. incremental) change, punctuated by periods of discontinuous (i.e. 
radical) change (Dosi 1982, p.147); albeit these perspectives may differ in the extent to which 
they emphasise the role of human agency within that process (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999; 
see further below). The value of these different perspectives, for the purposes of this study, is 
that they may offer a theoretical basis for identifying different degrees of change (e.g. 
incremental or radical), and for considering the contribution of selected factors towards these 
(thereby providing a means of engaging with and critically examining the question of whether 
structural changes in dairy farming are the result of  long run technological advances or 
whether they are directed by human agents, such as powerful buyers (see above, Chapter 1).  
 
The following sections explore how these related streams of thought have been developed by 
individuals working within the evolutionary tradition. This involves a consideration of the 
mechanisms through which development is stabilised and destabilised and begins with a 
discussion of the concept of ‘path dependence’ as a feature of ‘technological’ or ‘socio-technical 
systems’ (Sections 3.3.4 to 3.3.8), before moving on to discuss agency and social factors (Section 
3.4).  
3.3.4 Path Dependence 
“History matters” in the sense that all development is “past dependent” (Araujo and Harrison 
2000, p.3). Path dependence, however, implies something more than this, and “if ‘history 
matters’, both actors and analysts have to be clear in how it matters and through what 
mechanisms history is being carried forward” (ibid. p.12). 
 
The notion of path dependence has received considerable attention from scholars working 
within a broad range of disciplines (Dobusch and Schußler 2012). For those interested in the 
		
26	
history of technology, however, the works of Brian Arthur and Paul David provide a reference 
point.  
 
In his classic paper, “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY” (David 1985), David asserted that “… a 
path-dependent sequence of economic changes is one of [sic] which important influences upon 
the eventual outcome can be exerted by temporally remote events, including happenings 
dominated by chance elements rather than systematic forces” (David 1985, p.332). Historical 
events or accidents may therefore have a critical impact on the development or adoption of 
technologies. 
 
The paper examined the emergence and prevalence of the standard ‘QWERTY’ keyboard layout 
in spite of the presence of apparently superior alternatives. David described the typewriter as 
one component of a larger, “technically interrelated” system of production (ibid. p.334). This 
led him to identify the interaction between the components of this system – notably “hardware” 
(i.e. typewriter) and “software” (i.e. human operator) – as a source of path dependence. In 
particular, he highlighted three features that contributed towards the lock-in to QWERTY as an 
industry standard, which stem from the fact that ‘touch’ typing was “from its inception adapted 
to the … QWERTY keyboard” (ibid). These features are: 
• Technical interrelatedness – i.e. “the need for system compatibility between keyboard 
‘hardware’ and the ‘software’ represented by the touch typist's memory of a particular 
arrangement of keys” (David 1985, p.334); reminiscent of the concept of ‘compatibility’ 
developed by diffusion scholars (3.2) 
 
• Economies of scale – i.e. the process by which “the overall user costs of a typewriting 
system based upon QWERTY (or any specific keyboard) … tend to decrease as it gained 
in acceptance relative to other systems.” (ibid., p.335) 
 
• Quasi-irreversibility of investment – i.e. there are “high costs of software 
‘conversion’” (ibid., p.336), meaning that, once typists are familiar with the QWERTY 
layout, the expense associated with retraining them hinders potential moves to 
alternative keyboard layouts. 
 
 
Although David was studying a sector-level phenomenon, such processes may operate equally 
at the firm (or ‘local’) level (Dobusch and Schußler 2012). 
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3.3.5 Positive Feedbacks 
Other scholars have identified similar features of path dependent processes. Although the 
terminology used within the literature varies, there is often a clear congruence or overlap 
between the processes under discussion. For example, Arthur describes path dependence as a 
stochastic process, occurring under conditions of increasing returns to adoption (Arthur, 1989, 
p.116), conditions corresponding closely to David’s ‘economies of scale’.  
 
Arthur observed that where two or more technologies are in competition within a marketplace, 
and where increasing returns result from the adoption of those technologies (i.e. “the more they 
are adopted, the more experience is gained with them, and the more they are improved” and 
therefore adopted, ibid.), there will be multiple possible outcomes with regard to which 
technology ‘wins’. Although the range of outcomes (i.e. paths) can be identified, it is not 
possible to predict which one will transpire in practice because chance events (rather than 
technical superiority) may give one or other technology an early ‘lead’, with the increasing 
returns to adoption providing the momentum for that technology to “corner the market” 
thereafter (ibid.). This characteristic is known as “non-ergodicity”: “historical 'small events' are 
not averaged away and ‘forgotten’ by the dynamics – they may decide the outcome” (ibid. 
p.117) 
 
Increasing returns is an example of a positive feedback or self-reinforcing mechanism (the two terms 
are often treated as interchangeable, and this study will use the former). Arthur proposes four 
sources of such mechanisms (Arthur 1994 p.112):  
• Large set-up or fixed costs “which give the advantage of falling unit costs to increased 
output”;  
• Learning effects “which act to improve products or lower their costs as their 
prevalence increases” 
• Co-ordination effects “which confer advantages to ‘going along’ with other economic 
agents taking similar action”; and  
• Adaptive expectations “where increased prevalence enhances beliefs of further 
prevalence.” 
 
 
Building on the work of Arthur, some scholars have stressed the importance of distinguishing 
increasing returns as a specific subset of a broader set of positive feedbacks, rather than a strict 
prerequisite for path dependence, noting that increasing returns may only be “a temporary 
phenomenon resulting from positive feedback” (Dobusch and Schußler 2012, p.638) or a 
“phase” within path dependent processes (ibid. p.636). Indeed, “self-reinforcing mechanisms 
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may be accompanied by increasing returns, but also with constant or even decreasing returns – 
although this latter should not be confused with negative feedback” (ibid. p.637). 
 
Dobusch and Schußler define path dependence as “a process triggered by contingent events, 
then moved along through positive feedback mechanisms until it results in rigidity or lock-in”. 
Therefore, they regard positive feedback as a “necessary condition” for path dependence (ibid. 
p.618). Following a wide-ranging review of the literature on path dependence, they identified a 
long list of what they describe as “‘typical’ positive feedback mechanisms”, which they 
summarised into the following categories (ibid. p.623):  
• Complementarity effects, which they define somewhat broadly as “stemming from 
two or more otherwise independent social processes” (see further, below, 3.3.8 for a 
more in depth examination of complementarity effects); 
• Investment and learning effects, “because of the accumulation of specialised, but non-
transferable stocks of investment or knowledge”; 
• Co-ordination effects, which captures “utility resulting from others following the same 
path”; 
• Expectation effects, “similar to self-fulfilling prophecies”. 
 
 
For the purposes of this study, identifying and analysing the sources and effects (or absence) of 
such mechanisms at farm level may highlight and illuminate instances of continuity and 
discontinuity in farms’ development. Note that complementarity effects and investment and 
learning effects correspond broadly to the notions of ‘compatibility’, ‘trialability’ and 
‘complexity’ drawn from diffusion studies (see above 3.2), while co-ordination effects and 
expectation effects may correspond loosely to the notion of ‘bandwagon effects’ (ibid., p.625). 
3.3.6 A Systems Perspective 
Many of the positive feedbacks outlined above result from interactions between components 
operating within a system. The literature on “large technical systems” provides some interesting 
parallels to the path dependence literature discussed above, as well as some additional 
analytical tools.  
 
A systems perspective may offer a useful conceptual basis from which to approach to the 
debate surrounding technological change in dairy farming, given that dairy farms may be 
readily understood as systems of interacting components (including livestock, feed, housing, 
breeding, healthcare, waste management technologies and more; see further Chapter 5), nested 
within a broader sector-level system (the value chain for liquid milk) and its associated socio-
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technical regime. This perspective would suggest that a farmer’s decision to adopt new 
technologies may be based upon how compatible those technologies are with the farm’s current 
system of production – including the farmer’s current body of knowledge, or capabilities – 
meaning that existing models of production may effectively serve to constrain future patterns of 
technology adoption, and that different farms may react differently to the same (or similar) 
stimuli. Notably, diffusion studies that have sought to model farmer decision-making with 
regard to technology adoption have identified the “current technology in use” as a key variable 
affecting farmers’ adoption decisions (e.g. Diederen et al 2003, p.332), suggesting that 
“experience with innovations of similar types will most likely influence adoption in a positive 
sense” (Abadi Ghadim and Pannell 1999, p.152). 
 
Moreover, from the point of view of understanding the effects of buyer power upon farms, it 
may be instructive to view farms as ‘open’ rather than ‘closed’ systems, meaning that they do 
not operate independently of their surrounding physical, economic and institutional 
environment (Hughes 1983, p.5): although many components are controlled by the farmer, 
others (e.g. geography and climate, or markets and regulations) may be either partially within – 
or completely outside of – the farmer’s control. Farms’ development may therefore be 
contingent upon their particular context. 
 
Within the large technical systems tradition, Hughes’ work on the electric power system 
provides an important benchmark.16 Hughes defines a system as being “constituted of related 
parts or components … connected by a network or structure… [and] often centrally controlled”. 
He adds that, “because the components are related by the network of interconnections the state, 
or activity, of one component influences the state, or activity, of other components in the 
system” (Hughes 1983, p.5). The interconnected nature of system components gives rise to what 
Hughes terms “reverse salients”. A reverse salient “is an area where the growth of technology is 
seen as lagging ... Technologists focus inventive effort, like generals focus their forces, on the 
elimination of such reverse salients” (MacKenzie and Wajcmann 1999, p.16). Put differently:  
 
“A reverse salient appears in an expanding system when a component of the system does not 
march along harmoniously with other components. As the system evolves toward a goal, some 
components fall behind or out of line. As a result of the reverse salient, growth of the entire 
enterprise is hampered.” (Hughes 1983, p.79) 
 
 
	
16 Notably, a large technical systems perspective has been used to examine the effects of market 
liberalisation upon the electricity system (Markhard and Truffer 2006). This may be of relevance to the 
current study, given that it is focused on understanding patterns of technological development following 
the abolition of the Milk Marketing Board (MMB); see Chapter 2. 
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In a clear analogue to the concept of path dependence, Hughes cites “momentum” as a 
persistent feature of systems, which consists of “mass, velocity and direction” (ibid. p.15): 
• Mass corresponds closely to the investment and learning effects identified by path 
dependence theorists and includes “machines, devices, structures and other physical 
artefacts in which considerable capital has been invested”, as well as “the involvement 
of persons whose professional skills are particularly applicable to the system” (Hughes 
1983 p.15; i.e. David’s “hardware” and “software”). Although path dependence 
scholars also describe the interaction between technological and human components 
(with David, for example, regarding it as a source of technical interrelatedness), a 
systems perspective is arguably more explicit about the pervasive quality of such 
interactions. Indeed, Hughes views the electrical system as a “socio-technical system” 
(Hughes 1983 p.140, p.465, author’s italics, see 3.3.7).   
 
• Velocity is the rate at which the system grows (i.e. how rapidly its mass increases; 
Hughes 1983). Relating this once again to the path dependence literature, it can be seen 
that positive feedbacks will increase system velocity and, in turn, momentum. Such 
positive feedbacks may result from the “complementary interaction of system 
components, [which] generates ‘positive externalities’, strong growth and systems 
acquiring momentum” (Markhard and Hoffman 2016, p.64). 
 
• Hughes associates direction with the “goals”17 of a system and suggests that, in more 
established systems, the determination of goals becomes less important as “momentum 
provides an inertia of directed motion” (Hughes 1983 p.15). There is a clear congruence 
between Hughes’ systems approach and the Dosian approach outlined above: the 
solution of “‘relevant’ problems” (Dosi 1982, p.148) outlined by a technological 
paradigm /regime can be thought of as being equivalent to the goals towards which 
technological change is directed and towards which it progresses. Changes to goals 
would therefore be associated with changes in technological regimes and trajectories. 
Moreover, for Hughes, reverse salients serve to highlight ‘critical problems’, and 
engineers and inventors seek to “maintain … momentum by solving the critical 
problems that frustrated growth of the system” (Hughes 1983, p.79). 
 
The issue of direction provides a potentially significant distinction between a socio-
technical systems perspective and the path dependence perspectives described already. 
Although Arthur defines technology in broad terms as “[methods] to carry through any 
given economic purpose” (Arthur 1994, p.15), the question of how, when and by whom 	
17 Indeed, as MacKenzie and Wajcmann point out “The very concept of ‘reverse salient’ makes sense only 
if a technological system is seen as oriented to a goal.” (MacKenzie and Wajcmann 1999, p.18). 
		
31	
such purpose is determined is not a central concern to him. By extension, the path 
dependence literature is not particularly focused on the question of why a particular 
path is selected (e.g. who chooses it and for what reason). Instead, the main emphasis is 
on understanding the processes by which a path, having been established, is stabilised 
over time. Indeed, the path dependence literature has been criticised by some for being 
deterministic and for sidelining the role that human agents may play in determining 
the direction of technological development (Garud et al 2010; Sutherland et al 2012). 
 
However, by specifying direction as a key element of technological momentum, and by 
viewing direction as being related to system goals, Hughes presents a conceptual 
outlook that is concerned with understanding, describing and accounting for the 
persistence of technological trajectories, as well as their genesis and their potential for 
change under the action of agency. This is useful given that the current study is 
interested in how trajectories are established, maintained and changed, and in the 
contribution of both human and technological components towards this. 
3.3.7 Socio-technical Systems and Regimes 
While there is broad agreement that socio-technical systems such as those described by Hughes 
are composed of a multitude of interacting human, technological and other components, there 
is an array of different potential definitions of their scope, form and content, and diverse 
approaches to their analysis.  
 
Notably, transitions theorists – such as Frank Geels – have made extensive use of the concept of 
socio-technical systems. Geels’ definition of socio-technical systems begins at the broad, abstract 
level as “the linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004a, 
p.900). His exposition of these “necessary elements” is detailed and wide-ranging. First, he 
distinguishes the production, diffusion and use of technology as separate “sub-functions” of 
socio-technical systems, which are fulfilled using various “resources”. He suggests that the 
basic elements and resources of a socio-technical system include (ibid.): 
• The transfer of knowledge (education) 
• Scientific knowledge 
• Labour / human resources 
• Technological design / knowledge 
• Capital (money) 
• Tools / machines 
• Natural resources / parts 
• Regulation which produces “trust” (quality, norms, property rights, laws) 
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• Facilities for repair / maintenance 
• Cultural meaning 
• Complementary artefacts (possibly linked into a technical system). 
 
 
Drawing upon (and expanding) the notion of technological regimes, Geels uses the concept of 
the “socio-technical regime” to encapsulate the various institutions, rules and norms according 
to which socio-technical systems function and are governed, which contribute to the stability of 
systems (Geels and Kemp 2007, p.443). These regimes “sustain existing trajectories of 
development” (Smith 2007, p.428). Geels suggests that the elements and linkages that comprise 
socio-technical systems are “the result of activities of social groups which (re)produce them” 
(Geels 2004b, p.33), which may include producers of technology, users, policymakers and so 
forth. Socio-technical regimes represent the different regulative, normative and cognitive rule-
sets that co-ordinate these activities (Geels 2004b, p.33; Genus and Coles 2008 p.1438); or the 
“deep structure” underpinning a socio-technical system (Genus and Coles 2008, p.1438).  
 
In this view, systems and regimes “co-structure each other” (Geels and Kemp 2007, p.442) and 
rules (such as norms, rights and laws) are not only a component of a socio-technical system, but 
also provide a medium through which all system components (including the rules themselves) 
interact. Taking a fish tank as an example of a system, ‘rules’ might therefore be thought of as 
the water inside the tank. 
 
For Geels, socio-technical systems and regimes serve as different “analytic dimensions” (Geels 
and Kemp 2007, p.442). The regime concept addresses the question of how systems change, as 
opposed to how systems function (which, Geels suggests, has been the main focus of  “the 
systems of innovation approach”; Geels 2004a, p.899). “Institutions should not just be used to 
explain inertia and stability,” he writes. “They can also be used to conceptualise the dynamic 
interplay between actors and structures”(Geels 2004a, p.897). It is worth questioning whether 
this distinction between system functioning and system change is useful for the purposes of this 
study.18 It is suggested that any analysis that takes account of the mechanisms of path 
dependence outlined already cannot be a purely static representation, but will regard some 
degree of change and variability as an intrinsic part of system functioning. Hughes’ definition 
of momentum involved direction towards system goals and was therefore an inherently 
dynamic concept. 
 	
18 Geels was focused on system change over a much longer timescale than that used in this study, which 
may account for the sharper distinction he draws between short-term variability and longer-term 
(discontinuous) change.  
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The socio-technical transitions literature defines three main types of system-level change: 
reproduction, transformation and transition. Continuous change at the level of socio-technical 
regimes is described as a process of “reproduction”, with regimes being in a state of “dynamic 
stability” (i.e. developing incrementally and cumulatively over time along existing trajectories 
towards broadly consistent goals defined [and constantly redefined] by the regime; Geels 2004a, 
Geels and Kemp 2007, p.445). The current study is interested in understanding such processes 
and the concept of ‘dynamic stability’ usefully encapsulates the notion that, although the goals 
towards which a system is moving may remain broadly consistent, the system itself will exhibit 
a degree of change as it progresses towards those goals (even as the goals themselves may be 
gradually refined).   
 
Meanwhile, change of a more radical nature – discontinuous change – takes the form of either 
transition (which typically results from developments outside of the regime, i.e. from “niches”) 
or transformation (which typically originates from within the regime itself) from one socio-
technical regime to another involving a “change in the regime rules that coordinate actions of 
regime actors, e.g. changes in technical problem agendas, visions, goals and guiding principles, 
relative costs and incentive structures, regulations and perceptions of opportunities” (Geels and 
Kemp 2007, p.445). These discontinuous forms of change are more closely associated with 
changes in system goals, negotiated at the regime level. 
 
Given the huge variety of interacting components that constitute socio-technical systems, some 
means of categorising these is necessary, for the purposes of analysing processes of system 
continuity and discontinuity. Markhard and Hoffman, for example, propose a straightforward 
division of socio-technical systems into a small number of categories of components (Markhard 
and Hoffman 2016, p.64), namely: 
• Actors, which includes “individuals, firms and other organisations”  
• Institutional structures, including “societal norms, technology standards, regulations, 
user practices, culture, collective expectations etc.”  
• Technologies and;  
• Resources, such as “knowledge, human and financial capital, natural resources”.  
 
 
Although these categories may overlap19 they may nevertheless provide a simple means of 
grouping components in order to analyse their interactions. Moreover, where such interactions 	
19 e.g. knowledge and human capital will be embedded in human actors; technologies will embody as well 
as influence technology standards; institutions will be developed by the interaction of actors, technologies, 
resources, and the institutions themselves, as well as through their own reproduction. 
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influence the goals and therefore the trajectory taken by a socio-technical system, these 
categories may provide a means of identifying and characterising the sources of such influence.  
3.3.8 Socio-technical Systems and Complementarity Effects  
The positive feedback mechanisms associated with path dependence can be incorporated into a 
socio-technical transitions perspective. 
 
Markhard and Hoffmann developed “a framework to systematically identify different kinds of 
complementary relationships with a focus on technologies”, defining ‘complementarity’ as 
occurring, loosely, when the combined value of two or more components is greater than the 
sum of their values taken individually (Markard and Hoffmann 2016, p.64-65). With an interest 
in transitions from one socio-technical system to another, Markard and Hoffmann aimed to 
understand the dynamics of complementarities between system components, which may: 
• Change within transitions from one socio-technical system to another  
• Serve as a source of stability inhibiting transitions from one system to another  
• Act as bottlenecks delaying or preventing the emergence of new socio-technical 
systems, for example where “essential complementary components may be missing” 
(ibid. p.64, i.e. potentially giving rise to reverse salients, see 3.3.6).  
 
 
Their framework is underpinned by the concept of the “focal element” (which can be “a firm, a 
novel product” or a technology, ibid. p.65). Complementary components are viewed as “’what 
else is needed for the focal entity [element] to succeed’. In other words, there is a specific 
purpose underlying the identification of complementarities” (ibid. p.65). Furthermore, 
Markhard and Hoffman suggest that: “to identify complementarities we first have to specify 
what the complementary element is supposed to strengthen” (ibid. p.66). Put differently, their 
framework identifies complementarities where a component supports the performance of a 
focal element towards the achievement of system goals and, moreover, there may be a degree of 
intention20 behind such support.  
 
The framework may be useful for the purposes of the current study (see further 4.2.1), which is 
interested in understanding the mechanisms by which a system is stabilised (or not). An ability 
to identify and assess the sources of stability (or the lack thereof) may therefore be useful. Their 
framework is outlined, critiqued and adapted to the purposes of this study in Chapter 4. 
	
20 Markhard and Hoffman’s requirement for “intentionality” is problematic, given that a key characteristic 
of path dependent processes is that they can take place “behind the backs” of actors (i.e. without intention; 
Sydow et al 2012, p.155). 
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3.3.9 Path Creation and Path Constitution 
As outlined earlier (section 3.3.3) evolutionary theory encompasses a broad range of 
approaches, united in their conception of technological change as a non-linear process, but 
distinct in their views regarding the respective roles of economic, technological and social 
factors within the process of technological change. 
 
For example, critics of the path dependence literature (3.3.4) have suggested that it marginalises 
the role of human agency, arguing instead that the development of paths is better explained as 
a process of “path creation” (Garud et al 2010). In this view, deliberate or “mindful” actions of 
agents – as opposed to automatic or  “emergent” processes – are regarded as the principal factor 
determining how paths develop (Garud and Karnøe 2001). Those writing from a path creation 
perspective often cite the example of the manufacturer 3M’s discovery of a “glue that does not 
glue”, which led to the development of the ‘Post-it’ note. In this case, they suggest, actors 
“mindfully deviated from 3M's routines of developing stronger kinds of glue” (Meyer and 
Schubert 2007, p.27). 
 
From a path creation perspective, actors’ intentions are therefore a fundamental consideration. 
Actors often have clear objectives (i.e. which may be thought of as the ‘goals’ that Hughes 
describes), which they may seek to direct the system towards, as distinct from the system being 
directed purely through emergent processes towards some arbitrary or unintended outcome. 
 
However, just as path dependence is open to the criticism of overstating the role of emergent 
processes, so path creation may be criticised for placing too much emphasis on the role of 
agency. For example, path creation scholars assert that “initial conditions are not given, but 
rather constructed by actors” (Garud et al 2010, p.769), a view that seems untenable when one 
considers a dairy farmer, for example, who is unable to influence either the local geography or 
climatic conditions that he/she must operate within. Actors may envisage goals for themselves 
or the system, but may not have the power to realise these goals (or may be thwarted by other, 
more powerful, actors). 
 
A “path constitution” perspective aims to unify these competing path dependence and path 
creation perspectives, and regards the development of paths as a combination of both emergent 
and deliberate processes. In developing the concept of path constitution, Meyer and Schubert 
(2007) draw on Giddens’ concept of “structuration”. Giddens’ approach to understanding the 
creation and reproduction of social systems combines elements of objectivist perspectives 
(which position ‘structures’ as the main determinant of social systems) and subjectivist 
perspectives (which position ‘agency’ as the main determinant of social systems) and he 
therefore views structure as “both medium and outcome of reproduction of practices” (Giddens 
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1979, p.5). Therefore, just as structures define the space in which agents can act, so agency 
constantly redefines and reshapes that space.  
3.4 Sociological Perspectives on Technological Change 
Given that this study is interested in whether (and how) power contributes towards 
technological continuity and discontinuity, it may be useful to draw upon social constructivist 
perspectives on technological change, which have influenced both the socio-technical systems 
perspectives and path creation perspectives discussed already (Geels 2004b; Garud and Karnøe 
2001, p.3). 
 
Leading scholars in the field of the sociology of technology have been either critical of the 
Dosian perspective as being deterministic (Pinch and Bijker 1987) or accepting of it as being 
essentially compatible with their own views of technology as a “socially constructed” 
phenomenon (van den Belt and Rip 1987, p.129). Indeed, van den Belt and Rip were readily able 
to develop a “sociological extension of the Nelson-Winter-Dosi model” (van den Belt and Rip 
1987, p.130), in which they suggest that: 
 
“The occurrence of a technological paradigm can be characterised by the clustering of successful 
heuristics around an exemplary achievement… the combination of exemplar and cultural matrix 
forms a technological paradigm, and the further articulation of such a paradigm, partly 
influenced by the selection environment, leads to a technological trajectory” (ibid. p.134).  
 
 
MacKenzie and Wajcman suggested that, because paradigms are “exemplars”, one should 
understand trajectories as being “conditioned by social factors inside and outside the firm” 
(MacKenzie and Wajcman 1999, p.15). Whereas Dosi ascribes the variety of directions taken 
within a trajectory to differences in economic and technological trade-offs, MacKenzie and 
Wajcman ascribe such variety to differences in “social factors”. The two perspectives are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. 
 
This section will not focus upon sociological critiques of the Dosian perspective21 but upon 
those elements of social constructivism that can be usefully incorporated into a Dosian 
perspective in order to locate and account for the action and effect of power within processes of 
technological change. 
 
	
21 Such critiques appear to centre upon the extent to which the analogy between technological 
development and evolutionary biology is tenable, or on the “deterministic overtones” that some authors 
detect within the Dosian approach; see above, 3.3.2 	
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3.4.1 Social Groups, Power and Conflict 
Pinch and Bijker’s approach to understanding the development of technological artefacts begins 
with the identification of “relevant social group[s]” (Pinch and Bijker 1987, p.23), members of 
which “share the same set of meanings, attached to a specific artefact”. Because the same 
artefact may have different meanings for different groups (as the result of “interpretive 
flexibility”; Meyer and Schulz-Schaeffer 2006), technology – they argue – can be regarded as 
being “socially constructed” (Pinch and Bijker 1987), through a process of “stabilisation and 
closure” of “technological frames” (Meyer and Schubert 2007 pp.34-35). Put differently, the 
various meanings or frames developed by different social groups are in competition with one 
another, the outcome of such competition depending in part upon the power of those social 
groups. 
 
This notion of conflicting and contested “meanings” bears much in common with a “pathways 
approach” towards understanding the governance of complex systems, which suggests that 
“different actors … produce particular narratives which frame systems and their dynamics in 
different ways, promote particular goals and values, and justify particular pathways” (Leach et 
al 2010a, p.369). 
 
Although they are critical of the Dosian view, Pinch and Bijker’s approach is also in some ways 
reminiscent of Dosi’s, suggesting that technological change begins with the definition of a 
“relevant” problem: 
 
“In deciding which problems are relevant, the social groups concerned with the artefact and the 
meanings that those groups give to the artefact play a crucial role: A problem is defined as such 
only when there is a social group for which it constitutes a ‘problem’.” (Pinch and Bijker 1987 
p.22-23) 
 
 
From this starting point, the analysis of processes of technological change involves first 
identifying all relevant social groups, and then describing these groups “in order to define 
better the function of the artefact with respect to each group” and “the problems each group has 
with respect to that artefact” (ibid. p.28), namely, the ways in which the group ‘frames’ the 
technological problem and solution. Relevant characteristics for describing social groups 
include “power or economic strength” (ibid.). By placing social groups at the centre of the 
analysis, and considering their power (economic or otherwise), the issue of conflict comes to the 
fore as different groups may develop conflicting meanings for technological artefacts, based 
around the different functions that those artefacts perform for them.22 Further, groups may 
	
22 Dosi might describe this in terms of “different relevant variables”(Dosi 1982, p.148). 
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have conflicting future requirements of those artefacts, and may therefore prioritise different 
technical problems and solutions as a result (ibid.).  
 
This approach is both compatible with – and provides a possible extension to – the socio-
technical systems perspective already described. It is compatible in the sense that ‘social 
groups’ provides a clear counterpart to the category of ‘actors’, and that technological change 
involves the establishment of ‘goals’. It offers an extension insofar as it regards the 
determination of ‘relevant’ problems as an inherently contested process. The notion of ‘conflict’ – 
or of competition between alternative views of ‘progress’ (which, indeed, might be thought of 
as the opposite of ‘complementarity’; Markhard and Hoffman 2016, p.64) – introduces an 
element of normativity to the analysis of processes of both continuous and discontinuous 
change. 
 
In this view, technological change is not simply the result of firms executing various 
technological and economic trade-offs in order to conform with system goals. Regimes are not 
merely the “constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a 
given community” (MacKenzie and Wajcmann 1999, p.13). Instead, the trade-offs executed by 
firms (and the ‘relevant variables’ and goals themselves) may be related to the contested nature 
of technological problems (and solutions) at the actor-level (i.e. different actors may have 
conflicting definitions of problems and solutions, and therefore trade-offs may result not only 
from the constraints presented by current configurations of technologies, actors, resources and 
institutions but, further, from constraints presented by the meanings or frames developed by 
groups of actors, which are based in turn upon actors’ knowledge of and experience with the 
use of technological artefacts, and the beliefs they derive from such knowledge and experience).  
 
Therefore, when considering complementarity effects, for example, it may be expedient to 
incorporate an account of actors’ beliefs (which may be regarded, within socio-technical 
systems, as “cognitive rules”, a subcategory of institutions; Geels 2004a, p.904-5; see Table 3a), 
as well as the extent to which such beliefs “promote particular goals and values” (Leach et al 
2010a, p.369); i.e. the extent to which they support “normative rules” (see Table 3a). The issue 
of power therefore becomes a key element of such an analytical approach, because the beliefs of 
the most powerful actors seem likely to exert the greatest influence upon how problems are 
both defined and solved.  
 
Moreover, this perspective does not confine conflict to transition or transformation contexts. 
While socio-technical transitions perspectives regard socio-technical regimes as consisting of the 
institutions, rules and norms that govern socio-technical systems, and view socio-technical 
systems as “the result of activities of social groups which (re)produce them” (Geels 2004b, p.33), 
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the notion of reproduction as an inherently contested process (or of conflict between social groups at 
the regime level) is not always at the forefront. Instead, the literature has tended to focus more 
heavily on contestation within transitions contexts (where the locus of conflict is typically at the 
intersection of niches and regimes). However, the foregoing implies that reproduction may be 
viewed as a process of ongoing negotiation between various social groups of differing powers, 
which develops towards stabilisation and closure around “technological frames” (Meyer and 
Schubert 2007 pp.34-35). 
 
 
Table 3a: Varying Emphasis: Three Kinds of Rules/Institutions  
 
 Regulative 
 
Normative 
 
Cognitive 
 
Examples 
 
Formal rules, laws, 
sanctions, incentive 
structures, reward and 
cost structures, 
governance systems, 
power systems, 
protocols, standards, 
procedures 
 
Values, norms, role 
expectations, authority 
systems, duty, codes of 
conduct 
 
Priorities, problem 
agendas, beliefs, bodies 
of knowledge 
(paradigms), models of 
reality, categories, 
classifications, 
jargon/language, search 
heuristics 
 
Basis of 
compliance  
 
Expedience 
 
Social obligation 
 
Taken for granted 
 
Mechanisms Coercive (force, 
punishments) 
 
Normative pressure 
(social sanctions such as 
‘shaming’) 
 
Mimetic, learning, 
imitation 
 
Logic 
 
Instrumentality (creating 
stability, ‘rules of the 
game’) 
 
Appropriateness, 
becoming part of the 
group (‘how we do 
things’) 
 
Orthodoxy (shared ideas, 
concepts) 
 
Basis of 
legitimacy 
 
Legally sanctioned 
 
Morally governed 
 
Culturally supported, 
conceptually correct 
 	
Source: Geels 2004a, p.905, citing Scott 1995, pp.35, 52 	
 
Finally, this conception builds upon the notion that a farm’s ‘history’ (as a socio-technical 
system) influences its future development, incorporating the possibility that this history may be 
influenced by (and in turn may influence, or provide a justification for) a farmer’s beliefs about 
the ‘right way’ to farm, both in the past, present and future. Social constructivist and pathways 
perspectives may therefore provide a useful complement or extension to a socio-technical 
systems perspective. 
3.5 Further Approaches to Understanding Power 
This section examines the notion of power in further detail, with a view to informing a 
conceptual approach towards the identification and characterisation of the power of various 
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relevant actors, as well as the ways in which such power is exercised and its effect upon 
technological change. This will serve to develop an understanding of whether (and how) buyers 
are able to influence patterns of technological change exhibited by farms (which will be 
incorporated into the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 4).  
 
A comprehensive review of the literature on theoretical approaches to understanding power is 
beyond the scope of this section. Instead, it takes as its starting point conceptions of power that 
have influenced thinkers in the fields of evolutionary and social constructivist perspectives on 
technological change, discussed already. Notably, the socio-technical systems and transitions 
literatures have been influenced in their understanding of power by the work of Michel 
Foucault, with some transition theorists’ conceptions of power drawing upon Foucault’s “view 
of power as a structure through which agents must act” (Smith et al 2005, p.1504; Geels and 
Schot 2007; Geels 2010; Elzen et al 2011; Tyfield 2014). This informs their suggestion that 
“incumbent regimes constitute one aspect of this kind of power” (Smith et al 2005, p.1504).  
 
Within socio-technical systems, ‘institutions’ (or ‘rules’) may be viewed as a significant 
component of such ‘structures’ of power, and one that merits closer attention. Indeed, if dairy 
farms as socio-technical systems are viewed as being ‘nested’ (Smith et al 2005) within a broader 
socio-technical system and its underlying regime – namely, the value chain for milk – then 
understanding the operation of power, as it relates to the functioning of these socio-technical 
systems, must necessarily involve an examination of mechanisms for the governance of this broader 
value chain (i.e. some consideration of both the rules by which the value chain is governed and 
the extent of actors’ involvement in the development and enforcement of those rules).  
 
With this in mind, a consideration of the different categories of rulesets (regulative, cognitive 
and normative) introduced above (Table 3a), within which power may be embodied or 
expressed, provides a useful basis upon which to ground the theoretical perspective on power 
to be applied within this study.   
 
As outlined above (3.4.1), a social constructivist perspective encourages the analyst to regard 
the reproduction of socio-technical systems as being an inherently dynamic and contested 
process and, moreover, to take into consideration the contrasting approaches of different actor 
groups towards the ‘framing’ of technological problems and solutions. By reference to the 
different categories of rules defined in Table 3a, it can be seen that such perspectives are 
therefore focused upon cognitive rulesets (i.e. how actors think about technological problems), 
albeit these may be underpinned by, or indeed may inform, normative rulesets (loosely how 
actors feel about the world).  
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However, in order to make sense of the ways in which the contrasting cognitive and normative 
rulesets of different actor groups interact with each other, it is suggested that these cognitive 
and normative rulesets must be viewed within the context of an established structure of 
regulative rules that govern the system being studied. For example, the beliefs and objectives of 
social movements for change may be underpinned by cognitive or normative rulesets, but these 
may only be fully understood when viewed within the context of the established system of 
regulative rules that such social movements are aiming to change. Campaigns for safer road 
traffic laws, for example, cannot be understood or evaluated without an understanding of the 
existing regulative framework of road traffic laws.  
 
This implies that, when adopting a theoretical perspective of technological change that 
combines elements of evolutionary and social constructivist approaches, it would also be useful 
to incorporate a theoretical perspective of power that defines extant power structures by 
reference to regulative rulesets. This may illuminate the technological frames developed and 
deployed by different actor groups.23 Moreover, it may highlight where power lies within the 
value chain (i.e. who makes and enforces the regulative rules), the extent of such power, and the 
mechanisms through which it is exercised. Indeed, given that the research question is focused 
on the exercise of power by buyers (both processors and retailers) and the resulting influence on 
dairy farmers and their technological trajectories, answering this research question requires a 
consideration of not only cognitive and normative rulesets, but of the regulative rules (e.g. 
contracts for the sale of milk, milk prices etc) through which power relations between buyers 
and farmers are formally expressed. 
 
One such perspective, which has been applied extensively to the analysis of the food system, is 
a “global value chains” approach. 
3.6 Value Chain Analysis 
The literature on global value chains (GVC) is of interest to this study not only because it has 
focused on the functioning of supply chains for services and goods, with a strong emphasis on 
value chains for agricultural commodities (Vagneron et al 2009; Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). It is, 
further, of interest as it: 
• Presents potential conceptual tools relating to the analysis of regulative rules discussed 
above (3.4 – 3.5), and  
	
23 This is not to disregard the importance of cognitive and normative rules, or their relationship with 
regulative rules, but merely to observe that (from the point of view of answering the current research 
question) regulative rules may be placed to the fore, not least because they can be readily elicited and 
accurately specified. 
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• Is focused upon the role of “lead firms” or “dominant parties” that co-ordinate the 
activities of value chains through the development and enforcement of such regulative 
rules (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.8). This means that “power asymmetry is … central 
to value chain governance … [because] there are key actors in the chain who take 
responsibility for the inter-firm division of labour, and for the capacities of particular 
participants to upgrade their activities” (ibid. p.29). This theoretical / analytical 
perspective is of particular relevance to the present study, in the light of the policy 
context outlined in Chapter 2. 
 
The GVC literature regards a value chain as “the full range of activities that firms and workers 
perform to bring a product from its conception to end use and beyond” (Gereffi and Fernandez-
Stark 2011, p.4). By analysing the entire chain, a GVC approach aims to understand, among 
other things, how returns are distributed along the chain, from upstream producers to 
downstream consumers (i.e. the “distribution of benefits”, Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.14). 
Moreover, GVC studies are often interested in identifying which activities in the chain are 
“subject to increasing returns, and which are subject to declining returns” (ibid. p.22) in order to 
ascertain which links in the value chain may require additional (i.e. policy) support or control. 
 
Obtaining an understanding of where power lies within value chains, and the mechanisms 
through which it is exercised, is fundamental to answering many of these questions. The GVC 
literature has therefore developed a number of analytical tools for identifying and 
characterising the action and effect of power within value chains, which may be useful for the 
purposes of this study. These are outlined in the following sections. 
3.6.1 Value Chain Mapping 
Mapping involves the construction of a (typically visual) representation of:  
• Physical flows of materials, goods, and services along the value chain, from raw inputs 
to final products and waste 
• The activities taking place along the value chain, for example the points at which 
materials are converted from one form into another (i.e. where value is added) 
• Distributional outcomes, or the points along the chain at which value is extracted. The 
process of mapping value chains “analyses the way in which particular firms, regions 
and countries are linked to the global economy … [which] will determine to a large 
extent the distributional outcomes of global production systems” (Kaplinsky and 
Morris 2001, p.41). Put differently, mapping offers a means of identifying “who wins” 
within a value chain and can, moreover, provide an indicator of which participants in 
the value chain are “lead firms” (ibid. p.8). 
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3.6.2 Rent, Scarcity and Barriers to Entry 
Although value chain mapping can provide an indication of which participants derive the 
greatest benefit from value chain activities, it may only serve to describe the distribution of 
benefits as opposed to offering a full explanation for such outcomes. Therefore, it may not be 
enough to simply state that those actors who secure the lion’s share of returns from the value 
chain are the most powerful (although this may often be the case), or to conclude that their 
ability to capture that value is exclusively the result of their greater power. Instead, it may also 
be necessary to take some account of other, often structural, factors that may contribute towards 
distributional outcomes. 
 
The fact that some activities in a value chain are better rewarded than others can be partly 
explained using the concepts of “rent”, “scarcity” and “barriers to entry” (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001, p.25, p.45). Rent “arises from the possession of scarce attributes” (Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001, p.25, p.45). High barriers to entry may enable parties to secure rents, insulating them from 
competition and the associated downward pressure on incomes. Barriers to entry may include, 
for example, access to resources (e.g. raw materials or land), information or skills; high costs 
(such as plant, machinery, or labour); or regulatory requirements (such as minimum production 
standards). Where barriers to entry are low, the resulting competition will erode participants’ 
ability to secure rents.  
 
The degree of specialisation within the supply chain is a further relevant factor that can inhibit 
participants’ ability to secure rents. As the size of the market increases, activities at each link in 
the value chain will tend towards a higher degree of specialisation (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, 
p.9). Firms that specialise in a narrow function within a particular link of a value chain (dairy 
farms, for example) can become increasingly vulnerable (ibid. p.19), particularly when they are 
engaged in activities that add little value, which typically have low barriers to entry, meaning 
that it is easy for competitors to enter the market. Given the global nature of many value chains, 
increased competition may result from new market entrants from overseas jurisdictions in 
which operating costs (for example, those associated with labour or regulatory requirements) 
are lower. 
3.6.3 Conditions of Value Chain Governance 
From a GVC perspective, power is regarded as an element of broader “value chain governance” 
which “concerns not just the power to control what is happening in a value chain, but also the 
rules that determine how the game is played” (Van Dijk and Trienekens 2012, p.19). GVC 
scholars have suggested that the governance of global value chains can be understood by 
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reference to four analytic dimensions that are typically used for characterising conditions of 
civic governance (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.67), namely: 
 
• The separation of powers, which refers to the distinction between legislative (rule 
making), judicial (rule enforcing) and executive (rule implementing) functions within 
the governance of civil society. Where two or more of these functions are performed 
exclusively by a single participant in the chain, this may indicate a concentration of 
power. 
 
• The capacity to sanction behaviour and the effectiveness of sanctions (ibid., p.31, 36, 
72) – Power within a value chain resides with those actors that enforce the rules. 
Adherence to rules may be achieved by (a) the threat of punitive sanctions for non-
compliance, or (b) the provision of rewards for compliance. Value chain analysis may 
consider the effectiveness of such sanctions. 
 
• Legitimacy (or trust) – In civic governance, governors are regarded as having 
legitimacy when they enjoy popular support. Kaplinsky and Morris therefore draw a 
distinction between democratic systems of civic governance, which may be viewed as 
‘legitimate’, and non-democratic systems, which may not. They suggest that the closest 
proxy to this within the governance of global value chains is the concept of “trust”, and 
that legitimacy within value chains corresponds to “the degree of trust between 
different parties, and particularly of the ‘governor’” (ibid. p.32). Where trust is low 
“suppliers are frequently changed to pursue short-term price advantages and failure to 
conform with the wishes of the governor leads to the rapid sanction of exclusion from 
the chain” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.32; therefore, there is a relationship between 
trust conditions and the application, or threat, of sanctions). By contrast, a chain 
characterised by longer-term relationships may possess a higher level of trust. 
Kaplinsky and Morris propose a number of “data points” for assessing conditions of 
trust within value chains (ibid. p.73), as follows:  
• “the length of contracts 
• the nature of the ordering procedure 
• the nature of the contractual relationship 
• the modes of inspection used in accepting incoming materials 
• the degree of dependence24 which firms have on each other 	
24 Conditions of low trust may be indicated where a “supplier has many customers, and customer has 
multiple sources” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.74). Rather than using the term ‘dependence’, hereafter 
this study will use the term ‘reliance’, for the avoidance of confusion with the term ‘path dependence’ 
(3.3.4).  
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• the types of technical assistance which flow along the chain 
• the nature and methods of communication along the chain 
• the determination of prices 
• the nature of credit extended along the chain especially to exporting firms  
• the modalities of payment to outsourced informal economy producers” 
 
Assessing trust therefore requires some consideration of the basis upon which, and 
frequency with which, relationships between chain participants are reviewed, as well as 
the terms of those relationships – including the type of sanctions within the chain and 
how they are enforced – as articulated, for example, within contracts.  
 
Returning to the three rule types introduced above (Table 3a), it will be appreciated 
that the rules indicated by these data points are therefore regulative in nature, rather 
than cognitive or normative, and reflect broadly the formalised terms under which 
chain participants transact business, rather than the ways in which participants think or 
feel about such relations. Therefore, trust, for the value chain analyst, has a narrower 
meaning than in its popular, day-to-day use (in which it may have a distinctly 
normative or cognitive dimension). Instead, within the context of the analysis of value 
chain governance, ‘trust’ may be viewed as representing the degree of certainty, 
assuredness or confidence that value chain participants have in the continuous, reliable 
and predictable operation of the value chain, with participants regarding reliable 
operation of the value chain as ‘good’ in the sense that it benefits the functioning of 
their business, rather than in the sense that it has intrinsic moral value.  
 
In this regard, ‘trust’ may be viewed as an imperfect proxy for ‘legitimacy’. Indeed, in 
the context of civic governance (upon which Kaplinsky and Morris base their 
conceptual approach to value chain analysis) legitimacy has both a normative, cognitive 
and regulative dimension. The legitimacy of democratic institutions derives not simply 
from a popular acceptance of formal regulative architecture (e.g. democratic institutions 
and processes etc) but from an acceptance and endorsement, at a cognitive and 
normative level, of the very concept of democracy. If trust is an imperfect proxy for 
legitimacy, this may have implications for the analyst, discussed further below (5.2.6). 
 
• The depth and pervasiveness of a system of governance refers to the extent to which 
the rules governing the value chain affect the activities of participants. ‘Depth’ refers to 
“the extent to which [governance] affects the core activities of individual parties in the 
chain” as opposed to “peripheral operations” (ibid. p.32). For example, production 
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standards may generally be regarded as being deeper than product standards, because 
they place restrictions upon the activities of participants rather than merely the 
outcomes of such activities. Pervasiveness refers to “how widely … power is exercised” 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.32). For example, one may distinguish between system 
governors who have the power to enforce rules applying to all chain participants, and 
those that have the power to enforce rules applying to only a small subset of 
participants (e.g. the distinction between “private” and “public” standards). “In many 
cases chains may have more than one rule-setting lead-firm, so the issue is one of 
whose rules-agenda is heard most loudly” (ibid. p.74). 
3.7 Research Question 
The foregoing review provides a language and a set of conceptual tools that serve to further 
refine the broad research agenda outlined at the beginning of this thesis (Chapter 1), resulting 
in the following research question: 
 
In which ways, and through what mechanisms, does buyer power influence the 
reproduction of farm-level socio-technical systems for the agricultural production of 
liquid milk in the UK? 
 
 
The next chapter will outline an analytical framework derived from the theoretical materials 
considered above, which will be used to answer this question. 
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Chapter 4: 
Analytical Framework  
 
 
This chapter outlines an analytical framework derived from the theoretical materials reviewed 
in Chapter 3, which will be used (in Chapters 7 to 9) to characterise patterns of technological 
change exhibited by UK dairy farms, and to determine the influence of buyer power upon such 
patterns.  
 
The framework draws on three streams of literature: evolutionary theories of technological 
change; the study of global value chains (GVC); and the theory of the social construction of 
technology (SCOT). Basing the framework around an evolutionary perspective of technological 
change offers potential advantages over ‘linear’ perspectives, in which technological change 
results from variations in a single factor input, or is driven by either ‘market pull’ or ‘science 
push’ (3.3). Instead, change (and inertia) will be viewed as the product of interactions and 
feedbacks between a number of interrelated technological and non-technological components, 
categorised as actors, technologies, resources and institutions (Markhard and Hoffman 2016 
p.64). Together these comprise a ‘socio-technical system’ underpinned by a ‘socio-technical 
regime’ (3.3.6). Due to these ongoing interactions, socio-technical systems exhibit ‘dynamically 
stable’ ‘reproduction’25 along established technological trajectories (3.3.7), alternating between 
periods of relatively stable ‘path dependent’ change and periods of more disruptive change.  
 
However, evolutionary – or ‘coupled’ – models have been criticised for their ‘circular’ character, 
meaning that the practical value of such models may be limited because all elements of the 
model influence all other elements, thereby compromising the ability to “distinguish between 
more and less important aspects of socioeconomic and technological processes” (Millstone 2010, 
p.294; Section 3.3.2). Even if, in reality, “everything is interconnected with everything else” (see 
Figure 4a for a visual representation of this), it is desirable for the purposes of analysis to 
“differentiate more from less important links and interdependencies” in order to “indicate the 
main drivers of stability and change” (ibid.). This criticism highlights: (i) the need to select a 
starting point for the analysis and the sequence it will follow; and (ii) the need to determine the 
interactions that are most ‘important’ for the purposes of this analysis (4.1). Conceptual tools 
that will be used to examine these interactions – drawn from GVC and SCOT – will be 
elaborated upon in Section 4.2. 	
25 Reproduction encapsulates change within and between different clusters of “possible technological 
directions” taken within a technological trajectory (Dosi 1982, p.154). Transformations and transitions (i.e. 
change from one technological trajectory to another) are outside of the scope of this study. 
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Figure 4a: A Coupled Model of a Socio-technical System 
 
4.1 Determining a Starting Point for the Analysis and ‘Important’ Interactions 
This study aims to understand the ways in which (and mechanisms through which) buyer 
power influences the reproduction of socio-technical systems for the agricultural production of 
liquid milk in the UK. Put simply: “(How) do powerful buyers influence technological change 
amongst UK dairy farms?”  
 
This objective implies a logical starting point for the analysis. Before the influence of buyers 
upon farms can be considered it is first necessary to describe farms as socio-technical systems 
within which these interactions take place, and to consider the positive feedbacks that explain 
how these configurations may be stabilised and disrupted. This is important not least because 
the study is based on a 22-year ‘snapshot’ of a period of longer-run technological change (see 
4.4): because ‘history matters’ it is necessary to contextualise the interactions that form the focus 
of the study.  
 
With regard to which interactions will be viewed as ‘important’, the analysis will adopt a 
‘layered’ approach, illustrated in Figure 4b. Different components and interactions will be 
focused upon at different layers of the analysis, through the deployment of different analytical 
‘lenses’. In Figure 4b, the components and interactions highlighted in red are those that will be 
placed in the foreground, while other components and interactions will be placed in the 
background (although not completely overlooked).  
ACTORS 
RESOURCES 
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In the same way that binocular vision permits the perception of depth by superimposing two 
overlapping fields of view, it is envisaged that iterating between these different analytical 
lenses will yield a three-dimensional depiction of processes and patterns of technological 
change. The conceptual tools that will be used at different layers of the analysis are detailed in 
Section 4.2. 
 
The layers of this framework are described in further detail, as follows: 
• Layer 1: Describing and characterising socio-technical system reproduction (i.e. “What 
is happening?”). Individual farms will be described as socio-technical systems – 
configurations of interacting technologies, actors, institutions and resources – ‘nested’ 
within a broader, sector-level socio-technical system (the value chain for liquid milk; 
Smith et al 2005, p.1493). The ‘dynamically stable’ functioning of socio-technical 
systems will be described at the farm level by reference to variations in technological 
inputs (and their associated system outputs) across a range of relevant parameters 
(detailed in 5.1.2). In this way, farms will be categorised as belonging to one of three 
‘clusters’, or different possible technological directions within the technological 
trajectory for dairy farming (Dosi 1982, p.154), corresponding to three system ‘types’: 
intensive, intermediate, and extensive (5.1.2). Rates of change within, and changes 
between, these clusters will be characterised by reference to changes in relevant inputs 
across the duration of the study. 
 
• Layer 2: Identifying the mechanisms underlying system functioning (i.e. “How is it 
happening?”). Examples of the action or inaction of positive feedbacks or reverse salients 
will be identified (4.2.1). These are the mechanisms that explain the functioning of socio-
technical systems described using layer 1, and which explain stability (associated with 
rates of change) and disruption (associated with changes in direction) within these 
systems. This will involve both an analysis of interactions between technologies, and an 
analysis of interactions between technologies and other components (actors, institutions 
and resources).  
 
• Layer 3: Determining the role of buyer power (i.e. “Why is it happening?”). The 
dynamic stability of the systems described in layer 1 is a result of the inherently 
contested nature of socio-technical system reproduction. The variations in technological 
inputs described in layer 1 can be regarded as ‘trade offs’ that are made in order to 
direct systems towards ‘goals’ (Dosi 1982, p.154; Hughes 1983, p.15). Layer 3 will 
provide an explanation of why the changes described in layer 1 occur (i.e. this offers a 
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means of distinguishing between changes that have occurred under the influence of 
buyer power, and those that have not).  
 
This will involve a consideration of whether the ‘goals’ towards which socio-technical 
systems are moving ‘correspond’ with the goals towards which buyers are aiming to 
direct them and, if so, ‘how?’ and ‘why?’ (see further, 4.2). Socio-technical system 
inputs and outputs (as a proxy for ‘system goals’) will be compared with buyers’ 
demands (expressed through contracts, milk prices and other relations with farmers, 
and serving as a proxy for the goals towards which buyers are aiming to direct 
systems). The direction of the relationship between system goals and buyer demands 
will be illuminated by a consideration of the conditions of value chain governance (with 
buyer power acting either through or against the positive feedbacks identified in Layer 
2), and will be further enriched by a consideration of how and whether these conditions 
support processes of ‘stabilisation and closure of technological frames’ (Pinch and 
Bijker 1987, p.23; Meyer and Schubert 2007 p.35). This will involve a consideration of 
the interplay between the various regulative, normative and cognitive rules that 
characterise the value chain. 
 
 
This framework will be applied at the farm level of analysis. It may be possible, however, to 
draw some inferences with regard to sector level processes by aggregating and/or comparing 
these farm-level responses (for example, comparing the response of different farms to similar 
demands may reveal that different farms respond differently to similar demands, depending on 
their ‘starting point’ relative to the goal that buyers are seeking to direct them towards; see 
4.2.2). 
4.2 Conceptual Tools 
Concepts drawn from evolutionary theories of technological change; global value chains (GVC); 
and the social construction of technology (SCOT) will be used alongside each other at various 
layers of the analysis in order to illuminate the influence of buyer power within socio-technical 
system reproduction. 
 
The framework draws upon areas of common ground shared by evolutionary theories (e.g. 
Dosi 1982), large technical systems perspectives (e.g. Hughes 1983), and social construction of 
technology (SCOT) approaches to the study of technological change (Pinch and Bijker 1987) in 
order to explain the involvement of actors (buyers and farmers) within processes of 
technological change. These different perspectives – while emphasising to varying degrees the 
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roles of structure versus agency – broadly agree that the reproduction of socio-technical systems 
involves the definition, by actors, of ‘relevant’ problems and of approaches to the solution of 
these problems (with the solution of problems representing the ‘goal’ of technological change). 
Moreover, the definition of problems and solutions is shaped and constrained, to some extent, 
by current configurations of technologies. 
4.2.1 Positive feedbacks and Reverse Salients 
The mechanisms that explain the functioning of socio-technical systems will be examined by 
reference to the following positive feedback effects resulting from interactions between system 
components (both between technologies and other technologies and between technologies and 
other components, including actors, institutions and resources; layer 2): 
• Complementarity effects, which occur when the combined value of two or more 
components is greater than the sum of their values taken individually (Markard and 
Hoffmann 2016, p.64-65) and reverse salients, which occur where “essential 
complementary components may be missing” (ibid. p.64) meaning that “a component 
of the system does not march along harmoniously with other components” and 
“growth of the entire enterprise is [thereby] hampered” (Hughes 1983, p.79). 
 
For Markhard and Hoffman, complementarity effects occur where one system 
component supports the performance of a “focal element” towards the achievement of 
system goals (Markhard and Hoffman 2016, p.65). Such relationships may be unilateral 
(i.e. one way) or bilateral (i.e. both elements supporting each other’s performance), with 
the latter being regarded as stronger / more intense (ibid.).  
 
I will apply a broader definition of complementarity effects within this study. Instead of 
specifying a single focal element, which other components are “supposed to” support, I 
will adopt a more flexible approach, identifying complementarities wherever the 
interaction between two (or more) components improves the performance of any of the 
interacting components – or the functioning of the system as a whole – in support of the 
achievement of established system goals. Moreover, I suggest that complementarities 
may occur between more than two system components and may therefore be 
multilateral.  
 
I will also regard components that have a negative effect on the performance of other 
components with regards to the achievement of (current) system goals as competing 
with those other components, potentially resulting in the formation of new system 
goals. ‘Reverse salients’ will appear where complementary components are not readily 
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available (which may often accompany the introduction of a new technological 
component and / or a redefinition of system goals) which may prompt technological 
search in response to these reverse salients. 
 
• Investment and learning effects resulting from “the accumulation of specialised, but 
non-transferable stocks of investment or knowledge” (Dobusch and Schußler 2012 
p.623). These will refer to the physical, financial, and human capital embodied in stocks 
of “hardware” (e.g. machinery, buildings, infrastructure) and “software” (e.g. training, 
skills, ‘tacit’ knowledge, experience associated with farm processes or the operation of 
hardware; Cowan et al 2000), which are regarded as specialised and “non-transferable” 
(i.e. they are specific to a particular function associated with the current system; 
Dobusch and Schußler 2012 p.623); 
 
• Co-ordination effects “which confer advantages to ‘going along’ with other economic 
agents taking similar action” and expectation effects “where increased prevalence 
enhances beliefs of further prevalence” (Arthur 1994 p.112). For example, such effects 
may arise as a result of the creation of industry ‘best practice’ or standards and may 
therefore be of particular interest in the context of understanding the influence of 
powerful buyers upon technological development at the sector level. 
 
 
Chapter 5 will consider the technologies used in dairy farming. The interactions between these 
technologies can be understood by reference to these effects. 
4.2.2 Dimensions of Value Chain Governance 
Because this study regards technological change as ‘progress towards goals’, one approach 
towards identifying the influence of buyers upon socio-technical system reproduction is to 
consider whether the goals towards which systems are moving correspond with the goals 
towards which buyers are aiming to direct them and, if so, how and why.  
 
‘Progress towards system goals’ can be inferred from the inputs and outputs associated with 
socio-technical systems (layer 1, 4.1), with different configurations of technological inputs (and 
resulting outputs) progressing towards different system goals. Meanwhile, the goals towards 
which buyers are aiming to direct systems can be inferred from ‘buyers’ demands’, expressed 
through milk prices, contracts, or other relations with farmers.  
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Where there is a lack of ‘correspondence’ between system goals and buyers’ demands this may 
indicate that buyers have failed to influence the reproduction of farm socio-technical systems. 
However, where there is a close correspondence between ‘progress towards system goals’ and 
‘buyers’ demands’ the direction of the relationship between system outputs and buyers’ 
demands may be unclear. It may be that either: 
1. Buyers have influenced socio-technical system reproduction 
2. Buyers’ goals have themselves been influenced by socio-technical systems, or that 
3. Socio-technical systems and buyers have influenced each other. 
 
Determining the direction of the relationship between system outputs and buyers’ demands 
therefore involves some assessment of actors’ power relative to the broader structure of the 
system. The positive feedback mechanisms (4.2.1) that contribute towards the stability or 
instability of that structure identify points of strength (e.g. complementarities or investment 
effects) and weakness (e.g. reverse salients) within that structure. These mechanisms may act 
either in opposition to, or in support of, the exercise of buyers’ power (i.e. power can be 
exercised either through or against these mechanisms).  
 
Concepts drawn from the GVC literature may further illuminate the extent of buyer power and 
the direction of the relationship between buyer goals and system outputs, outlining conditions 
under which, and mechanisms through which, buyers exercise power in order to achieve 
compliance with their demands. The analysis will consider:  
• The sanctions (both positive and negative, including the power to exclude) that buyers 
impose in order to encourage compliance with their demands. Where changes in socio-
technical systems have followed the imposition of sanctions a causal relationship may 
be inferred (illuminating point number 1, above). When considering the impact of 
sanctions the analysis will consider the timing of changes in buyers’ demands 
compared with the timing of changes in socio-technical systems. With regard to 
timings, buyers’ goals may not correspond completely with the system goals due to 
time lags or imperfect overlaps between the two, not least because buyers’ goals may 
change (potentially with greater speed and frequency than technological 
configurations).  
 
• The depth and pervasiveness of rules, or the extent to which the rules that buyers seek 
to impose affect farms’ “core’ activities” and of “how widely … power is exercised” 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.32). Identifying ‘correspondence’ between buyer 
demands and system goals requires some consideration of the degree of differentiation 
between buyer demands and established system goals. This is because a variety of 
‘solutions’ to problems may be possible (i.e. alternative ways of progressing towards 
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the same goal, as evidenced by the existence of different clusters) and the responses of 
farms to buyer demands may therefore vary according to which cluster they inhabit. 
The depth and pervasiveness of rules will therefore vary amongst the different clusters 
identified in layer 1 and the diverse positive feedbacks associated with these (layer 2).  
 
Further, understanding how farms have developed, and attributing this to the action 
(or inaction) of buyer power involves not only an examination of progress made 
towards goals, but also some comparison between farms’ ‘starting points’ and ‘end 
points’. If a farm exhibits relatively modest changes across the period of the study this 
might indicate that either (a) it has not been influenced by buyer power, or (b) the 
technologies that it deployed at the outset of the study, and the ways in which these 
were configured, already supported progress towards the goals similar to those 
envisaged by the buyer. In this case buyer power may influence the rate of change 
(within a cluster) rather than the direction of change (between clusters). 
 
• Trust (and the separation of powers) – As outlined above (3.6.3), participants within 
value chains characterised by high levels of trust have confidence in the continuity, 
reliability and predictability of the operation of the value chain. Value chains 
characterised by higher levels of trust engender longer, more collaborative relationships 
between participants in the chain. Such conditions hold the potential for buyers to both 
influence and be influenced by socio-technical systems. Conditions of low trust are 
characterised by shorter, unilateral relationships. Such conditions are associated with 
buyers influencing farms’ socio-technical systems as opposed to being influenced by 
them. Conditions of trust may therefore illuminate points 2 and 3, above.  
 
 
Chapter 5 will comprise a review of the power relationships within the dairy value chain, the 
results of which will be used to describe in greater detail how the above concepts will be 
applied within the analysis (5.2.6). 
4.2.3 Stabilisation and Closure of Technological Frames 
Where value chains have been distinguished by reference to conditions of trust, thus revealing 
either bilateral/collaborative or unilateral/non-collaborative buyer-farmer relationships, these 
actor-actor interactions (and their outcomes) will be further illuminated using the concept of 
“technological frames”, drawn from the study of the social construction of technology (SCOT). 
Put differently, whereas conditions of trust may describe the nature of farmer-buyer 
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relationships by reference to regulative rules, this depiction will be supplemented by reference 
to the normative and cognitive rulesets developed and deployed by these actor groups. 
This analytical lens may provide a further explanation of the direction of the relationship 
between system outputs and buyer demands (points 2 and 3, above; 4.2.2) and, moreover, 
supplement the consideration of buyers’ power relative to the structure of the system (4.2.2) 
with a narrower consideration of buyers’ power relative to other actors in the system (namely, 
farmers). Collaboration – where buyers’ and farmers’ frames are supportive of each other – may 
result in increased rates of change. 
 
The SCOT literature suggests that different groups of actors attribute different ‘meanings’ or 
develop different ‘frames’ for technologies, related to the ‘relevant problems’ that they believe 
technology should solve, the approaches that should be taken to solving these problems, and 
therefore the goals towards which they believe technological systems should be directed (3.4.1). 
Alternative ways of progressing towards the same goal (as evidenced by the existence of 
different clusters) would be understood from a SCOT perspective as deriving from 
“interpretive flexibility” or “flexibility in how people think of or interpret artifacts but also … 
flexibility in how artifacts are designed” (Pinch and Bijker 1987 p.34). Through a process of 
contest or negotiation actors converge upon “collective stabilisation and closure” around 
technological frames (Meyer and Schubert 2007, p.35).  
 
The framework will consider this process of frame stabilisation and closure, which involves 
identifying the frames developed by different groups of actors. Farmers’ frames can be inferred 
to some extent from the socio-technical systems that they use (i.e. they will be embedded in the 
‘system goals’ identified in layers 1 and 2 of the analysis, see above, 4.2).  
 
However, a richer depiction of farmers’ frames can be drawn from the supporting statements 
that farmers make at interview when explaining their use of their selected technological 
configurations. This will include statements regarding farmers’ ‘mindsets’. For the purposes of 
this thesis, ‘mindsets’ will incorporate the personal ‘cognitive’ rulesets of farmers and their 
labour resources (i.e. their beliefs, experience and knowledge, including ‘tacit’ knowledge 
associated with the use of technologies, Cowan et al 2000; see 3.3.3); their ‘normative’ rulesets 
(values, norms etc); and how these relate to their knowledge of the broader ‘regulative’ rulesets 
imposed by buyers and agencies (e.g. production and product standards etc) (Geels 2004, p.905; 
3.4.1). Such mindsets will therefore include farmers’ beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm, both 
in terms of what farmers believe to be desirable and what they believe to be possible, as well as 
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the ways in which farmers think and feel about the regulative framework within which they 
operate (e.g. whether they believe that framework to be ‘fair’).26 
 
As outlined above, buyers’ technological frames can be inferred from buyers’ demands, 
expressed through contracts, price setting or other relations with farmers. The analysis will 
regard these as a proxy for the goals that buyers are aiming to direct progress towards.  
4.3 Selecting a Timeframe for the Analysis 
An evolutionary perspective – by definition – eschews ‘starting points’ and ‘end points’, 
viewing progress instead as ‘ongoing’. However, for practical purposes, it is necessary to select 
a timeframe for any study. The abolition of the Milk Marketing Board (MMB) in 1994 serves as a 
useful starting point, as a potentially significant episode within the history of the UK dairy 
farming sector (see Chapter 2) in which institutional changes signalled an expanded role for 
certain actors (chiefly processors and supermarkets) within the UK value chain for milk. The 
bulk of the fieldwork for the study was conducted in the summer of 2016, meaning that the 
study will cover the period 1994-2016 (albeit the overviews of dairy farming technologies and of 
governance conditions within the value chain for milk, in Chapter 5, will contextualise the 
systems and technologies that were available to farmers from 1994 onwards, and the 
institutional background within which they have operated).  
  
	
26 ‘Frames’ – being constrained by current technological configurations – incorporate both an aspirational 
element (i.e. “what problem should technology solve? Why and how?”), and a pragmatic element (i.e. “what 
problems can [current] technology solve?”). The former incorporates actors’ beliefs about the purpose of 
technology. The latter incorporates actors’ beliefs about the limits of technology. The two are not mutually 
exclusive. Technological artefacts and configurations, through their use, may condition actors’ “visions on 
‘how to do things’” or of “the best way forward” (Dosi et al 2006, p.1114; Berkhout et al 2003, p.14). 
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Chapter 5: 
Populating the Framework  
 
 
This study will examine socio-technical system reproduction in UK dairy farms. As outlined 
earlier, “regimes exist across different empirical scales … [and] there is a need carefully to 
distinguish in any given context between what constitutes the ‘nested’ and the ‘spanning’ 
regime, and to be precise in the empirical application of the concept” (Smith et al 2005, p.1493; 
3.3.2). It is suggested that socio-technical systems also exist across different empirical scales, not 
least because socio-technical systems and regimes “co-structure each other” (Geels and Kemp 
2007, p.442; see 3.3.7).  
 
With that in mind, this study will regard UK dairy farms as socio-technical systems, ‘nested’ 
within a broader ‘spanning’ socio-technical system (namely, the UK value chain for liquid milk) 
and its underlying socio-technical regime. The distinction between these different levels of 
analysis is useful, for the purposes of this study, as it enables the analyst to identify a sector-
level technological trajectory for UK dairy farming (i.e. at this high level of aggregation all dairy 
farms will share common technological characteristics, involving some combination of 
livestock, feed, and housing technologies, aimed at achieving a broadly shared ‘goal’ at the 
sector level; see further 5.1) while also allowing the analyst to distinguish, at a lower level of 
aggregation, differences in the ways in which these common technological inputs are deployed 
towards the achievement of distinct outcomes and goals at the farm level. This approach 
enables the identification of different ‘clusters’ of farms at the sub-sector level, allowing the 
analyst to capture and examine differences in the response of these clusters to similar buyer 
demands (i.e. whereas a sector level of analysis might assume or conclude that rules developed 
and enforced by buyers will have similar effects upon all of the farms supplying them, a farm 
level of analysis may reveal evidence that these rules in fact influence different farms in 
different ways).   
 
The study will therefore identify and characterise patterns of change within and between 
clusters of “possible technological directions” in the broader, sector-level technological 
trajectory for UK dairy farming (Dosi 1982, p.154; 4.1 - 4.2), which encapsulate farms’ progress 
towards ‘system goals’. The influence of buyer power upon these patterns of change will be 
ascertained by considering whether, how and why farms’ system goals correspond with buyers’ 
demands.   
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In order to determine whether buyers have influenced individual farms, one must first define the 
technological trajectory for UK dairy farming and characterise the various clusters of 
technological directions within it, and identify and characterise change at the farm level within 
and between these clusters. This involves enumerating the various technological and non-
technological components involved in dairy farming that will be regarded as ‘relevant’ to the 
analysis, as well as the dimensions along which these components (and their associated 
outputs) may vary (5.1). Different clusters – ‘intensive’, ‘intermediate’ and ‘extensive’ – will be 
characterised by different configurations of components and by variations across these 
dimensions (i.e. these correspond to the diverse ‘trade-offs’ that may be made between various 
system components; Dosi 1982, p.148; 4.2). Further, different trade-offs will result in different 
outputs (i.e. in this way, intensive, intermediate and extensive clusters will each progress 
towards different system goals at the farm level). 
 
As well as understanding the diversity of system goals that different clusters are moving 
towards, determining how and why buyers influence farms’ movement within and between 
clusters also requires a consideration of the diversity of governance conditions within the value 
chain and the diversity of mechanisms through which buyers exercise power in order to 
encourage compliance with their demands. Just as dairy farming must be viewed at different 
levels of aggregation – from high (trajectory), to medium (cluster), to low (farm) – so too must 
the value chain.  
 
The chapter will therefore provide an overview of the value chain, the actors within it, and its 
broad conditions of governance (5.2). It will, further, delineate value chains nested within this 
broader value chain – specifically ‘aligned’ and ‘non-aligned’ value chains – which will form the 
subject of this study. Significant distinctions in the governance conditions within these value 
chains will also be explained. This will entail: 
• Characterising buyers’ demands in terms of the security of supply, product 
characteristics and production characteristics, and enumerating the specific conditions 
within which, and mechanisms through which, buyers exercise power to encourage 
compliance with these demands, namely: 
- The depth and pervasiveness of rules (which may vary from cluster to cluster as 
similar rules may influence different clusters to varying degrees) 
- The separation of powers 
- The categories of sanctions that buyers utilise  
- Indicators of trust within value chains. 
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• Defining, more broadly, the ways in which actors (both farmers and buyers) frame the 
‘meanings’ of dairy farming technologies and the ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ towards 
which dairy farming should be directed. Because the influence of buyers will be 
understood by reference to goals, and examined by reference to the process of frame 
stabilisation and closure, it is necessary to define a broader arena within which this 
stabilisation and closure is staged (i.e. broad common dimensions along which different 
actors’ goals will be defined).  
 
Outputs from this chapter will serve to inform the data needs summarised in Chapter 6. 
5.1 Dairy Farms as Socio-technical Systems 
This section defines the technological trajectory for UK dairy farming for the period covered by 
the study (1994-2016). This technological trajectory is nested within the broader socio-technical 
system of the UK value chain for liquid milk and its underlying socio-technical regime, and is 
therefore defined by reference to the broad social ‘problem’ that dairy farming at the sector 
level was aimed at solving during the study period. This section will summarise technological 
and non-technological components27 that are common to farms within this trajectory, before 
distinguishing the various clusters of technological directions within this technological 
trajectory (“whose outer boundaries are defined by” the regime; Dosi 1982, p.154) by reference 
to variations in configurations and/or the utilisation of these components.  
 
For the purposes of this study ‘the provision of food at scale’ will be regarded as the broad 
social problem that dairy farming is directed towards solving.28 At the sector level, the 
approach taken towards solving this social problem can be summarised as: 
 
The domestication of dairy cattle for the production of milk to conventional (i.e. not 
organic) standards by (and as a primary commercial activity of) organised agricultural 
enterprises, for purchase by milk processors. 
 
 	
27 As discussed already (see 3.3.2, and Chapter 4) it is desirable to “differentiate more from less important 
links and interdependencies” when developing an analytical framework (Millstone 2010, p.294). When 
taking this approach, it is therefore necessary to privilege certain components within the analysis (e.g. 
given that this study is aimed at understanding the influence of buyer power upon technological changes, 
technologies and actors are given greater prominence in the analysis) at the expense of others (e.g. labour 
and environmental factors are included in the framework, although they are, relatively speaking, placed in 
the background). This should not serve to diminish the importance of environmental, labour, or financial 
components to answering other, related research questions. 	
28 Supporting the rural economy, the preservation of farming traditions, lifestyles, knowledge, and a host 
of other possible social problems, will be regarded as ‘peripheral’ issues (the use of the term ‘peripheral’ is 
not intended to diminish the importance of these issues, merely to highlight that they are not the central 
concern of the present study, although, at the farm level of analysis, individual farmers may ‘frame’ the 
problems and solutions of dairy farming by reference to such issues (see below 5.2). 
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This study therefore regards dairy farming as a highly-specialised, commercial agricultural 
activity. It will be noted that the tendency towards increased farm size and consolidation in the 
UK dairy sector outlined in Chapter 2 accompanied a long run trend towards greater 
specialisation within agriculture generally (e.g. Bieleman 2005; Grant 1998), as well the 
emergence of greater integration and consolidation within in the broader supply chain, enabled 
by advances in transportation and cold-chain technologies (Nimmo 2011, Grant 1998; Dewick 
and Foster 2011). 
 
Small scale, subsistence and other non-commercial farming enterprises will be excluded from 
the analysis, as will farms that process and/or market their milk direct to the consumer.29 
Finally, the study excludes farms that produce milk to organic standards.30 
5.1.1 Summary of Dairy Farming Socio-technical System Components 
This section summarises the categories of components – technologies, actors, institutions and 
resources – used within the technological trajectory for UK dairy farming, as defined above. The 
boundaries between these component categories will be regarded as being ‘soft’. For example, 
although technology may comprise ‘pure information’ (such as ‘codified’ information, residing, 
for example, in written operating manuals, textbooks, procedures or processes; Cowan et al 
2000) some forms of information will also be regarded as ‘resources’ (i.e. labour, knowledge or 
skills), residing (partially or exclusively) in ‘actors’, often in the form of either ‘tacit knowledge’ 
(Cowan et al 2000) or ‘beliefs’ (i.e. “cognitive rules”, a subcategory of institutions; Geels 2004a, 
p.904-5). 
Technologies – The study will adopt a broad definition of ‘technology’ in line with the one 
suggested by Arthur, namely: “[methods] to carry through any given economic purpose ... 
[which] may exist as pure method or pure information; or may be embodied in physical plant 
or machinery” (Arthur 1994, p.15). The study will therefore consider both technological 
‘hardware’ and ‘software’ associated with dairy farming (David 1985, p.334).  
 
At its simplest, dairy farming involves the conversion by cows of feed inputs into milk. At a 
minimum, this requires a means of impregnating cows; a space in which to keep (and, 
optionally, house) these cows; a means of feeding them; a means of harvesting the resulting 
milk; and a systematic approach to repeating and sustaining this sequence of events as milk 	
 
29 Which can be regarded as a ‘niche’ activity, external to the mainstream regime. 
 
30 This study does not regard organic farming (for the production of milk sold to milk processors) as a 
niche activity, but rather as a subset of the mainstream regime, being subject to broadly the same regime 
rules that govern conventional farming, in addition to some further (organic) production standards. 
Because organic farms and conventional farms are therefore governed by different institutional conditions 
(and for the sake of simplicity) organic producers will be excluded from the analysis.   
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yields decline after calving. It also requires a means of ensuring the health and welfare of the 
animals, and of managing their waste products. To enable a more fine-grained analysis of how 
technological components interact, the technologies associated with dairy farming will 
therefore be sub-divided into those associated with:   
• Feeding  
• Buildings and Housing 
• Breeding 
• Fertility 
• Milking 
• Animal husbandry and veterinary medicine 
• Production cycle (‘calving pattern’) 
• Waste management 
 
The dimensions of variability and change in these technologies will be discussed further in 
5.1.2, below, and form the main distinguishing factor between different clusters of farm socio-
technical systems. 
 
Actors – A range of actors are involved in the value chain for liquid milk, including consumers; 
legislative, executive and judicial authorities; extension agencies and technological input 
suppliers. However, given that this study is focused on the influence of buyers upon farmers, it 
will confine its attention to farmers, processors and supermarkets. 
 
Institutions – For the purposes of this thesis I will assume that institutions may include 
“societal norms, technology standards, regulations, user practices, culture, collective 
expectations etc” (Markhard and Hoffman, 2016 p.64). Because this study is interested in the 
effects of buyer power upon farms’ development, it will restrict its scope to private as opposed 
to public standards (Kaplinsky 2010), i.e. those mandated within contracts for the sale of milk 
between milk buyers and farmers, in particular where such standards impose requirements that 
are more detailed or stringent than those stipulated by industry-wide laws, regulations, 
standards or best practice guidelines developed, implemented and enforced by public bodies 
(see below, 5.2.6). In addition to ‘formal’ institutions (i.e. contracts), it will also consider the role 
of less formal institutions, such as unwritten agreements or relations between buyers and 
farmers, as well as farmers’ ‘mindsets’, which incorporate ‘beliefs’, or ‘cognitive rules’, 
underpinning their selected technological configurations. 
 
It will be clear that buyers will typically exercise their power through the medium of 
institutions (i.e. the ‘rules’ of the game). Therefore, the institutional context may vary 
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considerably from farm to farm, depending on the buyer and the contractual relationship. The 
diversity of governance conditions within the value chain is considered in Section 5.2, below, 
which identifies two distinct value chains (aligned and non-aligned) within the broader UK 
value chain for liquid milk, which will form the subject of the analysis. 
 
Resources will include: 
• Labour 
• Knowledge / skills embedded in farmers and their labour force (see 4.1) 
• Financial capital 
• Land and physical location 
• Local climate 
• Transport infrastructure and links. 
5.1.2 Dimensions of Variability / Change in Technological Components: Defining Clusters 
This section details the dimensions of variability and change in technological components and 
their associated system outputs (i.e. technological trade offs; Dosi 1982, p.148) that serve to 
distinguish different clusters of possible technological directions within the broader 
technological trajectory for UK dairy farming, which tend towards distinct system goals. 
 
The analysis will not consider all of these components, or all of their interactions, for every 
farm. Instead, it will focus upon those components and interactions that most usefully illustrate 
and explain observed patterns of change within each case study. These may vary from case to 
case, although the processes and mechanisms underlying these components and their 
interactions may exhibit greater consistency across cases. A summary of the relevant 
dimensions along which these technological components may vary, along with a (non-
exhaustive) list of some potential effects of variations along these dimensions, is included in 
Table 5a.
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Table 5a: Dimensions of Variability in Technological Components  
 
Category of 
Technological 
Component 
Dimension of 
Variability 
Description of 
Change  
Potential Effect(s) 
Feeding31 Source Home grown / 
grazed 
Reduce feed input costs 
 
Purchased Increase feed input costs 
 
Volume Increase Increase milk yields.  
 
Decrease Decrease milk yields.  
 
Tailored Increase milk yields 
 
Composition/ 
balance32 
Increase sugar 
and starch 
relative to fibre 
Increase milk yields. Reduce constituent content of milk (% butterfat 
and protein). Increase risk of acidosis 
 
Increase fibre 
relative to sugar 
and starch 
Reduce feed intake. Reduce milk yields. Increase butterfat content of 
milk. 
Frequency Continuous Increase milk yields 
Discontinuous Decrease milk yields 
Method Feed to yield  “Allocating concentrates on a daily or weekly basis according to yield … 
Feeding to yield tends to result in lactation curves with a higher peak 
yield but more rapid decline as cows respond positively to the challenge 
of more generous early lactation feeding and negatively to the 
progressive restriction of allocations in mid to late lactation” (DairyCo 
2012b, p.6:13) 
 
Challenge 
Feeding 
“A system of feeding dairy cows which provides more feed than is 
justified by the level of the individual cow's milk production. In the early 
part of the lactation the cow is challenged to produce more milk and in 
many instances does so. If the cow does not respond the level of 
feeding is reduced. Called also lead feeding because the cow is led to 
produce more heavily.”33  
 
Flat rate  “Completely opposite to feeding to yield, flat rate feeding involves 
providing all cows with the same quantity of concentrates each day 
throughout the lactation” (DairyCo 2012b, p.6:14) 
 
Step  “Provides a convenient half-way house between feeding to yield and flat 
rate feeding, more closely meeting cows’ nutritional needs at each 
stage in the lactation, while maintaining as much simplicity as possible.” 
(DairyCo 2012b, p.6:14.) 
Self / easy feed  Self / easy feed systems “allow machinery and labour costs to be kept 
to a minimum, although they are poorly suited to high output regimes” 
(DairyCo 2012b p.3:6) 
Cut and cart Allows “higher daily dry matter intakes to be achieved than self-feeding” 
but with higher associated labour and machinery costs (albeit lower 
than TMR, see below; DairyCo 2012b p.3:6). 
Total mixed 
ration (TMR) 
TMR approaches involve higher machinery and labour costs than other 
systems, but offer greater flexibility and the potential “to maximise dry 
matter intakes and optimise rumen fermentation” (DairyCo 2012b 
p.3:7). However, “the main nutritional disadvantage is that individual 
cows can become too fat if they eat large amounts of the TMR and 
don’t milk as well as they should”  (Chamberlain and Wilkinson 1996, 
p126) 
Form Increase particle 
size 
Reduce feed intake (and milk yield). 
 
Reduce particle 
size 
Increase feed intake (and milk yield) at risk of acidosis (DairyCo 2012b, 
2:7) 
	
31 DairyCo 2012b, Chamberlain and Wilkinson 1996; see further Appendix 5A for varieties of concentrate feeds 
 
32 Acidosis is a metabolic condition in cattle resulting from “feeding excessive amounts of non-structural 
carbohydrates and highly fermentable forages, and insuffi- cient dietary coarse fibre”, Plaizier et al 2009 p.21 
 
33 https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/challenge+feeding 
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Table 5a: Dimensions of Variability in Technological Components (Continued) 
 
Category of 
Technological 
Component 
Dimension of 
Variability 
Description of 
Change  
Potential Effect(s) 
Buildings and 
housing34 
Type Cubicle Increase fixed costs relative to ‘loose yards’. Reduced ongoing 
bedding costs and permit a higher stocking rate, but incur 
higher fixed (upfront) costs and may result in increased 
lameness and knee/hoof damage compared with straw yards. 
(DairyCo 2012c, p.14-15). 
Yard Potentially higher bedding costs Lower incidence of lameness 
but increased mastitis levels when compared with cubicles. 
DairyCo 2012c, p.14-15). 
Duration Increase Permit greater control of diet and monitoring of cows. Increase 
need to manage waste. 
Reduce Permit greater access to grazed grass. Reduce need to 
manage waste. 
Breeding & 
genetics35 
Breed Ayrshire Improved forage conversion (reduced purchased feed) and 
increased longevity 
Brown Swiss Improved forage conversion (reduced purchased feed) and 
animal health. 
Crossbreed Hybrid vigour36 “is the tendency of a crossbred animal to have 
qualities superior to that of either parent but not more than the 
dominant breed.”  
Friesian  Reduced vet costs. Dual purpose (beef and milk) 
Guernsey Increased constituent content of milk (butterfat and protein) 
Holstein Increased yield. Susceptible to reduced fertility and lower 
survival (Dillon et al 2006) 
Jersey Increased constituent content of milk (butterfat and protein). 
Improved calving ease. 
Montbeliarde Increased protein content in milk. Reduced cell counts in milk. 
Norwegian Red High production, health and longevity 
Shorthorn Improved milk quality (constituents) and forage conversion. 
Breeding 
strategy (use of 
genetic indices) 
Selection for production 
Selection for fertility 
Selection for lifespan 
Selection for maintenance 
Selection for SCC 
Selection for udder 
Selection for feet and legs 
Selection for calving ease 
Replacement 
planning37 
Home-rear Reduce risk of disease transmission. Increase need to maintain 
tight calving window (i.e. fertility) 
‘Flying herd’ Increase risk of disease transmission. Reduce need to maintain 
tight calving window (i.e. fertility) 
Milking Method Herringbone “financially advisable for herds of up to 350 cows” (O’Brien et al 
2006, p.6) 
Rotary High capital costs, but increased efficiency for herds above 350 
(O’Brien et al 2006, p.6) 
Robot Reduce labour costs. High upfront fixed costs and ongoing 
maintenance costs. 
Frequency Increase Increase overall milk output. Increase labour costs (unless 
robots used) 
Decrease Reduce overall milk output. Reduce labour costs 
 
 
 	
34 DairyCo 2012c 
 
35 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/breeding-genetics/£pli/; see further Appendices 5B and 5C 
for production and other characteristics of the main breeds of dairy cow  
 
36 http://www.dairyco.org.uk/technical-information/breeding-genetics/crossbreeding/#.U6wbsKX_ZBU  
 
37 http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/business-management/planning-ahead/short-
term/replacements/#.Vp4ylhGrbzI  
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Table 5a: Dimensions of Variability in Technological Components (Continued) 
 
Category of 
Technological 
Component 
Dimension of 
Variability 
Description of 
Change  
Potential Effect(s) 
Animal husbandry 
and Veterinary 
Medicine 
Dairy cattle are susceptible to a range of medical conditions, including mastitis, tuberculosis (TB), lameness 
and impaired mobility, bovine viral diarrhoea (BVD), Johnes Disease, and more.38 These may be aggravated 
or alleviated by variations in housing conditions, feeding practices, milking frequency and protocols, or 
breeding decisions; as well as by differences in approaches to dry cow therapy and the use of antibiotics. 
Although a full consideration of these conditions and their treatments is beyond the scope of this study, it is 
sufficient to note that animal husbandry and veterinary medicine technologies will be strongly influence by 
prevailing feeding, housing, breeding and milking technologies. 
 
Fertility  
 
Methods of improving fertility and the detection of ‘heat’ include: crossbreeding, oestrous synchronisation, 
activity monitors, and tailpainting. 
 
Production cycle / 
Calving pattern 
Spring 
calving 
Results in peak yields in the Spring, due to ‘lactation curve’39 
Autumn 
calving 
Results in peak yields in the Autumn, due to ‘lactation curve’ 
All year 
calving 
Results in a level annual production profile as lactation curves of cows overlap 
Waste Management Storage and 
disposal 
Requirement for waste management increases as period that cattle are housed increases, 
and with increased feed intake. 
  
 		  
	
38 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-welfare/  
 
39 The lactation curve of a dairy cow describes the “peak or maximum daily yield occurring between 4 and 8 weeks 
after calving, followed by a daily decrease in milk yield until the cow is dried off” Silvestre et al 2009 p.308 
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Given the vast number of possible configurations of these technological inputs, the numerous 
different ways in which these may be deployed, and the diversity of resulting system outputs, it 
is desirable to reduce these to a smaller number of clusters or stylised system ‘types’, 
characterised by the different possible combinations of technologies and the range of possible 
trade offs between them. For the purposes of this study, the following clusters will be used: 
• ‘Intensive’ farms, which are characterised by a high intensity of technological inputs 
and outputs per unit of livestock, land and/or labour relative to sector averages. 
• ‘Extensive’ farms, which are characterised by a low intensity of technological inputs 
and outputs per unit of livestock, land and/or labour relative to sector averages. 
• ‘Intermediate’ farms, which occupy a position between the above extremes. 
 
 
As should be clear, the main distinction between these clusters is the intensity of technological 
inputs and associated outputs. These clusters are considered in greater detail in Table 5b, and 
may be compared with similar categories developed by the National Farmers Union (NFU) in 
2010 and by DairyCo in 2012 (see Boxes 5a and 5b). The different inputs and outputs associated 
with these clusters will serve as a proxy for ‘system goals’ (4.2), nested within the broader 
regime level goal defined above (see further 5.2.5), and these clusters will tend towards distinct 
system goals.  
 
Broadly, observed patterns of technological change may be characterised as either change within 
these clusters (e.g. further intensification of an already intensive farm) or as change between 
clusters (e.g. change from the intermediate to the extensive cluster).  
 
Significantly, because the dimensions of change outlined above frequently involve changes of 
scale rather than kind (in particular changes such as housing period, and feed inputs):  
• The boundaries between these clusters may be indistinct. Broadly, changes of scale may 
typically be indicative of change within a cluster rather than change between clusters. 
However, ‘thresholds’ between clusters will exist, meaning that a change of scale above 
such a threshold may constitute a change between clusters; 
• ‘High’ or ‘low’ intensity of inputs will mean ‘high’ or ‘low’ relative to the mean input 
intensity of the rest of the population or sample.  
 
 
That being said, there will be some specific technological artefacts or processes that are used 
predominantly or exclusively within intensive, intermediate and extensive farms. For example, 
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feeding a ‘total mixed ration’ and milking three times a day will typically be associated with 
‘intensive’ production models as the aim of such technologies is to maximise system inputs and 
outputs per cow. 
 
 
Box 5a: NFU Farm Categories 
 
In 2010 the NFU proposed three main producer types in Great Britain, as follows:  
• “Extensively grazed systems” in which “the cows spend the majority of the year outdoors and 
are likely be out wintered in all weather conditions” 
• “Grass based” systems in which cows “graze during the spring and summer months, and 
[are] housed for up to six months of the year, usually from late autumn through to the end of 
winter, when the weather is wet and cold and grass stops growing” 
• “Zero grazed” systems, in which herds “spend the majority of their time indoors in modern, 
well ventilated and light cattle sheds”. 
 
Source: http://www.thedairysite.com/articles/2549/dairy-farming-systems-in-great-britain 
 
 
 
 
Box 5b: DairyCo Farm Categories 
 
In 2012, DairyCo identified three main producer approaches (DairyCo 2012a, p.4):  
• Cows at grass: “Predominantly grass-based and operating at lower yield levels”.  
• Composite: “Maximum use of family labour and a mixed approach to feeding and housing”. 
• High-output cows: “Generally housed with intensive use of major inputs”.  
 
These categories were constructed according to “the most important ways in which dairy enterprises 
differ”, which DairyCo defines as (DairyCo 2012a, p.5): 
• The feeding strategy adopted 
• Intensity of input use 
• Type of output. 
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Table 5b: Characteristics of Clusters  
 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
COMPONENT 
CATEGORY 
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLUSTER 
 
INTENSIVE INTERMEDIATE EXTENSIVE 
FEEDING Farms are likely to make minimal 
use of grazed grass as a feed 
input. Feed rations likely to be 
based around energy dense feeds, 
which may be tailored precisely to 
the cows’ energy requirements 
and fed as a “total mixed ration”. 
Feeding approaches may seek a 
balance between maximising 
yields (cf. intensive farms) or 
minimising feed costs (cf. 
extensive farms), and may be 
more influenced by other factors 
such as, for example, labour costs. 
Farms are likely to graze 
more extensively than other 
systems, using relatively 
lower amounts of purchased 
and concentrate feeds per 
cow. 
 
BUILDINGS AND 
HOUSING 
Cows may be housed for long 
periods of the year (potentially all 
year round) due to a desire to 
precisely control feed, and due to 
the relative fragility of the livestock 
(see below). 
 
Cows a likely to be housed 
approximately half of the year and 
kept outdoors for the remainder. 
Cows are likely to be housed 
for as short a period as 
possible, within the limits of 
the local climate, in order to 
maximise their access to 
grazed grass. 
BREEDING Holstein cows are likely to be 
preferred, in particular pedigree 
Holsteins that are genetically 
selected for their ability to produce 
high volumes of milk (albeit with 
relatively lower proportions of 
protein and butterfat). These cattle 
are generally less resilient and 
may suffer from lower fertility 
compared with other breeds (see 
below and Appendix 5C). 
 
Farmers may place less emphasis 
on genetic selection for maximum 
production and greater attention 
on other traits (see Table 5a). 
Breeds are likely to be 
selected that can withstand 
the shorter housing period 
and lower feed inputs 
associated with extensive 
grazing. 
MILKING Intensive systems are more likely 
than other systems to milk three 
times per day due to high output of 
the cows and the fact that the 
cows spend more of their time 
indoors (i.e. near the milking 
parlour). Where focused on 
maximising output per unit of 
labour, automated “rotary” 
parlours, or milking robots may be 
preferred. 
 
Cows are likely to be milked twice 
a day. 
Cows are likely to be milked 
twice a day. 
ANIMAL 
HUSBANDRY AND 
VETERINARY 
MEDICINE 
Stocking densities may be higher 
than less-intensive operations due 
to the minimal use of grazed 
grass. This, combined with 
intensive housing, may increase 
the risk of disease transmission 
and of conditions such as 
lameness and mastitis, which may 
exacerbated by the selection of 
breed and the physiological 
pressures placed on high-yielding 
cows (Dillon et al 2006).  
 
No particular distinctions may be 
observed between intermediate 
farms and extensive or intensive 
farms 
Long periods of grazing may 
raise health and welfare 
issues.  
FERTILITY Such systems may experience 
challenges with fertility, owing to 
the characteristics of the “high 
yielding cow” (Dillon et al 2006) 
 
No particular distinctions may be expected with regards to fertility 
n/a 
PRODUCTION 
CYCLE 
Year round calving models may be 
preferred and enabled because 
the lack of reliance upon grazed 
grass reduces exposure to 
seasonal variations in grass 
growth. 
 
No particular distinctions may be 
expected between intermediate 
farms and extensive or intensive 
farms 
Such models may be 
expected to adopt a Spring 
calving model, meaning that 
the cows’ maximum energy 
requirements coincide with 
the strongest grass growth  
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5.2 The Value Chain for Milk: An Overview 
The value chain for milk can be studied at various levels of analysis. At the macro-level, milk 
and dairy products are traded on global markets and there is, therefore, a truly global value 
chain for milk. At the meso-level, separate value chains may be distinguished by reference to 
geography, jurisdiction (i.e. regional or national value chains) and/or product category (i.e. 
liquid milk, cheese, butter, powdered products etc). At the micro-level, these value chains may 
be further distinguished by reference to their ‘lead firms’ and/or related distinctions in their 
governance conditions (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.8). This section describes the governance 
conditions within the UK value chain for liquid milk. In doing so, it explains: 
• Why this study will focus upon the UK value chain for liquid milk as opposed to 
viewing the value chain at a higher level of aggregation (e.g. as a global value chain, or 
the value chain for all dairy products) 
• Governance conditions across the UK value chain for liquid milk, and distinctions at 
more micro-levels of analysis (i.e. distinctions between ‘aligned’ and ‘non-aligned’ 
value chains nested within the broader UK value chain for liquid milk, see below) that 
are significant for the purposes of this analysis.  
5.2.1 Subsector Heterogeneity in Production and Product Characteristics 
The UK value chain for milk has been described as “relatively simple” (Mylan et al 2015, p.24). 
This perhaps overlooks the fact that there are many possible approaches to dairy farming in the 
UK (detailed above; 5.1) with different production characteristics. Although these all involve some 
combination of land, cattle, feed, and milking technologies, there is a range of different possible 
configurations of technological and resource inputs (see 5.2), a multiplicity of actors (with 
different goals), and a diverse institutional background (5.2.5).  
 
Moreover, although various farming approaches result in a broadly homogenous product (i.e. 
raw milk), there is nevertheless a degree of variability within that end product (e.g. in terms of 
milk quality and constituent content). At one extreme, some farms produce ‘white water’40 
(large volumes of milk per cow, with a low butterfat and low protein content, typically 
associated with the use of high-yielding Holstein cattle that are fed energy-dense diets). At the 
other extreme, some farms will produce smaller volumes of milk containing proportionally 
more butterfat and protein (typically resulting from more grass-based diets and often the use of 
breeds such as the Jersey or Guernsey). Similarly, there is a range of contracts for the sale of 
milk, containing incentives or penalties to encourage the production of milk that conforms 	
40 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/business-management/accounts/outputs-money-
which-earns/milk/  
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different product characteristics (in terms of e.g. volume, constituent content, and/or somatic cell 
count41; see further 5.2.5).  
 
It follows that the raw milk delivered from farms may be put to a range of uses. Beyond the 
farm gate, raw milk is directed towards one of two broad market segments: ‘liquid milk’ (i.e. for 
drinking) and ‘manufacturing’ (DairyCo 2013b, p.15). However, these segments are further 
subdivided into a wide array of final products (see Figure 5a). These end products may be 
intimately connected, both in terms of their production process and their markets. For example, 
excess butterfat removed in the processing of milk for the liquid market forms the basis of 
cream and butter production (DairyCo 2011a, p.9). Increased demand for drinking milk would 
result in a surplus of butter and cream in the absence of a commensurate increase in demand for 
those products, resulting in price depression in those markets. Conversely, increased demand 
for cream and/or butter may result in increased production of liquid milk, but in the absence of 
increased consumer demand for drinking milk, this may ultimately serve to depress farmgate 
prices. Such effects have been observed as a result of changing UK consumer preferences away 
from ‘full cream’ drinking milk and towards ‘semi-skimmed’ milk (Public Health England 
2014). 
 
Similarly, given the broad range of possible by-products from the manufacture of cheese  (see 
Figure 5a), price movements within any of these end markets may influence production 
patterns and returns further upstream. Such interconnectedness has led many to argue that, 
ultimately, domestic farmgate prices for milk are determined by global commodity market prices 
(House of Commons 2011, p.12).  
 
	
41 NB: although industry bodies might argue that farmers often fail to match their production approach to 
the terms of their contract (i.e. some farmers produce white water when their contracts reward the 
production of constituents). Personal communication, DairyCo representative 2 December 2014 	
		
	
72	
Figure 5a: Milk Products and Production Relationships 
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Adding to this complexity, the end products in Figure 5a have widely different characteristics. 
This has implications for processors and retailers operating in these markets. Products may 
differ according to, for example (the list is not exhaustive): 
• Consumer demand (e.g. whereas the UK is self sufficient in liquid milk there is a trade 
deficit – and exposure to international markets – in cheese, butter and yoghurt; House 
of Commons 2011, p.10) 
• Elasticities of demand – some products will be regarded as ‘staples’, others as ‘luxuries’ 
• Value added – Some milk products will command more of a premium than others, 
depending upon such factors as the production process, their provenance, consumer 
trends etc.  
• Shelf life – liquid milk is perishable, whereas other dairy products may be stored for 
longer periods. 
• Transportation costs 
• Processing costs and capacity. 
 
These (and other) factors may influence actors’ strategies at each link in the value chain, 
resulting in impacts both upstream and downstream. 
5.2.2 Processors, Market Concentration and Value Chains Nested within the UK Value Chain 
for Liquid Milk 
In many ways, processors (often referred to as ‘dairies’) act as ‘gatekeepers’ to the sector.42 In 
spite of the broad range of end markets outlined above, the vast majority of milk in the UK will 
pass through one of a small number of processors. In 2013, of a total of 13,563m litres of milk 
available for human consumption in the UK, 12,952m litres were delivered to processors (see 
Figure 5b). The processor market is extremely concentrated, with 80% of milk produced in 
2011/12 being purchased by just seven processors (DairyCo 2013b, p.4). This concentration is 
even more pronounced since 2012 following the takeover of the major processor Robert 
Wiseman by German dairy giant Müller43 and the merger of Arla with Milk Link.44  
 
This – in combination with the concentration in the retail market – has implications for value 
chain governance, including the duration and strength of buyer-supplier relationships, and the 
terms by which those relationships are governed (see more below, 5.2.6). 
 	
42 Personal communication, DairyCo representative 2 December 2014 
 
43 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-scotland-business-16572516  
 
44 https://www.arlafoods.co.uk/overview/news--press/2012/pressrelease/milk-link-and-arla-foods-
amba-farmers-vote-yes-to-merger-proposal-791953/  
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Figure 5b: UK Milk Flows 2013 (million litres) (a) 
 
 
Source: DairyCo (2014), p.29 
 
Moreover, given this market concentration, the largest processors will typically serve two or 
more end product markets (see Table 5c). One result of this is that the price received by a 
farmer supplying milk to domestic liquid markets may be influenced by price movements in 
any of the global commodities markets (e.g. for cheese, milk powders, or cream and butter) that 
the processor operates in (e.g. House of Commons 2011, p.13). 
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Further, processors employ various strategies for managing risks associated with end markets, 
chiefly, the practice of ‘balancing’ (MDC 2005 p.20). Due to variability in both upstream supply 
(resulting in part from seasonal fluctuations in production; see 5.1.2) and downstream demand, 
processors must address inevitable mismatches between the two, and they therefore take a 
strategic decision to be either a net seller or a net buyer into spot markets for milk (see Table 
5c). Security of supply is therefore a priority for milk buyers (see further 5.2.5). 
 
One consequence of such practices is that there may be a fundamental dislocation between the 
on-farm production of milk and the end use to which it is put. Studies suggest that such 
‘commodification’ of products dilutes producers’ power and ability to capture value (Kaplinsky 
and Fitter 2004; of which more below, 5.2.3). Indeed, as Kaplinsky and Morris note: “the way in 
which producers are connected to final markets may influence their ability to gain from 
participating in global markets … participation in global markets is not just governed by trade 
policies in final market countries … [but] also reflects the strategic decision of the lead firms in 
the value chains” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.12-13). 
 
Table 5c: Estimated distribution of raw milk to market sectors 2011/1245 
 
 
Source: DairyCo 2013, p.14 
 
 	
45 This table shows a snapshot of the estimated flow of raw milk into different market sectors in the period 
April 2011 to March 2012. The amount of raw milk going into different sectors continually changes in line 
with market dynamics and this table is therefore not an accurate reflection of the current marketplace. 
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Although retailers (i.e. supermarkets) do not serve multiple global markets, they must still take 
measures to match supply to demand, particularly because demand levels for liquid milk 
remain fairly constant throughout the year46, whereas production is more variable, traditionally 
peaking in the spring (security of supply is therefore a priority for supermarkets as well as 
processors; see further below, 5.2.5).  
 
One important way in which milk buyers match supply to demand is to implement measures 
within farmers’ contracts, either in the form of bonuses or penalties for production 
above/below a specified level (see below 5.2.6)   
 
A more thorough examination of the full range UK milk buyer strategies (and of the effects of 
these upon the prices that buyers are prepared to pay farmers for raw milk, or that they willing 
to accept from downstream purchasers for processed milk) is beyond the scope of this study. 
Instead, the discussion above merely serves to highlight the complexity of value chains for milk 
and dairy products; to emphasise the fact that these value chains are interconnected; and to 
demonstrate that, rather than there being one “relatively simple” value chain for milk in the UK 
(Mylan et al 2015, p.24), there are instead several different value chains (at a minimum one for 
liquid milk and one for manufacturing), which interact with one another.  
 
Indeed, the picture is made still more complex because, within the value chain for liquid milk, 
there are at least three separate but interrelated value chains, associated with three distinct 
arrangements for the purchase of liquid milk (and therefore distinct conditions of value chain 
governance47): 
• Non-aligned – In this arrangement, milk buyers (including the supermarkets Asda and 
Morrisons, the discounters such as Aldi and Lidl, and the broader ‘middle market’ 
including convenience stores, catering companies, coffee shops etc) purchase their milk 
from a generic pool of farmers supplying a processor. The majority (76%) of milk in the 
UK is purchased in this way,48 including milk destined for processors’ branded liquid 
milk products. Such arrangements introduce the potential for ‘dislocation’ of producer 
from end market (outlined above). 
• Aligned, non-segregated – In this arrangement, supermarkets source their milk from a 
dedicated pool of producers. The supermarket outsources the collection and processing 		
46 Personal communication, DairyCo representative 2 December 2014 	
47 Personal Communication, DairyCo representative 2 December 2014 
 
48 DairyCo 2013b, p.8: “approximately one in every four litres (24%) of milk produced in GB during the 
2011/12 milk year was purchased on retailer aligned contracts” 
		
	
77	
of the milk (the contracts for these functions being put out to tender periodically). 
However, the milk is not ‘segregated’ (or ring-fenced) but is instead pooled with all of 
the other milk collected by the processor (including the processor’s ‘non-aligned’ pool). 
During the period covered by this study, The Co-operative was the only supermarket 
operating this purchasing model. 
• Aligned, segregated – In this arrangement, supermarkets (namely, Tesco, Sainsbury’s, 
Waitrose, and M&S) source their milk from a dedicated, traceable pool of producers. 
The supermarket outsources the collection and processing of the milk, which is 
‘segregated’ (i.e. kept separate from the other milk handled by the processor). The issue 
of ‘dislocation’ is therefore diminished. Moreover, such segregation may accompany 
the specification of production or product characteristics distinct from those prevalent 
across the broader value chain for liquid milk (see 5.2.5), as well as different buyer-
farmer relationships and mechanisms of value chain governance, such as benchmarking 
of farmers against each other (see 5.2.6).  
 
Again, although the aim of this study is to distinguish the influence of different buyers upon 
farmers, and it is therefore necessary to distinguish these different value chains and their 
distinct governance conditions for the purposes of analysis, it is difficult to consider the value 
chains of different buyers completely in isolation, given that processors may operate across all 
three. For example, a processor operating an aligned milk pool for a supermarket may use milk 
from farmers that supply its non-aligned pools in order to make up shortfalls to the aligned 
pool49, paying those farmers a bonus to the usual non-aligned price they receive (i.e. a form of 
‘balancing’).  
 
This practice highlights the fact that, because processors operate across both aligned and non-
aligned value chains, aligned contracts have in practice served to create a system of ‘haves’ and 
‘have nots’ (House of Commons 2011, p.14). Indeed, as Kaplinsky and Morris note, “parties are 
often involved in different value chains and these may result in cross-cutting power between 
value chains with the demands of one dominating the other with detrimental effects down the 
chain” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.66).  
 
Such effects may be understood through a consideration of distributional outcomes and value 
chain governance, discussed below (5.2.3), which will further illuminate the shortcomings 
associated with sector-level approaches to analysing buyers’ influence upon farmers, 
supporting the farm-level analytical approach adopted in this study. 	
49 e.g. the Tesco and Asda ‘Seasonal’ milk pools www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalreports/dairy-industry-
sector-report/milkpricewars.aspx  
 
		
	
78	
 
Taken in combination with the different clusters outlined in 5.1, above, farms will fall into one 
of the following six broad categories, for the purposes of this study: 
• Aligned intensive 
• Aligned intermediate 
• Aligned extensive 
• Non-aligned intensive 
• Non-aligned intermediate 
• Non-aligned extensive. 
5.2.3 Distributional Outcomes across the Value Chain for Liquid Milk 
Bearing in mind the limitations outlined in the preceding section, the following provides a high-
level analysis of distributional outcomes within the value chain for liquid milk as a whole (i.e. 
aligned and non-aligned value chains).  
 
Estimated gross output values for the various activities in the value chain for liquid milk are 
readily available for dairy farming, processing and retailing, although it is not possible to 
determine the value captured by upstream suppliers of agricultural inputs (i.e. machinery, feed, 
consultancy etc).  
 
Up until 2011, DairyCo (now AHDB Dairy) published details of dairy supply chain margins for 
farmers, processors and retailers in the liquid milk, mild cheddar and mature cheddar 
markets.50 For the year 2010/11, these figures are summarised in Table 5d, while Figure 5c 
shows fluctuations in these margins over time – notably a ‘double squeeze’ on processor 
margins can be seen in 2010 as farmgate prices increased and retail prices dropped 
simultaneously, with retailers apparently passing losses in revenue on to processors. 
 
Table 5d: Liquid milk value chain gross margins 2010/11  
 
 Value captured (as % of 
final retail price) 
Value captured (ppl) 
Distributional 
outcomes (value 
extracted by each 
actor) 
Dairy Farmers 
 
43% 25.327 
Processors 
 
23% 13.547 
Retailers 
 
34% 20.026 
TOTAL 100% 58.9p 
 
Source: Adapted from DairyCo 2011b, p.6 	
50 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/processing-trade/dairy-supply-chain-margins/dairy-
supply-chain-margins/#.WdHxexSgf5o  	
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Figure 5c: Prices and gross margins for UK liquid milk 1999-2011 
 
* Gross margin equals the difference between the selling price and the buying price for milk 
 
Source: DairyCo 2011b, p.6 
 
 
 
The gross output values summarised above must be interpreted with some caution, based as 
they are upon estimated average annual prices paid and received by all chain participants. For 
example, they do not capture fully: 
• The degree of price variation in the market51 – Indeed, while the average annual 
farmgate price for the year 2010/11 was 25.33ppl, the price received under the best 
paying contract was 29.72ppl compared with 23.79ppl under the worst.  
• The range of prices received by processors from different retailers – The prices 
received by processors from retailers may vary according to the nature of the end 
product (e.g. ‘branded’ liquid milk products versus ‘own label’) and, moreover, the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties involved. Furthermore, it is unclear what 
categories of retailers are included in this data, i.e. whether the figures refer exclusively 
to large supermarket retailers (‘multiples’) or whether the ‘middle market’ (smaller 
retailers, caterers and food service businesses, etc) is included. 
• The range of final retail prices for liquid milk products (e.g. branded, own label etc) – 
Branded products will have a different retail price than supermarkets’ own label 	
51 The figures in Table 5d are also exclusive of bonuses, when compared against: 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/uk-farmgate-
milk-prices/#.WdS1rxSgf5o 
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products. For example, at the time of writing a 2 litre bottle of Tesco’s own brand semi-
skimmed, filtered milk cost £1.3052, whereas a 2 litre bottle of Arla Cravendale semi-
skimmed, filtered milk cost £1.80.53 
 
 
Given the observed variability in the above parameters, a range of distributional outcomes is 
possible, and in particular the difference in distributional outcomes between aligned and non-
aligned value chains may be considerable. Although farmers, processors and retailers may in 
aggregate terms capture 43%, 23% and 32% of the value of liquid milk sales respectively, these 
figures do not illuminate the differences in “distributional outcomes within any particular link of the 
chain” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.42). It is therefore important to consider not only inter-link 
distributional outcomes but, moreover, intra-link distributional outcomes, which suggests not 
only that these value chains should be analysed separately, but that a farm, rather than a sector, 
level of analysis may better illuminate buyer influence upon farms. 
 
For example, if one were to consider distributional outcomes for farms on retail-aligned 
contracts alone, the farmer may capture a relatively larger proportion of value (compared with 
the sector mean). Moreover, it may be that this comes at the expense of processors’ margins, 
assuming that the retailer is able to pass costs on to the processor (e.g. DairyCo 2011b, p.8). 
Ultimately, processors may look to offset the reduced margins associated with servicing 
supermarket contracts by paying a lower farmgate price to their non-aligned suppliers. Indeed, 
there are concerns within the industry that farmers on non-aligned contracts are effectively 
subsidising those on aligned contracts.54  
 
These disparities between the distributional outcomes for farmers operating in aligned chains, 
compared with those operating in non-aligned chains, which are exacerbated by the 
involvement of processors within both chains, therefore have implications for value chain 
governance, requiring analysis at the sub-sector level. 
5.2.4 Profitability and Specialisation: Variability by Cluster 
A further shortcoming of analysing distributional outcomes at the sector level, as represented in 
Figure 5c, is that gross margins may not provide an indication of “the incomes which are 
sustained in different parts of the chain” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.42) as they don’t 	
52 https://www.tesco.com/groceries/en-GB/products/253737115  
 
53 https://www.tesco.com/groceries/en-GB/products/257264875  
 
54 Personal Communication, December 2014 
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account for the different production costs associated with different farm socio-technical systems 
(different input costs associated with different clusters of farm systems can be seen in 5.1.2, 
Tables 5a and 5b, above).  
 
Profits can be obtained by deducting farm production costs, processing costs, and retailing costs 
from gross margins at each stage in the chain, and may offer a more useful perspective on 
distributional outcomes. For example, farmers’ gross margins for 2010/11 represent 43% (i.e. 
the majority) of value captured, although when production costs are accounted for farmers on 
average made a loss of -3.96 pence on each litre of milk sold (and made losses throughout the 
period from 2006/7 to 2010/11; Table 5e).  
 
Again, sector-level profit margins conceal the considerable variation in production costs from 
farm to farm. As an extreme example, a farm with low production costs that is on a retail-
aligned contract (i.e. receiving a higher farmgate price) may be considerably more profitable 
than a farm with high production costs on a non-aligned contract. This has implications in 
terms of the effectiveness of mechanisms of value chain governance in influencing farms. For 
example, it may that sanctions imposed by buyers – in the form of a high/low milk price – 
influence different farm clusters differently, due to differences in the production costs of these 
clusters. 
 
Table 5e: Liquid milk value chain net margins 2006/7 – 2010/11  	
 Year 
 
2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
Farmers’ gross margin 
(farmgate price) (ppl)** 
17.85 22.85 25.75 23.79 25.14 
Farmers’ cost of 
production (ppl) 
22.081 24.591 26.641 27.352 29.102 
Farmers’ profit (ppl) 
 
-4.23 -1.74 -0.89 -3.56 -3.96 
Processor selling price** 
 
36.06 40.34 46.10 42.71 38.77 
Processors’ gross 
margin (ppl)** 
18.21 17.49 20.35 18.91 13.63 
Processors’ costs** 
 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Processors’ profit (ppl)** n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Retailer’s selling price** 56.13 61.59 64.26 64.46 58.14 
Retailers’ gross margin** 
(ppl) 
20.07 21.25 18.17 21.75 19.37 
Retailers’ costs n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Retailers’ profit (ppl) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
** adapted from monthly data published by DairyCo. https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/processing-trade/dairy-supply-
chain-margins/#.WdIoFRSgf5o Figures have been annualised for periods starting April to March the following calendar year, and rounded to two 
decimal places. Figures are prices for liquid milk. 1. Source: Promar International “The real price of milk” 
http://milkprices.com/archive/Mar08archive.pdf; 2. NFU: 
https://www.farminguk.com/content/knowledge/COP%20Report%20Feb%202011%20FINAL%202011.pdf;  
 
 
Although average farm production costs are readily available – and have been published at 
irregular intervals by AHDB Dairy, the NFU, and consultants such as Promar International – 
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there is considerably less transparency surrounding processing and retailing costs. When 
contacted, the trade association for the British dairy supply chain – DairyUK – was unable (or 
unwilling) to provide an indication of ‘typical’ processing costs. 
 
The 2010/2011 annual report of Robert Wiseman Dairies55 provided a crude means of 
ascertaining a ‘ballpark’ figure for liquid milk processing costs. The company, prior to its 
acquisition by Muller, was a large processor operating almost exclusively in the liquid milk 
market.56 Its published operating profit margin therefore corresponded broadly to total revenue 
from sales of liquid milk minus total (fixed and variable) processing costs for liquid milk (i.e. 
the company was selected deliberately because of its lack of exposure to markets for other dairy 
products such as cheese, which will have different processing costs compared with liquid milk).  
 
For the year 2011, the company’s operating profit margin was reported as 4.1% (adjusted for 
restructuring costs, p.11, p.19), or 4.1p on every £1 of sales. Assuming that the price at which 
Wiseman sold its milk was in line with the industry average (i.e. 38.77ppl) and its gross margins 
were in line with industry average (i.e. 13.63ppl) then its profit on each litre sold can be 
calculated as 4.1% of 38.77ppl (i.e. 1.59ppl), and its processing costs can be calculated as gross 
margin less profit (i.e.12.04ppl).  
 
Other estimates of variable production costs – including processing (3ppl), bottling (4.5ppl) and 
distribution (7.2ppl) – suggest that processors’ total variable costs may be in the region of 
16.7ppl (2007 prices) (Smith and Thanassoulis 2008, p.20). 
 
There is even less transparency with regard to retailers’ costs, and some disagreement over 
whether retailers use liquid milk as a ’loss leader’ (House of Commons 2004). While some 
within the industry believe that “it could well be that the supermarkets accept no margin on the 
sales of milk”57 it has also been suggested that “there is no evidence that milk is being used as a 
‘loss leader’…” (Lingard 2015). However, because retailers do not disclose the price at which 
they purchase milk, or other associated costs, there is no way of proving for certain whether 
they are using milk as a loss leader or not. 
 
In summary, distributional outcomes in liquid milk value chains are the result of both the 
relative power of parties and their degrees of specialisation, which vary between aligned and 	
55 http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReports/PDF/RWD2010.pdf  
 
56 DairyCo 2013b, p.14 
 
57 Personal communication with industry insider, 2 December 2014 
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non-aligned chains. At a general level, farmers are specialised, performing a single function (the 
production of a generic, commoditised product that can be redirected to any number of end 
uses), which hinders their ability to secure rents. Processors have diversified their activities, 
accessing multiple end markets in order to spread risk. Supermarkets have a diverse product 
offering, meaning that they can offset losses made on one product (i.e. milk) against others. 
Moreover, the power of supermarkets relative to processors – and the involvement of the latter 
across both aligned and non-aligned chains – means that supermarkets may be able to exert 
influence both directly, within aligned chains, and indirectly, within non-aligned chains. 
5.2.5 Summary of Buyers’ Demands  
The broad ‘social problem’ of dairy farming in the UK was defined (in section 5.1) as ‘the 
provision of food at scale’, and the solution of this problem was defined as ‘the domestication of 
dairy cattle for the production of milk to conventional (i.e. not organic) standards by (and as a 
primary commercial activity of) organised agricultural enterprises, for purchase by milk 
processors’. Defining this problem at the sector level serves to outline the “outer boundaries” of 
the socio-technical regime for UK dairy farming (Dosi 1982, p.154), within which a range of 
clusters was identified (5.1.2). Although these clusters share this common goal of ‘providing 
food at scale’, at the subsector (i.e. individual cluster or farm) level of analysis a spectrum of 
goals nested within this broader regime-level goal will exist, identified with the different socio-
technical system inputs and outputs of farms operating within these clusters. Put differently, 
intensive, intermediate and extensive farms will tend towards distinct system goals. 
 
Similarly, the various actors within the value chain for liquid milk, while broadly agreeing on 
the overarching goal of ‘providing food at scale’ will – at the subsector level of analysis – 
emphasise to varying degrees different dimensions of this goal. In order to determine the 
influence of buyers’ demands upon farms (through analysing the correspondence between farm 
inputs/outputs as a proxy for ‘system goals’ and buyers’ demands; 4.2) it is necessary to 
characterise these demands and enumerate the mechanisms through which buyers exercise 
power to encourage compliance with these demands. From the foregoing overview of the value 
chain for milk (5.2), it is clear that milk buyers define the ‘problem agenda’ of dairy farming 
using the following (interrelated) dimensions: 
• Security of supply – The milk buyer’s goal is to procure sufficient volumes of liquid 
milk to satisfy customers’ demands throughout the year. Supermarkets, for example, 
may seek to manipulate the volumes of milk supplied by farmers (which tend to 
fluctuate seasonally throughout the year due to the seasonal variations in production 
associated with different farm systems, see 5.1.2) so that these match consumer 
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demand, which is broadly level throughout the year. Traditionally, production in the 
UK has peaked in the Spring (the so-called ‘Spring flush’58). 
 
• Product characteristics, including the composition and constituent content of the milk, 
and food hygiene and safety standards. Notably, there is a relationship between buyers’ 
demands regarding security of supply (volumes and seasonality) and buyers’ demands 
regarding product characteristics. Increases in the volume of milk produced per cow 
typically accompany reductions in the constituent content of the milk.  
 
• Production characteristics, which may include specific demands concerning both the 
performance of farms with regard to environmental impacts and animal welfare, and 
farms’ efficiency and production costs.  
 
 
Changes along these dimensions are often changes of scale (e.g. an incremental tightening of 
existing demands regarding, for example, hygiene standards) rather than changes of kind (e.g. 
the introduction of a requirement for ‘locomotion scoring’ of cattle, where no previous 
requirement had existed). These dimensions of variability and change in technologies (outlined 
above, 5.1.2) are related, but they are not identical. The analysis will involve relating changes in 
socio-technical system functioning (using the dimensions in 5.1.2) to changes in demands (using 
the dimensions above). Significantly, there may be several possible technological approaches to 
satisfying buyer demands, and the approach selected may vary from system to system. 
5.2.6 Distinctions in Governance Conditions within Different Value Chains 
The overview of the value chain for milk (above, 5.2) also highlights the differences between 
governance conditions within aligned and non-aligned value chains, along the various 
dimensions of value chain governance with which this study characterises value chains 
(namely, depth and pervasiveness, sanctions, trust and the separation of powers; summarised 
in 4.3.2). The ability of buyers to secure compliance with their demands is a product of these 
governance conditions. This section describes in greater detail both the relationships between 
these dimensions and the distinctions (along these dimensions) between aligned and non-
aligned value chains that will be deemed relevant for the analysis. 
 
The depth and pervasiveness of rules – “Depth” refers to “the extent to which [governance] 
affects the core activities of individual parties in the chain”, while “pervasiveness” refers to 
“how widely over the chain … power is exercised” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.32). Broadly, 	
58 ibid. 
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rules that do not require ‘deep’ or ‘pervasive’ change will be more readily complied with. For 
the purposes of the analysis: 
• The depth and pervasiveness of given rules will vary from cluster to cluster – because 
different systems will have different ‘core activities’ (5.1) – and the influence of buyers 
upon farms will therefore depend upon farms’ ‘starting points’ and must be considered 
relative to their clusters (see 4.2) 
• Rules regarding the security of supply and production characteristics may relate to both 
system inputs and system outputs (and may therefore affect farms’ ‘core activities’). By 
contrast, rules regarding product characteristics will typically only relate to outputs 
and may therefore be complied with through a variety of methods, without necessarily 
involving changes to core activities. Buyers’ demands regarding the security of supply 
and production characteristics (e.g. the adoption or rejection of specific technologies or 
standards) will therefore typically be ‘deeper’ than those regarding product 
characteristics.  
• Rules that persist over time are more likely to be ‘deep’ and ‘pervasive’ than rules 
requiring ‘one off’ or reversible changes at a fixed point in time, particularly where 
such rules mandate recurring, enduring or possibly escalating changes. 
• If rules demand continual improvements and/or serve to raise best practice standards 
across the market (i.e. capturing in an ever-wider number of participants through the 
creation of expectation or co-ordination effects, see 4.3.1) this may increase their depth 
and pervasiveness. The practice of benchmarking (5.2.2 above) may provide an 
example of this. As Tesco suggest: “We set targets for improvement each year, and 
monitor important areas such as lameness, cleanliness and cow health in each farm … 
Examples of improvements we have driven across the group include cow mobility 
(4.63%) and reduced abrasions (4.71%)”.59 
 
 
The separation / concentration of powers – Patterns of technological change will be attributed 
to buyer power where such power is exercised through rules developed, administered or 
enforced by buyers, which specify product, production or security of supply requirements that 
are in excess of industry wide ‘legal minima’ stipulated by authorities and agencies (such as 
Defra, The Environment Agency etc). Where buyers perform two or more of these functions 
(development, administration or enforcement) this will indicate a concentration of power. On 
the one hand, such a concentration may enhance the buyer’s ability to influence farmers, 	
59 
https://www.tescoplc.com/assets/files/cms/Food_news_results/Agri_content/Tesco_welfare_standard
s_for_dairy_cows.pdf  	
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through either increasing the effectiveness of sanctions (see below) and/or increasing farmers’ 
reliance on the buyer (see below). On the other hand, it may negatively affect conditions of trust 
(see below) within the chain. 
 
Sanctions – The analysis will consider the following sanctions, implemented by buyers in order 
to influence farmers with regard to the security of supply, production standards and product 
standards: 
• The power to exclude – The punitive value of losing (or of being refused) a contract 
may be measured crudely in terms of opportunity cost. The opportunity cost associated 
with losing (or failing to secure) a contract will be a product of the milk price paid 
under the contract and the milk volumes demanded by the buyer, as well as the 
availability of an alternative contract (and the price paid under that contract compared 
with the current contract).  
• Base prices for milk – A high base price (relative to average market prices) may be 
(broadly) indicative of buyer demand for increased volume while a low base price will 
be indicative of buyer demand for reduced volume. High, and stable, milk prices may 
be more effective in influencing farmers than low and/or volatile prices.  
• Bonuses for increased production and penalties for underproduction.  
• A / B pricing – The buyer may pay an ‘A’ price for each litre of milk supplied up to a 
certain volume, and a lower (‘B’) price for each additional litre of milk supplied. The 
effectiveness of such measures may depend upon where the levels of the A and B prices 
are set relative to prices available in the wider market. 
• Seasonality payments – adjustments to base prices to either reward or penalise 
production beyond certain limits at specific times of the year. The effectiveness of such 
payments will vary from system to system given the differences in production profile 
inherent to all year, Autumn and Spring calving models (5.1, above).  
 
Trust – For the purposes of this study, trust refers to participants’ confidence in the continuity, 
reliability and predictability of the operation of the value chain (with trust being enhanced 
[diminished] by conditions that support [threaten] such continuity, reliability or predictability). 
As noted earlier (3.6.3), Kaplinsky and Morris propose a number of “data points” that may be 
referred to when assessing levels of trust within a value chain. Table 5f summarises these data 
points, alongside a number of questions that may be considered when examining contractual 
and broader relationships between farmers and buyers.  
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Table 5f: Assessing Trust Relations in the Value Chain  
 
 Low Trust 
Chains 
High Trust 
Chains 
Relevant Questions for Analysis 
Length of 
contracts / 
trading 
relationship 
“Short-term” “Long-term” • How long has the farm been supplying the buyer? 
 
 
Modes of 
inspection used 
in accepting 
incoming 
materials 
“Inspection on 
delivery” 
 
“Little or no 
inspection on 
delivery for most 
parts” 
 
• How frequently and intensively are producers inspected by 
buyers? 
• What information is gathered? 
• How does the buyer use this information (e.g. for 
benchmarking purposes)? 
 
Degree of 
reliance which 
firms have on 
each other 
“Supplier has 
many 
customers, and 
customer has 
multiple 
sources” 
 
“Few customers 
for supplier and 
single- or dual-
sourcing by 
customer” 
 
• How readily available are alternative buyers if farmers are 
unhappy with their current buyer? 
• How readily available are alternative farmers if buyers are 
unhappy with a farmer’s performance? 
 
Types of 
technical 
assistance  
flowing along the 
chain 
“Expertise rarely 
pooled, and 
assistance only 
when paid for” 
 
“Extensive 
unilateral or 
bilateral 
technology 
transfer over time” 
 
• What types of assistance do buyers offer (e.g. technical or 
financial assistance, producer groups, training days, 
research centres, etc)?  
• How ‘deep’ is such assistance (e.g. does it extend beyond 
the achievement of product outcomes to influence 
production processes)? 
• How ‘pervasive’ is such assistance (e.g. is it extended to 
all farmers within a producer group, or only to a subset of 
farmers, who satisfy certain requirements)? 
• How is the scope of such assistance determined (e.g. do 
farmers play a role in defining the type of assistance they 
require, or is this determined unilaterally by buyers)? 
 
Nature and 
methods of 
communication 
along the chain 
“Infrequent and 
through formal 
channels. 
Narrowly 
focused on 
purchasing 
department” 
 
“Multi-channelled, 
including, 
engineers, 
personnel 
department and 
top management; 
frequent and often 
informal” 
 
• What are the channels and frequency of communication? 
• Is such communication bilateral or unilateral?  
 
Determination of 
prices 
“Adversarial, 
with hiding of 
information” 
 
“Non-adversarial 
with "open books" 
 
How are prices calculated (i.e. are prices calculated on a 
discretionary basis, or according to a transparent formula, 
such as ‘cost of production’)?  
 
 
Source: Adapted from Kaplinsky and Morris (2001), p.74. NB: The term ‘reliance’ is used here (and 
throughout this study) in preference to Kaplinsky and Morris’s term ‘dependence’. This is for the avoidance 
of confusion with the term ‘path dependence’ (Chapters 2 and 3). 
 
 
Kaplinsky and Morris suggest that the effect of rules upon behaviour “is a function of sanctions 
and legitimacy [i.e. trust]” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.74). They add that: “the effectiveness 
of a governor’s command of a chain does not only reflect the power of its sanctions, but also the 
trust which its suppliers or customers have in it. This is particularly important in assessing the 
long-term viability of the chain” (ibid. p.73). 
 
This study is not primarily concerned with the viability of the UK value chain for liquid milk. 
However, the duration of relationships between chain participants is a significant variable to 
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consider when attempting to understand whether and how power influences technological 
change, which often occurs over long periods of time. For example, where relationships 
between buyers and farmers are short-lived, it could be that either: 
a) The opportunity for buyers to influence technological change amongst individual 
producers is limited. Within a low-trust value chain, in which a farmer’s failure to 
satisfy the buyer’s requirements may result in their immediate exclusion, technological 
change on the part of that farmer may be inhibited (i.e. due to their immediate 
exclusion) and therefore the buyer’s ability to influence such technological change is 
diminished (with respect to the individual farmer, albeit these circumstances may 
effectively enhance the buyer’s ability to influence technological change at the sector 
level if farmers that don’t satisfy its requirements thereby fall out of the market 
altogether); or 
b) The buyer’s ability to influence technological change may be increased (i.e. the severity 
of the sanctions may force producers to immediately comply, rapidly implementing 
technological changes to meet buyer’s requirements in order to avoid immediate 
sanction).  
 
 
Whether (a) or (b) occurs may depend upon the availability of alternative buyers in the market 
(and therefore relates to the buyer’s power to exclude, above). If there are no alternative buyers, 
then the producer may be more willing to comply. Therefore, the “degree of dependence 
[reliance]60” that parties have on each other is both an indicator and a product of trust within 
the value chain (Kaplinsky and Morris. 2001, p.73). In the context of dairy farming, assessing 
available alternative buyers for dairy farmers is a matter of both geographical circumstances 
and market concentration. Indeed, “the fact that in some parts of the country farmers do not 
necessarily have access to alternative milk buyers reduces the extent to which there can be 
competition for demand for raw milk.” (House of Commons 2011, Ev 3) 
 
Whether (a) or (b) occurs may also depend upon the speed and ease with which the required 
technological changes can be achieved, and therefore upon the existing technologies in use (see 
above, with regard to the depth and pervasiveness of rules and different ‘core activities’ 
associated with different clusters of farms; 5.1), as well as the availability of financial and other 
resources. Therefore, when assessing the effectiveness of buyers’ sanctioning power it may also 
be necessary to consider this in relation to the depth of the change that such power is directed at 
securing. If buyer requirements necessitate shallow changes, then the farmer may make such 	
60 The term ‘reliance’ is used in this study in preference to Kaplinsky and Morris’s term ‘dependence’. This 
is for the avoidance of confusion with the term “path dependence” (Chapters 2 and 3). 
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changes even when relatively little power is exercised. If deep changes are required then the 
farmer may not be willing/able to make these, even in the face of an extremely powerful buyer. 
 
The duration of relationships – and the role of trust in sustaining them – also raises the question 
of how technological changes are negotiated. Conditions of low trust may be characterised by 
unilateral action, whereas conditions of higher trust may be characterised by bilateral 
interaction or collaborative relationships. Within such relationships, producers may be 
supported in meeting requirements, as opposed to being coerced (see Table 5f, “types of 
technical assistance”). As Kaplinsky and Morris note: “in modern flexible production systems 
… trust becomes increasingly important, and failure to reach the required level of standards 
does not automatically result in the sanction of exclusion; instead executive governance is 
exercised to assist the transgressing party to achieve the required levels of performance” (ibid. 
p.31-32).  
 
Within such collaborative situations, however, assessing the scale and effect of power may not 
be straightforward. Collaboration should not be confused with equality or parity in bargaining 
power. Collaboration that results in parties ‘meeting in the middle’ may be more indicative of 
parity between those parties than collaborative efforts that result in an outcome identical to that 
initially requested by the buyer. Moreover, the provision of ‘support’ should not automatically 
be interpreted as diminished power on the part of the buyer. Providing support may simply 
offer a more politically-expedient means of achieving the desired outcome, in particular when 
such support accompanies significant data gathering by buyers (as in the case of benchmarking 
exercises; 5.2.2). An assessment of collaborative efforts, and the provision of support by buyers 
in the dairy value chain, should consider these possibilities. 
 
Through understanding such collaboration as a process of “collective stabilisation and closure” 
of technological frames (Meyer and Schubert 2007, p.35; 4.3.3), the assessment of buyer 
influence upon farms moves beyond a consideration of the correspondence between farm 
system goals (as these differ amongst different clusters; above 5.1.2) and buyers’ demands (as 
these differ along the dimensions outlined in 5.2.5), to include a consideration of how these 
interact and inform one another other and of the beliefs or meanings that underpin these goals. 
 
Indeed, although evidence of “sustained governance” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.30) may be 
relatively easy to glean by reference to the data points in Table 5f, it is suggested that they may 
not provide a complete picture of power relations between chain participants. It is suggested 
that ‘trust’ is an imperfect proxy for ‘legitimacy’ (being centred on a regulative perspective of 
the nature of governance; see 3.6.3). As outlined above, the duration of the relationship between 
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a governor and those whom it governs may not provide conclusive evidence that the former is 
supported by the latter, but may instead indicate mere acceptance or tolerance of the situation 
by the latter, due to the absence of an alternative. ‘Trust’ may therefore provide an imperfect 
depiction of the true nature of the relationship between chain participants. This is significant in 
the context of the present study, which is centred on understanding whether and how buyers 
influence producers. Conceptual tools drawn from SCOT (see 4.2.3), namely the notion of 
‘technological frames’, may illuminate the analyst’s understanding of trust conditions, through 
providing a consideration of not only formal transactional interactions between buyers and 
farmers but, moreover (and more informally), the way that farmers think and feel about such 
relations. 
 
With that in mind, in conjunction with these data points, it will be useful to examine chain 
participants’ perspectives regarding such rules (including, for example, whether they regard 
prices or pricing mechanisms as ‘fair’), on the basis that these may provide a more complete 
picture of the relationship between – and relative power of – chain participants. These 
perspectives will be captured at interview, through questions directed at eliciting information 
regarding farmers’ ‘mindsets’ (4.2.3, 5.1.1), not only in relation to technologies but, moreover, in 
relation to the regulative framework within which they operate. This will provide an indication 
of the process of stabilisation and closure of technological frames. 
 
Finally, immediate and punitive exclusionary sanctions are not the only possible cause of short-
lived, low-trust relationships. Positive sanctions (i.e. prices and bonuses) may also be a factor in 
the duration of relationships. If buyers do not offer an attractive and/or stable price, producers 
may ‘shop around’ in search of a better alternative (although farmers are nearly always “price 
takers” – DairyCo 2011a p.3). High-trust situations may therefore be characterised by higher, 
more stable and transparent prices. Where prices are stable over the long term (as with cost of 
production pricing associated with aligned contracts) then this may also impact upon 
technological development as it enables farmers to plan ahead with regard to investment 
decisions. The strength of both positive and negative sanctions should therefore be borne in 
mind when assessing the extent to which ‘collaboration’ is truly ‘collaborative’.  
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Chapter 6:  
Data collection and  
Case Study Approach 
 
 
This chapter describes the data collection and case study approach adopted in this study. It 
begins by explaining how the interpretive aims of the study imply a set of indicators and 
consequently data requirements61 that can be provided by using a case study approach (6.1). 
This is followed by an enumeration of the relevant (and available) sources of data (6.2), 
including an account of the process and reasoning behind the selection of particular farms as 
the subjects of case studies (6.2.1), as well as a summary of the key characteristics of those farms 
(6.2.2). The types of data collected and the chosen methods of data collection and analysis are 
then described (6.2.3, 6.2.4). Limitations associated with this approach are suggested in 6.3. 
6.1 Data Requirements and Case Study Approach 
As outlined in Chapter 4, this study aims to understand the influence of buyers upon patterns 
of technological change in UK dairy farms through: 
• allocating selected dairy farms, as socio-technical systems, belonging to one of three 
clusters (intensive, intermediate and extensive), by reference to their configurations of 
technological inputs and associated outputs;  
• explaining the mechanisms through which these systems function and are stabilised; 
and  
• identifying and analysing the changing relationships between, on the one hand, 
changes in these inputs and outputs and on the other changes in buyers’ demands over 
the period 1994-2016.  
 
 
Understanding these processes requires the collection and analysis of multiple sources of both 
qualitative and quantitative data. These data requirements, and their relationship with the 
analytical framework, are summarised in Table 6a. The indicators that were chosen were 
consequent on the discussion in Section 5.1, where the key characteristics of dairy farms as 
socio-technical systems were identified. 
 
Conducting case studies at the farm level provides one method of obtaining such data, enabling 
the collection of both quantitative data about the technologies used by farms and the conditions 	
61 As discussed already (5.1), the research question informed the components that were regarded as ‘more 
important’ within the analysis. This in turn informed the primary data requirements of the study. 
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of value chain governance within which farms operate, as well as qualitative data explaining 
the farmers’ selection of those technologies and the influence of value chain conditions upon 
that selection. Bearing these data requirements in mind, and considering the interpretive 
ambitions of this study, a case study approach was selected, which was aimed at comparing 
several cases “… identify[ing] issues within each case and then look[ing] for common themes 
that transcend the cases” (Creswell 2013, p.101).  
 
 
Table 6a: Data Requirements  
 
Analytical Layer Data Requirements 
 
Layer 1: Describing 
and characterising 
observed 
technological 
changes  
Evidence of variations and changes in socio-technical system inputs and 
outputs (between 1994-2016) associated with: 
• Feeding technologies 
• Buildings and housing technologies 
• Breeding technologies 
• Fertility technologies 
• Milking technologies 
• Animal husbandry and veterinary medicine technologies 
• Production cycle (‘calving pattern’) technologies 
• Waste management technologies. 
 
Layer 2: Identifying 
the mechanisms 
underlying 
technological 
changes  
Evidence of interactions between the technological components described 
above, explaining both positive feedback effects and reverse salients 
resulting from these interactions. 
 
Evidence of variations and changes in other system components 
(resources, institutions and actors), and their relationship with farms’ 
selected technological inputs (i.e. their contribution towards positive 
feedback effects and reverse salients), including: 
• Labour resources 
• Knowledge / skills / beliefs embedded in farmers and their labour force 
• Financial capital 
• Land and physical location 
• Local climate 
• Transport infrastructure and links. 
 
Evidence of the sequence in which such technological changes were 
required and introduced. 
 
Layer 3: 
Determining the 
contribution of 
buyer power to the 
above  
Evidence of buyers’ demands, drawn from: 
• Contracts for the sale of milk, including: 
• Base prices for milk 
• Bonuses and penalties for product and production characteristics 
• Broader contract conditions and terms of engagement. 
 
• Formal (documented) and informal communications and relations 
between buyers and farmers (i.e. the ‘data points’ outlined in Table 5f; 
5.2.6), including farmers’ accounts of relationships between changes in 
their selected technological inputs / outputs and changes in buyer 
demands. 
 
Evidence of milk prices at the sector level (because the sanctioning effect 
of individual milk prices is likely to depend upon how high / low those prices 
are relative to broader market prices). 
 
Evidence of the sources of technological inputs. 
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6.2 Data Sources 
Chapters 4 and 5 served to ‘bound’ both the broader system (i.e. the UK value chain for liquid 
milk) within which farm case studies are situated, and to bound these case studies themselves 
within the following categories (Creswell 2007, p.73):  
• Aligned intensive farms 
• Aligned intermediate farms 
• Aligned extensive farms 
• Non-aligned intensive farms 
• Non-aligned intermediate farms 
• Non-aligned extensive farms. 
 
 
Access to the ‘Milkbench+’ database – owned by the Dairy Division of the Agricultural and 
Horticultural Development Board (AHDB) 62 – was secured, making it possible to identify farms 
that occupied these clusters, which could form the subject of case studies. 
6.2.1 Milkbench+ Database and the Selection of Case Studies 
Between 2007/8 and 2012/13, AHDB provided a benchmarking service to UK dairy farms, 
called ‘Milkbench+’. This involved the annual collection of physical and financial data from a 
self-selecting63 sample of over 350 UK dairy farms, yielding a series of cross-sectional datasets 
that provide a 5-year snapshot within the longer 22-year snapshot of this study (see 4.1). For the 
purposes of this study, AHDB agreed to share Milkbench+ data relating to a limited number of 
variables. The variables that were selected were those that best served to define the clusters (by 
reference to the characterisation of dairy farms as socio-technical systems, in 5.1) and are listed 
in Appendix 6B. 
 
 
 
 
	
62 Previously called ‘DairyCo’, but re-branded as ‘AHDB Dairy’ halfway through the study. For the sake of 
simplicity it is referred to throughout as ‘AHDB’ (except where referring to publications produced under 
the name ‘DairyCo’). 	
63 Although not a random or stratified sample, it is relevant that the participants in the survey were 
subjected to the same (industry-wide) forces as non-participants and may therefore, to that extent, be 
regarded as being representative of the broader population of dairy farmers. The extent to which the 
Milkbench+ dataset was representative of the broader UK population of dairy farmers is considered in 
greater detail in Appendix 6A. 
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Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and cluster analysis was performed upon the 2012/13 
Milkbench+ dataset in order to derive three clusters corresponding to ‘intensive’, ‘intermediate’ 
and ‘extensive’ farms. Data for a single year were used, as opposed to data averaged across 
each year of the dataset, because using such averages would have resulted in a much smaller 
sample size (only 15 farms submitted data returns for every year of the Milkbench+ survey), 
whereas using 2013 data yielded a sample size of 285 farms on conventional (i.e. not organic), 
liquid contracts. Moreover, data for some variables had been retrospectively overwritten from 
one year to the next (see further, 6.3 – limitations – below) meaning that it was not possible to 
derive reliable averages across the 2007-13 period for many variables. 
 
PCA can be used to reduce the dimensions of data, and can therefore help to distinguish ‘signal’ 
from ‘noise’ within large, complex datasets, focusing the analysis on those dimensions that 
account for the most variance in the data (Smith 2002). In a dataset containing a large number of 
variables, it is possible to identify a smaller number of ‘principal components’, which are 
essentially those different combinations of variables that together account for the largest 
amount of variance within the dataset. PCA therefore enables the analyst to determine 
relationships amongst numerous variables simultaneously whereas, “traditionally, we would 
use a series of bivariate plots (scatter diagrams) … to try and determine any relationships 
between variables… [which] for large datasets … is not feasible” (Richardson 2009, p.3). 
 
AHDB had previously performed a PCA and cluster analysis of the Milkbench+ dataset 
(DairyCo 2012a), resulting in the development of the farm categories included in Box 5b (5.1.2). 
Although AHDB’s methodology provided a valuable reference point when conducting the 
PCA, the approach decided upon in this study – unlike the one used by AHDB – excluded the 
use of output variables64 to identify principal components. Instead, principal components were 
developed from the following input variables (selected by reference to 5.1.2; Table 5a, and to 
AHDB’s own PCA): 
• Housing period in weeks 
• Number of milkings per day 
• AI and breeding costs per cow (£) 
• Feed per cow in DM weight (Kg DM) 
• Compound feeds fed per cow in DM weight (Kg DM) 
• Number of full dairy grazing weeks 
• Fixed Costs per cow (£) 
• Variable Costs per cow (£) 	
64 AHDB had included ‘milk production’, ‘Yield per cow’, ‘Milk price p/l’ and ‘Protein content of milk’ as 
variables used to developed principal components.  
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Having extracted principal components from the data, cluster analysis was performed, using 
these principal components as clustering variables. 
 
Figure 6a provides a visual representation of these three clusters. Farms are plotted along the 
axes ‘Feed per Cow’ in kilogrammes of dry matter (KgDM) and ‘Housing Period’ in weeks of 
the year, and colour-coded according to the cluster to which they were allocated. The right 
hand side of the scatterplot shows a number of intensive farms that house cows for 52 weeks of 
the year, and feed relatively larger quantities of feed per cow compared with the rest of the 
sample. At the other (left hand) extreme of the scatterplot lie the extensive farms, characterised 
by low feed inputs and short periods of housing (in one case, below ten weeks of the year). 
 
Descriptive statistics that outline broad differences between these clusters across key variables 
are included in Table 6b, alongside mean values for the entire sample, and are summarised as 
follows: 
• Intensive farms had the highest housing periods, feed per cow, stocking rates, average 
numbers of dairy cows and yields per cow, and the lowest number of grazing weeks 
• Intermediate farms had the highest AI and breeding costs, the lowest stocking rate and 
the lowest average number of dairy cows 
• Extensive farms had the highest number of grazing weeks, and the lowest housing 
period, feed per cow, AI and breeding costs, and yields per cow. 
 
Figure 6a: Farm Clusters Developed using PCA / Cluster Analysis 
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Table 6b: Descriptive Statistics: Mean Values for Key Variables Across Clusters 
 
 
Housing 
period in 
weeks 
AI and 
breeding 
costs per 
cow (£) 
Feed per 
cow in DM 
weight (Kg 
DM) 
Number of 
full dairy 
grazing 
weeks 
Yield per 
cow (litres 
per year) 
Dairy 
stocking 
rate 
(LU/ha) 
Average 
number of 
dairy cows 
Intensive N Valid 90 90 90 90 90 87 90 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Mean 44.59 34.834 3261.12302 7.0550 8952.65632 2.36768 248.07 
Std. 
Deviation 
6.39677 14.49124 649.145412 5.87583 886.215493 .687365 119.403 
Variance 40.919 209.996 421389.766 34.525 785377.900 .472 14257.106 
Intermediate N Valid 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 26.8581 40.0988 2285.84636 24.8283 7458.91647 1.75755 147.94 
Std. 
Deviation 
5.49459 18.10156 636.925050 5.59772 1247.90378
3 
.470939 78.334 
Variance 30.191 327.667 405673.520 31.334 1557263.85
1 
.222 6136.155 
Extensive N Valid 69 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 24.5565 21.2602 1808.23553 26.4682 6705.91194 2.08934 228.44 
Std. 
Deviation 
6.50700 9.43727 684.503429 6.47445 1353.41948
2 
.580846 151.244 
Variance 42.341 89.062 468544.945 41.918 1831744.29
4 
.337 22874.814 
[Farms not 
allocated to 
clusters] 
N Valid 4 8 8 8 9 9 8 
Missing 5 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Mean 24.5000 37.3243 1889.22751 26.9541 7154.66426 1.92603 202.83 
Std. 
Deviation 
8.26640 24.22519 804.818154 7.74176 1140.87271
9 
.824173 133.917 
Variance 68.333 586.860 647732.261 59.935 1301590.56
1 
.679 17933.716 
Whole Sample 
Mean 31.9568 33.7752 2467.70130 19.6542 7738.70947 2.03234 200.78 
 
 
 
Having developed these clusters, thirty farms were shortlisted from them to form the basis of 
potential case studies.  
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The selection of farms for case studies followed the approach recommended by Creswell, 
namely, cases were selected “that show different perspectives on the problem, process or event 
… [as well as] ordinary cases, accessible cases, or unusual cases” (Creswell 2007, p.75). 
Therefore, the shortlisted farms were those that appeared to provide “representative” examples 
of each cluster (i.e. the findings from which may therefore be generalisable to the broader 
population; Creswell 2007 p.74), as well as those that had shown some evidence of movement 
from one cluster towards another over the period 2007-2013; or appeared to be significant 
outliers / extreme examples of the extensive or intensive clusters. The assessment of whether 
farms were representative examples or outliers was made by reference to the farms’ position on 
scatterplots such as the one represented in Figure 6b, above, in addition to comparing changes 
in these farms over the period covered by the Milkbench+ dataset.  
 
AHDB contacted these farms in order to arrange farm visits and interviews. Out of the farmers 
contacted, eight agreed to be interviewed. The case study sample was therefore supplemented 
by farms drawn from outside of the Milkbench+ dataset, which fulfilled the same criteria 
outlined above. Appropriate farms were identified from a study of dairy farming trade 
publications and news services, and online farming forums. One farm – Farm P – was drawn 
from a previous research conducted by the author in 2014.65  
6.2.2 Summary of Case Studies 
The main features of farms included in the study (cluster membership, value chain, and 
whether they were included in the Milkbench+ dataset) are summarised in Table 6c, while 
Table 6d provides a breakdown of these farms by category.  
 
Given the study’s objective of identifying the influence of buyers upon technological change in 
farms across aligned and non-aligned value chains, the intention was to interview equal 
numbers of aligned and non-aligned farms. Moreover, the proportions of intensive (31.25%), 
intermediate (50%) and extensive (18.75%) farms represented in the case studies broadly mirror 
the proportions of these farms within the Milkbench+ dataset – which contained 90 intensive 
(31.58%), 117 Intermediate (41.05%), and 65 extensive farms (22.81%) – albeit extensive farms 
and intermediate farms were slight under- and over-represented, respectively.  
 
 
 
 	
65 In the form of a pilot study of technological change in UK dairy farming which served as the dissertation 
component of a Masters programme in Science and Technology Policy at the University of Sussex. 	
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Table 6c: Summary of Farms Included in the Study 
  
Cluster Value Chain Included in 
Milkbench+ 
dataset? 
Farm A Intensive Aligned No 
Farm B Intermediate Non-aligned No 
Farm C Intermediate Aligned No 
Farm D Intermediate Aligned No 
Farm E Intermediate Aligned No 
Farm F Intensive Aligned No 
Farm G Extensive Non-aligned No 
Farm H Intermediate Non-aligned Yes 
Farm I Intensive Non-aligned Yes 
Farm J Intermediate Non-aligned Yes 
Farm K  Extensive Aligned Yes 
Farm L Intermediate Non-aligned Yes 
Farm M Intensive Non-aligned Yes 
Farm N Intermediate Non-aligned Yes 
Farm O Intensive Aligned Yes 
Farm P Extensive Non-aligned No 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6d: Breakdown of Farms Included in the Study by Category  
 
 Aligned Non-aligned Total Proportion  
Intensive 3 2 5 31.25% 
Intermediate 3 5 8 50% 
Extensive 1 2 3 18.75% 
Total 7 9 16 100% 
Proportion 43.75% 56.25% 100%  
 
 
 
6.2.3 Methods of Data Collection  
Data were collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews, or “guided conversations” 
(Yin 2018, p.118), with farmers, of approximately 1 – 1.5 hours in length. These were conducted 
on-farm, which offered the interviewee the comfort and security of familiar surroundings in 
which to discuss potentially sensitive issues. Interviewees were briefed in advance regarding 
the broad subject areas to be covered within the interview and were provided with an 
information sheet outlining the scope of the study (see Appendix 6C). One strength of 
interview evidence, compared with purely documentary data, is that it offers the potential for 
eliciting information regarding the subject’s “explanations as well as personal views” (ibid. 
p.114) on a range of potentially complex and sensitive topics. Interviews also presented an 
advantage over surveys, for example, in teasing out complex case histories. 
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Interviews with farmers incorporated a range of questions regarding farm characteristics (herd 
size, output per cow, marketing arrangements for milk etc) and the technologies and 
innovations employed by the farmer, complemented by a series of more ‘open’ questions aimed 
at capturing the complexity of individual farm circumstances, histories and contexts (see 
Appendix 6D). Interviews were recorded – with the permission of the interviewees – and later 
transcribed for analysis. 
 
Additional, documentary evidence was collected during farm visits for the purposes of 
triangulation (Yin 2018, p.128). This included: copies of contracts for the sale of milk, copies of 
ration formulation reports, and summaries of farm accounts (although not all farmers were 
willing or able to provide all of this supplementary information). Data collected through semi-
structured phone and face-to-face interviews with industry representatives (including 
processors, farmer representatives and industry bodies), as well as quantitative data extracted 
from the Milkbench+ dataset, provided further data sources for the purposes of triangulation.  
6.2.4 Methods of Data Analysis66 
The method selected for analysing case study data followed the format of producing a “within 
case analysis” of each farm case study, “followed by a thematic analysis across the cases, called a 
cross case analysis” (Creswell 2013, p.101; Eisenhardt 1989; 539-540). 
 
Systematic textual analysis was performed on the individual interview transcriptions. 
Transcriptions were coded, i.e. aggregated into “small categories of information [i.e. ‘codes’]” 
(Creswell 2013. p.184), which were then used to identify broader “themes”, cutting across case 
studies. Codes were both “prefigured” (i.e. implied by the analytical framework, e.g. categories 
of technological and non-technological components were ‘codes’; see also Eisenhardt 1989, 
p.540) and “emergent” from the analysis itself (Creswell 2013, p.179-184). The process was 
iterative, meaning that – having been coded – transcriptions were later reviewed in the light of 
themes that had emerged through coding and analysis of subsequent transcriptions. 
 
Case studies were enriched using descriptive data extracted from the Milkbench+ dataset, 
which provided a means of comparing farms against mean values for key variables both for 
both their particular clusters and for entire the Milkbench+ sample. 
 	
66 NB: Principal Components Analysis and cluster analysis, used to develop clusters and shortlist farms for 
interview, have been described above; 6.2.1 	
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6.3 Limitations of the Data  
Because the clusters used within this study were derived from Milkbench+ data for 2013, and 
detailed historical farm input data were not consistently available (at either the individual farm 
and sector level) for years not covered by the Milkbench+ dataset (i.e. 1994-2006 and 2015-16), 
the process of allocating farms to clusters for the years prior and subsequent to 2013 involved a 
consideration of farmers’ testimony, data gathered at interview, and a comparison against 
published industry averages for inputs such as herd size and outputs such as yield per cow. 
 
There are further limitations associated with basing the clusters on the Milkbench+ data for a 
single year, insofar as the composition of these clusters may therefore have been influenced by 
volatility associated with short-term weather conditions (which might vary considerably by 
region on an annual basis) or by short term movements in market prices for feed inputs. 
Producing clusters from data averaged over the entire 2007-2013 period might have smoothed 
such volatility. However, using data averaged over the period 2007-2013 would have resulted 
in a much smaller sample size as only 15 farms submitted data returns for every year covered 
by the Milkbench+ survey. Moreover, this approach would have been complicated by the fact 
that data for some variables – such as ‘contract type’ – had been retrospectively overwritten 
from one year to the next. 
 
Further, the use of PCA and cluster analysis to develop ‘clusters’ of farms corresponding to 
intensive, intermediate and extensive farm systems provided an approximate rather than a 
precise or definitive method of deriving clusters, because it relies upon the use of scale 
variables, rather than doing so by reference to the use or non-use of certain technologies or 
combinations of technologies. This is demonstrated by Figure 6b, which shows clear overlaps 
between the various clusters. 
 
However, notwithstanding the above limitations, the analysis of the Milkbench+ dataset was 
adequate for the purpose of producing approximate clusters from which to shortlist farms for 
more in-depth interviews. 
 
Finally, both documentary and interview evidence may contain biases (Yin 2018, p.115; p.121). 
Interviews create the potential for response bias, while the self-selecting nature of the 
Milkbench+ sample, from which half of the interviewees were drawn, demonstrated further 
potential for bias: farmers who were willing to be interviewed may have been those with an 
‘agenda’ (i.e. who held particularly strong views that were not representative of the broader 
population). A further limitation was the absence of interviews with farmers who had exited 
the sector due, for example, to persistent conditions of low milk prices.  
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Chapter 7: 
Technological Change in Intensive Farms 
 
 
This chapter considers patterns of technological change in intensive farms and the influence of 
buyer power upon such patterns. A number of farms in this study that were categorised within 
the ‘intensive’ cluster at the time that the fieldwork was conducted (2016) appear to have 
operated intensive systems throughout the duration of the study period (1994-2016), albeit 
differences in rates of change within this cluster could be observed. The following analysis 
identifies some common themes that can be observed amongst these farms with regard to the 
changes in system inputs and outputs, the positive feedback effects that explain these changes, 
and the influence (or lack of influence) of buyer demands upon them. 
 
Positive feedback effects, namely, complementarity effects that result from interactions between 
different technological components; investment effects; expectation and co-ordination effects 
are considered first (7.1). Feedbacks resulting from interactions between technological 
components and other socio-technical system components, specifically resources (including 
knowledge and skills, labour, and physical resources) and institutions (farmers’ beliefs) are 
considered next (7.2). This is followed by an examination of the successful influence of buyer 
power upon system reproduction (7.3), by reference to conditions of value chain governance, 
exercised through or against these positive feedback mechanisms, which is then contrasted with 
instances in which buyer power has been unsuccessful (7.4) in influencing the extent, rate or 
direction of technological change. 
7.1 Interactions Between Technologies  
Complementarity effects resulting from the interaction between breeding, feeding and housing 
technologies were particularly pronounced amongst intensive farms. Notably, these farms 
typically housed their cattle for a large proportion of the year, in order to support the 
performance of the high-yielding Holstein cows that they favoured (which are generally less 
hardy than other breeds; see 5.1.2, Table 5a), and to enable greater control over the cows’ diets 
(to further boost their performance). The goal of these systems (as a product of system inputs 
and outputs) could be summarised as ‘maximising output per cow’. 
 
These complementarity effects were bilateral as the high-yielding potential of the Holsteins in 
turn supports the performance of the feeding and housing technologies used (in the words of 
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Farmer I67: “That type of cow does seem to suit that type of system” and Farmer P68: “the bigger 
[i.e. Holstein] cows are more efficient at converting concentrate”). There was also evidence of 
these technologies interacting with milking technologies (in terms of both milking frequency 
and method). In particular, the introduction of milking robots typically accompanied a move to 
permanent housing in order to maximise the performance of the robots (i.e. for systems that 
had introduced robots an additional system goal as to ‘maximise yield per robot’). 
 
Evidence of reverse salients could be observed in many cases, as farms appeared to be 
approaching certain boundaries associated with the intensive system, with the performance of 
some system components ‘falling behind’ relative to others (e.g. some farms were encountering 
the physiological limits of the cattle, or physical limits in terms of stocking density, housing and 
waste management). These reverse salients had prompted the search for – and selection of – 
additional complementary technologies (such as those aimed at improving fertility, cow health 
and welfare, or waste management), which had resulted in further stabilisation of systems 
through the creation of additional complementarity or investment effects. There follows a more 
detailed consideration of these feedbacks for each farm. 
 
Farm M69 increased herd size incrementally from 140 to 222 between 1994 and 2016 and annual 
output per cow increased steadily from 7,20070 to approximately 11,000 litres per cow over the 
same period71 (see timeline Appendix 7B), and the farmer suggested that he had been operating 
an intensive model throughout the study period. The farmer’s account highlighted the bilateral 
complementarity effects between feeding technologies (using a total mixed ration [TMR], which 
permitted more precise control over the cows’ feed intake than grazing or self-feed systems) 
and breeding technologies (“Genetic progress has certainly been very important … I’ve always 
bred for milk yield”). Feeding a consistent ration supported the performance of the high-
yielding cow (i.e. increasing yields because, in the farmer’s words, “cows like stability”), whilst 
cows genetically selected for their ability to produce large volumes of milk supported the 
effectiveness of the TMR in increasing yields. More recently, thrice daily milking had been 
	
67 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 31/5/16; Timeline Appendix 7A 
 
68 Non-aligned extensive farm, interview date 18/7/14, see Chapter 8 
 
69 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 5/5/16 Timeline Appendix 7B 
 
70 Compared with UK average yields in 1995/96 of 5,512 litres per cow per milk year; 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/average-milk-yield/ 
(pre-1995 figures not available) 
 
71 Yields per cow for Farm M in 2013 were 10,487 compared with the mean for the Milkbench dataset 
(2013) of 7,739 litres, placing it in the 90th percentile. 
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introduced, supporting the performance of these high yielding cows (i.e. further increasing 
their yields).  
 
Reverse salients had emerged within Farm M’s system, and technological search and selection 
was being directed in response to these reverse salients. The selective breeding of Holstein cows 
for maximum yield is frequently associated with the reduced fertility and/or longevity of the 
cattle (Dillon et al 2006; Pryce et al 2004; Veerkamp and Beerda 2007; Harris and Colver 2001), 
thus limiting the overall performance of the system72 and requiring the introduction of 
technologies to mitigate these impacts. Within a system based around the breeding and 
intensive feeding of cattle for yield, the performance of the cattle may therefore fall behind, or 
out of line, with the performance of the rest of the system over time. 
 
Farmer M confirmed that “fertility has always been an issue” on the farm, and that activity 
collars (to improve the detection of ‘heat’ in cows) had been introduced in 2002 in response to 
this. He also reported that short lifespan is “one of the downsides” of the high yielding cow, 
and that this was – at the time of the interview – influencing his use of breeding technologies. 
Specifically, he had begun selecting semen from genomically-evaluated73 bulls: 
 
“I one hundred percent believe in genomics … it’s just a big step up… particularly in lifespan, 
which is what I’m looking at… you can buy [semen from] a bull whose daughters will last 0.5 of 
a lactation longer than their mothers…” 
 
 
The farmer’s selection of breeding technologies to counter fertility problems appeared to be 
strongly influenced by his previous investments in breeding technologies, which had driven the 
herd down an increasingly specialised path in terms of genetics (i.e. investment effects had 
served to further stabilise the system). Specifically, rather than introducing cross breeding as a 
means of improving fertility and longevity (through “harnessing the power of hybrid vigour”, 
DairyCo 2012b p.2:27) he preferred the use of genomically-evaluated semen, which enabled him 
to preserve the capital value of the herd: 
 
“The cows are locked into higher genetic merit, and that route, and certainly from a capital value 
point of view if I was to cross [breed] them you would lose quite a lot of that value of the cows … 
for the last three years now we’ve only used genomic[ally evaluated] sires, and I think that over 
a generation that is going to have more benefit from our point of view than cross breeding.” 	
72 Reduced fertility results in fewer pregnancies and/or a longer calving interval, and therefore reduces 
the farm’s total annual milk production (http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-archive/2009/is-calving-
index-important-for-higher-yielding-herds/#.Vqc5OBGrbzI). Reduced longevity means fewer lactations 
per cow, meaning reduced output over the lifespan of the cow. 
 
73 Genomic evaluation more accurately predicts a cow’s genetic merit than previously available 
technologies, https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-archive/press-releases/2012/january-
2012/genomics-launched-to-dairy-industry-at-the-british-cattle-breeders-conference/  
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There was a further, related, suggestion that the system – through incremental intensification – 
was approaching certain limits with regard to yield per cow: 
 
“[We managed a] ten percent per year output increase … for the first ten years or so [from 1987 
when the farmer moved to the farm]… by [increasing] the cow numbers and yield per cow. If 
you carry it on it doubles every seven years, [but] it gets more and more difficult [to maintain 
that rate of growth]” 
 
 
The farmer confirmed that this was not only due to the fertility and longevity issues considered 
above, but was also a result of the diminishing returns (in terms of milk yield) on inputs of 
concentrate feed above a certain level. These limits may also be regarded as reverse salients (i.e. 
advances in the performance of the cows were lagging behind advances in the performance of 
other system components) and they appeared to be redirecting technological search and 
selection with regard to feed inputs (the farmer was altering the feed ration to include higher 
proportions of forage as opposed to purchased concentrate feeds): 
 
“In ’06-’07 we hit 10,000 litres a cow [per annum] on 3.5 tonnes of concentrate [feed, per cow, 
per annum]74… we’re [now] back down under three tonnes a cow … [we’ve bought 150 acres [of 
land, which] … should enable us to grow a lot more forage ... and in the last two or three years 
we’ve put much more emphasis on grazing cows as well, which is a big step in the right 
direction in reducing the reliance on bought in feed.” 
 
 
Buyer demands were also focusing the farmer’s attention on the pursuit of greater efficiency of 
feed inputs (see below, 7.3.2). Notably, however, this search for improved feed efficiencies does 
not appear to represent a reversal towards an extensive model of production, but instead it 
represents change within the boundaries (Dosi 1988, p.226-7) of the established system (i.e. the 
farmer remained committed to an approach based on maximising output per cow, see more 
regarding the farmer’s beliefs and the way in which he framed the problem and solutions of 
dairy farming, below 7.2 – 7.4). 
 
Farm F’s75 production model was based around the year-round housing of Holstein cows, 
yielding 10,400 litres per cow76, which were fed a TMR to maximise their yield. The farmer 
summarised the complementarity effects between breeding, housing and feeding technologies 	
74 Mean compound (concentrate) feeds per cow for the Milkbench dataset in 2013 was 1,614 Kg/DM (1.6 
tonnes), and Farm M was therefore in the 90th percentile for compound feeds per cow. 	
75 Aligned farm, interview date: 20/7/16; Timeline Appendix 7C 	
76 Which would have placed it in the 90th percentile of the 2013 Milkbench dataset (albeit this farm was not 
in the Milkbench dataset)  	
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associated with this model, as follows: “When they’re inside on a controlled diet we can 
maintain a higher yielding cow.” 
 
The farm further intensified production in 2011 (see timeline Appendix 7C) through adopting 
thrice-daily milking to improve output after milk yields per cow had declined following the 
departure of a “very good herdsman” and his replacement with “not such a good herdsman” 
(which may be viewed as a reverse salient that had emerged through a loss of knowledge and 
skills with regard to fertility – see 7.3.2 – that had resulted in the performance of the cows 
lagging behind the performance of the rest of the system). Once per cow yields had recovered, 
thrice-daily milking was retained. Complementarity effects underlying this decision were in 
evidence, through the interaction of feeding, milking, breeding and fertility77 technologies, with 
increased milking frequency supporting improved fertility through its associated requirement 
for increased feed inputs: 
 
“We’ve worked hard at transition management.78 We’ve got cows ‘calving in’ in better 
condition. [Milking] three times a day definitely helps with that because the cows are given a bit 
more [feed], so we can keep the cows in the right condition. So they are transitioning better and 
getting in calf better.” 
 
 
This need for increased attention on fertility (which includes the development of skills within 
the labour force, see 7.2, e.g. with regard to heat detection) may also be viewed as a response to 
a reverse salient resulting from the interaction between breeding (Holstein cows genetically 
selected and bred for high yield) and feeding technologies (feeding a TMR with a high energy 
content). Feeding an energy dense ration to high yielding cows may cause their performance (in 
terms of fertility) to fall out of line with the rest of the system; as Farmer F explained: 
 
“[The feed ration is] geared up to be reasonably potent … so you don’t want too many cows 
giving low amounts of milk otherwise they’ll end up fat … and they’ll be hard to calve back in… 
fertility is key here … the more pregnancies you make, the more milk you’re going to sell. So the 
quicker they are back in calf, the less chance they have of putting on weight and getting out of 
condition … so they are just healthier when they’re going to calve in now… they are in peak 
condition when they’re going to calve in and their bodies are ready for it.” 
 
 
Finally, the farmer stressed that the collection and monitoring of data regarding cow health 
indicators (including mastitis levels, lameness and antibiotics use) was a key activity on this 	
77 NB: “Considerable research into nutrition and fertility performance has pinpointed more pronounced 
and protracted early lactation energy deficits as a major factor in the lower fertility experienced by many 
high yielding cows” DairyCo (2012b), p.19 
 
78 Transition management involves the measures taken “to ensure the smoothest possible transition from 
the end of one lactation into full production in the next”; 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/non_umbraco/download.aspx?media=13856  
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farm, suggesting that: “herd health is quite high on my agenda all the time”. He explained that 
his current farming system strongly supports these data collection and monitoring activities, 
which have in turn supported changes in veterinary medicine and husbandry technologies used 
on the farm, stating that: “I feel that I can look after them better when they are housed … they 
are housed right next to me all the time, and I can monitor them at all times.” In particular, he 
reported that he had been operating a “monitor group” since taking over responsibility for the 
farm’s dairy operations. Cows showing signs of mastitis were separated from the herd and 
placed in this group, and the farmer milked and monitored them individually, whereas 
previously they would be administered antibiotics and milked with the rest of the herd:  
 
“… It just ensures all the cows are milked out properly and I can just watch these cows, and 
designate really ‘do they need antibiotics?’… Right now I’m doing a lot of self-curing, so I’m 
doing work giving cows anti-inflammatories, not antibiotics …” 
 
 
Although these activities were supported by both the farmer’s beliefs and by the buyers’ 
demands (see more below, 7.3), the implementation of increased data collection and monitoring 
may also be interpreted as a response to a reverse salient that results from (and an expectation 
effect arising due to) the adoption of an intensive, permanently-housed system.  
 
It has been suggested that permanent housing of cattle creates a higher risk of health disorders 
and the spread of disease, which would serve to limit the performance of the cattle and thereby 
hamper the overall enterprise (EFSA 2009; Jackson 2013). Certainly, the public debate regarding 
intensive indoor cattle farming has centred heavily around health and welfare issues (Jackson 
2013). The combination of technologies used on this farm may have therefore created conditions 
that necessitate greater monitoring (either as a means of mitigating the potentially negative 
consequences of permanent housing or of defending the farm against criticisms from opponents 
of the housed system). Such concerns appeared to be in the farmer’s mind, for example: 
 
“The dairy industry is one of the few industries that is being blamed for the overuse of 
antibiotics… third generation drugs… so I’m ready for all that… [and] I’ve stopped using 
third generation drugs now…” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Similarly, the farmer was keen to emphasise that the recent introduction of “green bedding” on 
the farm – a controversial technology involving the use of recycled manure solids79 (RMS) as a 
bedding material for cows – had not introduced health issues, but had in fact accompanied a 
reduction in somatic cell counts80 (SCC) to around 140,000. In 2010, average cell counts in the UK 	
79 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/buildings/housing/recycled-manure-solids/  
 
80 SCC is an indicator of milk quality and mastitis, with a count of 100,000 or below indicating an 
‘uninfected cow’, and 200,000 or above indicating that the cow is ‘highly likely’ to be infected on at least 
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were 220,000 (Jackson 2013 p.32). Mean cell counts for Milkbench sample for 2013 were 167,290, 
placing Farm F in 25th percentile: 
 
“This is a highly-contentious issue at the moment… [but] if you take a look at our cows you will 
quickly see that they are pretty clean … We’ve had our lowest cell counts on this system… 
[with] cleanliness scoring, we don’t have much of a problem there now that we’re on green 
bedding, because the cows are always clean. We don’t have abrasions because we are on deep 
beds.” 
 
 
Farm I had recently further intensified production, becoming “very much a high-input, high-
output … intensive system”, following the introduction of milking robots in 2012, which was 
accompanied by a move to the year round housing of cattle (see timeline, Appendix 7A). These 
changes increased per cow yields from 8,000 litres to 10,000 litres primarily as a result of the 
increased milking frequency from twice daily to 2.6 times per day (averaged across the herd).81 
The robots complemented the farm’s system, which was already largely indoor-based, with 
minimal grazing due to resource limitations (see 7.2). Farmer I described the complementarity 
effects that existed between breeding, housing, feeding, production cycle and milking 
technologies, and emphasised in particular the ways in which housing and feeding technologies 
supported the performance of Holstein cows (Dillon et al 2003). Investment effects were also 
apparent, resulting from the specialised and non-transferable nature of the Holstein cow, which 
– he suggested – is unsuited to other production systems: 
 
“The Holstein breed, and the high genetic cow … we’ve found with the robots it is a lot easier to 
manage that type of cow … I think a lot of the problems that we used to get with high genetic cows 
we see less of, because of the system … And possibly, keeping the cows in [all year] there is 
generally more consistency [in the diet] … If we were to go to a more extensive grazing system 
then, possibly, our cows wouldn’t be quite so well suited to that … if you put them out in a field on 
a wet, windy day they’d probably just stand there and shiver.” 
 
 
Investment effects associated with milking robots were evident, resulting from the specialised 
and non-transferable character of robotic milking, which is distinguished from other 
approaches to milking by the fact that the cow chooses when to walk to the machine to be 
milked. This characteristic meant that the performance of milking robots was supported on this 
farm by a permanent housing arrangement, ensuring that the cows were kept in close proximity 
to the robots, and did not have to walk long distances to be milked.  
 
Although farmers suggested that grazing is possible with robots, the relative non-transferability 
of the robotic milking system to more grazing based systems was evident: all of the intensive 	
one quarter of the udder; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-
welfare/mastitis/symptoms-of-mastitis/somatic-cell-count-milk-quality-indicator/  81	And placing the farm in the 90th percentile of the 2013 Milkbench dataset	
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farmers using robots suggested that access to grazing would limit the robots’ performance. 
Farmer I explained how his system had become increasingly centred on maximising and 
maintaining the “flow rate” of cows to the robots to ensure maximum yield per robot: “We took 
the view that …  to keep the flow rate to the robots up it would be better… to just keep them 
[the cows] in [housed all year]”. This represented an evolution in system goals on this farm 
from maximising yields per cow towards maximising yields per cow and maximising yields per 
robot. 
 
The farmer also noted that the introduction of milking robots had resulted in new 
complementarities being created as the production cycle (year round calving) supported the 
performance of the robots (see further, 7.2): 
 
“We’re all year round calving … we always were really, before the robots, but with the robots 
installed, [it helps] just to keep a continual, level supply of milk.” 
 
 
The reproductive, incremental nature of technological change on this farm was evident, as were 
the irreversibilities associated with these patterns of change: 
 
“I’m not sure about it being us deciding … ‘we have to go intensive’ … it was more a system that 
suited us… You know, there have certainly been times recently when … with the high costs of the 
robots and, you know, things are a bit tight at the minute … you do question whether it was the 
right way forward, but we are sort of committed to it really.” [emphasis added] 
 
 
The introduction of milking robots had resulted in reverse salients, causing the performance of 
some cows in the herd to fall out of line with the rest of the system, and therefore redirecting 
search for and selection of breeding technologies: 
 
“Some cows do struggle to become ‘robotic’ cows because of either their temperament or their 
teat placement … so they end up being culled out ... so maybe our focus [in breeding decisions] 
has changed a little bit … and particularly with the robots we look at things like teat placement 
… in terms of making sure that the robot can find the teats.” 
 
 
The decision to house the cows permanently following the robots’ introduction had also 
reduced the feed efficiency of the system (“we’ve been aware since we’ve been on the robots 
that we’ve always had quite a high feed rate82”), prompting the introduction of “zero grazing” 
(where fresh grass is “cut and carried” – using a machine – to feed housed cows). The 
introduction of this machine represented an investment effect. 
 	
82 ‘Feed rate’ is defined as the number of kilogrammes of concentrate feed per litre of milk yield, expressed 
in kg DM/litre; DairyCo (2012a) 
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Complementarities between breed, housing, feeding, milking technologies and production 
cycle were also in evidence at Farm O83 (see timeline, Appendix 7D). The farm had operated 
towards the intensive end of the scale since 1994 when it was producing, annually, between 
7,000 and 8,000 litres of milk per cow (compared with UK average yields of 5,512 litres in 
1995/9684), rising to 8,500 to 9,000 litres in 2004 (compared with UK averages of 6,886 in 
2004/585). At the time of interview, yields were 13,000 litres per cow.  
 
The farmer had kept Holstein cows since the 1970s and had been feeding a TMR using a mixer 
wagon since 1996. The farmer explained how the use of this feeding technology supported the 
performance of his herd of high-yielding Holsteins, enabling him to keep the feed ration “as 
consistent as possible” and to reduce the length at which forage is chopped in order to increase 
the volume the cows were able to consume (as shorter chop length reduces the amount of time 
and energy the cow expends on chewing). 
 
In 2008 the farm replaced its ageing herringbone parlour and housing with three milking robots 
(a fourth was added in 2014) and a new purpose-built shed to house the cows all year round. 
This represented intensification in production, and complementarity effects between the robots 
and housing, production cycle and feeding technologies could be observed. For example, 
activity and rumination collars that came packaged with the milking robots supported the 
farm’s existing focus on feeding precision: 
 
“[the collars] highlight cows that have dropped in rumination, and then you’ll go out and find that 
they’re ill … but you’ll also find they haven’t visited the robot.” 
 
 
Moreover, similar to the experience of Farm I (above), the introduction of robots was made 
easier by – and served to further stabilise – the farm’s existing all year calving approach (“we 
need to keep a consistent number of cows milking all year round, to get the best use out of the 
robots”). Further, investment effects associated with the specialised and non-transferable 
characteristics of robots were apparent: the robots had become the focus of the system, with the 
farmer’s attentions centred on ensuring that other technological components supported the goal 
of maximising milk output per robot. For example, with the robots installed, the farm moved 
immediately to year round housing, and the robots also appeared to consolidate the farm’s 
approach to feeding: 
 	
83 Aligned farm, interview date: 12/7/16; timeline, Appendix 7D 	
84 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/average-milk-yield/ 
 
85 ibid.  
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“Because the robot is a very expensive86 capital item, you want to be getting sort of two thousand 
litres a day from the robot as soon as you can … you will struggle to do that on a grazing system 
… You cannot get the yield out of the cow on grass. You need a consistent diet, which is well 
formulated, it doesn’t change from day to day whether the sun’s out or if it’s raining.” 
 
 
The effect of this was to further stabilise the system around an intensive model, with input 
intensity (in terms of stocking rate) also being increased because the farmer was able expand 
the herd from 140 to 200 cows as a result of year round housing: 
 
“By keeping the cows in and using all silage [it] meant that we became far more efficient in the use 
of the fields and the cropping that we got off of them … we then were able to increase the herd up to 
about 200 cows [over the course of 12 months]…” 
 
 
The robots had also introduced reverse salients. Following their introduction, the performance 
of feeding technologies had fallen out of line with overall system goals. Specifically, the fact that 
cows must choose when to visit the robots had necessitated changes to the composition of the 
feeding ration (see further 7.3.5): 	
“You cannot feed a high starch TMR [with robots], which is what we were feeding … Because … 
that … makes the cows very slow … [and] they don’t want to get up to walk to the robots to get 
milked! … We had to change the diet to have a much more open diet with less starch … and more 
protein and more forage, so we have a much higher forage content in the diet, and then … you have 
a high starch dairy cake in the robot … that’s their treat when they go to the robot …” 
 
 
Further, the move to permanent housing (and an increased herd size) had directed the search 
for and selection of new waste management technologies. The farmer had anticipated these 
when planning the new housing, constructing a ‘slatted’ floor for the cowshed and investing in 
a robot to push waste through these slats into a cellar excavated beneath the building. The 
farmer had also introduced ‘slurry bugs87’ into the cow’s bedding. These are aimed at (a) 
reducing mastitis levels (given that “confinement and the increased humidity levels found in 
livestock housing will lead to increased concentrations of disease-causing pathogens, 
particularly those which cause mastitis”88 i.e. a reverse salient associated with permanent 
housing which, if unaddressed, will hamper system performance) and (b) locking nitrogen into 
the slurry (the farmer reported that grass growth had improved and fertiliser use on the farm 
had reduced by half as a result).  
 	
86 Farmer O suggested that the price of a second hand robot in 2014 was £50,000, see below 7.3.1.4 
 
87 see: https://www.envirosystems.co.uk/slurry-improvers/  
 
88 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-welfare/mastitis/working-arena-
prevention-of-infection/housing/  
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Farm A89 had operated an intensive system using Holstein cows since 1994, when yields were 
7,500 per cow, albeit it had intensified over the period 1994-2016 to a lesser extent than some of 
the other farms in the study (see timeline, Appendix 7E). The farmer described the system as 
“fairly high-input”, and was achieving yields of 9,500 – 10,000 litres per cow on the date of the 
farm visit. 
 
The farm had changed from a Spring and Autumn block calving model to Autumn calving, 
with the cows housed from the time that they calved (August / September) until the start of 
April, and were therefore grazed for approximately 20 weeks of the year (Milkbench mean = 
19.65). This move was underpinned by complementarity effects between technological 
components, namely breeding technologies (Holstein cows), calving pattern, and feeding 
technologies (interacting, further, with physical resources, see 7.2): 
 
“We … looked at the Spring calving versus Autumn calving a couple of years ago, and looked at 
the cost ... And with … the high-yield type cows we've got, what we found was ... the way we were 
managing the Spring calving cows, you can't just turn them out to grass and expect them to milk 
off grass … We were finding that we were keeping them in for a fair bit of the Spring. So you keep 
them in until sort of the end of May on a full winter ration ... Instead of feeding cheap grass, you’re 
feeding conserved forage from the previous year. And obviously, there's quite a cost to that.” 
 
 
Put differently, an Autumn calving model supported the Holstein cattle (with their high energy 
requirement) as it enabled them to be fed an energy-dense ration when they most required it 
(i.e. “in the early stages of lactation when the energy demand for production is higher than 
intake can support, creating an increasingly negative energy balance which cows have to meet 
from body reserves”; DairyCo 2012b, 2:17). A Spring calving model, by comparison, would 
involve the cows receiving a less energy-dense diet (i.e. with a higher component of grazed 
grass) at peak lactation, and therefore requiring supplementary feed.  
7.2 Interactions Between Component Categories 
Many intensive farmers described their systems by reference to complementarity effects 
between the technologies and technological configurations described above (7.1) and other 
component categories, including resources (e.g. the physical environment and location, 
financial resources, knowledge and skills, and labour) and institutions (e.g. beliefs as ‘cognitive 
rules’). 
 
For many, the choice of farming system had been influenced by characteristics of the physical 
environment or their financial circumstances. For example, Farmer M had limited available 
land when he first established the farm and suggested that he had borrowed extensively to 	
89 Aligned Farm, interview date: 18/7/16; see Timeline, Appendix 7E 
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finance the business. These conditions, he said, had influenced his decision to establish a 
production model based around maximising output per cow as opposed to one based around 
extensive grazing. 
 
Similarly, Farm F, which had housed its cows all year round since 1998, having previously 
offered limited grazing to “low yielders”, revealed evidence of the interaction between the 
technologies involved with the housed system and the available physical resources. The farm 
was in Scotland90, where the climate was unsuitable for keeping Holstein cows outdoors for 
prolonged periods. This highlighted the specialised and non-transferable character of Holstein 
cows and their incompatibility with the prevailing weather conditions (i.e. necessitating 
housing for extended periods). Further, the farm was on land better suited to producing arable 
crops than grass, which in turn supported the use of a housed rather than a grazing based 
system. Farmer F returned to the farm from university in 2009 and had been overseeing the 
dairy operations since 2011, and noted that: “This is the system that I was brought into … the 
farm had already been pre-set for this system before I came to it.”  
 
Farmer A also reported that limitations in physical resources had influenced the system used on 
his farm:  
 
“We've always majored [in] producing our milk in the wintertime. It worked better on this farm. 
It’s not a typical grassland farm … in the summertime it can dry out. We’re on thin chalk … 
and you can get into June and you've got virtually no grass… The terrain doesn't lend itself 
very well [to grazing] either, because we're [on] quite steep [land].” 
 
 
Farmer I explained that his intensive approach had been influenced by characteristics of the 
local climate, land and access, which supported and/or constrained the farmer’s knowledge 
and skills: 
 
“We were never big grazers … we always struggled to get that right in this area, particularly 
[as] we’ve had historical dry summers … some of our land is quite heavy… access isn’t too bad, 
but we would have to spend quite a lot of money on infrastructure to get access to some of the 
fields.” 
 
 
The fact that the farmer was ‘never a big grazer’ meant that the introduction of robots and 
permanent housing was complementary to his – and his labour force’s – knowledge and skills 
approach. Moreover, the farmer explained the influence of labour resources upon his decision 
to introduce milking robots on the farm, which was “fundamentally because of staffing issues 
… We were faced with the issue of struggling to find people to milk the cows”. 	
90 The contrast between Farm F and Farm G, which is also based in Scotland, albeit using an extensive 
system – see Chapter 10 – is notable. 
		
	
113	
 
Intensive farms provided further examples of complementarity effects resulting from 
interactions between technologies, resources (in the form of [non-codified] information 
embodied in the knowledge and skills of actors, i.e. the labour force), and institutions (i.e. 
actors’ beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm). Investment and learning effects associated with 
these components and interactions were also evident. 
 
For Farm M, operating an intensive system had accompanied the development of a clearly 
defined body of knowledge and skills amongst the farmer and his labour force, which in turn 
supported (and was supported by) his beliefs about the ‘right’ way to produce milk, or how he 
framed dairy farming problems and solutions. These skills and beliefs further supported (and 
were supported by) the continued use of these technologies. There was evidence that the 
strength of these bilateral complementarity and learning effects had served to inhibit moves to 
alternative approaches and/or constrain system reproduction within clearly defined 
boundaries (see further 7.4): 
 
“… I’ve got three staff, two have been here over 20 years and I’m keen to keep them happy … 
My main herdsman in particular has always been focused, like I have, on milking as few cows 
possible and getting as much milk as possible out of them, rather than doubling the cow numbers 
and getting half as much production. He might up and leave if I went for a major change.” 
 
 
There was evidence that the system used by Farm F was also underpinned by (interrelated) 
knowledge and beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm. Changes in (tacit) knowledge and skills 
(through the loss of “a good herdsman”) had resulted in the introduction of thrice daily milking 
(see above 7.1). Moreover, the farmer had developed his own knowledge and associated beliefs 
about dairy farming while on a work experience placement in the United States. The 
technological configurations on the farm therefore supported (and were supported by) these 
beliefs (a strong, bilateral complementarity): 
 
“[When I visited to the US] they set me up on a farm that was milking 1,000 cows, farming 
exactly the same acreage [as us], in New York state … and that was when I was given my 
dairy education … they look after cows really well there… I was working in one of the top 20 
herds in New York State. So these guys … would get together and really benchmark. I probably 
learned a lot about efficiencies from those guys. Everything is monitored. I learned to measure 
everything, whether it’s cow health, foot health … The first change [I made] was to three times a 
day [milking]. I did that within about six weeks of coming home.” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Based on these beliefs, Farmer F had voluntarily joined a local benchmarking group and, he 
said, had implemented “loads of things” as a result of his involvement with that group; a clear 
co-ordination effect. Bilateral complementarities were also in evidence between the farmer’s 
beliefs regarding benchmarking and those of the milk buyer, Tesco. In this case, the similarity 
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between the farmer and supermarket’s frames implied a process of collective stabilisation and 
closure of these frames (see further, below 7.3.3.2) 
 
The farmer’s beliefs about the benefits of his system, in terms of cow health and welfare, also 
appeared to provide a means of defending his approach in the face of growing public scrutiny 
of indoor-housed systems: 
 
“The public probably perceive their milk coming from grass as opposed to this sort of scenario. 
There was a thing on [television] three or four months ago … all about dairying … I was on the 
Tesco website about a week after … people were really shocked about the intensive system … but 
unfortunately, the guy who was on the intensive system … wasn’t given enough time to tell 
them just how healthy his herd was … I’ve been down there and he milks seventeen hundred 
cows and he does a hell of a good job of it, and that was the part that needed to be put over … not 
that [the cow] needs to be standing in a wet field … I mean, they only take videos of cows on a 
sunny day, but I mean up here we just can’t do that.” 
 
 
Farmer O explained how his approach to housing and milking had been influenced by 
knowledge and beliefs acquired during a visit to the Netherlands, which therefore had 
influenced his mindset. Given that the Netherlands was, at the time “well advanced” of the UK 
in the use of milking robots, expectation and co-ordination effects were also at play in this case: 
 
“We went to Holland on a study tour and looked at robots over there, because they were well 
advanced [compared] to what they are over here … And that’s where I came across the slatted 
floors and the slurry cellars ... So we changed the whole idea of what we were going to do 
and went from having a parlour with a slurry lagoon to having just one shed with a cellar 
underneath and slats on top and just putting robots along one side of it. It made so much more 
sense.” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Significantly, learning effects on these farms were not restricted to knowledge embedded in 
human actors (farmers and the labour force) but also included specialised and non-transferable 
stocks of knowledge embedded within the cattle. Farmer I (see 7.1, above) suggested that he 
was constrained from moving from a fully housed system to a grazing based system not only 
by the investment effects associated with milking robots, but also due to the fact that grazing is 
“a learned process”. Just as “some cows do struggle to become robotic cows because of … their 
temperament” (see above, 7.1), equally: 
 
“You train your animal at a young age as a young heifer calf to go out and graze … and it’s a 
learned process to actually go and graze in the field.” 
 
 
Similarly, Farmer O, highlighted the challenge of moving from milking robots to other milking 
methods. He recounted the experience of a neighbouring farmer whose robots had broken 
down: 
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“They were having to take their cows to the neighbouring farm to milk them through their 
parlour… and it’s chaos… You try and put a herd of cows through a herringbone parlour that 
haven’t been through one in four years or so.” 
 
7.3 The Influence of Buyer Power  
This section considers the influence of buyer power – working through or against the positive 
feedback mechanisms already identified – upon the patterns of change outlined above. It is 
structured according to buyer demands relating to:  
• Security of supply (7.3.1) 
• Product characteristics91 (7.3.2) 
• Production characteristics (7.3.3) 
 
Within each of these sections the analysis considers how buyers sought to achieve compliance 
with these demands (i.e. conditions of value chain governance, including sanctions and trust). 
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the influence of buyer demands upon technological change in intensive 
farms was most evident when buyer demands corresponded closely with farms’ progress 
towards established goals, namely to maximise yield per cow and/or robot (i.e. when they 
worked ‘through’ positive feedbacks). In these cases, buyer demands had the effect of 
influencing farms to further intensify and/or expand production (i.e. to increase rates of change 
within the cluster).  
 
When buyer demands did not correspond closely with farms’ progress towards established 
goals (i.e. when they worked ‘against’ positive feedbacks), the presence of strong sanctions and 
conditions of high trust (continuity, reliability and predictability in the operation of the value 
chain; see 5.2.6) was essential to enabling buyers to influence farms. Such demands often served 
to limit or arrest farms’ intensification and/or expansion, although it appeared that farms 
selected approaches to comply with these demands that minimised the disruption to their 
established systems. Moreover, and again unsurprisingly, the successful influence of such 
buyer demands appeared to be related to the depth of changes that these demands necessitated. 
Demands necessitating ‘deep’ changes (i.e. changes involving farms’ ‘core’ activities) appeared 
to require the support of strong sanctions and trust. The strength of sanctions and trust in value 
chains was dependent to some extent on the presence of weaker sanctions and lower conditions 
of trust across the wider sector 	
91 NB: The farm visits provided no evidence of farmers responding (or not) to food hygiene and safety 
standards above those required by statutory minima, hence the following discussion does not include a 
section dedicated to these. 	
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Finally, there was clear evidence of expectation and co-ordination effects resulting from 
benchmarking, with such effects influencing both aligned farmers (directly) and non-aligned 
farmers (indirectly).  
7.3.1 Security of Supply 
This section is structured according to the following sanctions used by buyers in order to 
influence farms (see above, 5.2.6): 
• Base prices for milk 
• Bonuses for increased production and penalties for underproduction 
• A / B pricing  
• Seasonality payments  
7.3.1.1 Base Prices for Milk 
It was notable that intensive farms had frequently responded to high base milk prices (i.e. 
positive sanctions indicating buyer demand for milk) by further intensifying and/or expanding 
production. In these examples, there was a close correspondence between the buyers’ demands 
and the farms’ progress towards established system goals (i.e. maximising output per cow / 
robot). 
 
For example, immediately following the abolition of the MMB, Farm O contracted to supply 
processor MD Foods. Farmer O explained that the milk price that MD Foods paid at the time 
had encouraged him to intensify production through investment in new feeding technologies:  
 
“MD Foods gave us a good price for our milk. We had a lot of money coming in then, so we were 
looking at ways of improving our milk yield. In 1996 we bought our first feeder wagon, which 
improved our yields considerably. We also increased the amount of maize we grew …[and]… 
because we had a feeder wagon we could make better use of maize … milk yields would’ve 
probably gone up 1,500 litres … in a matter of a year.” 
 
 
Farmer I reported a similar response (“when prices were good for milk … it paid to feed the 
cows”), as did Farm M (“We had a Waitrose contract briefly, which was very nice and a good 
milk price, and encouraged us to produce more milk per cow”). 
 
It was also clear that high base prices presented farms with the incentive and/or opportunity to 
invest in new technologies, which often, due to investment effects (see above), resulted in the 
further stabilisation of farms’ production systems around an intensive model.  
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For example, Farmer O explained how his decision in 2008 to implement significant 
investments in milking and housing technologies and infrastructure (see 7.1) had been 
supported by the milk price  (“there was money in the milk at the time, and we thought it was a 
good time to do it”). 2008 saw a significant upturn in milk prices across the sector, with average 
UK farmgate prices in January 2008 (excluding bonuses) at 25.82p, compared with 5-year rolling 
averages at the time of 18.93p (excluding bonuses).92  The farm had an ageing milking parlour 
and housing that no longer suited its intensity of production (“our buildings were coming to 
the end … they were built for little old Friesian cows and our cubicles were too small … cows 
were finding it difficult to lie in them”). Their replacement with milking robots and the 
accompanying move to year round housing (with cubicles that suited the cows) served to 
further stabilise and intensify the production model. 
 
Farmer F suggested that the high milk price that he had received under his aligned contract to 
supply Tesco (through Muller) – and continuity, reliability and predictability associated with 
this – had enabled him to expand and intensify his system. Indeed, he suggested that his system 
might not have been sustainable had he been receiving the kind of prices that many non-
aligned farmers were being paid at the time. On the date of the interview93, the average price 
received by farmers on Farm F’s Tesco (Muller) contract was 28.55ppl. By comparison, many 
non-aligned farmers94 were receiving as little as 17.75ppl. The farmer suggested that: “… at 
minus ten pence it would be nigh on impossible [to run a place like this] … there would be only 
so long you could sustain it for … I would heavily think about keeping the cows… I would 
have to have a complete reshuffle on what I’m doing.” 
 
Significantly, Farmer F suggested that the stability of the milk price was key to enabling him to 
invest in expanding and intensifying his system, and that this was a common experience 
amongst aligned farmers:  
 
“… it offers stability, so … we can work at buying things to improve our herd because we know 
where we are [and] we don’t have volatility [in the milk price] … when I’ve been around some of 
the other Tesco herds, the majority of them I see have used that money correctly to build systems 
that can produce a healthier litre.” 
 
 
	
92 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/uk-farmgate-
milk-prices/  
 
93 20 July 2016 
 
94 UK Arla Farmers Liquid Contract, https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-
information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-new-profile/  
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The high, stable price received by Farmer F under the Tesco (Muller) contract is illustrated by 
comparing monthly average milk prices received under the Tesco (Muller) contract against 
prices received under the standard non-aligned contracts of two major processors (“First Milk 
Liquid Profile” and “Arla Non-Aligned”; see Figure 7a).  
 
Over a 44-month period between August 2008 and March 2012, the Tesco contract paid an 
average of 27.94ppl, compared with 24.04ppl and 25.5ppl paid under the First Milk and Arla 
contracts, respectively. Moreover, over the same period, the Tesco price changed 9 times (or 
every 4.89 months) compared with 17 times (or every 2.59 months) and 23 times (or every 1.91 
months) under the First Milk and Arla contracts, respectively. As well as changing less 
frequently, the amount by which the price changed was also smaller: the variance in the Tesco 
price over the period was 1.84ppl, compared with 5.08ppl (First Milk) and 2.61ppl (Arla), 
demonstrating its greater stability. This high, stable price – and the investments that it enabled – 
is evidence of higher conditions of trust within the Tesco value chain compared with non-
aligned value chains. Within such conditions, buyers may be better able to influence changes at 
the farm level. 
 
 
Figure 7a: Aligned vs Non-aligned Milk Prices and Volatility 
 
 
 
Source: Author (adapted from AHDB data95) 
 
 
	
95 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-
new-profile/; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-
contracts/uk-farmgate-milk-prices/ 
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In the above examples, when milk prices were high, there was a clear correspondence between 
buyers; demands and farms’ progress towards established system goals (i.e. buyers’ demands 
were working through existing positive feedbacks). However, the analysis also revealed 
examples in which buyers’ demands, expressed through base prices, did not correspond with 
farms’ progress towards established goals (i.e. where low prices reflected demand for reduced 
farm output) and where such demands had successfully influenced farms despite working 
against the positive feedbacks noted above (7.1 – 7.2). 
 
Farmer A, for example, explained that, although his current system had the potential to be more 
intensive than it currently was (in terms of stocking rate), low milk prices were limiting 
investment and expansion (i.e. holding back progress towards further intensification): 
 
“… We've got a plan … but we're not doing it at the moment because of the milk price96 … to 
put up a pair of buildings that will enable us to expand the herd and improve our facilities ... to 
increase the herd size by about 50 percent … We feel we've got enough capacity with the milking 
at the moment for 300 cows… But … we've got to see some improvement to the milk price 
[before] … we can think about doing that…” 
 
 
Elsewhere, as outlined above (7.1), Farm M appeared to have experienced diminishing returns 
to further intensification, which were redirecting technological search and selection towards the 
pursuit of improved feed efficiency. Low milk prices also appeared to be focusing Farmer M’s 
attention in this direction, serving to arrest the process and/or rate of intensification on this 
farm: 
 
“I’ve just bought another hundred and fifty acres …  it’s an opportunity to look at the what 
we’re doing and whether there is a less intensive way of doing it… with the way the milk price is 
at the moment.” 
 
 
The farm had increased the home grown forage component in the cows’ diets and reduced the 
amount of purchased concentrate feed. 
 
Similarly, Farm I had recently invested in a ‘zero-grazing’ machine97 as a means of reducing 
feed input prices98 in response to low milk prices. This might be characterised as a technological 	
96 NB: Farm A supplies Tesco, through Arla, but is no longer paid the Tesco price directly because he 
opted to become a member of the Arla co-operative. This means that Tesco pays the agreed cost of 
production price directly into the Arla members’ pool, with Farm A receiving the standard Arla price, 
which was, on the date of the interview 17.45ppl, plus a premium; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-
library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-new-profile/ 
 
97 A machine that enables fresh grass to be mown and carried, in bulk, to housed cows.  
 
98 Interestingly, the farmer had been less open to considering similar measures when advised to by a 
previous buyer, with whom relations (trust) had become strained (see below 7.4). 
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change within the boundaries defined by the existing system, resulting from the investment 
effects associated with the specialised and non-transferable nature of milking robots (Dosi 1988, 
p.226-7). The prior introduction of milking robots had prevented the farm from achieving 
similar results (i.e. reducing feed input costs) by using other means (such as, for example, 
grazing), prompting the implementation of zero-gazing in response to this: 
 
“This year the price of the milk has crashed and we are obviously looking at different ways of 
doing things and one option is to get more from grazed grass … we’ve looked into it and we just 
felt that it’s going to be hard to graze efficiently with robots … To actually get the cows in and 
out of the shed … hence [we have implemented] zero-grazing”.  
7.3.1.2 Bonuses for overproduction  
Although high base prices (above) may be interpreted (broadly) as a buyer demand for 
increased volume, bonuses for overproduction provide a more explicit and precise mechanism 
aimed at achieving the same goal. Farmer O explained the influence of such bonuses upon his 
system, and the powerful incentive that they presented to increase production output: 
 
Farmer O: “If you go back to when we put that robot in in 2014 … back then if we produced 1% 
more than what we did the year before then we got an extra 0.5ppl for the whole year on all the 
milk produced … and if you produced more than 5% than you did the year before then you got 
an extra penny on the whole production. Now, we were producing 2 million litres a year, so it 
came to a lot of money.” 
 
 
This annual bonus arrangement – in conjunction with a seasonality bonus scheme (see below 
7.3.1.5) had influenced the farmer to expand production through investing in a fourth milking 
robot. 
 
Shortly before the fieldwork was conducted, Tesco had introduced a scheme99 to reward its 
producers with volume bonuses, based on their performance against a range of criteria 
(discussed below, 7.3.3.1). 
7.3.1.3 A/B pricing 
Although low base prices (above) may be interpreted (broadly) as a buyer demand for reduced 
volume, A/B pricing provides a more explicit and precise mechanism aimed at achieving the 
same goal. Because intensive systems are centred on maximising output per cow, and – through 
further intensification – will tend towards increased output over time, A/B pricing runs 
broadly in opposition to the positive feedback effects associated with intensive systems. 		
99 1 February 2016; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-articles/november-2015/tesco-maintains-milk-
price-link-to-cost-tracker/  
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In the cases analysed, where buyers had imposed A/B pricing, there was some evidence of 
intensive farms responding to such demands by implementing changes within the established 
boundaries of the system, with the feedback effects discussed already (7.1 – 7.2) appearing to 
restrict the implementation of more radical changes (i.e. extensification). For example, Farmer 
M’s current buyer had introduced A/B pricing (see Appendix 7F) in April 2015:  
 
“The first 6,900 litres that we produce we get paid the flat rate basket price for … which is 21ppl 
… and anything over that we get what is called [an] ‘open market price’ which is actually the 
spot price, which was 13.7ppl last month.” 
 
 
In response to this strong disincentive against production, the farmer had decided to cull 40 
cows (“because they were producing B litres milk… and we were just buying feed to feed 
them”). Technically, the farmer could have sought to reduce total farm output using a range of 
possible approaches, including reverting to twice daily milking or substantially reducing feed 
inputs (and associated costs) per cow. The approach he selected, however – culling 40 cows 
from the herd while maintaining output per cow – demonstrates the action and strength of the 
complementarity and investment effects outlined above (7.1), which served to preserve a model 
centred on maximising output per cow, and which was strongly underpinned by the farmers’ 
beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm. Put differently, the farmer had opted for minimal 
disruption (‘shallow’ changes) to the system and the buyer’s demands had influenced the scale 
of operations rather than the intensity of technological inputs on this farm. 
 
Within aligned value chains buyers impose limits with regard to the number of ‘core’ or ‘base’ 
litres for which farmers may receive the premium, aligned milk price, with farmers being paid 
the standard processor price for additional litres supplied above that level (see Appendix 
7G).100 The influence of such measures on farms was also evident, despite the fact that the 
sanctioning effect of supermarket-imposed volume limits may be relatively less punitive than 
the sanctioning effect of A/B pricing within non-aligned contracts.101 According to Farmer O: 
 
“If you are supplying Tesco … probably … 70% of your milk will go to Tesco, and the other 
30% will be paid at the standard Muller price … [the proportion that receives the Muller price 
is] the percentage of your production for the month over the base (which is worked out by the 
average of [your output for] the same month last year and the year before) ... So … if you have 	
100 Although this is not referred to as ‘A/B pricing’ within the industry, it serves the same purpose, 
imposing a financial penalty for production above certain specified limits. 
 
101 For example, in April 2016 the price received by a Tesco (Muller) farmer for additional litres above the 
specified limits would have been 20.36ppl, compared with the spot price of 13.7ppl received for ‘B’ litres 
under some non-aligned A/B contracts (see above); http://www.mynewsdesk.com/uk/muller-
wiseman/pressreleases/muller-confirms-april-milk-price-reduction-due-to-continued-volatility-1329082.  
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expanded a lot in the last two years you’ll get a lower percentage than somebody who hasn’t 
expanded. So it’s not encouraging you to expand.” [emphasis added] 
 
 
In other words, supermarkets’ efforts to limit volumes encouraged aligned farmers not to 
expand, whereas processors’ efforts to limit volumes encouraged non-aligned farmers to scale 
back production. 
7.3.1.4 Seasonality Adjustments 
Only one out of the five intensive farms analysed had been influenced to change their calving 
pattern by seasonality payments. Farmer A (see above 7.1) revealed that buyer demands had 
influenced his decision to change from operating two calving blocks (Spring and Autumn) to a 
single Autumn block: 
 
“With our particular contract, there are penalties for producing more milk in the Spring than 
you do in the winter time. So it does make sense for us … from that point of view, to produce 
more milk in the winter.” (See Appendix 7H) 
 
 
Farmer O recalled how his milk buyer’s previous seasonality bonus scheme had influenced his 
purchase of a fourth milking robot, expanding the production system (see also 7.3.1.2, above): 
 
“ … if you produced more milk in the months from October to February … they paid an extra 6p 
a litre … just for those extra litres. We sat down and worked it out: ‘If we put this robot in, it 
was worth something like an extra £50,000 in one year’… which would pay for the robot, 
because I’d bought a second hand one.” 
 
 
Farms O and F, supplying supermarkets, had both operated all year calving models since the 
beginning of the study period. All year calving corresponded well with their buyers’ demands 
for a level year-round supply of milk, and therefore required no changes to their system. 
Indeed, the close correspondence between Tesco’s scheme for seasonality payments, and Farm 
O’s level production profile (which its housed / robot system both necessitated and facilitated, 
see 7.1.2), was particularly evident: 
 
“It used to be that if you could produce milk within plus or minus 15% you stayed on a single 
price right through the year… which is what we’ve done over the last five or six years … we 
haven’t had a seasonality payment, because we could keep our milk production within those 
parameters … But now they’ve got a really, really complicated seasonality system, which I still 
don’t really understand… but basically if you can keep within five or ten percent of an average, 
then you don’t have any seasonality, but if you do vary you do incur seasonality 
[penalties] and the more you vary the more the seasonality [penalty] is.” [emphasis 
added] 
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The refusal of Farms M and I to comply with buyer demands for changes in their production 
profile is outlined below (7.4.1). 
7.3.2 Product Characteristics 
Evidence of buyers influencing product characteristics was limited to the use of sanctions to 
encourage changes in the constituent content of milk. Whereas demands relating to volume and 
profile (7.3.1) had required quite fundamental (‘deep’) changes to production systems (e.g. to 
calving pattern), changes to constituent content were generally not ‘deep’ but could be 
achieved, for example, through adjustments to feed inputs. 
7.3.2.1 Sanctions: Bonuses / Penalties for Constituents 
For Farmer M, buyer demands in the immediate aftermath of the abolition of the Milk 
Marketing Board (MMB) were complementary to his intensive approach, and strongly 
influenced his subsequent use of breeding technologies:  
 
“I remember when Unigate took over from the Milk Marketing Board … the Unigate bloke stood 
up and said ‘there’s no market for saturated fats, what we want is volume’, so we bred the cows 
very much for volume rather than butterfat yield, which we’ve slightly come to regret later on, 
but it stood us in good stead. In those days we were using bulls that were predicted to transmit a 
thousand litres more than their daughters, so yields went up quite fast … and solids 
[constituents] didn’t follow because that was what we were told we didn’t need.” 
 
Farm O switched processors numerous times between 1994 and 2016, with different buyers 
making different demands regarding the constituent content of the milk. Farmer O explained 
how this had influenced the farm system, largely involving changes to the composition of the 
ration fed to the cows, which it appears could be readily accommodated without requiring 
fundamental changes to the existing system: 
 
“MD Foods gave us a good price for our milk. We had a lot of money coming in then, so we were 
looking at ways of improving our milk yield… We then went to Horlicks Creamery, which was a 
cheese factory. They wanted high constituents in the milk so we then started feeding things like 
caustic wheat, which would improve milk proteins… We then went to Westbury Foods … which 
was [a] liquid milk [contract]… so I think we went for then producing more volume … and cut 
the quality back, so we cut a lot of the caustic wheat and probably gave them a more high-protein 
diet… we ended up at Cricketer cheese factory … so then we went back to producing high 
protein and high butterfat milk… so the diet changed again, but I think we managed to change it 
without losing too much volume … then I went to Wiseman, which is a liquid contract [see 
Appendix 7I], which suited me much better… so then we could produce as much low protein 
and low butterfat milk as we wanted!” 
 
 
The farm was able to respond to these changing buyer demands, without altering its overall 
intensive production approach, in spite of the obstacles presented by the use of milking robots: 
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“[When we introduced the robots] were still supplying Cricketer Farms, which was obviously a 
butterfat / protein based payment. But when we changed to the robots there are certain things 
you have to do to make the robot system work. And you cannot feed a high starch TMR, which is 
what we were feeding to get the high milk protein [see above 7.1]… the biggest problem with 
robots… [is that] it is very difficult to produce high protein milk” 
7.3.3 Production Characteristics 
This section considers buyer’s efforts to influence the cost of production and standards of 
animal welfare and environmental performance. 
7.3.3.1 The Cost of Production (and The Power to Exclude) 
The milk price paid to farmers within aligned value chains is frequently calculated by reference 
to the average cost of production of the pool of producers supplying the supermarket. For 
example, farmers within the producer pool supplying Tesco (the ‘Tesco Sustainable Dairy 
Group’ or ‘TSDG’) received a price based upon the cost of production, through Tesco’s ‘Cost 
Tracker’ scheme (see Appendix 7J), under which an independent consultancy – Promar – 
calculated the milk price based on the average cost of production of all members of the TSDG.102 
The use of this pricing mechanism indicates Tesco’s goal of encouraging farmers to reduce their 
production costs and/or improve production efficiency (for example, through reducing the 
fixed and variable costs that form the basis of the cost of production calculation).  
 
Further goals were revealed by Tesco’s 2015 review of its supplier base, following which the 
supermarket resolved to source all of its milk from within its aligned pool (in the words of 
Farmer O: “Now what they want is that all their milk comes from full Tesco farms. So … now 
… they’ve got enough farms that will match their highest [level of] demand”). As a result of the 
review, Tesco introduced a ‘balanced scorecard’ to measure the performance of farms in terms 
of ‘quality’, ‘value’, ‘innovation’ and ‘service’, parameters that serve to outline – in broad terms 
– the ‘problems and solutions’ that the supermarket associated with dairy farming. The top 5% 
of producers, assessed using this scorecard system, would be rewarded with “an additional 
100,000 litres to produce within their TSDG contract”, with this extra volume being made 
available as a result of “retirements or through the performance review process”. 103  Moreover, 
“the bottom 5% of farmers will be given a notice period of 6 months”.104  
 	
102 https://www.tescoplc.com/news/news-releases/2016/tesco-continues-to-pay-a-market-leading-price-
to-dairy-farmers-for-their-fresh-milk/  
 
103 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/news/news-articles/november-2015/tesco-maintains-milk-price-link-to-
cost-tracker/  
 
104 ibid. 
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Given that the review had only recently been completed at the time the fieldwork was 
conducted, the farmers interviewed appeared uncertain as to its influence on their systems. For 
example, when asked whether he felt that Tesco was expecting farmers to constantly lower their 
production costs Farmer F replied that: 
 
“Tesco are really driven by health … and carbon footprint. And … they try and put that across 
to their customers as much as possible. Health is a big driver.” 
 
 
Farmer A, on the other hand, explained that: 
 
“I think all [Tesco are] trying to do … is encourage us to produce our milk as cheaply as 
possible. And I think that … one of the ways that they’re trying to help us – and help 
themselves, obviously, too – is to point to where the feed might be cheaper, or what sort of feeds 
are cheaper…” 
 
 
In this sense, Tesco’s demands for improved production efficiencies appeared to correspond 
with intensive farms’ progress towards established goals. In particular, Tesco’s demands were 
consistent with many of the ‘reverse salients’ associated with intensive farm systems, such as 
those that had emerged as farmers were experiencing decreasing returns to intensification (see 
above 7.1).  
 
Moreover, it was also apparent that the practice of benchmarking aligned farms according to 
production costs was giving rise to expectation and co-ordination effects. When asked whether 
Tesco had instructed farms to emulate the production approaches of the ‘top performing’ farms 
with a view to driving down production costs, Farmer A replied: 
 
“Not that I’m aware of ... But, I suppose we were all sort of doing that to some extent anyway. 
So if you … hear of farms performing particularly well, then you … look at their system, if you 
have the opportunity, and see how they’re doing it. So I suppose we’re doing that anyway. And 
most of us, we use a nutritionist and somebody who can advise… and obviously, they’re looking 
at other farms as well, so they can bring that information to you…” 
 
 
Furthermore, it was also evident that the supermarket practice of collecting of data for the 
purpose of benchmarking (both accounts data and data on other performance metrics, such as 
animal health and welfare) had a more pervasive effect, influencing farms both inside and outside 
of the supplier pool. For example, Farmer O, who had been awarded a Tesco contract just 
months before the date of the interview, explained that meeting Tesco’s demands for 
production characteristics with regard to animal welfare (see below 7.3.3.2) had required no 
fundamental changes to his system, because: 
 
“We were there already because we wanted a Tesco contract, so we were trying our best to be 
what they wanted anyway.” [emphasis added] 
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Tesco farmers appeared to be supportive of benchmarking, in spite of Tesco’s review of the 
TSDG and the threat that the “bottom 5%” of Tesco farms would be given notice while the 
worst performing farms would be subject to more rigorous modes of inspection than other 
Tesco suppliers. According to Farmer O: 
  
 “Apparently we will get a visit [from Tesco, to perform an audit] at any time, but at least once a 
year…. And if you’re at the bottom of the scale you’ll get more visits, and if you’re at the top of 
the scale you’ll get less visits … it’s very competitive… some farmers don’t like that, but if 
some people are prepared to put in the effort to do better, why shouldn’t they be 
rewarded?” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Indeed, there was some evidence that the transparency of the cost of production pricing 
formula had influenced farmers’ mindsets, in particular with regard to their perspectives on the 
‘fairness’ of such pricing mechanisms (Farmer F: “it’s a pretty fair process … they get all this 
information and they put us on a cost of production contract”). However, it does seem probable 
that farmers’ willingness to concede to supermarkets’ data collection and benchmarking 
requirements is closely related to the presence of positive sanctions in the form of a high, stable 
milk price (see above, 7.3.1.1). As Farmer O suggested: 
 
“People are very reluctant to give their figures to Tesco … but there is no other contract out 
there that will match it … because they have put in a decent profit margin. They [others] think 
it’s just a cost of production [price], but there is a profit margin in there as well, which is a good 
profit margin. And no other contract will give you that.” 
 
 
Moreover, the scale of the negative sanction associated with losing a supermarket contract (i.e. 
the supermarket’s ‘power to exclude’, see 5.2.6) should not be overlooked. According to Farmer 
O: 
“There was a period … where the standard milk price was actually higher than the aligned Tesco 
or Sainsbury’s price … and there were some farmers that were so upset by this that they went 
out and changed [to a non-aligned contract]! [laughs] … And Tescos will tell you: ‘if you 
leave, we won’t have you back!’” [emphasis added] 
 
 
Significantly, the Cost Tracker scheme had initially involved the voluntary submission of 
accounts data by farmers, in exchange for a 0.5ppl bonus. The 2015 review of the TSDG made 
the submission of accounts data compulsory (for example, Farm A had not initially signed up 
for the 0.5ppl bonus for supplying accounts data but had been required to from February 2017). 
This may represent a shift in the governance of the Tesco value chain. 
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7.3.3.2 Animal Welfare and Environmental Performance 
Both aligned and non-aligned contracts105 required farms to adhere to certain standards with 
regard to animal welfare and environmental performance.  
 
The farm interviews implied that such demands typically required ‘shallow’ changes to farms’ 
systems. For example, when he was awarded a Tesco contract, Farmer A was already 
undertaking locomotion scoring, body condition scoring, antibiotics use, and monthly milk 
recording (for yields, fats, proteins for individual cows), in accordance with Tesco’s demands. 
He reported that his system presented no obstacles to complying with Tesco’s further demands 
for abrasion scoring, lesion scoring, cleanliness scoring and the submission of accounts data. 
 
Similarly, Farmer O stated that he was willing and able to comply with Tesco’s demands (see 
above 7.3.3.1): 
  
“We … have to do mobility scoring, which is not a big problem … and we’ve had to change some 
of the antibiotics we’ve used, because we were using the third generation antibiotics for 
mastitis… no big problem with that.” 
 
 
For Farmer F, Tesco’s demands for data collection and its approach to benchmarking 
corresponded closely with the farmer’s own beliefs about the value of data collection and 
monitoring, acquired during his time in the US (see above, 7.2). The farm had implemented 
monitoring (including mobility scoring, antibiotics use, and mastitis levels) at the request of the 
buyer, but these changes were consistent with the farmer’s existing approach, and therefore did 
not require ‘deep’ changes to the system): 
 
“Tesco want to know where their milk is coming from. It isn’t much work. They just want to 
know what it is that they are buying. And they want to be able to tell their customers what they 
are buying too. So it’s not a lot of hassle. And most of the information that we give them we 
should be using ourselves … even just getting you to count your antibiotics usage every month, 
that’s something you should be doing anyway, but you don’t probably if you’re not on a Tesco 
contract.” 
 
 
In such examples, it was significant that both the farmer and the supermarket appeared to 
frame the problems and solutions of dairy farming in similar terms. In this sense, the practice of 
benchmarking provided a framework within which buyers’ demands both influenced – and 
were influenced by – farmers’ production approaches (i.e. not only because supermarkets are 
not themselves users of technology meaning that their ‘frames’ are informed by farmers’ use of 
the technology but, moreover, because examples of ‘best practice’ that buyers hoped to spread 	
105 e.g. “ArlaGarden” assurance scheme within Arla (non-aligned) contracts; 
https://www.arla.com/company/responsibility/farm-quality/arlagaarden/  
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across producer pools were developed by the best-performing farms. It was also significant that 
farms, as a result of being benchmarked, were framing the issue of benchmarking in terms of 
the value or benefits that it presented to them (see further, 9.3.3.1). 
 
Elsewhere, there was clear evidence of the conditions of trust within aligned value chains, in 
which supermarkets provided support and extension services that served to influence the 
reproduction of farm systems. Farmer A explained: 
 
“I think [Tesco are] trying to aid us to improve cow welfare. So they’ve done workshops … on … 
dry cow therapy … locomotion ... lameness, mastitis, calf rearing, things like that. We’ve 
definitely learned things [from those workshops] and put things in place to help us improve our 
management.” 
7.4 When Buyer Power Fails to Influence Technological Change  
Broadly, buyer power failed to influence technological change in farms where sanctions were 
weak and/or there was a lack of trust within the value chain. This was exacerbated where 
buyer demands required deep changes to farms’ systems.  
7.4.1 Security of Supply 
Farm M has followed an intensive trajectory, operating an Autumn-calving model, since the 
outset of the study period (see 7.1). Although the farm provided examples of buyer demands 
influencing processes of change, Farmer M also reported that is had switched milk buyers in 
response to buyer demands for system change. In 2008 the farmer made the decision to switch 
from supplying Dairy Crest to supplying Freshways after Dairy Crest had demanded a level 
year round production profile from its farmers.  
 
Although a move to all year calving would be compatible with an intensive trajectory (and 
might be regarded as accelerating development along that trajectory, being generally associated 
with increased housing period and higher feed inputs per cow) it would nevertheless require 
quite deep changes affecting this farm’s core activities (namely, a move from autumn calving to 
all year calving, which would alter long-established working practices and processes on the 
farm, and require the development of new skills). Therefore, in this example, investment and 
learning effects appeared to play an important role in countering buyer influence: 
 
“I left Dairy Crest because … they wanted level production and they were pushing quite hard 
for all year calving… it wasn’t what I wanted to do… All my working life we’ve been an 
autumn calving herd, so it was what I was used to.”  
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These investment and learning effects were also associated with ‘beliefs’ about the right way to 
farm. Having autumn-calved for over thirty years, the farmer explained: 
 
“I think it works very well… as much as anything [for] the youngstock rearing … it’s one hell of 
an advantage… I don’t think people realise what an advantage it is over having replacements 
born all year round. I’ve always felt we’ve got the best results by being able to concentrate on 
one thing at a time.” 
 
Moreover, it appears that levels of trust (seemingly related to knowledge and associated beliefs) 
within the value chain were low, and that this may have further hindered the buyer’s ability to 
influence the farmer: 
  
“When we gave our notice in, a senior director [at] Dairy Crest, came to see us to try to 
convince us to stay … and I was very unimpressed with his knowledge of dairy farming … he 
pretty much convinced me to leave Dairy Crest ... he just didn’t understand about how milk 
production worked.” 
 
 
By contrast, the farmer described stronger conditions of trust between himself and his new 
buyer: 
 
“Freshways are a relatively small company… a third of the size [of Dairy Crest] … but they 
claim to be the biggest family owned or independent [processor] … we spoke directly to the 
Managing Director, he took us around the factory, showed us how everything worked … I felt 
much more comfortable with that sort of family structure rather than Dairy Crest executives 
who are really looking at numbers on a piece of paper and don’t really understand what they are 
buying or what they are doing… I’ve got a good enough relationship with [the Managing 
Director] that I can ring him up and ask him what’s going on … but he is quite open, really … 
he’ll tell you anything: what his costs of processing are, what his markets are and suchlike.”  
 
 
The influence of sanctions upon the farmer’s decision making was also apparent. The 
availability of an alternative buyer (Freshways) – which paid a good milk price – meant that 
there was no negative sanction associated with leaving Dairy Crest. Moreover, the buyers’ 
demands contained within the Freshways contract corresponded closely with farms’ progress 
towards its established goals: 
 
“It’s a very simple white water contract, [which] suits our three times a day system, because 
there is no incentive for high solids … that suits our high input-low solids [milk] … [it] actually 
suits us very well because we produce most of our milk over the winter and … we’re producing 
quite a lot of milk on some of the best prices in the country because we’ve had no penalties for 
seasonality.” 
 
 
In the case of Farm I, the failure of buyer power to influence the farm’s calving pattern, through 
seasonality payments, demonstrated the strength of complementarity effects that had created 
by the introduction of milking robots (see above 7.1) relative to weak positive sanctions: 
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“We’re all year round calving… we always were really, before the robots, but with the robots 
installed, [it helps] just to keep a continual, level supply of milk. And our milk supplier [buyer], 
whilst they still do a seasonality payment thing ... they are a liquid supplier … we don’t really 
seem to get any real benefit from doing that particularly.” 
 
 
Much stronger positive sanctions (in the form of a bigger seasonality bonus) and corresponding 
negative sanctions (in the form of the threat of loss of contract) would be required in order to 
ensure compliance with these demands. 
7.4.2 Production characteristics 
Farmer I recalled an unsuccessful attempt by a former buyer – First Milk – to influence his 
production approach. The buyer had established a discussion group for its farmers, which was 
attended by a First Milk representative who attempted to influence the farmers to focus on 
reducing their production costs: 
 
“I remember one particular meeting, he stood and did a bit of a slide presentation to try and tell 
us [that farmgate price] isn’t the main driver of profitability… [that] it actually comes down to 
cost of production, and keeping that as low as possible… but it was a little bit galling to hear 
him say that when we knew there were people up the road getting quite a bit more for their 
[milk] … if your neighbour up the road producing the same amount of milk was by default 
getting another 2 or 3ppl on his milk, you know, on a million litres, that’s another 20 or 30 
thousand pounds [per annum] just like that.” 
 
 
First Milk’s unsuccessful attempt to influence the farmer’s cost of production in this example 
may be contrasted against Tesco’s successful influence upon farmer production costs (described 
above, 7.3.3.1). While it was apparent that the presence of powerful positive sanctions (in the 
form of a high, stable milk price) and negative sanctions (i.e. the threat of losing the contract) 
may have been instrumental in enabling Tesco to successfully influence the farmers supplying 
it, the absence of similarly strong positive and negative sanctions in this example may have 
restricted the buyer’s ability to influence the farmer. Put differently, the buyer’s inability to 
influence Farmer I appears to be related to the low milk price that the buyer was paying, and 
the availability of better prices elsewhere (i.e. the opportunity cost associated with losing the 
contract was low).  
 
Similarly, it was implied that conditions of trust within the aligned value chain (related to / 
resulting from the high, stable milk price) may have played a role in enabling Tesco to influence 
its farmers. Such conditions of trust were notably absent within First Milk’s value chain, as 
indicated by the Farmer’s history of “frustration” with the buyer. Again, these low conditions of 
trust appeared to be directly related to the low, volatile price being paid by First Milk. Farmer I 
		
	
131	
switched milk buyer in the middle of 2013, due to longstanding dissatisfaction with the milk 
price he had been receiving:  
 
“We’d been getting more and more frustrated with First Milk for a number of years… we’d had 
a look at leaving previously… [but] there was no one interested in taking us on… when we 
eventually were able to get out, it was a time when people were looking for milk… and we could 
have easily gone with Arla… you know there was different people we talked to… we ended up 
going with Cotteswold.” 
 
 
The low, volatile price paid by First Milk price was outlined already above (Figure 7a). Over a 
44-month period between August 2008 and March 2012 the mean price paid under the First 
Milk Liquid Profile contract was 24.04ppl, compared with the UK average farmgate price of 
25.70ppl. Moreover, the variance106 of the First Milk price was 5.08ppl, whereas the variance of 
the UK average farmgate price was 4.10ppl over the same period. Having switched milk buyer, 
the farmer subsequently focused on reducing production costs. 
 
Farmer O had also switched buyer following demands from his buyer aimed at enforcing a 
specific production standard that was inconsistent with farmer’s beliefs about the right way to 
farm. The farmer explained that his buyer – Cricketer – a processor that specialised in 
producing cheese, wanted to prevent its suppliers from using ‘Orbeseal’ teat sealant, believing 
that one of the ingredients of Orbeseal – bismuth107 – caused ‘black spot’ in mature cheddar. It 
appeared that complying with this demand would involve a deep change to core activities on 
the farm:  
 
“Orbeseal is really part of my routine, I can’t go without it… I think it is essential for dry cow 
management … it’s a dry cow management tool, which has I think most vets would tell you has 
been a revolution in dry cow therapy…“ 
 
  
	
106 i.e. the variability of the price around the mean, providing an indication of the volatility of that price 
 
107 http://www.broughtonveterinarygroup.co.uk/news/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/2012.10-Newsletter-October-
20121.pdf)   
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Chapter 8: 
Technological Change in Extensive Farms 
 
 
This chapter considers patterns of technological change in extensive farms and the influence of 
buyer power upon these patterns. The analysis begins with a description of farm socio-technical 
systems by reference to inputs and outputs and the positive feedbacks and reverse salients 
associated with the interactions between technologies (8.1) and between technologies and other 
components (8.2), which serve to highlight farms’ progress towards system goals. This is 
followed by an analysis of the influence of buyer demands, by reference to conditions of value 
chain governance, upon this progress (8.3), contrasted against instances in which buyer power 
has been unsuccessful (8.4) in influencing the extent, rate or direction of technological change. 
8.1 Interactions Between Technologies 
The configurations of technologies used on intensive farms – and the interactions between these 
technologies – supported progress towards the broad goal of maximising output per cow 
and/or per milking robot (where these were used; see Chapter 7). By contrast the technological 
configurations used on extensive farms appeared to centre upon maximising the performance 
(i.e. growth and utilisation) of grass, supporting progress towards the goal of minimising inputs 
of purchased feed per cow and/or per litre of milk (a further – related – goal being the 
reduction of labour inputs per cow / litre). Therefore, although interactions between breeding, 
feeding and housing technologies were pronounced on both extensive and intensive farms, the 
selection of (and the approach to and intensity of deployment of) these technologies was 
noticeably different between the two systems.  
 
Chiefly, the use of robust breeds of cattle (as opposed to Holsteins, see 5.1.2 and Appendix 5C) 
– able to withstand a broader range of weather conditions108 – enabled extensive farms to house 
their cows for a smaller proportion of the year compared with intensive farms and therefore to 
graze for a larger proportion of the year, meaning that grass constituted a larger proportion of 
the cows’ diets. Moreover, being more physically robust, the cattle were better able to tolerate 
the inconsistencies in diet resulting from inevitable variations in grass growth (i.e. in both the 
volume and nutritional quality of grass) throughout the year, by contrast to the pedigree 	
108 “Some breeds are considered to be better at looking after themselves and replacing condition more 
easily than others, making them better suited to systems involving out-wintering or extended grazing … 
deeper-bodied cows with larger rumen capacities [may be] better adapted to high forage grazing 
systems.” (DairyCo 2012b, p.2:26). Related to this, the interactions between technologies and physical 
resources (i.e. climate) on extensive farms were also distinct from those on intensive farms (see below, 8.2). 
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Holsteins favoured by intensive farmers, which required a more controlled, consistent diet all 
year round. There was also evidence of bilateral complementarity effects between the adoption 
of Spring calving and the use of grazed grass as the primary component of the cows’ diets: 
grass growth is greatest in the Spring, coinciding with the Spring-calved cows’ maximum 
energy requirement.  
 
The lower requirement for housing also appeared to provide extensive farms with greater scope 
for herd expansion (herd size could be increase without the need for additional housing 
infrastructure). 
 
Farm P109 provides some useful examples of the distinctions between extensive systems and 
more intensive models of production, and of the different interactions between technologies 
within each system. In 2005 Farmer P returned to the family farm and began to extensify 
production. At that time, the herd had been composed entirely of pedigree Holstein cows, fed a 
total mixed ration (TMR), achieving yields of approximately 9,000 litres per cow110 (i.e. a similar 
approach to the farms considered in Chapter 7; see also timeline Appendix 8A). In 2005 Farmer 
P began crossbreeding the Holsteins with Norwegian Reds and Jerseys, and shifted from all 
year calving to Spring calving. In 2007 he stopped feeding a TMR in favour of an ‘easy feed’ 
approach (see 5.1.2; Table 5a). In 2010 he realised that his use of feed inputs had not advanced 
fully in line with the other changes made within the system (which had been aimed at reducing 
inputs per cow), and that this was holding back overall system performance (i.e. a reverse 
salient had emerged): 
 
“2010 was probably the year we … said ‘we need to fully adapt to the grass based system’, 
because we sort of had one foot in each camp ... we probably got to the point where we were 
milking sixty percent crossbreds and forty percent Holsteins [but] we were still tailoring the 
system to the Holsteins … [and] the crossbreds were getting fat.” 
 
 
Farmer P addressed this through reducing concentrate feed from 3.5 tonnes to 2 tonnes per cow 
per annum on the date of the interview (which, he suggests, “is [still] pretty heavy for those 
little cows” but had been necessary “because we didn't have enough silage this year”).111  
 
	
109 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 18/7/14; Timeline Appendix 8A 
 
110 Compared with UK average yields in 2005/6 of 7,001 litres per cow per milk year; 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/average-milk-yield/ 
 
111 Mean compound feeds for the Milkbench sample in 2013 were 1.9 tonnes [1,903kg)] for intermediate 
farms and 1 tonne [1,033kg] for extensive farms 	
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On the date of interview, the cows were being housed for approximately 100 days of the year 
(and grazed for the remainder), which would have placed the farm within the tenth percentile 
of the Milkbench dataset for housing period.112 The farmer explained the contribution of the 
above changes to breeding and feeding technologies towards current milk yields of 7,500 per 
cow113:  
 
 “About four thousand [litres comes] … from forage, and the rest you get from concentrate … 
[whereas] when we had nine thousand litres a year we probably only got about three thousand 
litres from forage… the bigger [i.e. Holstein] cows are more efficient at converting concentrate.” 
 
 
The farmer also summarised the ways in which the crossbred cow complemented the housing 
and feeding technologies deployed on the farm:  
 
 “The difference between our cows and the bigger cow is that they are just not overly affected by 
bad management … if we put them in a grass field and there's not enough grass in there, they 
don't die, they just get hungry … But … the pure bred Holsteins are always on the edge, which 
is why you have a feeder wagon [for feeding a TMR], because you're trying to get as much feed 
into them [as possible].” 
 
 
The use of crossbred cattle therefore supported a reduction in other technological inputs, as 
well as a reduction in labour (“management”) inputs (see further, 8.2). 
 
Additional evidence of breed selection supporting the performance of feeding and housing 
technologies (with the goal of reducing inputs per cow) was apparent in the case of Farm G114, 
which comprised a herd of 600 Friesian-Jersey crossbred cows in Scotland, yielding 5,000 
litres115 per cow.116 The farmer explained the importance of cow breed to his farming model: 
 
“[The cows] go out to grass almost immediately [after calving in February/March] … if the 
conditions allow … And the only condition that will stop us is snow … The breed of cow is very, 
very important ... The Holstein wouldn’t survive in this type of system.” 
 	
112 The mean housing period for farms in the Milkbench dataset (2013) was 31.96 weeks (223.7 days), while 
for the extensive cluster the figure dropped to 24.56 weeks (171.92 days). 
 
113  Mean yield for extensive farms in the Milkbench dataset were 6,706 litres 
 
114 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 21/7/16. The farmer had only been operating on the site a little over 
a year, hence no timeline is provided.  
 
115 Yields of 5,574 litres and below would place the farm in 10th percentile of the Milkbench dataset. 	
116 Unlike the other farms within this study, Farm G had been established relatively recently (December 
2014), although the farmer had been in dairy farming for over a decade (“There was zero dairy 
infrastructure here as it had been a mixed enterprise of beef, sheep and arable”). Complementarity effects 
were nevertheless in evidence. Moreover, the farmer had over 10 years experience in dairy farming, which 
provided evidence of investment and learning effects. 
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In addition to these complementarity effects, investment effects associated with crossbreeding 
were evident not only from the adaptation and specialisation of the crossbred cow to the 
extensive system but, moreover, from the length of time required to implement (and by 
implication reverse) such breeding changes (highlighting the fact that the cows were not readily 
transferable to a different system). According to the farmers interviewed, the effects of 
crossbreeding took between three and ten years to become established.  
 
A feature of the extensive farms in the study – related to the breed-feed-housing interactions 
detailed above – was the apparent ease with which they were able to increase herd size. The 
low feed and housing inputs on these farms, enabled by the use of crossbred cows, appeared to 
support such expansion and to allow the farms to achieve a high stocking rate. For example, the 
changes at Farm P, described above, accompanied an increase in herd size from 140 in 2005 to 
240 in 2014, resulting in a very high stocking rate of three cows per hectare.117 The farmer 
explained that, because crossbred cows are smaller than Holsteins, with lower nutritional 
requirements, “you can keep more of them on less of an area”. The stocking rate at Farms G 
and K was two and a half cows per hectare. 
 
Farm K118, which had operated an (increasingly) extensive system throughout the study period, 
provided further evidence of complementarity effects between breeding, feeding, and housing 
technologies – these interacting in turn with production cycle – as well as evidence of an 
expansion in herd size over that period enabled by this configuration of technologies.  
 
When Farmer K took charge of the farm in 1994, he inherited a herd of 170 Autumn-calved 
cows, which were “British Friesian with a fifty per cent … Holstein influence”. The farmer 
planned to expand the herd by introducing a block of 60 Spring-calved cows (“so that I could 
add more cows to the farm without changing the infrastructure [i.e. housing]”). He explained: 
 
“If we were to change [back] to a single Autumn block we would have to reduce cow numbers 
because I haven’t got enough housing for everybody at once … With the two blocks, and 
particularly with the Spring block, when they are outwintered, we actually have the ability to 
have more cows than we would otherwise have.” 
 
 
The farmer planned this Spring-calved block to operate as “a very low input system … [based 
on] grazing with a very small amount of bought feed”. In order to achieve this, he introduced 	
117 Compared with mean values for the Milkbench dataset of: 2.37 LU/Ha (livestock units per hectare) for 
the intensive cluster, 1.76 LU/Ha for the intermediate cluster, and 2.09 LU/Ha for the extensive cluster. 
For whole dataset a stocking rate of 2.47 and over would place the farm in the 80th percentile, while a 
stocking rate of 2.78 and over would place the farm in the 90th percentile. 
 
118 Aligned farm, interview date: 28/5/16; Timeline Appendix 8B 
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New Zealand Friesian genetics into the herd (i.e. to produce cows that were better suited to a 
system of minimal housing and extensive grazing). At the time of the interview, the herd 
contained “predominantly New Zealand genetics, with some Norwegian Red crossbreds”. The 
farmer explained that the genetic make up of the cows permitted the use of very low feed 
inputs: “The Autumn calvers just have just grazed grass, nothing else … [while] the Spring 
calvers have a small quantity of bought feed, a little bit of silage and 23 hours of grazing”. 
 
The ability of crossbred cows to tolerate this type of Spring-calved model provides a contrast to 
the experience of more intensive farms. For example, Farmer A (see above, 7.1) had moved from 
operating two calving blocks (Spring and Autumn) to a single Autumn block, because his high-
yielding Holstein cattle could not meet their peak energy demand within a Spring-calved model 
without the addition of considerable feed supplementation. 
 
More generally, interactions could be observed on extensive farms between the configurations 
of breeding, feeding and housing technologies outlined above, and broader technological 
approaches to fertility and production cycle. Chiefly, a block calving model supports improved 
fertility through enabling the easier detection of ‘heat’, without the need for additional 
technological or labour inputs. As Farmer K explained: 
 
“On a block-calved system it’s usually pretty easy to find bullers [i.e. cows in oestrous]. On an 
all year round calving system, if there’s only one cow bulling on a particular afternoon, and she 
hasn’t got a friend to play with … it’s quite difficult to see.” 
 
 
Accordingly, whereas technologies such as heat detection collars were relatively commonplace 
on intensive farms operating all-year calving models (Farms I and O, see Chapter 7) – as well as 
those operating block calving models (Farms M and A; Chapter 7) – extensive farms favoured 
comparatively rudimentary (and less expensive) approaches to heat detection, consistent with 
their focus on reducing input costs. For example, Farmer G used what he referred to as 
“crayons” to identify cows in heat. This involved painting the cows’ tails: where paint was 
rubbed away this provided evidence of ‘bulling’. Similarly, Farm K – after a switch from a block 
calving model to all-year calving had been “imposed” on the farm, (see below, 8.3) – introduced 
Estrotect119 detectors, or “scratchcards” – which worked on the same principle as the “crayons” 
described above.  
 
In addition to heat detection technologies, and in common with the intensive farms discussed in 
Chapter 7, cow fertility was a priority on extensive farms (although, unlike some intensive 	
119 http://estrotect.com/estrotect-heat-detector/  
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farms, the focus on fertility was not the result of a reverse salient associated with the use of high 
yielding cattle). Both Farm P and Farm G calved in a single block. Both farms demonstrated a 
clear focus on fertility and stressed the importance to their model of maintaining a tight calving 
window.120 As Farmer G explained: 
 
“Calving interval is fairly simple for us: if they are not in calf in that 12 week period they do not 
stay here. There is no reason that I’m keeping an empty cow.”  
 
 
The importance of a tight calving window related to the broader objective of reducing 
production (including labour) costs.121 
 
The technologies deployed to support fertility on extensive farms provided a further contrast to 
those used on intensive farms. Crossbreeding – used by all of the extensive farms in the study – 
ensured ‘hybrid vigour’122 to boost fertility (DairyCo 2012b p.2:27; see 5.1.2, Table 5a). In 
addition, extensive farmers reported that, in the words of Farmer G: “A key driver in terms of 
the sires that are selected is fertility”. By comparison, intensive farms had historically focused 
on production [yield] traits when selecting sires (in the words of Farmer I: “in the past a lot of 
farmers were perhaps guilty of breeding for milk, milk, milk”) and had only recently 
considered a broader range of traits (such as fertility) when selecting sires. Farmer P 
summarised the differences in approach between the intensive and extensive system:  
 
“Pregnancy rates drive our profit … A Holstein breeder will be picking bulls to get a better [i.e. 
higher yielding] cow … To maintain what we do we need about a fifty five to sixty percent 
conception rate123… so [the bulls I select have] always got to be a plus on fertility, a plus on milk 
solids, fat and protein, and easy calving.” 
 
 
The relationship between feeding and fertility also differed between extensive and intensive 
systems. For example, Farmer G explained that he supplemented grazed grass with concentrate 
feed, in order to improve cow condition and support fertility: 
 	
120 Farm P was aiming for all cows to be pregnant within a window of 15 weeks and Farm G was aiming 
for a window of 12 weeks (with plans to reduce this to 10 weeks in the following year). 
 
121 Which, in turn, related to the interaction between technologies and (labour) resources, see further below 
8.2 
 
122 “Heterosis/hybrid vigour is the tendency of a crossbred animal to have qualities superior to that of 
either parent but not more than the dominant breed.” (http://www.dairyco.org.uk/technical-
information/breeding-genetics/crossbreeding/#.U6wbsKX_ZBU). In the words of Farmer G: “we are also 
very fixated on hybrid vigour, which is where the crossbreeding element comes in.” 
 
123 Conception rate is “the percentage of a herd becoming pregnant relative to the total number of services 
administered”(Cook 2009 p.262). Median conception rate for the UK national herd was 33% for the year 
ending 31 August 2014, based on a study of 500 Holstein/Friesian herds, 
https://www.nmr.co.uk/uploads/files/files/HolsteinFriesian-500NMRherds-2014.pdf  
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“When they are turned out124 they are fed other supplementary feeding … they get fed a ration 
along with grass. But, unless we’re having a poor season grass-growth wise, they’ll always be 
getting a good element of their diet from grass… concentrate feeding … I believe … helps to put 
condition on our cows, which helps with the fertility.” 
 
 
The farm’s concerns about the potential impact upon fertility of underfeeding the cows, stood 
in contrast to the experience of some intensive farms, such as Farm F, which had been 
concerned instead about the impacts upon fertility of overfeeding the cows (see also Farm P, 
above). Put differently, Farm G’s feeding approach was based around establishing the cows’ 
minimum feed requirements (and meeting these, as far as possible, using grass) as opposed to 
identifying the maximum amount of feed that the cows could consume before returns to 
additional feed inputs began to diminish (and/or the cows became overweight; see above 7.1). 
Concentrate feed was therefore used only when grass was insufficient to meet these basic 
requirements, as Farmer G explained: 
 
 “[at the point when] grass growth matches the demand of the cows [around 15 April] … I can 
pull out that [concentrate] ration, and the cows are then on … 95% grass, and they’ll still get an 
element of concentrate feed in the parlour, primarily to attract them into the parlour.” 
 
 
Farmer K’s feeding approach was similar: 
 
“We’re getting about 6,800 litres per cow125. And we try to get as much of that from grazed 
grass as we can, and if we can’t use grazed grass, as much from other forage.” 
 
 
Monitoring and managing grass growth, and matching this to the cow’s energy requirements, 
was therefore a key activity on these farms. Farmer G explained how this was achieved using a 
plate meter126 for measuring grass growth, in conjunction with a grass management software 
tool called “Agrinet”127: 
 
“We plate meter the farm once a week. That gives us a read out of each field in terms of … kilos 
of dry matter per hectare. We input that into … Agrinet and that puts [the fields / paddocks] all 
in a bar graph, ranked from ‘most grass’ to ‘lowest grass’. We then tell them how many cows we 
have, an estimate of how many kilos of dry matter per head per day that they are consuming, and 
what residual we require (which is the amount of grass left in the field).” 
 
 
 	
124 “Turning out” refers to sending cows out to graze following a period of being housed. 
 
125 Mean yield for the extensive cluster of the Milkbench dataset was 6,706 litres per cow per annum 
 
126 A plate meter is a tool for measuring the amount of grass in a field: 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/grassland-management/using-a-plate-meter/  
 
127 agrinet.ie  
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Farm P’s approach was strikingly similar: 
 
“We paddock graze. We grow a lot of perennial rye grass and white clover grass leys [which] are 
best managed in a rotational grazing system … grass puts up a leaf every … seven days. So 
ideally you want the cow to go back in the paddock twenty-one days after she was last in there … 
We measure grass weekly on both farms with a plate meter. That information gets loaded into … 
Agrinet ... And then we can look for any potential holes in the feeding… Where there's a hole … 
you have to plug it with feed.” 
8.2 Interactions Between Component Categories 
The configurations of technologies outlined above interacted in turn with other system 
components, notably physical and labour resources, as well as institutions (both ‘cognitive’ and 
‘normative’ rulesets underpinning farmers’ mindsets regarding their approach to farming and 
supporting progress towards existing system goals, which centred around the superiority of 
grass as a feed input and upon reducing labour inputs as a means of improving lifestyle).  
 
Whereas on intensive farms the interaction between technologies and physical resources was 
characterised by farmers’ efforts to limit the impact of climatic conditions upon the performance 
of high-yielding cattle (through the deployment of housing and feeding technologies128), on 
extensive farms this interaction was largely characterised by farmers’ efforts to maximise grass 
growth and utilisation within the limits defined by the climatic conditions. 
 
Meanwhile, the interaction between technologies and labour resources was evidenced by 
extensive farms’ preferred approaches to feeding (grazing and self serve feeding was favoured 
over the more labour intensive TMR or ‘zero grazing’ approaches used by intensive farms) and 
production cycle (seasonal block calving was preferred to all year calving, offering labour 
efficiencies through enabling staff to concentrate on one task at a time). Moreover, one extensive 
farmer reported a willingness to milk once (rather than two or three times) a day in order to 
reduce labour inputs. More broadly, the smaller cattle used on extensive farms were reportedly 
easier to manage, meaning a reduction in the requirement for labour resources in terms of 
person hours per cow. 
 
These approaches to physical and labour resources appeared to be underpinned by farmers’ 
mindsets, which incorporated beliefs (or cognitive rules), values (normative rules) and tacit 
knowledge. With regard to physical resources, there was a belief that grass is the best food for 
cows from both an economic, sustainability, physiological and ethical standpoint. With regard 
to labour resources, there was a view that labour should be minimised from both an economic 	
128 Effectively, intensive farms had exchanged their exposure to variability in weather conditions for 
exposure to volatility in market prices for feed inputs. 
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and lifestyle standpoint. These farmers therefore farmed the ‘problem’ of dairy farming, and its 
solutions, in terms of the value of minimising feed and labour inputs. 
 
Broadly, the extensive farms analysed relied as heavily as possible upon grazed grass, within 
the limits imposed by the available physical resources. In the words of Farmer P:  
 
“We are grass based. In the South East [of England] you can't keep cows out all year round [as 
there isn’t sufficient grass growth]… But the fundamental foundation of our businesses … is to 
use as much ... grass as possible.” 
 
 
Similarly, Farmer G would have preferred to keep his cows outdoors all year, albeit the climate 
did not allow this: 
 
 “We have invested in a [cow] shed, which is not something we would have done if we were in 
the South West, say in Pembrokeshire, which is where I’ve just moved up from. But this area – 
obviously, we are now in the North East of Scotland – winters are going to be longer and 
harder.” 
 
 
Farm K provided evidence of how the interaction between selected technological configurations 
and available physical resources was influenced by the farmer’s beliefs. First there was evidence 
of competition between the technologies used on Farm K and the available resources, 
specifically: 
 
“Our farm doesn’t lend itself particularly well to what you might call an ‘intensive grazing’ 
farm for Spring calving cows, in that our rainfall is about 22-24 inches (less than 600mm) in a 
year … particularly in the summer, we’re pretty dry … and … we have a lot of heavy land, so 
[the grass] doesn’t grow really well in the early part of the spring.” 
 
 
However, the farmer’s decision to adopt an extensive system in spite of these resource 
limitations was supported by his mindset, or how he framed the problems and solutions of 
dairy farming. This incorporated both a normative (ethical / animal welfare) and an cognitive 
dimension (i.e. based on an understanding of what ‘works’ from both an economic and 
physiological perspective): 
 
“I’ve always been a passionate believer that grass is the cheapest food for cows and that cows 
should be grazing… cows as ruminants are designed to eat large quantities of average quality 
food [and] range over quite big distances … they should be outside… I haven’t got a problem 
with lots of cows together, but I have got a problem with them being inside 24/7.” 
 
 
Similar beliefs – albeit with an additional environmental dimension – were in evidence on 
Farms G and P. As Farmer G suggested:  
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“Grass is the cheapest possible feed you can put into cows [and] it’s also the highest quality … I 
strongly believe that … On a personal level I feel that it’s a sustainable way to farm. We’re not 
pushing cows to the limit … we’re not pushing land to the limit. Not to say it’s the high point of 
environmental friendly and welfare friendly [farming] … it’s not … it’s somewhere in between 
… I feel that we have a duty to try and feed the population … so there’s going to be a cost to that 
… and in terms of environmental [cost] the key then is to minimise that cost and maximise food 
production ... on a moral level I feel that we are achieving that very well compared to the 
Holstein system.” 
 
 
Meanwhile, Farmer P, maintained that: 
 
“I'm interested in sustainable farming practices, so I'm interested in … herbal leys, getting back 
to … what we call ‘conventional pastures’ like my granddad used to grow, that didn't need the 
inputs.” 
 
 
For Farms P and G, the reduction of labour inputs, in particular, was also underpinned by 
values regarding the importance of achieving a ‘work-life balance’ (see ‘normative rules’, Table 
3a; 3.4), combined with knowledge of how to achieve such labour reductions. Farmer P 
explained how these factors combined to form a mindset that underpinned the decision to 
adopt a low-input system: 
 
“Before we invest a pound into this farm we just think ‘Is this going to enhance our lifestyle?’ 
… We look at how much profit we make for how many man-hours it took to make that profit … 
[and] come up with a figure per hour. So … if you employ somebody else … that figure should 
either go up or stay the same … So everything we've done here has been basically to improve our 
lifestyle … why do we create a better parlour? So we milk the cows faster, so we finish work 
earlier ... it might put more yield in the tank... [but] I don't really worry about that… I want to 
see farming …  conform more to other industries. So [when] you come and work for me you do 
your forty hour week ... There's no reason to make it hard work, we just do.” 
 
 
Farmer G expressed similar views on work-life balance: 
 
 “I … feel [this is] the most profitable way to milk cows… I also feel it’s the most labour-friendly, 
both from mine … and from my staff’s point of view. Certainly one of my key aims is to create a 
system that people enjoy coming to their work … the traditional mindset in farming is that you 
work every hour that God sends and then you do some more, and that’s not our focus at all… 
our mindset is very much that ‘this is a job, you work to live, you do not live to work’.” 
 
 
The broader influence of this mindset upon the technologies used on these farms was clearly 
evident. The selection of both feeding and housing technologies supported low labour inputs – 
grazing plus ‘easy feed’ silage or in-parlour concentrate supplementation required less labour 
than the TMR approach favoured by intensive farms, while a shorter housing period meant 
lower labour inputs (for example, in the words of Farmer G: “They spread their own slurry, 
which is a huge cost saving”). Moreover, this mindset also had a bearing on Farmer G’s 
approach to fertility (see above, 8.1). The importance of maintaining a short calving interval was 
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emphasised by the fact that the farm had a policy of ‘drying off’129 all cows at the same time 
(presumably) to reduce labour costs: 
 
 “We dry everything off on 1 December regardless of whether she calved on the 1 April or the 1 
February ... [so] days in milk is what drives us…” 
 
 
Finally, there was evidence of the influence of these beliefs upon milking, which is potentially 
one of the most labour intensive activities on a dairy farm. All of the extensive farms analysed 
had taken measures to reduce the labour demands incurred by milking. In the case of Farm P, 
this was manifested in a willingness to milking only once a day, at the expense of overall milk 
yields, a degree of flexibility that was permitted by the robust nature of crossbred cows: 
 
“Part of our breeding policy is to have very adaptable cows, so you could always milk once a day 
... we've actually done it here … At this time of year when there's not many cows in milk 
because a lot of them are dry … At some point we will all be on holiday between now and 
calving ... So if you’re on your own you might just milk them once in the morning and not 
bother in the afternoon...” 
 
 
For Farms G and K, the labour demands of milking were reduced through investments in 
rotary parlours, one of the few examples of large capital investments by the extensive farmers 
interviewed.130 Farmer G explained that his investment in a 54-point rotary parlour with 
automatic teat sprayers and automatic cup removers meant that a single member of staff could 
milk 600 cows, while Farmer K suggested his rotary parlour was “the single most important 
technology” on the farm, adding that: 	
“I think the rotary parlour… is the thing that allowed us to expand, and actually milking is – 
whilst it’s still a major job and a major issue in terms of staffing – if you’ve got a very efficient 
way of harvesting milk that reduces the time and cost and reduces the time that the cows spend 
stood about (so actually you can get the cows in and out and back to the grazing or back to the 
shed very, very quickly).” 
 
 
Significantly, the size of these herds131 (which was a result of the high stocking rate enabled by 
the configurations of breed-feed-housing, described above, 8.1) made the considerable capital 
	
129 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-welfare/mastitis/working-arena-
prevention-of-infection/dry-periods-resting-cows/  
 
130 Notably, none of the extensive systems used robots, which would have served the same function (of 
reducing labour inputs), perhaps because of the potential incompatibility of robots with grazing, and with 
seasonal block calving (see Chapter 7). 
 
131 With 600 cows (Farm G) and 660 (Farm K) cows, respectively, these were two of the largest herds in the 
study. The Milkbench mean herd size was 200.8 cows, with herds above 336.04 cows being in the 90th 
percentile. 
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investment in a rotary parlour economically justifiable.132 Moreover, the fact that rotary 
parlours require a herd size in excess of 350 in order to justify their high capital cost133 
represented an investment effect inhibiting future reductions in herd size.  
 
As with the intensive farms analysed in Chapter 7 (e.g. Farm M; above 7.2), there was evidence 
that farmers’ beliefs supported (and were supported by) a clearly defined body of knowledge 
and skills amongst the farmer and farm staff, which had been developed through the operation 
of an extensive system. In the case of the intensive Farm M it had been evident that these skills 
and beliefs in turn supported (and were supported by) the continued use of certain 
technological configurations (i.e. as a result of bilateral complementarity and learning effects), 
which served to inhibit system change (from block to all year calving) in response to buyer 
demands.  
 
However, in the case of the extensive Farm K, although evidence of such complementarity and 
learning effects was apparent, the farm did change system (from block to all year calving) in 
response to buyer demands (see below 8.3). This may be because: 
• The complementarity and learning effects were weaker on Farm K than Farm M (e.g. 
the stocks of knowledge were more transferable); and/or 
• The conditions of governance within Farm K’s (aligned) value chain were different to 
those within Farm M’s (non-aligned) value chain (e.g. sanctions were stronger, trust 
was greater etc; see further below, 8.3). 
 
Farmer K explained that, after an all year calving model was “imposed” by his milk buyer 
(Waitrose, see 8.3), the technological changes that this necessitated had been easier to 
implement than the changes in mindsets that meeting the buyer’s demands had required: 
 
“The thought [of changing calving pattern] was worse than [the reality]… and the mindset was 
the biggest problem … because I was a block calver. And I’m still a block calver … Putting 
positives through to the staff on the farm, you know, that we’re now going to be calving every 
day of the year, we’re going to be looking for bullers every day of the year, we’re going to have a 
routine vet visit every fortnight… it was the mindset for me and my staff that was really 
difficult to change.” 
 
 
	
132 “When both the labour requirement and the initial cost of … [a conventional herringbone and rotary 
parlour] were evaluated, the conventional parlour was financially advisable for herds of up to 350 cows, 
whereas, the rotary parlour was financially prudent for herds of greater than 350 cows. The greatest 
disadvantage of the rotary parlour is the high capital cost compared to the conventional milking system” 
(O’Brien et al 2006, p.6) 
 
133 ibid. 
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The farmer added that changes in feeding, for example, were easier to implement than he had 
expected: 
 
“My mindset said ‘we’re feeding cows in May, June, July with bought food that we shouldn’t 
have to use’, but … In reality if you look at the litres they produced, we were slightly higher in 
total litres per cow and actually the extra food went into milk rather than perhaps what you 
might call ‘wasted’ …” 
8.3 The Influence of Buyer Power  
This section considers the influence of buyer power upon the patterns of change outlined above 
(8.1 – 8.2), resulting from buyer demands relating to:  
• Security of supply  
• Product characteristics134  
• Production characteristics  
 
Within each of these sections buyer demands the analysis considers how buyers seek to achieve 
compliance with these demands (i.e. conditions of value chain governance, including sanctions 
and trust). 
 
As with the intensive farms analysed in the Chapter 7, buyer influence was greatest when 
buyer demands corresponded most closely with established systems goals, and where demands 
involved shallow rather than deep changes. Further, there was evidence of the importance of 
sanctions and trust to securing influence. 
8.3.1 Security of Supply 
The extensive farms analysed provided evidence of the successful efforts of milk buyers to 
influence farms with regard to the security of supply through the use of the following 
sanctions135 (see also above, 5.2.6): 
• Base prices for milk 
• The power to exclude 
• A / B pricing  
 	
134 NB: The farm visits provided no evidence of farmers responding (or not) to food hygiene and safety 
standards above those required by statutory minima, hence the following discussion does not include a 
section dedicated to these. 	
135 NB: There was no evidence of seasonality payments influencing the approaches of the extensive farms 
visited, hence the following discussion does not include a section dedicated to this. 	
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8.3.1.1 Base Prices and the Power to Exclude 
In 2002/3 Waitrose demanded that all of its farmers must produce a level year-round supply of 
milk. This demand was not accompanied by explicit bonuses/penalties for 
over/underproduction, and was separate from the supermarket’s A/B pricing mechanism136, 
but was instead underpinned by the threat of contract termination for non-compliance resulting 
in the loss of a historically superior base price for milk.  
 
In the words of Farmer K – who had until that time been operating a Spring and an Autumn 
calving block, yielding a slightly uneven annual production profile – the supermarket 
“imposed” an all year calving model on the farm. The farmer outlined the depth of changes 
necessary to comply with this demand, which reportedly took four years to implement and 
affected ‘core’ farm activities. Chiefly, the move to all-year calving conflicted with the farmer’s 
beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm, which centred on maximising the use of grazed grass 
(discussed above 8.2). Moreover, although the farmer suggested that altering this mindset 
presented the greatest obstacle to change, the process of switching to all year calving did reveal 
substantive challenges related to the deployment of both housing and feeding technologies on 
the farm.  
 
With regard to housing, a reverse salient emerged following the move to all year calving, with 
the performance of the farm’s existing housing arrangements for calves ‘falling behind’ relative 
to the rest of the system. The farmer explained that the use of all-year calving with his existing 
housing arrangements had resulted in newly-born calves sharing “the same airspace and the 
same water trough” with calves that were several weeks old, resulting in the spread of 
pneumonia. To counter this the farmer constructed additional calf housing to separate calves of 
different ages.  
 
A further reverse salient that emerged involved the performance of feeding and housing 
technologies. The feeding and housing approach that had worked successfully with a block 
calving model (namely, extensive grazing and minimal housing and feed supplementation) 
proved incompatible with an all year calving model, being unable to match the energy 
demands of the cows: 
 	
136 Waitrose has, since it established a dedicated pool in 1998, operated effectively an A/B pricing system, 
whereby suppliers receive a premium price for milk delivered up to a certain limit, above which farmers 
receive the standard processor price. “They call [this] ‘modulated volumes’… [it’s] a contracted volume… 
[which] tends to run at an average of about 90% of what the [farmers] can produce, and they review that every couple 
of years, allied to the [consumer] demand that Waitrose have…” personal communication, Dairy Crest Direct 
spokesperson 14/1/15. See also 8.3.1.2 
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“In the summer months, we really struggled with … ‘metabolic’ – or at least ‘digestive’ – 
disorders, where we were struggling to keep the cows full. We were giving them enough food in 
theory, but because we wanted them to graze a bit as well, they weren’t actually [eating enough] 
… we had a lot of trouble with displaced abomasums, which is twisted gut from not having the 
gut full, from the May / June / July calvers … unless we kept them in [indoors] … that … 
caused quite a big vet & med issue … it was a problem … that I don’t think I had seen until that 
point.” 
 
 
Finally, fertility (heat detection) issues emerged from switch to all year calving, with staff being 
required to detect bulling cows all year round, as opposed to in concentrated ‘blocks’. This 
created the need for the introduction of new technologies (“scratchcards”, see above, 8.1). 
 
In spite of these challenges, the farmer complied with Waitrose’s demands. The milk price paid 
under an aligned Waitrose contract was higher and more stable than prices available under 
non-aligned contracts, providing continuity, reliability and predictability. This strong positive 
sanction (and the associated negative sanction of the threat of losing the Waitrose contract) was 
perhaps instrumental in securing compliance. As Farmer K explained: 
 
“Why are we still in a Waitrose contract? … Because we have jumped through the hoops … 
[and] we are in the position where, whatever hoop they chuck at us, we are gonna have to try 
and jump through it because … why wouldn’t you? It’s bound to be worth it, at the moment … 
Two or three years ago, actually, the Waitrose premium wasn’t very huge… and there were 
people … saying ‘we could get as much money for our milk from somebody else without all the 
hoops’. I think the response was: ‘well, go on then.’ Nobody did!” 
 
 
Over a 44-month period between August 2008 and March 2012 (see Figure 8a), the Waitrose 
contract paid an average of 28.35ppl, compared with 24.04ppl and 25.5ppl paid under the First 
Milk and Arla contracts, respectively. Moreover, over the same period, the Waitrose price 
changed 7 times (or every 6.29 months) compared with 17 times (or every 2.59 months) and 23 
times (or every 1.91 months) under the First Milk and Arla contracts, respectively. As well as 
changing less frequently, the amount by which the price changed was also lower: the variance 
in the Waitrose price over the period was 1.55ppl, compared with 5.08ppl (First Milk) and 
2.61ppl (Arla), demonstrating its greater stability.  
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Figure 8a: Milk Prices and Volatility: Aligned vs Non-aligned contracts 
 
 
 
Source: Author (adapted from AHDB data137) 
 
 
A personal communication with a farmer representative highlighted the value of a long term, 
high, stable price to farmers: 
 
“If you look at any research on the original specialist pools, [of] M&S and Waitrose, … the 
Capex [capital expenditure], of those farms is recorded to be four times more on a Waitrose or 
M&S farm than it would be on another retail contract.“138 
 
 
As well as demonstrating the effect of strong sanctions, the above example also provides some 
evidence of the conditions of trust within the Waitrose value chain. According to Farmer K:  
 
“Waitrose said: ‘we’d like you to be level’… and I argued with them for five years, saying: ‘we’re 
nearly level’ … after five years of arguing I accepted defeat and we spent four years changing to 
all-year round calving and a completely level supply … and at the end of the four years – and I 
have to say under some duress (there was quite a lot of heated exchange of messages, emails and 
letters) – we eventually became completely level ... So we got to the end of March and we were 
completely level for the year … and on the second week of April I got a letter saying: ‘Would you 
like to take part in a trial for seasonal production?’!” 
 
 
	
137 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-
new-profile/; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-
contracts/uk-farmgate-milk-prices/ 
 
138 Personal communication, farmer representative 14/1/15 	
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Although the farmer suggests that he acceded to Waitrose’s demands under “duress”, the 
length of time (nine years) between the buyer’s initial demand and the farmer’s ultimate 
compliance implies a high level of trust between the parties, and a bilateral or collaborative 
relationship between the two (5.2.6). Moreover, evidence of the degree of reliance that each 
party had on the other was demonstrated by the fact that the farmer didn’t immediately accede 
to the buyer’s demands, nor did the buyer immediately terminate the contract. Further, with 
regard to the nature and methods of communication within the value chain(see 5.2.6; Table 
5f), communication between the farmer and buyer, while not always cordial, appeared to be 
frequent and bilateral (there were “quite a lot of heated exchange of messages, emails and letters”). 
Moreover, the buyer’s offer to take part in a trial for seasonal production – while perhaps 
galling – does imply a degree of openness to the farmer’s perspective on the part of the buyer. 
 
It is also worth considering the degree of reliance that parties in the value chain have upon each 
other (see 5.2.6; Table 5f). It is significant to note that the Waitrose supplier pool comprises a 
relatively small number (c.50) of relatively large producers139, many of which have enjoyed 
long-term relationships with the buyer (Farmer K had been a Waitrose supplier since 1999), 
conditions that are associated with “higher trust” chains (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.74). 
Indeed, many of these farms had expanded having benefitted from a high, stable price, 
providing continuity, reliability and predictability, which enabled farmers to invest. 
 
A personal communication with a spokesperson from Dairy Crest Direct (DCD)140 – the 
producer group that represents farmers supplying Waitrose141 – provided further evidence of 
conditions of trust within the Waitrose value chain. Notably, he stressed that the value chain 
was characterised by the strength of personal relationships and “frequent and often informal” 
interactions between farmer and buyer (which are associated with “higher trust” chains; ibid.). 
Significantly, the Waitrose milk price (unlike the milk prices in other aligned value chains) is 
not calculated by reference to a formula (such as ‘cost of production’) but is set on a 
discretionary basis. Trust, therefore, appeared to result from trust in individual relationships, as 
distinct from trust in the process of price determination (as had been the case within the Tesco 
value chain; see 7.3.3.1). The DCD spokesperson explained: 
 	
139 Indeed, Farmer K noted that: “The other issue about [us] being a significant size is that we can fill a 
tanker”. Moreover, a personal communication with a Dairy Crest Direct (DCD) spokesperson (date: 
14/1/15) revealed that: “because the contract has been very good there has been a lot of expansion within 
the pool [i.e. farmers increasing in size]”. 
 
140 https://www.dairycrestdirect.co.uk  
 
141 Personal communication, DCD spokesperson 14/1/15 	
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“It’s amazing how informal the Waitrose deal, and the relationship with the farmers, actually is. 
They’ve never had to sign a side letter agreement between the Waitrose farmers and Waitrose … so 
it’s amazing how the partnership has evolved and grown over the years and has embedded to 
become very firm … there is an awful lot of trust that is there…  It seems to have worked … 
because they are dealing with such a small number of farmers … because of the confidence it’s 
given those farmers they have all grown enormously, so … they will be very big farmers across the 
pool…” 
 
 
These conditions of trust appeared to extend beyond the relationships between supermarket 
and farmer. A personal communication with a processor142 revealed that certain relationships 
between processors and supermarkets exhibited greater continuity, reliability and predictability 
than others: 	
“[With] some supermarkets … Waitrose and M&S in particular … the relationships there are 
much more valuable than they are with the Tescos and the Sainsburys, Icelands … For example, I 
cannot remember the last time Waitrose or M&S changed their processor: both of them have been 
dealt with by Dairy Crest for a long time. That’s not to say that other businesses didn’t get invited 
to tender … but it would be very difficult to topple Dairy Crest because the relationship that Dairy 
Crest has with those two supermarkets is so strong. [Further] with some of the major supermarkets 
you tend to get dairy products handled in different buyer categories … so depending on whether 
it’s a long life or shorter life product … whereas in the smaller supermarkets — the Waitroses and 
M&S — the buyer tends to deal with dairy, full stop, so consequently it’s easier to negotiate a deal 
across products with a smaller supermarket than it is with the large supermarkets.” 
 
 
Finally, in this case, the relationship between farmer and buyer appears to be based around 
shared beliefs or values, which implies a process of collective stabilisation of frames (Meyer and 
Schubert 2007). In the words of Farmer K: “our system probably lends itself – with the one 
exception of the level supply – to the ethos that Waitrose think they should have” (see further, 
8.3.3).  
 
This case provides a useful contrast to the example of Farm M (7.4.1), in which the farmer 
switched buyer in response to an identical demand for all year calving, which, arguably, might 
have been more readily accommodated within the farm’s intensively housed system, requiring 
fewer changes to feeding approach, for example. In that case, sanctions were weak and the 
value chain was characterised by very low levels of trust. It appears that, where buyers’ 
demands do not correspond closely to farms’ progress towards existing goals, but instead 
require ‘deep’ changes, they must be accompanied by strong positive and negative sanctions, as 
well as conditions of trust in the value chain, in order to secure compliance. 
 	
142 Personal communication, milk processor 7/1/15 
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8.3.1.2 A/B pricing 
Milk buyers use A/B pricing to control the volumes of milk that farmers supply to them. 
Because the goals of extensive farms are broadly centred on minimising inputs rather than 
maximising outputs, there is not necessarily an inherent conflict between the effect of A/B 
pricing and the positive feedback effects associated with extensive systems. 
 
Although Waitrose does not describe its pricing scheme as an A/B pricing scheme, it does 
stipulate a fixed number of litres per day for which it will pay a premium price, with additional 
milk receiving the (lower) standard processor price (see above 8.3.1.1). The sanctioning effect of 
this arrangement is considerably less punitive than the A/B pricing schemes discussed in 
Chapter 7, such as the one described by Farmer M in which the “B” price was, at the time of the 
interview, 13.7ppl (see 7.3.1.3143). 
 
According to Farmer K, the number of litres that qualify for the premium price has increased 
consistently since he was been supplying Waitrose (1999), in line with the farm’s expansion 
(“The Waitrose [premium] litres have increased over the years as we have increased cow 
numbers”). However, this expansion was within system boundaries (Dosi 1988, p.226-7) and/or 
limits defined by the farmer’s beliefs: 
 
“We have got to a level where I don’t think I can fit any more cows into our system. So if we 
want to continue to increase our Waitrose-allocated litres, we would need to increase yield per 
cow. I haven’t attempted to do that … because… I think it’s back to my belief about cows 
grazing grass and not pushing them too hard … Because the Waitrose premium is still relatively 
reasonable, and feed prices have come down … that may have encouraged people to chuck more 
food at the cows ... It hasn’t particularly encouraged me because I’m fairly wedded to my system 
of ‘the cows graze when they can’.” 
 
 
Therefore, although this may be viewed as a case of buyer demands influencing the farm to 
expand in herd size – as a result of the provision of a high, stable base milk price, allied to an 
increasing level of production for which that premium price would be paid – it should be noted 
that there was already a close correspondence between the buyer’s demand for more litres and 
the farmer’s existing goal of expanding the system – which had been motivated by his efforts to 
support an additional wage (“when I came back to the farm … the accountant said ‘it’s gonna 
cost the farm £40 or £50,000 a year for you to be here: what are you going to bring to the farm?’ 
So I said: ‘well, we can bring some more cows’.”). Moreover, the effect of the buyer’s demands 	
143 By means of comparison, the standard Muller price that Waitrose farmers would have received for non-
premium litres on that day was 24.70ppl; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-
information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-new-profile/; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-
library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/uk-farmgate-milk-prices/ (NB: Muller took over Dairy 
Crest’s liquid milk business in January 2016: https://www.fginsight.com/news/news/name-change-for-
muller-wiseman-as-dairy-crest-deal-completed-8918)  
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was to influence the scale of the system rather than to alter the production approach (i.e. it was 
not ‘deep’). 
8.3.2 Product characteristics 
8.3.2.1 Sanctions: Bonuses / Penalties for Constituents 
Farmer G explained how his current contract – with Graham’s the Family Dairy – had 
influenced breeding technologies on the farm. He explained that the genetics of his Jersey-
Friesian crossbred cows are “weighted slightly towards the Friesian, because … we are on a 
liquid-based contract”: 
 
 “We run a New Zealand-style144 system, but we’re not in New Zealand … [in] New Zealand 
they are paid on kilogrammes of milk solids… we are paid pence per litre, so at the end of the day 
we produce volume, which is what our market wants.” 
 
 
He explained that – although Graham’s currently rewarded the production of butterfat – his 
preferred system would be better suited to a cheese contract, which paid a bonus for the 
production of both butterfat and protein: 
 
“We also produce a lot of protein because of the way we manage [the cows]. So the holy grail for 
this type of system is to be on a cheese contract, because it’s a high protein product and it’s also 
got a long shelf life … And there are changes that can be made [to the system to increase protein 
levels further]… we can certainly tailor the feed in a little bit more towards the protein…[we 
can] change the breeding strategy and take it slightly away from the Friesian and more towards 
the Jersey…” 
 
 
In the absence of a bonus for protein, however, the technological approach to feeding and 
breeding on this farm was being influenced by buyer demands for volume and butterfat. 
8.3.3 Production Characteristics 
Waitrose made a number of demands regarding production characteristics, which Farm K had 
complied with (“When they have audited we’ve made sure that we passed the audit. They 
wanted us to spend some of the premium that they give us on improving cattle welfare. We’ve 
done that”). For example, the farm was required to stop feeding soya hulls, and the buyer also 
insisted that male calves should enter Waitrose’s beef supply chain. These demands were easily 
accommodated within the farm’s existing system (i.e. they didn’t require ‘deep’ changes): soya 
hulls were replaced with rolled oats, while the farmer’s uncle – a beef farmer since 2000 – was a 
Waitrose beef supplier. 
 	
144 i.e. grazing-based 
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Broadly, the goals towards which Farm K was progressing appeared to correspond closely with 
the goals towards which the buyer was aiming to direct it:  
 
“Waitrose … are very keen on the environment, and … [in] what we are doing to reduce our … 
damage to the environment … They set up a scheme that we should all take part in… well it was 
actually stuff that we were already doing. So we had originally a Countryside Stewardship 
agreement and then when Entry Level Stewardship came in we were very happy to take on that, 
and indeed [now] we’ve got a Higher Level Stewardship scheme going on the farm … so as a 
business, that’s our ethos… and … that fitted very well with Waitrose… Currently … they’re 
promoting 100 days grazing… well … If they’d said ‘a hundred and eighty days’ … I’d be 
happy to meet that.” 
 
 
The exceptions to this are buyer demands for a level year round supply of milk, requiring all 
year calving, (see above 8.3.1) and individual milk recording, which Farm K introduced at 
Waitrose’s request. Again, the farm’s willingness to comply with this demand appeared to 
result from farmer’s mindset (i.e. comprising the farmer’s knowledge beliefs and values): 
 
“They want us to record the cell count per cow. Actually the most recent thing – and the cell 
count recording ties up with this – is anti-microbial resistance and a wish to use less antibiotics 
… knowing the infection status of your cows is actually really important… and it does mean 
that we have used dramatically less dry cow therapy145 than when we started cell count 
recording. We were blanket treating everything, and now we do 30-35% with antibiotics at 
drying off… It’s the right thing to do.” 
 
 
Although Waitrose did not benchmark farmers in its producer group against each other (cf. 
Tesco and benchmarking; 7.3.3), there was evidence that involvement in the producer group 
had resulted in expectation and co-ordination effects, with the potential to influence production 
approaches. Farmer K explained:  
 
“We meet as a [producer] group a couple of times a year. There are regional subgroups [and] if 
there’s some sort of training or something going on that [Waitrose] want transferred out to the 
producers there will be little groups that meet possibly another couple of times a year … 
Representatives of the producers … meet with Waitrose on a regular basis … and finally they 
have a ‘study tour’ … [which is] an opportunity to interact with Waitrose and find out what the 
buyers are thinking…” 
 
 
For example, the farmer recalled a “study tour” to Canada in 2007: 
 
“We went to various really high producing herds … I can vividly remember looking at these big 
Canadian Holstein cow … and one of the Waitrose people said ‘What do you think of these 
cows?’ and I said ‘Well, as far as I’m concerned, they are horrible!’… and the reply was ‘I 
completely agree. That isn’t what we want our farmers to be using’… It just showed me that we 
were heading in the same direction as Waitrose.” 	
145 Dry cow therapy is “the treatment of cows at the end of lactation with a long acting antibiotic 
preparation with or without a teat sealant. This is to treat for any intra-mammary infections (IMI) 
contracted during lactation and provides protection against new infections during the dry period; 
https://en.wikivet.net/Dry_Cow_Therapy  
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The dairy cow – viewed as a technological artefact – is subject to a degree of “interpretive 
flexibility” (Pinch and Bijker 1987, p.36) with regard to the meanings that various actors may 
attribute to it (as evidenced by the wide range of different breed types, with different functional 
traits; 5.1.2). This interaction between the farmer and the buyer reveals bilateral 
complementarities between the farmer’s meanings those of the milk buyer, implying a process 
of collective stabilisation and closure around a technological frame. 
 
Although he had made the decision to forgo his Tesco Direct contract in favour of Arla co-
operative membership (see below, 8.4.2), Farmer P was still required to meet certain production 
standards determined by Tesco, and to submit accounts data to the supermarket. He explained: 
 
 “We get the Arla price [and] We get a tiny bit extra for Tesco taking the milk and in return we 
have to do a little bit extra work, which is not more really than we do already ... And we have to 
locomotion score146, we have to submit our drug usage to Tesco.” 
 
 
Although complying with buyer demands, he suggested that this hadn’t required him to make 
any (‘deep’) changes to his current system, however: 
 
“You have to keep those records ... All those records are here, all we are doing is pushing the 
button and sending them.” 
8.4 When Buyer Power Fails to Influence Technological Change  
8.4.1 Security of Supply 
8.4.1.1 A/B pricing 
Theoretically, buyer-imposed limits on the number of litres per day on which farmers receive a 
premium milk price has the potential to influence the farmer to limit their production and/or to 
smooth the profile of milk delivered. In the case of Farm K, this was not the case: 
 
“There is a set number of litres per day that Waitrose will pay a premium for… and obviously 
on a seasonal pattern sometimes you are producing twice as much as that [number] and 
sometimes you’re not producing as much … and so whilst that potentially isn’t a massive issue, 
there is a premium there that you are not using … I set it up [the two block calving system] 
thinking that as long as we always produce up to somewhere near the premium, and then for 
some parts of the year we’re going to be producing massively over it.” 
 	
146 Locomotion scoring is a system for “measuring levels of ease of movement and locomotion in dairy 
cattle” (https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-
welfare/lameness/genetics/locomotion/), as distinct from  mobility scoring, which is a system to “assess 
lameness prevalence – the number of animals lame at any one time – in a given herd” 
https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/animal-health-welfare/lameness/husbandry-
prevention/mobility-scoring/  
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Farmer G’s buyer – Graham’s – had also imposed an A/B pricing scheme. Within the scheme, 
the ‘A’ price was calculated as a standard litre price, with a bonus for butterfat, while the ‘B’ 
price was based on the spot market price, which the farmer reported was 10ppl (“I don’t think 
there’s a farmer in the world that can make money out of that”). The number of litres that 
would receive the ‘A’ price each month was calculated as 90% of the farm’s total production for 
the previous year, divided by 12. The farmer explained that this had a serious impact on the 
profitability of his Spring-calved system because during the months of peak production “we’ve 
got a huge chunk of our milk being sold at ‘B’ litres”. However, in spite of the strong 
sanctioning effect of this pricing scheme, it had failed to influence the farmer’s production 
approach: 
 
“We contemplated making major changes to the system in terms of putting two calving blocks 
in, but when it came down to it we were fractionally better off to stay purely Spring calving… it 
would have needed to be significantly better to have gone split calving, because it does make 
major changes to what you’re doing and the cost of production would change … you’d have 
cows … winter milk … fully in the shed, fully fed on bought-in feed, and needing bedding … 
you’d have more slurry to spread … [And] we have a two month down period when we are not 
producing milk, which provides rest and recuperation for staff… so you’d lose all of that and 
gain all that cost.” 
 
 
Put differently, given the depth of changes required to switch calving pattern – which would 
have affected both technologies and labour resources, and conflicted with the farmer’s beliefs 
about the ‘right’ way to farm – even stronger sanctions would have been necessary in order to 
make the move worthwhile.  
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Chapter 9: 
Technological Change in Intermediate Farms 
 
 
The distinctions between intensive and extensive farms should be clear, from the preceding 
chapters (Chapter 7 and 8), with these farms lying at either end of a continuum of system types. 
However, distinguishing intermediate farms from both extensive and intensive farms presents a 
greater challenge because, as outlined already (5.1.2), farm systems are typically differentiated 
from each other by reference to scale variables rather than categorical variables, with the result 
that boundaries between clusters may be indistinct or arbitrary.  
 
Related to this (as discussed in Chapter 6), the use of principal component analysis and cluster 
analysis to develop ‘clusters’ of farms corresponding to intensive, intermediate and extensive 
farm systems provides an approximate rather than a precise or definitive method of deriving 
such categories, because it relies upon the use of scale variables to define clusters, rather than 
doing so by reference to the use or non-use of certain technologies or combinations of 
technologies. Indeed, the definition of the clusters is dependent upon the composition of the 
sample (farms are therefore only categorised as being ‘intermediate’ relative to the rest of the 
farms in the sample, and therefore rely for their identification upon the presence of more and 
less intensive systems. Moreover, the rate of intensification relative to other farms in the sample 
also becomes a relevant consideration, as a farm that was – relative to the sample – ‘intensive’ 
or ‘extensive’, say, ten years ago may now be categorised as ‘intermediate’ if the rest of the 
sample has intensified or extensified more or less rapidly or to a greater or lesser extent). 
 
Allocating farms to the intermediate cluster was, therefore, challenging. For example, Farm H147 
was allocated to the intermediate cluster by the principal component analysis, but the 
qualitative interview data suggested that it could conceivably have been categorised as an 
extensive farm. Further, Farm E148 – similarly on the ‘border’ between intermediate and 
extensive systems – is included in this chapter rather than in the extensive chapter as it 
appeared to be in the process of intensifying towards a position that would have placed it more 
firmly within the intermediate category. Finally, because they had ‘a foot in each camp’ 
intermediate farms appeared to have a wider range of possible options for future development 
in response to milk price changes (i.e. greater flexibility to change between clusters than either 
extensive or intensive farms).  
 	
147 Non-aligned Farm, interview date: 7/7/16 see timeline Appendix 9A 
 
148 Aligned Farm, interview date: 6/7/16; see timeline Appendix 9B 
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This chapter follows the same structure as the previous two chapters, namely it divides the 
analysis into a description of farm socio-technical systems in terms of inputs and outputs and 
the positive feedbacks associated with the interactions between technologies (9.1) and between 
technologies and other components (9.2) which serve to highlight farms’ progress towards 
system goals; followed by an analysis of the influence of buyer demands, by reference to 
conditions of value chain governance, upon this progress (9.3). 
9.1 Interactions Between Technologies  
Similar to the intensive and extensive farms analysed in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively, 
intermediate farms provided evidence of interactions between technological components, 
notably those associated with feeding, housing and breeding. However, within such 
interactions, components often appeared to be in competition with each other rather than 
complementing each other’s performance. 
 
Moreover, and perhaps unsurprisingly given that intermediate farms occupy a ‘middle ground’ 
on the continuum between intensive and extensive systems, these technological configurations 
appeared to support progress towards a less clearly / narrowly defined set of system goals 
when compared with intensive and extensive farms (in which technological configurations 
supported progress towards either the goal of maximising output per cow / milking robot in 
the case of the former, and towards the goal of minimising feed and labour inputs in the case of 
the latter).  
 
For example, while extensive (intensive) systems were focused on exploring the limits of 
minimising (maximising) feed and housing inputs, and therefore selected breeds of cattle that 
complemented those approaches (7.1; 8.1), the use of specific cattle breeds was less critical to the 
performance of intermediate systems, and the particular traits of these cattle (i.e. hardiness or 
yield potential) were typically not being exploited or ‘pushed’ to the same degree through the 
deployment of feeding and housing strategies.  
 
Farmer J149, for example, farmed a herd of 120 Autumn-calved pedigree Holstein cows, which 
was, he suggested, “the highest £PLI herd in the United Kingdom”.150 Although these cows 
	
149 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 31/05/2016; see timeline Appendix 9C 	
150 “Profitable Lifetime Index” (£PLI) “is a within breed genetic index developed specifically for UK dairy 
farmers. The £PLI value represents the additional profit a high £PLI bull is expected to return from each of 
its milking daughters over her lifetime compared to an average bull of £0 PLI” 
(https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/breeding-genetics/£pli/) 
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were each yielding 10,100 – 10,200 litres151 per annum, the farmer explained that they could 
have produced even greater volumes of milk (see 9.3.1.1) had he chosen to feed them more 
intensively with concentrate feeds and to rely less upon grazed grass. Although it was towards 
the intensive end of the intermediate cluster, the farm was nevertheless typical of the 
intermediate approach, incorporating elements from both intensive systems (i.e. pedigree 
Holsteins) and extensive systems (paddock grazing and the use of a plate meter to measure 
grass growth; see 8.1). The farmer explained: 
 
“It isn’t [a pure] grazing [system], but it’s slightly further towards the grazing system than the 
high output system, because they are certainly nowhere near fully housed … the main priority is 
to get as much forage in the diet as possible … to some extent to the detriment of yield…” 
 
 
The farmer had taken the decision to increase the forage component in the cows’ diet with the 
aim of reducing feed input costs (see further 9.3). His approach to feeding had also been 
influenced by the use of milking robots, introduced in 2009/10 (see below, 9.2). Similar to 
intensive Farm O (see 7.1), the introduction of robots had required the farmer to feed 
concentrates inside the robot, rather than in the cows’ usual feed ration, in order to attract cows 
to walk to the robot for milking. However, by contrast to the intensive farms that were using 
robots (see Farmers I and O, Chapter 7), the farmer had not moved to a permanently housed 
system to support maximum ‘cow flow’ to the robots.152 Moreover, the farmer was also 
operating a seasonal (Autumn) calving model rather than the year round model favoured by 
the intensive farms that had introduced milking robots. 
 
Just as the farmer’s use of grazing limited his ability to extract maximum yield from his 
pedigree Holsteins and to maximise cow flow to his robots, his use of robots also prevented him 
from maximising the use of grazed grass. As Farmer J explained: 
 
“The cows are milked with robots … so grazing is difficult, but they are grazed from April 
through to October, depending on the weather … a strict grazing man … wouldn’t see it the 
same… the cows go out and they are allocated a daily area of grass… [which] is … probably no 
more than 25% of their forage intake for the day … and the rest of their forage intake is fed in the 
sheds… Using the robots actually prevents me from using a fully grazed system because if I 
didn’t have to have the cows with 24 hour access to the robots, I could graze the other side of the 
road…” 
 
 
	
151 Compared with the mean for the whole Milkbench sample (7,738.71 litres) and for the intermediate 
cluster of the sample (7,458.92 litres) 
 
152 The cattle were housed for 33 weeks of the year. By comparison the mean housing period for intensive 
farms in the Milkbench dataset was 44.59 weeks. 
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Put differently, these breeding, feeding, housing and milking technologies might be regarded as 
competing with, rather than complementing each other, and the system was characterised by the 
trade-offs and tensions made between these various technological components, rather than by 
complementarity effects between them. Nevertheless, it was clear that the system permitted a 
degree of flexibility, perhaps because it was characterised by competition rather than 
complementarities between components. As Farmer J explained: 
 
“At the moment concentrates are dear and forage is cheap, so therefore we push towards forage. 
But if wheat prices drop to £60 a tonne and soya to £100 a tonne ... I'd swing back the other way 
…” 
 
 
The flexibility inherent in the technological configurations used on Farm J was therefore 
mirrored by the farmer’s mindset (see further 9.2, below). 
 
Like Farmer J, Farmer C153 also outlined the trade-offs and tensions involved in combining 
elements of both intensive and extensive systems. He described his farm – which comprised a 
herd of 500 Holstein cows, across two sites, calved all year round and yielding 9,000 litres – as 
being “in the middle of two systems”. The cows were housed for between 26 and 30 weeks of 
the year (compared with a mean of 31.96 weeks for the whole Milkbench sample, and 26.86 for 
the intermediate cluster). The farmer explained: 
 
“Our main feed is grass silage, a little bit of wholecrop154 forage, and we have blends. Quite often 
we'll feed brewers grains, and we'll feed a semi-TMR ration through the winter, topped up 
with cake [concentrate] in the parlour twice a day … We want high production [but] we still 
want some cheap grazed grass, so we've got sort of a hybrid model … We're feeding silage 
and cake … we’re letting them out to grass and still feeding in the parlour. [But] you can't get 
the best out your grazing when you're feeding because they've been out dumping all that 
muck on the field, and they're not hungry enough to bare the field off level. So you get very 
selective grazing.”[emphasis added] 
 
 
In other words, the system appeared to be characterised by competition (as opposed to 
complementarity effects) between the different feeding technologies deployed (grazing vs 
intensive feeding). This was mirrored to some extent by the farmer’s own mindset (and his 
ambivalence about his future plans for the farm; see 9.2 and 9.3, below). 
 
Farmer D155, who also farmed Holsteins – a herd of 480 Autumn-calved, TMR-fed cows yielding 
10,000 litres each – described his system as “middle-of-the-road”. The farmer explained that the 	
153 Aligned farm, interview date: 19/7/16; see timeline Appendix 9D 
 
154 http://www.thedairysite.com/articles/3670/wholecrop-a-potential-alternative-forage/  
 
155 Aligned farm, interview date: 28/7/16 
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system had been more intensive when he returned to the family farm in 1994, at which time the 
cows were milked three times per day and fed using a TMR approach. He recalled his attempt 
at the time to switch to an extensive system: 
 
“We then went to try an extensive grazing system, thinking we were going to reduce lots of 
costs, so we took out the third milking, put in the paddock grazing system, and tried to graze 
cows from the middle of February to the middle of December. And it didn't work. It's too 
extreme for this farm and for the cows we had. So we came back to a middle-of-the-road system… 
[And] I think we feed better now than we ever have done … the whole emphasis of the business 
is to get the diet and everything right for the cows so it should produce naturally, rather than 
trying to fill her with feed and force her…” 
 
 
On the date of the interview, Farm D housed its cows for approximately 26 weeks and grazed 
for the remaining 26 weeks of the year (mean housing period for the intermediate cluster was 
26.86 weeks). 
 
Similar to Farmer D, Farmer B156 housed his cows for approximately 26 weeks of the year and 
operated a single Autumn calving block. He suggested that “We're on a cross between the two 
systems”. The farmer described his system as a “housed-system-stroke-grazing-system”, which 
is perhaps best understood as operating intensively during the winter months, and extensively 
during the summer.  
 
Although Farms B and D were not housing their cows for significantly longer than the typical 
extensive farm157, their operation of a single Autumn calving block – which accompanied the 
more intensive feeding of the cows during the Winter (housed) period, when the cows were 
early in the lactation cycle and therefore experiencing peak energy demand – distinguished 
them from extensive systems such as Farm G (8.1), which operated a Spring-calved block and 
therefore kept the cows outdoors to graze at the peak of lactation (energy demand) and 
accordingly fed less intensively during the housed period. They were also distinguished from 
the extensive Farm P – which was Autumn calving – by their longer housing period and the 
greater attention they appeared to place upon matching feed inputs to the cows’ stage of 
lactation (whereas Farmer P adopted an ‘easy feed’ approach; 8.1). 
 
Farmer B explained the feeding-housing-fertility-calving pattern interactions associated with 
his approach: 
 
	
156 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 20/7/16; see timeline Appendix 9E 
 
157 Mean housing period for extensive farms in the Milkbench sample was 24.56 weeks  
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“[We’re] trying to push the cows as much as we can to get the peak yields as high as we can 
during the Winter, at an efficient rate … [and] once we get to the end of January / February we 
start looking to cheapen the diet up because the cows are hopefully getting back in calf. The 
majority are all back in calf then. We try and extract more efficiency from the cows and then [the 
lower feed input] is not having detrimental effect too much on the milk yield at that point 
because it's passed the peak … During the Winter, we're very focused on the health and the 
fertility … Once back in calf, we can just … try and extract a little bit more out of them and 
push them a little bit harder, knowing they've already got in calf, so they're not gonna have a 
reduced conception rate…”   
 
 
This feeding approach stood in contrast to the approach taken by intensive Farmer F, for 
example, who fed a “potent” feed ration (7.1) throughout the cows’ lactation and therefore had 
to take care to ensure that the cows did not become overweight and “hard to calve back in”. 
Instead, Farmer B initially fed to yield158 before appearing to switch to a ‘flat rate’ feeding 
approach,159 before increasing the ration once more, once the cows were in calf. 
 
Competition between the different feeding technologies used on Farm B was less pronounced 
than in some of the other intermediate farms outlined above. Instead, complementarities 
between feeding and housing appeared to be mediated by the selected calving pattern, with 
intensive feeding and housing complementing each other during the early stages of lactation 
and more extensive feeding and housing complementing each other later on. Once the cows 
were in calf, the intensity of feeding was increased without compromising fertility. The timing 
of feeding changes was therefore determined by fertility considerations. 
 
Although Farmer C had complained of “selective grazing” (i.e. competition between his chosen 
feeding technologies) his feeding approach was similarly mediated by calving pattern and 
fertility considerations: 
 
“It's a stepped [feeding] system really160. We build them up from when they calve. We have a 
good transition period, and aim to get them peaking … and we'll hold them at that and then … 
as they start dropping off [in yields], we will step 'em down [i.e. reducing feed]. But we hold 
them at a fairly high concentrate level because we want to hold that lactation. Then when we 
know they're in calf…  we'll challenge161 them in later lactation. So early Spring … we'll gain 	
158 Feeding to yield involves “Allocating concentrates on a daily or weekly basis according to yield … 
Feeding to yield tends to result in lactation curves with a higher peak yield but more rapid decline as cows 
respond positively to the challenge of more generous early lactation feeding and negatively to the 
progressive restriction of allocations in mid to late lactation” (DairyCo 2012b, 6:13) 
 
159 Flat rate feeding is “Completely opposite to feeding to yield, flat rate feeding involves providing all 
cows with the same quantity of concentrates each day throughout the lactation” (DairyCo 2012b, 6:14) 
 
160  “Step concentrate feeding provides a convenient half-way house between feeding to yield and flat rate 
feeding, more closely meeting cows’ nutritional needs at each stage in the lactation, while maintaining as 
much simplicity as possible.” (DairyCo 2012b, 6:14).  
161 Challenge feeding is “a system of feeding dairy cows which provides more feed than is justified by the 
level of the individual cow's milk production. In the early part of the lactation the cow is challenged to 
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some feed off cows that are in calf, and that are not going to lose a lot of condition, we’ll ask 
a lot [of them] from grass … and likewise if we've got very good silage … we'll challenge those 
cows. They'll be in a lower yielding group which have a lower blend ration…”(emphasis 
added) 
 
 
The intermediate farms also provided evidence of fertility-calving pattern interactions, similar 
to those observed on extensive farms (8.1), in which reverse salients, resulting from the 
application of a block calving model (with its requirement for getting all cows pregnant within 
a narrow ‘window’ when compared against all year calving models), had led to the adoption of 
heat detection technologies aimed at reducing the calving interval.  
 
Notably, whereas extensive farms had favoured ‘low-tech’ heat detection solutions such as 
‘crayons’ or ‘scratchcards’ (Farms G and K, 8.1), and intensive farms had favoured heat 
detection collars (Farms O and M, 7.1), many intermediate farms chose to outsource the 
function to third party providers who would detect heat manually. Upon switching to Autumn 
calving in 2010, having previously operated an all-year calving model, Farmer B had contracted 
out heat detection to a consultant, which had reduced the calving interval from 400 to 
approximately 369 days.  
 
Farmer E had also outsourced heat detection services to Genus – using the company’s  “RMS”162 
service – having previously used heat detection collars. Since employing the services of Genus, 
calving interval had reduced from 405 days to 391 for the herds’ Holsteins and from 390 to 363 
for the herds’ Shorthorns. Farm N163 was also using RMS, while Farm C used both RMS and 
collars: 
 
“A big management part of this farm is we use RMS services. We used to just run natural 
service bulls through the herd. About five years ago, we changed and we started recording all the 
data ... we PD164 every week so we've got exact dates on when to go ‘dry’, and when calving. It's 
revolutionized the management. Before that it was a lot of guesswork … [and] some cows were 
in far too long in the dry period, gaining the wrong condition … We realise now we've gotta 
have the cow in the perfect, best condition we can get her for the coming lactation…” 
 
 
	
produce more milk and in many instances does so. If the cow does not respond the level of feeding is 
reduced. Called also lead feeding because the cow is led to produce more heavily.” Saunders 
Comprehensive Veterinary Dictionary, https://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/challenge+feeding 
 
162 http://www.genusbreeding.co.uk/?p=1615 
  
163 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 20/7/16 
 
164 Pregnancy diagnosis  
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Farm D and Farm L165 both used ‘Heat Time’ collars. Farmer H, by contrast, used neither collars 
nor RMS. The farmer explained: 
 
“The calving index is about 420 days … either they get in calf during that 12-month period or 
they tend to have a very long extended lactation because they’ve run around and they’ll be 24 
months later when they calve. So it’s all about getting more and more in calf in the 12-month 
calving and less that run round.” 
 
 
On the date of the interview, the herd was entirely composed of Holsteins. The farmer, 
however, was considering crossbreeding, due to concerns over inbreeding (and its impact on 
fertility). The use of increasingly narrow bloodlines (a co-ordination effect at the sector level, 
resulting in a convergence upon a Holstein-based model of production) was resulting in a 
reverse salient (due to the reduction in genetic diversity of cattle at the sector level, associated 
with this convergence) , requiring the use of further technologies, such as inbreeding checks: 
 
“When you look at something with Oman in… and all of a sudden you work out that 90% of the 
bulls have got Oman in them166… and nearly half of them come out of one cow … you can use 
the mating programmes and you can use herd indexes and everything, but then you also need to 
use an inbreeding code, and checkers, because by focusing just solely on one trait, the industry 
as a whole has ended up with narrower and narrower-bred bloodlines… it’s got to the stage now 
where you have to check the bloodline as well, as well as just checking whether it’s got the right 
type and fats and proteins…” 
 
 
Although most of the intermediate farms interviewed farmed Holstein cows, some had 
incorporated other breeds into their systems. For example, Farmer B described his cows as 
being “not ‘Holstein’ Holsteins”: 
 
“Ours have a little bit more flesh on them. [They are] not as tall and not as heavy … when 
they're grazing if you’ve got too much weight on feet you start making indentations into the 
floor [sic] and damaging the swards by ‘poaching’167… [but] If you get too light they [also] 
produce less milk … We're about 625 kilo cows, rather than extremes [which] might be 700, 
750. But on the complete Spring calving ones they might be down at 500 kilo … So we're 
somewhere in the middle ...”[emphasis added] 
 
 
These ‘smaller’ Holsteins clearly complemented the farm’s grazing-based approach in the 
summer months, without being so small as to compromise the farm’s more intensive housed 
approach in the Winter. Moreover, Farmer B had also, approximately ten years before the date 
of the interview, introduced some Holstein-Jersey crossbreeds to the herd. Significantly, these 	
 
165 Non-aligned farm, interview date: 19/7/16 
 
166 http://www.fwi.co.uk/livestock/oman-and-sons-still-dominate-holstein-proofs.htm  
 
167 ‘Poaching’ refers to the compaction of soil due to trampling by livestock: 
http://www.gov.uk/guidance/rules-for-farmers-and-land-managers-to-prevent-water-pollution  
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breeding changes had not been influenced by the desire to produce a cow better suited to 
grazing (which was the objective of extensive farms that had introduced crossbreeding; see 
Farmer P; 8.1). Instead crossbreeding was introduced because “we had too many maiden 
heifers having caesareans on their first calf” and “the Jersey calf will come out of the cow a lot 
easier”.  
 
Farm E, like Farm B, was not farming exclusively Holstein cows, but farmed a mixed herd of 90 
Holsteins and 90 Dairy Shorthorns (a traditional breed that had been on the farm for several 
generations, pre-dating the Holsteins), yielding 8,200 litres (averaged across the herd), and 
operating an all-year calving pattern. The cows were housed for five months (21.73 weeks) of 
the year, placing them towards the extensive end of the intermediate cluster. However, the farm 
had operated more intensively in the past and was milking three times a day when the farmer 
“came home” to the farm in 2006 at which time there were only 30 shorthorns in the herd and 
yields were 10,000 litres-plus.  
 
This farm, with its 50:50 split between Holsteins and Shorthorns, exemplified the potentially 
conflicting nature of the technologies associated with intermediate systems. On the one hand, 
the farmer used in-parlour feeding and a ‘feed to yield’ strategy, complementing the farm’s all 
year calving pattern: 
 
“We feed in the parlour. We have always fed in the parlour. It’s an intensive way of looking at it. 
It’s a very good way of focusing in on an individual cow and giving her food that suits her own 
personal needs, rather than blanket feeding the lot…. because we calve all year round… so if you 
looked at the herd at any point in time you’ve got cows at different stages of production. So you 
have the ones that are freshly calved that have very high needs … to the ones that aren’t giving 
much milk that have low needs ...” 
 
 
However, on the other hand, Farm E was also using paddock or ‘rotational’ grazing, with a 
view to maximising the use of grazed grass.168  
 
Elsewhere, Farm E also provided evidence of the complementarities that exist between milking 
technologies, housing technologies herd size, and of the sequence in which technologies were 
required to change as the farm expanded (as well as of the interactions with, and dependencies 
of these upon, financial resources, see 9.2): 
 
“[Having purchased a new milking parlour] what we need to do now is extend our cow numbers 
… so we’re 180 cows [and] in the ideal world we would just go up to 200, because the 20 extra 	
168 Rotational grazing involves “moving grazing livestock between pastures (often called paddocks) as 
needed or on a regular basis”; https://www.premier1supplies.com/sheep-guide/2012/07/a-look-at-the-
advantages-of-rotational-grazing/  
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cows would just help pay for the cost… But we can’t do it at the minute because we are 
constrained by housing… so until we get more housing… it’s a bit like a chicken and egg 
thing…”  
 
Finally, there was evidence of an interaction between housing, grazing and waste management 
technologies on many intermediate farms. With these farms housing their cows for half of the 
year, this created a need to manage considerable volumes of slurry (as distinct from some 
extensive farms, such as Farm G, on which the cows “spread their own slurry”). Moreover, 
because these farms also wanted to make efficient use of grass during the Summer months 
many of them (Farms B, H, E, D) chose to use umbilical systems to inject slurry into the ground 
rather than spraying it onto the surface. Farm B explained the reasoning behind this: 
 
“During the Summer … we inject [slurry] into the ground … Because it’s going directly into 
the ground you've got less ammonia into the atmosphere. And then also, with our system it 
works really well, because we can graze 12 days after you’ve done the injecting … the old 
fashioned way, the spread plate way169, you'd be talking a month, six weeks before you can graze 
in it.” 
9.2 Interactions Between Component Categories 
The technological configurations used by intermediate farms interacted with other categories of 
system components: resources (chiefly labour and physical), and the knowledge and skills 
embedded in actors and the labour force, as well as their beliefs (institutions) that supported 
and were supported by such knowledge and skills. There was some evidence that these 
interactions supported a degree of flexibility and/or responsiveness in intermediate systems, in 
the face of changes in market prices, for both inputs and outputs. 
 
As with intensive and extensive farms, there was considerable evidence of the influence of 
physical resources upon intermediate farm systems. For example, Farm D’s use of an Autumn 
calving pattern was influenced by local geography and climate:  
 
“Generally in a valley like this we dry up in August … So we've got less grass about this time of 
year [July], so sometimes cows have to be in during the day or night to get feed. But then in the 
Spring, if you've got the cows calved earlier [i.e. in the Autumn] there's more decrease in 
lactation, [and] they can make better use of grass.” 
 
 
Farmer B also provided a clear example of the influence of physical resources upon his decision 
to adopt an approach halfway between a grazed and a housed system:  
 
“We try and turn out [graze] as early as we can, but in the climate that we've got – with 17 
inches of rainfall, and an altitude of 600 to 900 feet up here – we tend to get out in the first week 	
169 A spread plate distributes slurry across the surface of the ground 
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in April … If we've no grass, we'll bring them in. It's also the weather, the climate really. It just 
ends up making too much mess, we'll have to bring them in 'cause it doesn't dry out that much 
at that time of year. That's one of the reasons … why we're on a cross between the two systems 
… If we put our cows out during the winter it's just too wet and they'd plough most of the fields 
up... So that's one of the main reasons why we don't have the have a grazed system all the 
time…” 
 
 
Farm C showed similar interactions between the available physical resources and the selected 
(grazing) technologies on the farm, which interacted further with the farm’s approach to 
breeding (operating a ‘flying herd’ – i.e. purchasing heifers – rather than rearing replacement 
cows on the farm): 
 
“We're in marginal land here, we have half the farm is croppable, or grass croppable, I should 
say… half the farm is pretty much grazing, predominantly … we cut [grass] where we can, and 
we keep improving the land so we can cut more, but there is a certain element that is grazeable 
only … So we can't really cut it. We need to graze it. We don't have youngstock [as we operate a 
flying herd], so it makes sense that the cows go out and eat the grass.”  
 
 
In the cases described above, interactions between technologies and available physical 
resources were also supported by farmers’ mindsets or technological frames. Indeed, Farmer D 
suggested that such factors might play a larger role in influencing farmers’ approaches than 
constraints in physical resources:  
 
“I can’t speak for [other farmers] but I wonder how much of that is restriction of the asset [i.e. 
land] or restriction of the mind … I mean, everything I'm telling you supports what we're 
doing, because we're doing it. So to consider something else, you've got to get your head right 
round that and think somewhere different … very often people say, ‘I can't possibly do that 
because X, Y and Z’, but what they’re saying is ‘I can’t possibly do that because I can't think of 
a different way’…” 
 
 
Many of the farmers interviewed displayed a clear personal preference for grazing, for at least 
some of the year. As Farmer B reported: “I'm more of a grazing type person … Personally I 
wouldn't like cows to be in all year round. That's my personal preference”. Meanwhile, Farmer 
C’s personal beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm appeared to mirror his “middle road” 
approach:  
 
“I like to see cows at grass. I think it's a big part of … the ‘feel good’ factor in the job ... [But] 
where cows are grazed for long periods throughout the year, I see welfare issues there. Some 
guys are keeping them out in terrible weather, up to their knees in shit ... I wouldn't want to 
keep cows like that...” 
 
 
Similarly, Farmer D maintained that, having operated both extensive and intensive models: 
 
“[On] the very extensive [model]… we were just killing cows. It just didn't sit all that well with 
what you were doing… I don't like high intensive systems, personally … one of our core values 
		
	
166	
is care, we care for our cows as best we can, we make them produce milk naturally. It's not about 
forcing them and looking at them as machines, just as business-generating things… That's the 
ethos that I work under. If I was forced to change from that, I probably wouldn't do it.” 
 
 
In the case of Farm C, the farmer’s beliefs – and the interaction between these and the 
technologies used on the farm – related not only to the available physical resources but also to 
the farmer’s values regarding his preferred lifestyle and its relationship with those physical 
resources:  
 
“We're very fond of the appearance and the ‘hill farm’ nature of the traditional buildings 
[here]… [and we’re] little bit stuck with how the land lies to expand massively ... I've got friends 
who're selling a lot of milk from one farm and are progressing, and really pushing on with milk 
sales, and they've gone down that road of housing the cows, and then you milk them three times 
a day with a big rotary parlour… It doesn't just fit in with the fit of this farm … I like living 
here. … It's a nice farm. I wouldn't want to move. And I wouldn't want to build up anything 
and spoil it … I wouldn't want to expand at the expense of the pleasantness of the farm … Some 
people expand for necessity, whether they do it for the need to generate cash to stay in business. 
Or some guys do it for a mission to milk 1,000 cows. I don't want to milk 1,000 cows … if I 
can’t have a good living off 500 I should be investing elsewhere in other things.” 
 
 
The importance of ‘lifestyle’ to the farmer was reminiscent of extensive Farms G and P, 
(Chapter 8), albeit he was measuring quality of life in terms of his physical surroundings, 
whereas Farmers G and P were measuring quality of life in terms of the labour demands of the 
job. 
 
The interaction between technologies and labour resources was also particularly pronounced on 
intermediate farms, notably on those farms operating smaller herds.170 For example, Farmer J’s 
(herd size 120 cows) decision to install robots was influenced by a shortage of labour resources 
(similar to Farmer I, Chapter 7).  
 
In the case of Farm E (herd size 180) interactions between technologies and labour resources 
were mediated by other, physical, resources, as changes in milking frequency were driven by 
labour shortages resulting from the farm’s urban location: 
 
“We used to be a three times a day system … until … about six years ago when we had serious 
limitations in labour. We are quite an urban farm and you struggle to get people that want to go 
into farming. So from that point we decided to go back to twice a day. The cows on a three times 
a day system were 10,000 plus litres yielding … now we’re more like 8,200 on average.” 
 
 
	
170 Intermediate farms, compared with intensive and extensive farms, had smaller herds. The mean herd 
size for the whole sample was 200.78 cows: 248.07 for intensive farms, 147.94 for intermediate farms, and 
228.44 for extensive farms. 
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In addition to the influence of limitations in the availability of labour upon production models, 
there was also a trend amongst intermediate farms towards the reduction of labour input costs, 
with such reductions influencing decision making regarding the adoption of technologies. 
Farmer N explained that, alongside a reduction in herd size had from 330 to 165-175 cows, 
functions on the farm had been increasingly contracted out to third parties: 
 
“We contract most [functions]… silaging [and] emptying the lagoon is contracted out. 
Fertilizer's already contracted out and spraying… so we just tend to milk … [in] MMB days, 
with 330 cows, we did our own silage. We never had any contractors in. We did everything … 
We're [now] using more compounds and blends produced by others … the switch over to blends 
has been more of a cash flow issue …” 
 
 
Although considering milking robots, to further reduce labour costs, it was clear that the way 
that Farmer N framed the dairy farming problem was influenced by potential changes in future 
buyer demands, which were influenced in turn by changing public perceptions about dairy 
farming: 
 
“I am a bit concerned of the public’s perception of dairy cows. I think we're just not far from 
people wanting free-range cows. That's been probably at the back of my mind against robots. … 
I think there could be a huge swing away from housed animals…” 
 
 
Farmer H, with a herd of 150 cows, explained how a desire to reduce labour costs had 
influenced his decision to move from an even smaller, more intensively farmed herd towards 
his current system: 
 
“Over about a six-year period ending a couple of years ago we went through and basically 
rebuilt the whole farm on its existing site … [and] we thought that, for the amount of effort we 
put into a hundred cows, we could actually look after a hundred and fifty… we thought ‘we’re 
actually chasing our tails all the time here and we could be bigger and produce more milk and do 
it for less money’ …” 
 
 
A key element of this change was the replacement of an old milking parlour that was “slow and 
unpleasant to work in”. However, the farmer also made fundamental changes to his feeding 
approach in order to reduce labour requirements: 
 
“In 1994… We were…  a proper family farm, with a Keenan feeder [i.e. feeding a TMR]. We 
spent two hours a day putting feed out every day of the year. And they were giving about 8,200 / 
8,300 litres of not quite such good quality milk, and consuming about 2.25 – 2.4 tonnes of 
bought in straights [concentrates]171… But we’ve made life simpler. They’re not fed a TMR any 
more, the cake goes in the bottom of the feed trough and the silage goes on top, so it’s a twenty 
five minute job rather than a two hour job…” 
 
 	
171 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/technical-information/feeding/concentrate-feeds/#Straights  
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Farmer D, by comparison, explained how rising labour costs had influenced his decision to 
expand the herd over time, in the pursuit of economies of scale: 
 
“The problem is if you've got certain overheads in the business, they invariably go up; wages go 
up each year ... So unless you're moving the business forward, it's quite hard to cover the cost of 
that ever-increasing overhead… steadily increasing [the herd size] just keeps you the right side, 
it keeps you ahead on that cost basis … So that's the reason for expanding.” 
 
 
In expanding his herd (from 350 in the 1990s to 480 at the time of interview, with plans to 
increase to 550), Farmer D also revealed significant interactions between labour resources (and 
the knowledge and skills embedded in his staff) and technologies (in this case, herd size and 
fertility). As the herd had expanded – employing more staff – the farmer had found the need to 
introduce heat detection collars (which had reduced the calving interval “from 430 / 440 to 390” 
days), in response to a reverse salient (namely, newly-introduced staff lacked the necessary 
knowledge or skills to detect heat and therefore the calving interval had increased, as heat 
detection fell behind the performance of the rest of the system): 
 
 “Certainly as you get a bigger herd, you put more people in it, so we've got six or seven people 
in the herd now as opposed to three or four, some years ago. Particularly on a large herd, to get 
people to identify bulling cows accurately, it's quite difficult… and we are employing quite a few 
people in the farm now who've never seen a cow when they arrive ... Whereas the guys who've 
been here for years, they can see a bulling cow before it's bulling. But I think actually a sort of 
crossover between technology and psychology is that technology is eliminating a lot of the 
stockmanship skills that take years to build up, so there's quite a benefit in technology ... 
But you've still got to get the people using technology right…” (emphasis added) 
 
 
A positive feedback effect resulting from the introduction of such technologies was notable, as 
the farmer implied that the introduction of collars was effectively ‘deskilling’ the workforce (in 
terms of heat detection) and therefore requiring the continued use of collars. This could be 
characterised as a complementary effect between the collars and the labour force’s lack of skills. 
 
Similar to interactions between technologies and physical resources (above), interactions 
between technologies and labour resources were also mediated by actors and institutions 
(chiefly, actors’ beliefs, which influenced their ‘technological frames’). For example, Farmer J – 
who had explained that his system offered flexibility in terms of feeding approach (see 9.1) such 
that he could easily “swing back the other way” from feeding predominantly forage towards 
feeding predominantly concentrates – provided evidence that the flexibility of his system was 
supported by a flexibility in the farmers’ beliefs about the ‘right’ way to farm:  
 
“I'm driven by profit ... I'm only in it for business ... and therefore I try and run the system as 
profitably as possible ... if I couldn't make money out of it, I'd give up ... I don't mind cow s... I 
quite enjoy working with cows ... but they are a means to me getting money, and that's all I do it 
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for. What motivates me is making money, and I'm always constantly challenging the system to 
make more money, and I will follow the way to make money...” (emphasis added) 
 
 
In this case, the farmer appeared to frame the ‘problem’ of dairy farming almost exclusively in 
terms of how to extract the maximum financial return from the enterprise. Of course, while all 
of the farmers interviewed, as business owners, were financially motivated to some degree, not 
all farmers framed the problem of dairy farming, or the solutions to that problem, in terms so 
tightly centred upon the profit motive. Instead, their frames were more often contained other 
cognitive and normative dimensions, including considerations of animal welfare, lifestyle or 
aesthetics (e.g. Farmer C, below, 9.3.3.1). Farmer D, for example, suggested that: 
 
“It always made sense to produce as much milk as possible within the realms of the economics of 
unit cost. But it's a case of how you do it. If you do it by stuffing your cows full of food, you're 
gonna drive problems into your business, and welfare, et cetera, et cetera.” 
 
 
Some farmers also revealed the existence of normative rules related to their inheritance of the 
business, in particular around the use of specific breeds that had been used by previous 
generations. Farmer E, for example, described a personal / emotional attachment to the 
Shorthorn cows that had been kept on the farm for several generations, which was exerting an 
influence on her current breeding decisions.172 While the farmer was being driven to reduce the 
number of Shorthorns in the herd in order to improve yield and efficiency (see below 9.3), she 
reported that: 
 
“All our cows are descended back to my grandfather and his father and probably his father – and 
just to suddenly give up on them doesn’t seem right. So there’s that mental barrier … which is 
bad business, but it’s still something that mentally we’ve got to overcome…” 
 
 
Moreover, the farmer’s attachment to her current system extended beyond breeding 
technologies. She also suggested that changing pattern represented a significant ‘mental 
change’: 
 
“We don’t manage [the Shorthorns and Holsteins] massively differently [from each other]. [But] 
we could ... the Shorthorns would be suited to Spring calving and milk at grass … and then we 
could calve the black and whites in the Autumn and they would be on a more expensive system. 
So we’ve looked at it… it’s just a very big mental change… we calve all year round and it’s the 
system I’m used to …” 
 
 
	
172 NB: The farmer was also influenced to keep Shorthorns by more ‘formal’ institutions (“We have been 
influenced to keep more Shorthorns lately because we are on an environmental scheme, which encourages 
us to keep native breeds”). 
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Farmer N made similar observations regarding his decision to continue dairying in spite of 
receiving a very low price for his milk (see below, 9.3.1.2): 
 
“The herd goes back … almost 100 years. It does make you hang on to things when they are not 
profitable, because I think most people have got out this last 12 months… family farms… It's 
more than just a business. And working with animals is more than just a business how you do 
it. I don’t think you can do dairy and just treat it as a purely financial thing to do.” 
9.3 The Influence of Buyer Power  
This section considers the influence of buyer power upon the patterns of change outlined above 
(9.1 – 9.2). As with Chapters 7 and 8, this analysis is structured by reference to buyer demands 
relating to:  
• Security of supply (9.3.1) 
• Product characteristics173 (9.3.2)  
• Production characteristics (9.3.3) 
 
Within each of these sections the analysis considers the mechanisms through which buyers seek 
to achieve compliance with these demands (i.e. conditions of value chain governance, including 
sanctions and trust). 
9.3.1 Security of Supply 
Intermediate farms provided examples of milk buyers successfully influencing farms, with 
regards to the security of supply, through the use of the following sanctions174 (see also above, 
5.2.6): 
• The power to exclude 
• Base prices for milk (and bonuses175 for overproduction) 
• A / B pricing  
• Seasonality payments 
 	
173 NB: As with the intensive and extensive farms reviewed in Chapters 7 and 8, intermediate farms 
provided no evidence of farmers responding (or not) to food hygiene and safety standards above those 
required by statutory minima, hence the following discussion does not include a section dedicated to 
these. 	
174 NB: There was no evidence of seasonality payments influencing the approaches of the extensive farms 
visited, hence the following discussion does not include a section dedicated to this. 
 
175 Bonuses for overproduction are considered concurrently with base prices because, in the example used 
(Farm C), the influence of buyer demands on the farmer (and the broader sector) was the result of the 
interplay between base prices and bonuses, see further below.  
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9.3.1.1 The Power to Exclude 
In addition to ‘direct’ influences of buyer power and demands upon farms, there was evidence 
of intermediate farms responding to broader sector-level market movements and signals (i.e. 
‘indirect’ influences of buyer power). These may be grouped broadly under the heading of ‘the 
power to exclude’ and relate, variously, to farmers’ status as ‘price takers’ and to their reliance 
upon buyers due to the lack of availability of alternative contracts (see, 5.2.6).  
 
For example, Farmer C explained that he had switched supplier from Milk Marque to Wiseman 
in the mid-1990s when it became apparent that Wiseman was expanding its market share and 
that it might therefore dominate the processing regional market: 
 
”The catalyst was when Wiseman dairies came to Manchester, and they paid some ex-MMB guy 
who I was good friends with, and he came and he targeted bigger farmers in this [area] … we 
were on a main route ... I just felt, these guys are coming and bringing superdairying … They’re 
gonna get the milk.” 
 
 
Put differently, this was not a direct response to explicit sanctions applied by buyers to their 
existing suppliers. Instead, the farmer had switched supplier in anticipation of a sector-level 
shift in the balance of power within the processing market (i.e. an expectation effect associated 
with concentration in the processor market, discussed in 5.2.2) and due to a desire for the 
relative security associated with belonging to a large milk pool operated by a powerful market 
player (resulting from a fear of being left without a buyer or with an inferior contract in the 
event of the anticipated market shifts).   
 
The attractiveness of supplying a milk buyer with a strong market position – and the reliance of 
farmers on buyers – was highlighted by the experience of Farmer N: 
  
“Our previous dairy supplier went bankrupt … just over 10 years ago. I actually had three 
bankruptcies on me within 12 months … We lost £50,000 from the business, which really hurt, 
when the price wasn’t particularly good anyway.” 
 
 
Farmer E’s experience as an aligned producer offered further evidence of farms’ reliance on 
buyers, with farms effectively being passed from one processor to another, with little apparent 
control over their ultimate destination. Although Farm C suggested that one of the benefits of 
an aligned contract, from the farmers’ perspective, is that the processor “becomes a contract 
processor” (see below 9.3.1.2), the drawback of this is that, because supermarkets may re-tender 
processing contracts, the farmer relinquishes control over the decision of who processes their 
milk. Farmer E explained: 
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“Sainsbury’s has retendered for their milk … originally the bulk of it was coming from Muller 
and Arla … [but] they have played the processors off against one another… [and] they’ve also 
been influenced by the latest policy from Welsh Government, which is to encourage more 
processing in Wales. So … our milk, which was going over the border to England and then 
coming back to Wales … is now going up to Wrexham – which is three hours away – to a Welsh 
processor. But it’s a little bit worrying for me, because we have always been with Unigate, Dairy 
Crest and now Muller … and now our aligned [buyer] is saying ‘right, you know, you are going 
to this one now’.”  
 
 
This practice of ‘playing processors off against one another’ stood in contrast to the relatively 
longer term supermarket-processor relationships within the value chains of Waitrose and 
Marks & Spencer (see 8.3.1.1), and suggests that the value chains of large and small 
supermarkets may have distinctive characteristics. The farmer reported feeling insecure about 
the loss of control that this arrangement involved, and the risk that, were she to lose her aligned 
contract, she might be left without a contract with a local processor: 
 
“They [Sainsbury’s] have given us a lot over the years, we trust that relationship, and we are 
just going to have to go with the flow and hope … We are just taking it on goodwill that 
Sainsbury’s are going to look after us and that it will be OK.” 
 
 
Although the above cases do not provide examples of the (direct) influence of buyer demands 
upon specific aspects of production, they do highlight the degree of reliance that farmers may 
have upon powerful buyers (such as supermarkets), which may in turn influence indirectly the 
technological decisions that such farmers make (in order to secure or retain their contracts). 
Moreover, the fact that farmers appear to be prepared in some cases to relinquish considerable 
control to buyers highlights either the degree of trust within such relationships, and / or the lack 
of alternative contracts offering competitive milk prices. 
 
Indeed, despite the potential loss of control associated with being an aligned producer, the 
demand for such contracts (perhaps due to their higher, more stable price, see below) was clear, 
once again demonstrating the pervasive effect of such contracts (see 7.3.3.1), influencing farms 
both inside and outside of the supplier pool. As Farmer D recalls: 
 
“I wrote to [Dairy Crest] almost at the very beginning [when supermarket contracts were first 
introduced], saying I'd be interested in a contract with a supermarket should one come up.” 
 
 
Further evidence of this indirect influence of supermarkets was provided by Farmer C, who 
explained that Tesco operates a ‘waiting list’ of farms hoping to secure the contracts of the 
worst-performing farms that Tesco excludes from the pool (7.3.3.1). This supports the finding 
that practices developed and promoted within aligned pools (as a result of benchmarking) have 
indirectly influenced some farmers’ practices across the sector as a whole, through expectation 
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and co-ordination effects (see 7.3.3.1, Farmer O, who was “trying our best to be what they 
[Tesco] wanted anyway”.) Similarly, Farmer N, who was hopeful of securing an aligned 
contract, explained that, in order to do so, he would “jump through whatever hoops we were 
given”. 
9.3.1.2 Base Prices for Milk (and Bonuses for Overproduction) 
Intermediate farms provided clear evidence of the influence of sanctions imposed by buyers, in 
the form of milk prices. As with intensive and extensive farms, high prices encouraged 
intermediate farms – such as Farm N – to expand farms to expand and low milk prices also 
encouraged intermediate farms – again, Farm N – to scale back in herd size (cf. 7.3.1.3). 
 
Reductions in base prices, implying a buyer demand for reduced volume, also influenced 
intermediate farms to reduce yields per cow, often through changes in the deployment of feed 
technologies (similar to intensive Farm I, 7.3.1.1). Farmer B’s experience was typical: 
 
“[We’re on] 8,100 [litres per cow per annum] at the moment … Going back a year / 18 months 
… we peaked at about 8,400 litres and then ... with the milk price the way it is, we're trying to 
get more out of the forage now. And then it's just dropped us back a little bit on litres, but with 
the way the milk prices are it's a more profitable way to do it at the moment…” 
 
 
Similarly, Farmer J’s approach to feeding was strongly influenced by the current prices 
available for milk (see further below, 9.3.1.3): 
 
“We could chuck more concentrates in and push the yield up but I don’t think we’d make any 
more money … I think we’d make less… so that’s why we’re going towards feeding more forage 
and less concentrates … Last year we had a rethink about what the marginal litre was costing us 
… [and] we really dramatically cut back the concentrate feed.”  
 
 
As well as such ‘direct’ effects, the interviews also provided an example of ‘indirect’ or sector-
level effects similar to those outlined already (9.3.1.1), resulting from the manipulation of prices 
by buyers with considerable market power. Farmer C recalled that he had decided to switch 
from supplying his processor, Wiseman, due to the low base prices it had been paying. While 
this appears, initially, as an example of a ‘failure’ of buyer power (section 9.4 below), the 
ensuing events and actions suggest, over the longer run, the reverse. Farmer C explained: 
 
“I had a bit of a falling out [with Wiseman] around … 2002 ... They were … dropping the price 
down ... blaming currency, commodities, whatever ... a lot of farmers became unhappy ... I was 
disgruntled. I handed my notice in.” 
 
 
With many of its suppliers threatening similar action, the farmer recalled that Wiseman had 
responded by offering farmers a bonus of 4ppl for providing additional milk, enabling it to 
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retain many disgruntled farmers, as well as to attract new farmers. The net result, the farmer 
recalled, was overproduction in the market, precipitating a slump in the milk price at the sector 
level: 
 
“Basically, the market collapsed … They took these extra farmers on. There was an oversupply 
… and they just bombed … There was nowhere to sell it [the milk]…” 
 
 
While the above account implies a degree of bargaining power on the part of the farmers with 
regards to short-term price movements, over the longer-term the net result was, ultimately, a 
return to low prices. Significantly, the broader effects of overproduction upon the market 
appeared to have an influence on the farmer’s attempted switch to an alternative buyer. He 
recalled: 
 
“We had about three or four months selling to First Milk, which was [merging] with Dairy 
Farmers of Britain … and it went tits up. It was a mess. I said [to Wiseman], ‘look I need to 
come back’… It were breaking me. I said: ‘I've made the biggest mistake to my business’. They 
were all laughing, taking the piss, you know … the whole deal cost me 50 grand … but … I 
begged to go back … I was losing literally 10 or 15 grand a month … [it was] a very strong 
lesson to learn. We were very small fry … You are so soon shafted by these big companies … 
They can always put you in your place ... Obviously … what you want [is] security … and that 
you're going to get paid, and to work on the factors that you can influence, like your own job.” 
 
 
The volatility of a discretionary price, and the insecurity that this implied for Farmer C, stood in 
contrast to his subsequent, aligned, contract to supply Tesco (the high, stable Tesco price 
relative to prices paid under non-aligned contracts was illustrated in Chapter 7, Figure 7a). The 
farmer explained how the stability of that price – and the continuity, reliability and 
predictability it provided – had given him the confidence to plan and invest: 
 
 “The market has no mercy … the milk purchaser is a massive, massive area, where you need 
security and commitment. And we're very fortunate, we've got an aligned contract with Tesco, 
who I’m quite involved with … and that's seen us through these difficult periods. It’s set us on a 
different trajectory because … about nine years ago we were in a similar situation the farmers 
have been in now, and my faith had about left for me investing in the farm … but then when the 
Tesco job came up, we got this guaranteed structure on [a] fully cost of production [basis]. You 
got an idea of where it was going, and ... it gave us a lot of security, and a lot of confidence. 
We've since then re-invested in the facilities the best we can.” 
 
 
Such investments would, further, result in investment effects, introducing stability into farms’ 
socio-technical systems. Farmer E, who had an aligned contract to supply Sainsbury’s, reported 
a similar effect of price stability upon the farm’s ability to invest: 
 
“We became an aligned producer in 2007 … and we had a lot more guarantees then on income 
that was coming in … 18 months ago we moved into our new milking parlour. That’s the 
biggest investment that’s been made on the farm, other than the slurry tower, in the last forty 
years. It replaced a forty-year-old parlour that was falling apart… We got to the point with it 
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where we thought ‘this parlour is so old we are either going to have to replace it or get out of 
dairy’. Because of our contract we replaced it, because we were secure, and we survived this 
nightmare that everybody else has been through.” 
 
 
The price paid by Sainsbury’s (through Dairy Crest), relative to prices available under non-
aligned contracts, is demonstrated by comparing prices over a 44-month period between 
August 2008 and March 2012. Over that period, the Sainsbury’s (Dairy Crest) milk price was 
high relative to non-aligned prices, paying an average of 27.29ppl, compared with 24.04ppl and 
25.5ppl paid under the First Milk and Arla contracts, respectively (see Figure 9a, albeit it was 
not as high or as stable as the Tesco or Waitrose prices, see Figures 7a and 8a). Over the same 
period, the Sainsbury’s (Dairy Crest) price changed 15 times (or every 2.93 months) compared 
with 17 times (or every 2.59 months) and 23 times (or every 1.91 months) under the First Milk 
and Arla contracts, respectively. The variance in the Sainsbury’s price over the period was 
2.7ppl, compared with 5.08ppl (First Milk), demonstrating its greater stability, although the 
Arla price (while lower) was more stable, with a variance of 2.61ppl. 
 
 
Figure 9a: Volatility of Milk Prices in Aligned vs Non-aligned Contracts 
 
 
 
Source: Author (adapted from AHDB data176) 
 
 
Farmer E provided further evidence of the influence of this stable price upon Sainsbury’s 
producers. Just as farmers within the Waitrose pool have “grown enormously” “because of the 	
176 https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-contracts/league-table-
new-profile/; https://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/milk-prices-
contracts/uk-farmgate-milk-prices/ 
 
19.00
21.00
23.00
25.00
27.00
29.00
31.00
Au
g-
08
O
ct
-0
8
D
ec
-0
8
Fe
b-
09
Ap
r-0
9
Ju
n-
09
Au
g-
09
O
ct
-0
9
D
ec
-0
9
Fe
b-
10
Ap
r-1
0
Ju
n-
10
Au
g-
10
O
ct
-1
0
D
ec
-1
0
Fe
b-
11
Ap
r-1
1
Ju
n-
11
Au
g-
11
O
ct
-1
1
D
ec
-1
1
Fe
b-
12
UK average farmgate price (excl
bonus)
Sainsbury's (Dairy Crest)
First Milk Liquid Profile
Arla non-aligned
		
	
176	
confidence [the Waitrose contract has] given [them]” (8.3.1.1), so too the Sainsbury’s pool has 
reduced in farmer numbers while increasing in milk output:  
 
“When we first became members of Sainsbury’s there were 333 of us in the group… by purely 
… natural shedding – so I’m told – there are now 272 of us, maybe… 273... [and] we’re all 
doing well, so the pool is producing more milk and Sainsbury’s is now buying more than it 
sells…”  
 
 
By contrast to the high, stable base price paid under aligned contracts – and the opportunities 
this offered for planning and investment (outlined above), there was evidence that low, volatile, 
discretionary (non-aligned) prices inhibited investment (in addition to encouraging a reduction 
in output, as already observed). Farmer N explained: 
 
“We are currently on 18.9ppl, [and] we are going to get 2p increase at the end of this month, at 
the beginning of August. I think my costs [of production] are 27p, [so] I think we're losing 7,000 
quid a month at the moment, which has a big bearing on the future, and this last 18 months had 
a big bearing on investment…”  
 
 
The influence of such low prices upon conditions of value chain trust was widely evident 
amongst non-aligned farmers, and echoed the ‘frustration’ reported by intensive Farmer I 
(7.4.3). For example, the low milk price that Farmer N had been receiving was not only 
hindering potential investment in milking robots but, in the absence of an improvement in 
prices, the farmer was considering exiting the dairy farming sector:  
 
“We've gone from really being a reasonable sized producer (we had 330 cows) to a small 
producer (we've got 170) in 15 years …  probably the only way [forward] is [to introduce] 
robotic [milking] … to cut down costs even more. [But] before you get on route you need 
confidence that you're not going to hit another lull like we did … If we did get an aligned 
contract … I think that would be fair route to go down … We are looking for better contracts... If 
we don't get one ... I think we may actually sell the herd … an aligned [contract] with Tesco 
would’ve given us another £130,000 this year… We would … for five to 10p a litre extra, which 
it [the Tesco price] is at the moment … we could have an extra member of staff … you could 
invest in machinery, invest in health…” 
 
 
The importance of a high, stable price to the continued operation of intermediate farms was 
therefore clearly evident. Indeed, similar to intensive Farm F (7.3.1.1), Farmer D suggested that, 
were it not for his aligned contract, he would probably no longer be in the dairy farming 
business, or would have to significantly scale back production in order to remain viable: 
 
“If we were on an open market price, I don't think we'd be dairy farming today … We would 
have to be doing things different than we are now. We would be losing around £400,000 a year if 
we were doing things as we are now on a non-aligned contract … A herd like us – 4 to 500 cows 
– if you had the ability in times of low prices to take that back to maybe 100, 180 cows, and just 
run that on sort of one-man, very tight [system] ... you're still gonna lose money, but you're not 
gonna lose that much money… And then scale it back up when times are good … The only way 
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you could do that is to have an open herd. You wouldn't be able to do that with a closed herd, 
which we are, and obviously a closed herd has all the benefits of disease prevention …” 
 
 
There was, therefore, evidence that the stability of prices paid under aligned contracts not only 
supported the ability to invest, but had also contributed towards strong conditions of trust 
within aligned value chains, providing a degree of predictability and continuity that was both 
enabled by and had enabled long relationships. Sainsbury’s supplier, Farmer D, believed that 
supermarkets were consciously and actively seeking to develop such conditions: 
 
“The supermarkets … have sort of grown up a little bit with their relationship with their 
suppliers. It's not quite so cutthroat… ‘Buy it as cheap as we can, sod you’ … I think they’ve 
realised a need for longevity. I'm not saying that's true of all supermarkets, there's certainly a 
thing I'm noticing with the supermarket we're with.”  
 
 
However, this claim was not without [light-hearted] qualification, as he added: 
 
“That said, tomorrow they might completely throw that … out of the window! [laughs] Then 
we'd be having a different conversation. But certainly since the time we've been working with 
Sainsbury's, they've been really fair, particularly through all this milk crisis…” 
 
 
Just as it was evident that farmers desired long-term relationships with supermarkets, 
ostensibly to benefit from the high, stable price, it was also clear that supermarkets wanted 
farmers to demonstrate consistent long term performance to high standards. For example, 
Farmer E explained that she was awarded a supermarket contract, in part, to the fact that she 
could demonstrate continuity in her relationship with her previous processor and a consistent 
level production profile: 
 
“Dairy Crest started supplying Sainsbury’s, Sainsbury’s said ‘we want suppliers that have been 
with us a long time’, they looked back through the records [and] found us” 
 
 
Similarly Farmer C explained that invitation to be a ‘farmer champion’ for the Tesco Sustainable 
Dairy Group (TSDG), when it was first established, was the result of a long term personal 
relationship with one of the individuals responsible for establishing the TSDG: 
 
“I was still friendly with [the individual]. Although we'd had this tiff, if you like, we got back 
and what have you. I think there's some mutual respect, friendship, whatever.” 
 
 
Perhaps understandably, non-aligned producers were more openly sceptical of the ‘fairness’ of 
the aligned value chain model. Farmer N, although actively seeking an aligned contract at the 
time of interview, suggested that: 
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“[Tesco] could source that milk for … millions of pounds cheaper … if they wished … their PR 
guys are obviously persuading the buyers it's worth it, and … once the PR guys can't persuade 
them that the benefits are there, the price they’re paying may just collapse.” 
 
 
Farmer J – who would also have welcomed an aligned contract, and had no reservations about 
the requirement to share unaudited accounts data with supermarkets – expressed similar views. 
Indeed, although farmers within this study were almost universal in their distrust of 
discretionary approaches to determining base milk prices, Farmer J was equally sceptical of the 
future sustainability of using cost of production data as a method of base price calculation, and 
therefore questioned not only the fairness of such models, but also the continuity, reliability and 
predictability of their operation (see further below, 9.3.3.1): 
 
“[Aligned contracts] have their appeal but ... the likes of Tesco and Sainsbury's will have to 
eventually hammer back on this, because they can’t keep on paying so much more for their milk 
... Tesco and Sainsbury’s are making an inefficient group of farmers ... the more inefficient they 
get, the more Tesco pay them ... so I’m sure Tesco's now see the error of their ways... [However, I 
would accept a Tesco contract because] … we have now driven our costs down to about 22-23ppl 
... if I was selling to Tesco I would be on 29ppl ... because I am driven by driving my costs down 
[while] Tesco farmers aren't driven by driving their costs down. So why wouldn't I want to go 
in there? I'd probably then become very inefficient and ease my way back up to 29p, because 
that's what happens. Give a farmer some money and he will spend it.” 
 
 
For Farmer C, however, the transparency of the price calculation mechanism in aligned 
contracts (as compared with the discretionary pricing available under many non-aligned 
contracts) was fundamental to the creation of conditions of trust within aligned value chains: 
 
“[When the Tesco aligned pool was first established] Some farmers were enraged, [because] part 
of the deal was, to set your cost of production, you’d give your figures … [but] I thought ‘go 
with it’ … and a lot of scepticism has been turned into ... a built up trusting relationship … By 
being aligned, we're protected. The difference is … we're protected from the other market forces 
that affect Muller's pooled price, including their costs … They stipulate, that’s the price the 
farmer gets, so the processor becomes a contract processor… he’s no longer skimming whatever 
he wants ... that's the big benefit.” 
 
 
Once again, just as the strength of sanctions within aligned chains relied upon the existence of 
relatively weaker sanctions across the sector (7.3), so too were conditions of trust in aligned 
chains regarded as ‘strong’ relative to conditions within non-aligned value chains. 
 
Finally, in addition to enabling farms to invest, the price stability afforded by aligned contracts 
was contributing to inertia and path dependence in the case of Farm E, inhibiting a move to 
alternative approaches to producing and marketing milk, such as on-site processing: 
 
“Whether our future is as your standard dairy farm or whether, because the urban area is 
closing around us, I might go on to more local supply … we’d process on farm possibly … but 
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our contract is so good at the minute and so secure, you worry about giving that up … So 
perhaps looking ahead I would like to think we would go into on-farm processing and link in 
with the local area and we would probably become more of an open farm, and perhaps our money 
wouldn’t come so much from milk, it would come from the fact that we are open and we are an 
attraction…” 
 
 
The farmer was therefore discouraged from diversifying her business into the direct marketing 
of milk within local markets, for fear that such a move would conflict with her current 
contractual arrangements with Sainsbury’s. As well as stabilising the farm socio-technical 
system, this therefore served to further compound the farmer’s reliance upon Sainsbury’s, 
restricting her to supplying a single, large, buyer as opposed to negotiating with several buyers. 
9.3.1.3 A/B Pricing 
There was considerable evidence of the influence of A/B pricing on the intermediate farms 
analysed, in particular upon non-aligned farms. 
 
Farm N’s milk buyer had introduced A/B pricing in April 2015, with farmers receiving a ‘B’ 
price 5ppl less than the standard ‘A’ price for any milk delivered 5% above or below their 12-
month rolling average production, except during the months of April, May and June when the 
‘B’ price was paid only for milk above 5% of 12-month rolling average production, with the ‘B’ 
price being calculated as “the difference between the average A Litre price to our farmer 
suppliers and the net spot price obtained for milk during April, May and June” (see Appendix 
9F). 
 
The farmer explained that, to avoid being penalised for underproduction, he would probably 
increase feed per cow, rather than expand herd size: 
 
“I don't want to buy cows in … we’ve got closed herd status, and have since 1998. I wouldn't 
want to risk buying something in … so we're just going to have to take that knock … [But] if 
yields are looking low … We'd look at it financially and if it's worth feeding a bit more to get 
that, we would do that…” 
 
 
He also highlighted his relative lack of power, and complete reliance upon the processor, which 
served as an indicator of low levels of trust within this value chain: 
 
“The dairy has had a whip hand for 18 months now, which is most annoying and really we had 
to just take it … There was a so-called negotiation but as a matter of fact we didn't have any 
strength whatsoever. There was no other dairy we could have gone to. That is a weakness 
always.” 
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Farmer J, under the influence of A/B pricing, had reduced his herd size and his concentrate 
use: 
 
Our milk buyer was First Milk and … they brought in their A and B [contract] and … 90% of 
your average of your milk in any particular month [would receive the ‘A’ price] … and their A 
price is poor, and their B price is pathetic … so last year … we basically chopped out [sold] 
about 7% of our cows… and we also changed the system … to make better use of the quality 
forages we were using … So we fed more forage, less concentrates, and milked less cows … milk 
yields stayed roughly the same, but our feed rate dropped to 0.25 of a kilo of concentrates per 
litre, last year177…” 
 
 
Ultimately, the farmer had switched processor, to Wyke Farms, which also operated an A/B 
pricing scheme, albeit one that corresponds more closely with the farm’s system, allowing the 
farmer to increase the herd size back to its previous level. Whereas ‘A’ litres under the First 
Milk contract were determined to be 90% of the farmer’s production for a particular month, by 
reference to the farm’s average historic production for that particular month, the Wyke Farms 
‘A’ litres were determined to be 100% of the farmer’s daily production volumes (within a +/- 
5% tolerance), calculated as the total number of litres produced over a two-year reference 
period, divided by 730 (days) (see Appendix 9G). The contract therefore didn’t penalise the 
farm to the same extent for seasonal fluctuations in yield resulting from the farm’s Autumn-
calving model. 
 
“When you’re drifting into B milk, you are only risking a smaller proportion of your milk 
[under the Wyke contract] … So in your low milk months – because we are seasonal calving, 
we’re July, August, September, October calvers – you are never going to be in ‘B’ milk … and 
our low months tend to be the months that would have low milk prices (the Spring) … but we do 
produce more in the Autumn, and therefore our milk will go into the ‘B’ milk band in the 
Autumn, but in average years the ‘B’ milk is worth more than the ‘A’ milk at that point and so 
we will get a bonus for producing it… [with] the First Milk one … you couldn’t avoid [being 
penalised] really because they averaged it on a monthly basis, not a twelve monthly basis.” 
 
 
By contrast, Farmer D, supplying Sainsbury’s, suggested that the introduction of A/B pricing 
had given him cause to reconsider expansion, but had had limited influence on his approach:  
 
“We were looking at expanding this year, but I thought we'd put it back a year [as a result of the 
new limits on production introduced by Sainsbury’s].” 
9.3.1.4 Seasonality Payments / Penalties 
Seasonality requirements influenced intermediate farms, albeit to a lesser extent than intensive 
farms (many of which calved all year round) and those extensive farms that operated Spring 
calving approaches, which were often penalised for higher production in the Spring. Instead, 	
177 Feed rate is a measure of units of feed inputs used per unit of milk output, typically measured in kg / 
litre. In this case, 0.25kg of concentrate feed is used for each litre of milk produced. 
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intermediate farms (e.g Farm H and Farm B) often opted for Autumn calving, enabling them to 
benefit from Autumn bonuses in non-aligned contracts 
 
For example, Farm H moved from all year calving to Autumn calving to secure seasonality 
bonuses, a move that was enabled by the farm’s relatively low production volumes per cow: 
 
“It suits us financially because I get no Spring deductions on Arla’s payment programme, but I 
get the Autumn bonuses, because in the Spring I’m below my average profile production, and in 
the Autumn of course I’m above it… The cows graze grass freshly calved and I don’t find a 
problem with that. People keep saying you should only … put stale milkers on there [to graze], 
but … for their level of production, you know, seven and a half thousand litres that I’m doing, it 
pays …” 
 
 
Farmer B reported that his buyer had influenced his selection of calving pattern in a similar 
way: 
“On the Arla contract we get penalised for producing Spring milk, so we're trying to hit the 
peaks in the winter now so we can have a good high base and we won't get penalised as much in 
the Spring … One of the things is the milk buyer trying to drive us down more to the Autumn 
production milk.” 
 
There was evidence that supermarkets’ preference for level annual milk production militated 
against the use of more extensive Spring-calving approaches amongst intermediate farms. In 
the words of aligned Farmer D: 
  
“I think that an extensive system is very good. Because obviously if you've got a low unit cost 
production, you're more resilient anyway, to a low price. The downside of that is that your low 
cost of production tends to mean a really tight block of milk, generally in the Spring when it's 
less wanted. Sainsbury's wouldn't want to know you … so they're buying what they want. And 
we're providing that, albeit at a higher cost of production than producing all your milk in that 
one shorter span of time.” 
 
 
Aligned farm Farmer E had been all year calving since before the MMB was dissolved (i.e. 
before she was supplying Sainsbury’s, and suggested that “[calving pattern] is pretty much 
fully influenced by the buyer”.  
9.3.2 Product Characteristics 
9.3.2.1 Sanctions: Bonuses / Penalties for Constituents 
Similar to intensive and extensive farms, there was evidence of contracts supporting farms’ 
existing approaches to feeding cows. For example, Farmer C explained how his previous 
contract to supply Wiseman made sense as their system was set up to produce ‘white water’. 
Elsewhere, Farmer J explained that his current contract, which rewarded the production of 
constituents was encouraging changes in his feeding approach” 
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9.3.3 Production Characteristics 
Buyer demands regarding production characteristics were most notable within aligned value 
chains, in which supermarket buyers required the collection of considerable volumes of farm 
data for benchmarking purposes, in order to calculate production costs (in contracts in which 
the milk price was determined by reference to costs of production), and to monitor farm 
performance against animal welfare and environmental standards. 
 
Buyers’ efforts to influence the cost of production and welfare/environmental standards, 
respectively, are considered in greater detail in the sections below. However, at a general level, 
the enforced requirement for data collection corresponded well with some farms’ progress 
towards existing goals, and was complementary to a trend within dairy farming towards 
increased data collection and analysis (whether around grass growth, the nutritional 
composition of feed, somatic cell counts, or antibiotics use; e.g. Farmer F, Chapter 7; Farmer K, 
Chapter 8). For example, one consequence of the increased data collection requirements in 
supermarket contracts was an improvement in the ability to secure grant funding. Again, 
Farmer E explained: 
 
“We have just applied for a grant for housing … [so] we can increase [cow] numbers. We have 
got through phase one… probably … because of all the data we keep as aligned suppliers with 
Sainsbury’s. So they require us to keep a lot of data, and applying for grants is suddenly a lot 
easier because I’ve got it all there: we know our carbon footprint, we know our cost of production 
and we know our performance figures and our welfare figures and everything else.”  
9.3.3.1 The Cost of Production (and the Threat of Exclusion) 
Whereas non-aligned Farmer J had criticised aligned pools for “making an inefficient group of 
farmers” (see above, 9.3.1.2) and argued that cost of production pricing removed the incentive 
to improve efficiencies, aligned farmers, unsurprisingly, offered a different view. Many claimed 
that benchmarking and cost of production contracts had served to focus their minds upon 
seeking efficiency improvements, due to the threat of exclusion for poor performance. Farmer 
C, for example, explained how, as a result of being benchmarked against other Tesco producers, 
he was paying closer attention both upon increasing yields per cow and cutting costs: 
 
“[It’s] a combination of the two. Every Tesco supplier now … The data is aggregated, but our 
own specific data’s come back, and it’s identified variable cost … feeding, forage, vets, sundries, 
whatever [as an area of concern]. It’s identified where you sit, where the average is, where the 
top 25% average is, and the average of the bottom 25%. So you can see there, at a glance, 
whether you're in the red, green, or amber.” 
 
 
The pressure on Tesco farmers to improve their performance relative to the rest of the aligned 
pool was potentially amplified by Tesco’s 2015 review of its producer group, from which the 
supermarket concluded that it would in future serve notice upon the worst performing 5% of 
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producers, based upon a ‘balanced scorecard’ (see above 7.3.3.1). Exclusion, according to 
Farmer C, would be based on a “cumulative score” which takes into account a farm’s 
performance in terms of ‘quality’, ‘value’, ‘innovation’ and ‘service’, bearing in mind its 
performance against Tesco’s ‘livestock code of practice’178 and its carbon footprint (“which is 
directly relevant to your cost of production”), rather than being based purely on production 
costs in pence per litre. Whereas intensive systems (7.3.3.1) appeared uncertain about the 
influence of Tesco’s review upon their systems, intermediate Farmer C appeared to be more 
sensitive to these developments (albeit he was intimately involved in the Tesco pool, having sat 
on the steering group that informed its creation, and served as one of the pool’s ‘farmer 
champions’). 
 
Farmer C said that he was initially awarded his Tesco contract by ”luck … I was definitely in 
the right place at the right time.” However, he welcomed the fact that future membership of the 
group would be more selective, following the review, and the influence that such pressures 
would have on production approaches:  
 
“The hiring and firing … is the way it’s going to go forward … And as a group, we felt … that 
just because you've inherited a Tesco contract … that it [shouldn’t] give you a right to that 
privilege … You've got to earn it haven’t you? So where there’s a case that perhaps people aren’t 
investing in the farm … they're just taking the money, or they don't look after the cows as 
we’ve179 prescribed, then … you could lose your contract. They're making it more select, more 
competitive, so that the bottom 5% can be taken out… for the good of the group ... 
Competitiveness is good … it's just forcing you to use best practice, that actually is benefiting 
you.” 
 
 
Further, his belief that ‘competitiveness is good’ provided evidence of a process of collective 
stabilisation and closure of frames within aligned pools (in which supermarkets encourage 
competition between farmers), and echoed the view of intensive aligned Farmer O (7.3.3.1), 
who had argued that “if some people are prepared to put in the effort to do better, why 
shouldn’t they be rewarded?” This stood in contrast to farmers who had chosen to forgo their 
Tesco Direct contracts in favour of Arla co-operative membership (e.g. Farmer B, 9.3.3.1; Farmer 
P, 8.3.3). Indeed, Farmer B explained that the constant downward price pressure resulting from 
competition between farmers within aligned pools underpinned his decision:  
 
“Arla is always going to be there. Tesco’s, you would have thought will probably be there, but 
they will always keep the costs down as well. So they are only going to pay on a cost of 
production. [But] with Arla … hopefully if the milk prices get better we'll see the benefit of being 
with a farmer-owned company” 
 	
178 Smith et al 2012 
 
179 NB: Farmer C was a ‘farmer champion’ for Tesco 
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Farmer C added that underperforming farms within the Tesco pool would be “offered help” to 
reduce their cost of production: 
 
“If you can see your feed costs are 3 pence higher than the average or the top 25%, the writing is 
on the wall isn’t it? And they [Tesco] can see that. So they're obviously going to spend time and 
money now, through consultancy, on targeting those in the bottom 25% to say ‘either you are 
going to go, or are you going to improve?’.” 
 
 
This provided evidence of co-ordination effects resulting from “technical assistance which flows 
along the chain” and “bilateral technology transfer over time”, which Kaplinsky and Morris 
associate with ‘high trust chains’ (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.74), in which “failure to reach 
the required level of standards does not automatically result in the sanction of exclusion; 
instead executive governance is exercised to assist the transgressing party to achieve the 
required levels of performance” (ibid. p.31-32). 
 
Such support may be an indicator of high levels of trust within aligned chains, with 
underperformance resulting not in immediate exclusion, but in “executive governance [being] 
exercised to assist the transgressing party to achieve the required levels of performance” 
(Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.31-32).180 Such support could equally be regarded as a 
mechanism through which supermarkets achieved closure around technological frames. Put 
differently, supermarkets develop their meanings of problems and solutions of dairy farming 
through data gathering and benchmarking, and then feed this back to farms through extension. 
In benchmarked pools, therefore, farmers participate in this process of frame stabilisation and 
closure only to the extent that they are able to outperform other farmers in the pool (i.e. 
opportunities to influence buyers’ demands – see 7.3.3.2 – are restricted to the top-performing 
farms). 
 
‘Methods of price determination’ serve as an additional metric for assessing trust relations 
within value chains, with low trust chains being characterised by price determination that is 
“adversarial, with hiding of information” and high trust chains being characterised by price 
determination that is “non-adversarial with ‘open books’” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001 p.74). 
	
180 As an aside, the provision of extension and support by supermarket buyers was not limited to failing 
farms, as Farmer D reported: “… [Sainsbury’s] are putting out some really good stuff, they're doing 
business improvement groups so that farmers can go and learn bits and pieces … they do these business 
clubs which are really good where they get groups of farmers together for a couple of days, to talk about 
the business issues, and they're quite inspiring ... [They’re] keeping us very up-to-date on the marketplace 
as well, in terms of feed prices, which helps us decide whether we should buy forward for feed, or hold 
back, that sort of stuff … it helps to change the mindset.” 	
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Farmer E gave an indication of the transparency of the cost of production data being collected 
by Sainsbury’s:  
 
“All the data is anonymous … Sainsbury’s isn’t allowed access to any of it individually … it’s 
used through an intermediary … They gather all the data, collate it, and put it into a readable 
form, so you get your own personal data. Then we’re split into [geographical] zones … so you 
can then compare your data to that zone, all anonymously. You can also then compare your data 
to the full Sainsbury’s hub, or other zones individually. And … Sainsbury’s are now working a 
lot with Kite [Consulting], so we can now compare our data to Kite non-aligned [farmers] as 
well.” 
 
 
Although the anonymity of individual farmers was maintained within this arrangement, the 
supermarket nevertheless enjoys full disclosure of its suppliers’ collective production costs. 
Arguably, price determination within aligned value chains should not be viewed as the product 
of an interaction between a supermarket and an individual farmer (indeed, all of Sainsbury’s 
farmers receive the same base price). Instead, where prices within aligned value chains were 
determined on a cost of production basis, this should perhaps be viewed as the product of an 
interaction between a supermarket and a supplier pool as a whole, for which complete 
transparency of production costs has been provided. In the case of cost of production contracts 
within aligned value chains, therefore, it is arguable that not only are prices determined 
according to an ever-tightening standard but, moreover, the books are only open on one side of 
the negotiating table. This represented a significant information asymmetry between 
supermarkets and farmers, which many aligned farmers appeared oblivious to (or unconcerned 
by). 
 
Whereas the threat of exclusion for poor performance was increasingly visible within the Tesco 
producer group, Sainsbury’s approach to cost of production data collection and benchmarking 
was described by Farmer E as being more ‘carrot’ than ‘stick’: 
 
“[We’ve] never felt the extreme pressure putting in this data … it’s all been gently pushed along 
and, you know, [the message has been] ‘this is going to work’, and you can see the benefit … 
before you have a chance to think ‘we are being controlled’.”   
 
 
However, the farmer expected this to change in future: 
 
“I suspect [penalties] will start to come in. It’s been a very hard year for the supermarkets; 
they’ve spent millions keeping us going … [and] if you can’t keep up then you’re going to start 
becoming a problem… Because we’re all doing well, so the pool is producing more milk and 
Sainsbury’s is now buying more than it sells … and that’s not right. I don’t massively follow the 
Tesco [pool], but they monitor their farms, they invite better farms to come in, and they drop the 
bottom percent … So you do wonder, therefore, whether this might be something that other 
supermarkets would also think about, because … they need to get our costs down…” 
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In the case of Farm E, these increasing pressures and expectations were manifested in tensions 
between the buyer’s demands and the farmer’s attachment to the Shorthorn cattle farmed by 
previous generations on the farm (see 9.2, above): 
 
“[Keeping Shorthorns] has become a bit of a problem. Because they yield less, and because we are 
an aligned supplier we get rewarded for milk so we obviously want to maximise that … 
currently we’ve got 90 Shorthorns and 90 black and whites … and I need to reduce those 
Shorthorns to 45. And that is being … influenced by our aligned supply to push it down… and 
it’s probably not so much that the supermarket is encouraging us to produce more and more and 
more, but they are very closely monitoring our costs of production and we are paid on cost of 
production and they want to get that down… certain things, like the Shorthorns, a lot of our 
facilitation to change it has come from this benchmarking meeting…” 
 
 
Farmer D suggested that, although Sainsbury’s did not yet appear to be operating a policy of 
terminating the contracts of its worst-performing farmers (i.e. the threat of exclusion was less 
present), nevertheless, basing the milk price on the average cost of production of the supplier 
pool created a natural incentive for farmers to reduce their production costs: 
 
“The nature of the game on aligned contracts is to be in the top 25%, because if you're gonna 
make any money at it you need to be better than the average, don’t you?” 
 
 
Having said that, the farmer was uncertain as to whether such pressures were exclusive to 
aligned suppliers: 
 
“I don't know if that’s what drives farms to make improvements or not. I mean, you’re always 
driving efficiencies into your business because that's the nature of business… it’s what you’re 
going to do, or at least trying to.” 
 
 
Nevertheless, even if farmers were ‘going to do’ these things, regardless of buyer pressure, it 
did appear that such pressures encouraged farms to take action sooner than they might 
otherwise. Put differently, if buyer demands didn’t influence the direction of change, they at 
least influenced the rate of change. Farmer B, who had previously been a Tesco supplier (via 
Arla) but had made the decision to forgo his Tesco Direct contract in favour of Arla co-operative 
membership (see also above 8.4.2), made a similar observation regarding the difficulty of 
disaggregating the influence of buyers’ demands for efficiency improvements from broader, 
sector-level influences: 
 
“[The aligned contract] made you a bit more aware of the inputs and outputs and made it a bit 
more focused … we just tried to make the system better and just improve on it really, which 
probably would've come with the other [non-aligned contract] as well … but I think it’s just 
probably a bit sooner on Tesco. [It made us] a bit more focused on … efficiency … Probably 
the cow health is … the primary benefit first and then all the rest is just a chain 
reaction...”(emphasis added) 
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However, the farmer’s suggestion that his efforts to make such improvements came “a bit 
sooner” as a result of the Tesco contract suggests that aligned producer pools serve to accelerate 
the rate of change along established trajectories. Again, the fact that supermarkets operated 
‘waiting lists’ (see above, 9.3.1.1) provides further evidence that aligned pools resulted in 
expectation and co-ordination effects across the sector. 
 
Putting sector-level co-ordination effects to one side, farmers were divided regarding the effect 
of benchmarking within aligned pools, chiefly as to whether the practice influenced all aligned 
producers to converge upon the same model of production, through co-ordination and/or 
expectation effects within the pool. For Farmer C, benchmarking created significant pressure to 
intensify his system, which was in conflict with both the farmer’s beliefs about the ‘right’ way to 
farm (“I like to see cows at grass”) and about his preferred lifestyle and its relationship with the 
farm’s physical environment (discussed above 9.2): 
 
“I benchmark myself against these guys on the high output systems, and it makes me question 
whether our system is going to be viable ...  I sit on this [Tesco farmers] board and certainly 
three of the farmers I sit with there are pretty intensive housed units and … I don't really want 
to do it, but I’m worried that how we do it is being threatened …” 
 
 
However, Farmer C maintained that Tesco was not explicitly advocating one system or another: 
 
“I'm sure there will be some research on which system is the cheapest … [but] … I think Tesco’s 
mantle is, if it's done to prescription, and it's done well, and the animals are well cared for, 
we're not going to tell how to farm. The models they're looking at at the moment for 
benchmarking it’s not so much about benchmarking systems against systems, it's about 
benchmarking people within a system…” 
 
 
Farmer E explained the influence of her involvement with discussion groups run by 
Sainsbury’s, and had been invited to participate in “a much more rigid benchmarking group”, 
called ‘BIG’. She emphasised the variety of farms involved in the benchmarking group:  
  
“We meet as about 20 farmers, one representative from each farm, and we’re not defined by area 
or size or anything else… we meet as completely different people, [from] right the way up to the 
border of Scotland down to Cornwall… some would be [using] robots, some would be big farms, 
some would be block calving… there’s no defined structure as to who you are. So we meet on 
somebody’s farm and you do serious benchmarking, you declare all your costs, you discuss, 
you’re critically analysed, and then they also update you on the market and things.” 
 
 
The analysis shows that supermarkets that benchmarked farmers framed the problems and 
solutions of dairy farming in terms of production costs and compliance with environmental and 
welfare standards (e.g. Tesco’s ‘balanced scorecard’ approach assessed farms’ performance in 
terms of ‘quality’, ‘value’, ‘innovation’ and ‘service’; see 7.3.3.1). Although this appeared to 
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permit a variety of different farming systems to operate within aligned pools, in practice the 
competition between farms engendered by benchmarking and cost-of-production pricing (and 
the creation of expectation and co-ordination effects that this created) resulted in a narrowing of 
frames around the models of those farms with the lowest production costs. Therefore, while 
farms with low production costs participated with supermarkets in a process of collective frame 
stabilisation and closure, the participation of other farms was marginalised. 
9.3.3.2 Animal Welfare and Environmental Performance 
Aligned farmers in particular emphasised that supermarkets placed a clear emphasis on animal 
welfare and environmental performance (see 7.3.3.2). According to Farmer E: 
 
“As soon as we went with Sainsbury’s they started introducing targets for us to hit … the first 
thing that was brought in was mobility scoring … lameness in the herd was suddenly looked at 
in a very different way and you suddenly realised that once you could measure something you 
could control it a bit more … And then we started measuring other things and before you know 
it the performance of the herd becomes extremely important.” 
 
 
Performance against these metrics was viewed by supermarkets within the context of 
controlling broader production costs (9.3.3.1). According to Farmer D:  
 
“Lameness and mobility is a big thing, mastitis levels are a big thing. Overall KPIs, like your 
calving index, cost of production they are very interested in, because that’s what they’re basing 
their price on, so they want us to reduce our costs as much as we can 
 
 
The influence of supermarkets’ focus on these metrics was felt outside of aligned pools. Non-
aligned Farmer N, who was hopeful of securing an aligned contract, explained that would be 
willing and able to jump through “Whatever hoops we were given to do”.  
9.4 When Buyer Power Fails to Influence Technological Change  
This section considers examples of failures of buyer power to influence technological change 
where these illuminate the examples of successful influence discussed in section 9.3. 
9.4.1 Security of Supply: A/B pricing 
Sainsbury’s supplier Farmer E explained that the supermarket had begun to impose limits on 
volume, based on their previous production levels: 	
“They are effectively going to quota us, so we’ll only be paid for a certain amount, and then any 
milk over that will continue to go through Muller …  When originally I heard that, it put me off 
growth … because it’s basically [an] A and B price, and it [the B litres] will dilute my A price 
… but actually when you look at it a little bit more … and perhaps I got to grips with it a little 
bit more by speaking to other Sainsbury’s suppliers…  they were saying ‘well, you’re still 
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getting a good price… you’re getting a better price than anyone else, so why not push more and 
produce a bit more?’.” 
 
 
This supported the view, proposed in Chapter 7, that the sanctioning effect of supermarket-
imposed volume limits may be relatively less punitive than the sanctioning effect of A/B 
pricing within non-aligned contracts (7.3.1.3), because the ‘B’ price under an aligned contract is 
typically the processor’s standard liquid price rather than the spot market price. 
9.4.2 Production characteristics 
Farm B, who had switched from a Tesco Direct aligned contract to an Arla co-operative 
membership, suggested that benchmarking was “unfair” insofar as it compared a diverse range 
of systems against the same (cost of production) standard, regardless of the fact that some of 
these systems were constrained by their available physical resources: 
 
“I think the unfairness of the comparison is probably where the land is. Because if you’re on flat 
ground with reasonable rainfall, rather than heavy rainfall over the year, you can also graze 
your cows more which then would keep your cost of production lower. We're probably in the 
halfway middle of it and the more expensive system is probably keeping the cows indoors all year 
round… but the way they benefit is more litres, so they are producing a lot more litres at a 
smaller margin.  
 
 
Further, he queried the effect that this would have on the overall size of the pool (see further 
Observation 2, Chapter 10) and, consequently, the ability of farmers to compete within it: 
 
“The thing with Tesco, they have brought out a new thing now, that you have to be in the top 
95% of farmers… But, slowly the one [reason] where I'm more pleased to be on an Arla contract 
is [because if] every year they take 5% off… It’s always going to get smaller and smaller… from 
being a big number of farmers, if you're average now, in ten years time you might be at the 
bottom.”  
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Chapter 10: 
Discussion 
 
 
This chapter evaluates the findings detailed in Chapters 7 to 9 in order to answer the research 
question: 
In which ways, and through what mechanisms, does buyer power influence the 
reproduction of farm-level socio-technical systems for the agricultural production of 
liquid milk in the UK? 
 
  
There are two elements to this research question. The first concerns the ‘ways’ in which buyer 
power influences the reproduction of farm-level socio-technical systems, which in the context of 
this thesis involves a consideration of both the speed (i.e. rate of change within clusters) and the 
direction (i.e. movement between clusters) of change. It is notable that most farms examined in 
the study exhibited change within a single cluster over the full duration of the study, although 
some appeared to be moving between clusters (tendencies towards movement between clusters 
could often be observed, rather than actual between-cluster movement). The second element of 
the research question concerns the mechanisms through which such influence is achieved. The 
relationship between the two elements of the research question should be clear from the 
analysis in Chapters 7 to 9. Due to this relationship it is neither possible, nor desirable, to treat 
the two elements completely separately within this discussion.  
 
The following sections are partitioned into: 1) distinctions observed between different value 
chains; and 2) distinctions observed between different farm systems. These findings are 
interwoven with an assessment of:  
• The extent to which these knowledge claims are original,  
• The degree to which these claims narrowly address the research question or have more 
general application (i.e. in answering similar questions in other contexts, and therefore 
contribute to more general ‘ways of understanding’) 
• The degree to which these claims are ‘speculative’ or not (and the extent to which they, 
therefore, imply areas for further research). 
10.1 Distinctions Between Value Chains 
While the direction of socio-technical system reproduction as a whole was towards greater 
intensification of production across the research period (farms that were ‘intensive’ at the outset 
intensified [e.g. Farms F, I, M, O; 7.1], some extensive farms extensified [Farm P, 8.1], while 
intermediate farms more frequently tended towards intensification than towards 
		
	
191	
extensification; e.g. Farms E and C, 9.1), the analysis clearly demonstrated that this pattern was 
not due to incremental technological improvements alone. Instead, buyer demands had 
influenced both the rate and the direction of change, where such demands were supported by 
strong sanctions and high levels of trust. In particular, these characteristics were more typical of 
aligned than non-aligned value chains (7.3, 8.3, 9.3).  
 
Buyer influence was therefore most readily observable within aligned chains. However, it was 
also apparent that farmers within aligned value chains were more likely to influence – as well 
as to be influenced by – buyer demands. Moreover, and significantly, the influence of 
supermarket demands was also felt within non-aligned value chains (e.g. Farm O, 7.3.3.1, Farm 
N, 9.3.1.1, albeit such influence was not uniform across aligned and non-aligned chains). 
 
Specifically, the following observations can be distinguished between farms within different 
value chains, regardless of system type: 
 
OBSERVATION 1: Aligned value chains were characterised by stronger sanctions (in the form 
of high, stable base prices and the power to exclude) and higher levels of trust between value 
chain participants, when compared with non-aligned value chains. As a result of these 
conditions, farmers supplying supermarkets were more likely to be influenced by buyers’ 
demands than non-aligned farmers and, moreover, supermarkets were able to influence non-
aligned farmers. 
 
Supermarkets’ ability to influence farmers therefore depended upon the presence of non-
aligned value chains containing weaker sanctions and lower levels of trust, and buyers’ ability 
to influence farmers was not only a product of their greater power relative to farmers but also 
of the degree of price variation and the diversity of contractual arrangements available in the 
market (see 7.3.1.1, 8.3.1.1, 9.3.1.2).  
 
This finding provides a meaningful contribution to our understanding of the “divided market 
between the ‘haves’ supplying liquid milk to the supermarkets and the ‘have-nots’ that supply 
processed products into commodity markets” (House of Commons 2011, p.14). It presents 
strong evidence not only of the “equity divide” between aligned and non-aligned value chains 
(i.e. that farmers within each value chain receive widely varying prices for a broadly similar 
product; Dewick and Foster 2007, p.33), but also that this system of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ 
influences producers’ technological approaches across the sector. In particular, non-aligned 
farmers sought to emulate the approaches taken by aligned farmers, in the hope of securing an 
aligned contract (Farm O, 7.3.3.1, Farm N, 9.3.1.1). Taken alongside the findings discussed 
below (Observations 2 to 4), this serves to drive homogenisation at the sector level.  
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Similarly, the analysis demonstrates that the strength of sanctions was not only a function of a 
buyer’s power relative to farmers, but was also a result of their power relative to other market 
participants, including other buyers. For example, the extent of a buyer’s ‘power to exclude’ 
depended upon the availability of alternative buyers (i.e. the physical location of farms) as well 
the prices paid by those other buyers. The power to exclude was greater within aligned value 
chains due not only to the higher, more stable prices paid by supermarkets (e.g. see Section 
7.3.3.1, Farmer O), and the relative scarcity of supermarket contracts181 compared with non-
aligned contracts, but was also a result of supermarkets’ greater market power relative to other 
buyers. This greater market power was expressed, in particular, through supermarkets’ practice 
of re-tendering processing contracts for aligned pools (in the words of Farmer E, “they have 
played the processors off against one another”; 9.3.1.1). This situation resulted in farmers 
relinquishing control over who processed their milk.  
 
This study focused upon relationships between buyers and farmers, meaning that relations 
between other participants in the value chain were largely outside of its scope. However, this 
finding strongly suggests that a deeper analysis of interactions and power dynamics between 
supermarkets and processors (who serve as ‘contract processors’ – or intermediaries between 
supermarkets and farmers – within aligned chains) and between large and small processors182, 
and in particular of conditions of trust within the wider value chain, may provide fruitful 
avenues for further research, given that processors operate across both types of value chain (see 
10.3). Notably, such research may further illuminate the ways in which the power of processors 
varies between aligned and non-aligned value chains, and may reveal impacts of this upon 
farmers, such as, for example, the potential for processors to pass costs associated with aligned 
contracts on to their non-aligned suppliers. 
 
At a more general level, the finding that farmers were influenced by buyer demands broadly 
supports Hayami and Ruttan’s extension to the induced innovation hypothesis, namely their 
view that technological change in agriculture results from variations in both the “conditions of 
factor supply” and “product demand” (Hayami and Ruttan 1985, p.73; see Chapter 3).183 
However, the induced innovation model predicts that firms innovate in response to price 	
181 “Because of the structure of the milk supply sector, only about 3% of milk producers are direct 
suppliers to retailers” (House of Commons 2015, p.15) 
 
182 e.g. Within non-aligned value chains, consolidation in the processor market, in combination with the 
practice of discretionary pricing, meant that powerful processors were able to both influence milk prices at 
the sector level, and to attract and retain farmers who were concerned about the relative insecurity of 
smaller processors’ contracts (see, e.g. 9.3.1.2). 
 
183 Albeit the influence of such prices was “within the boundaries defined by the nature of technological 
paradigms” (Dosi 1988, p.226-7; see further below, 10.3). 
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changes, notably increased input costs or reduced product prices. Whereas induced innovation 
theory therefore implies that high product prices reduce firms’ incentive to innovate, the 
findings indicated that aligned farmers – receiving the highest, most stable prices – innovated 
as much as, if not more than, non-aligned farms, which, due to expectation and co-ordination 
effects, often followed the example of aligned farms. 
 
Moreover, although Hayami and Ruttan argued that “a fully developed general equilibrium 
theory of induced innovation … should incorporate the mechanisms by which changes in both 
product demand and factor endowments interact with each other” (ibid. p.85), the findings 
strongly suggest that any consideration of these interactions should involve a more 
comprehensive account of: 
(a) The significant heterogeneity within both “conditions of factor supply” (i.e. ‘resources’) 
and “product demand” (i.e. not only demand for increases or decreases in volume, 
expressed through milk prices – which exhibit considerable diversity and volatility184 – 
but also other buyer demands, such as those relating to product or production 
standards) across the sector185; and  
(b) The observation that – as a result of this apparent lack of uniformity in product 
demand, manifested in high levels of price variation – market-leading prices exert both 
a direct influence (on farms currently receiving such prices) and an indirect influence 
(on farms that aspire to receive such prices in the future). Moreover, future research 
might examine whether the extent of such influences is related to the degree of price 
variation within markets (i.e. whether the influence of buyers offering higher prices 
increases as the difference between the highest and lowest prices available increases).   
 
When developing their theory, Hayami and Ruttan considered “increases in population or per 
capita income resulting in increased demand for food” (ibid. p.85) as an example of “product 
demand”, and appeared to assume that this pattern acts uniformly across the agricultural sector 
at any given time. Such an assumption overlooks the differences in patterns of demand that this 
study clearly identified occurring at the subsector level, related to different buyers’ ‘balancing 
strategies’, end markets and so forth (see Chapter 5). 
 
	
184 NB: Hayami and Ruttan focus on long term “secular” trends, such as the changes in production and 
demand witnessed within the agricultural revolution in England between the 15th and 19th centuries 
(Hayami and Ruttan 1985. p.97), rather than the influence of shorter term price / demand volatility upon 
technological selection. 
 
185 With variations in the latter potentially resulting from downstream factors (e.g. differences buyers’ 
ultimate end-markets; consumers in the case of supermarkets and retailers, food services, global 
commodity markets etc in the case of processors), see areas for further research (Observation 2). 
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Further, Hayami and Ruttan “… hypothesize[d] that technical change is guided along an 
efficient path by price signals in the market, provided that the prices efficiently reflect changes 
in the demand and supply of products and factors…” (ibid. p.88). This study demonstrates that 
the assumption that “… prices efficiently reflect changes in demand…” is problematic. Within 
the dairy sector, the prices received by farmers on non-aligned contracts, supplying milk 
destined for liquid markets, may be influenced by changes in demand within other markets 
(e.g. markets for commodities such as skimmed milk powder [SMP], butter and cream etc) and 
therefore may be influenced as much by the processor’s exposure to such markets as by 
fluctuations in demand for liquid milk (see Chapter 5). 
 
Moreover, within aligned value chains that operate a cost of production pricing model, milk 
prices are effectively ‘decoupled’ from demand, i.e. prices will reduce based upon reductions in 
the average production costs of producers within the pool, rather than solely as a reflection of 
reduced demand. Where such buyers engage in the practice of benchmarking farmers on the 
basis of production costs, eliminating the worst-performing farms in the process (see 7.3.3.1), 
prices will exhibit, over the longer term, a steady downward trend, regardless of levels of 
product demand. 
 
Both the processors’ capacity for discretionary pricing, and the supermarkets’ ability to 
‘decouple’ price from short-run changes in levels of demand, are indicators of the unequal 
distribution of power between farmers and buyers that exists within the value chain for liquid 
milk (i.e. farmers are ‘price takers’ and buyers ‘price setters’), which this study demonstrates 
has a significant impact upon farms’ selected production approaches, and which may be 
overlooked by an induced innovation perspective, which assumes that ‘prices efficiently reflect 
changes in demand’. 
 
In summary, the findings of this study call into question the suitability of applying a sector-
level analysis to understanding technological change within a sector such as dairy farming, in 
which there is a considerable variation in the power of actors and market prices, and in which 
‘product demand’ may vary along a range of dimensions (price, volume, seasonality, product 
quality, etc). Instead, a farm-level approach – as adopted within this study – can more 
effectively capture and explain the different approaches taken by different farms. 
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OBSERVATION 2: The high, stable base prices paid by supermarkets resulted in investment 
effects at the farm level, which stabilised the direction of farm reproduction and / or 
accelerated the rate of change. Because high, stable prices enabled farm expansion, aligned 
producer pools tended towards consolidation and overproduction over the longer term in the 
absence of effective limits on production.  
  
Supermarkets clearly paid the highest, most stable milk prices, which encouraged aligned farms 
to increase milk production and allowed them to plan, invest and expand, resulting in 
investment effects at the farm level (see 7.3.1.1, 8.3.1.1, 9.3.1.2). This increased the rate of aligned 
farms’ progress towards established goals and/or inhibited future changes of direction in socio-
technical systems at the farm level (e.g. Farm F, Chapter 7; Farm E, Chapter 9).  
 
Further, the sanctioning effect of supermarket-imposed volume limits was less punitive (and 
less effective) than the sanctioning effect of A/B pricing within non-aligned value chains, due to 
the degree of price variation within the market, as a result of which, supermarkets’ ‘B’ prices 
remained high relative to broader market prices (see 7.3.1.3; 9.3.1.3).186 This, in combination 
with the investment effects described above, implies that aligned pools – ceteris paribus – tend 
towards overproduction over the long term, relative to supermarkets’ levels of demand.  
 
This finding calls into question the long-term sustainability of aligned pools (as currently 
constituted) and supermarkets may be expected to introduce changes in response to this. 
Tesco’s practice of terminating the contracts of its least efficient farmers (albeit while awarding 
additional volume allowances to the most efficient farmers) might be viewed as one method of 
mitigating the risk of overproduction, although it may also contribute towards (or accelerate) a 
trend towards consolidation within the pool (i.e. result in fewer, larger farms over the longer 
term). 
 
Within smaller aligned value chains (i.e. Waitrose and Marks & Spencer) consolidation 
resulting from the effects of high, stable pricing was already in evidence, with expansion in 
individual farm sizes accompanying a reduction in farm numbers over time (see Chapter 10). 
Likewise, the Sainsbury’s producer pool had also reduced in producer numbers over the study 
period (attributed to “natural shedding”, i.e. retirements), at the same time as overall milk 
volumes had increased (Farmer E claimed that “Sainsbury’s is now buying more than it sells”), 
indicating a similar tendency towards consolidation, farm expansion, and overproduction (see 
Chapter 9).  
 	
186 Although if price variation in the market were to reduce, for example due to reductions in aligned 
prices because cost of production pricing results, over the longer term, in a steady reduction in prices over 
time (see above), then one might assume that supermarket A/B pricing might become a more effective 
means of controlling volumes 	
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Although the Tesco pool provided an exception to this pattern (expanding from 600 to 750 
farmers during the study period187) this can be attributed to a policy change implemented by 
Tesco after a review of its producer pool in 2015, following which the supermarket resolved to 
source all of its milk from within the pool (whereas it had previously procured milk from 
outside of the pool in order to meet temporary seasonal shortfalls188). Farmer O, who had 
operated as one of these ’seasonal’ farmers prior to being awarded a ‘full’ Tesco contract, 
explained: “When we were on the seasonal [contract] we weren’t audited by Tesco… they just 
used our milk … now what they want is that all their milk comes from full Tesco farms. So … 
now … they’ve got enough farms that will match their highest [level of] demand”.  
 
Tesco’s desire for increased control over – and transparency regarding the sourcing of produce 
within – its value chain is most likely related to a perceived consumer demand for improved 
product traceability, following the 2013 ‘horsemeat scandal’189, which prompted a pledge from 
the supermarket to “work harder than ever with all our suppliers”.190 The influence of end 
consumers within value chains for liquid milk is therefore a significant area for further research 
(see further, below). Although this policy change meant, in the short term, an expansion in 
producer numbers, one would expect that the accompanying policy of excluding the worst 
performers will, over the longer term, reduce overall producer numbers. Indeed, there was clear 
evidence that individual Tesco producers had expanded output as a result of high, stable milk 
prices (e.g. Farm F, 7.3.1.1; Farm C, 9.3.1.2) and it was also clear that intermediate farmers in 
particular were feeling pressure to emulate the larger, higher output intensive farms within the 
pool (e.g. Farm C, 9.3.3.1; see also Observation 4). The tendency towards consolidation and 
overproduction within the Tesco pool was therefore also clearly evident. 
 
Finally, the fact that Tesco is aiming to source all of its milk from within its supplier pool, 
suggests that there will be heightened pressure on Tesco farmers to produce level year round 
production in the future, to ensure that Tesco avoids over- and under-supply. This implies a 
homogenisation within the Tesco producer pool as farmers switch to all year calving (which 
may serve as a ‘gateway’ to further intensification involving, as it does, longer periods of 
housing and lower levels of grazing compared with Spring calving systems, for example).    	
187	https://www.thegrocer.co.uk/buying-and-supplying/categories/dairy/tesco-wants-to-add-150-more-
farmers-to-sustainable-dairy-group/525320.article			
188 Personal communications with NFU (10/2/14) and DairyCo (2/12/14) representatives suggested that, 
historically, it had been common practice for supermarkets to recruit farms on a temporary basis in order 
to ‘balance’ shortfalls in production 
 
189 https://www.fsai.ie/uploadedFiles/Enforcement_and_Audit/Horse_Meat/Equine-DNA-DAFM-
March-2013.pdf  	
190 https://www.tescoplc.com/news/news-releases/2013/an-apology-from-tesco/ 
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A related effect of high, stable supermarket base prices – and the superiority of these relative to 
other prices available in the market – was that they compounded farmers’ reliance on 
supermarkets, through enhancing the supermarkets’ power to exclude (5.2.6; 7.3.3.1; 9.3.1.1). 
The influence of this upon the reproduction of socio-technical systems was that farmers in 
aligned pools would readily ‘jump through hoops’ (i.e. comply with buyer demands) for fear of 
losing their contracts and, moreover, farmers appeared reluctant to pursue alternative paths of 
development that might conflict with their current contracts (both of these contributing to a 
tendency towards homogenisation in these pools, outlined further below; Observation 4). 
Notably, Farmer E was discouraged from diversifying her business into the direct marketing of 
milk within local markets, for fear that such a move would conflict with her current contractual 
arrangements with Sainsbury’s. As well as stabilising the farm socio-technical system, this 
therefore served to further compound the farmer’s reliance upon Sainsbury’s, restricting her to 
supplying a single, large, buyer as opposed to negotiating with several buyers. 
 
At a high level, this finding serves to support, and offer further insight into, the 
interrelationship between the different dimensions of value chain governance expounded by 
Kaplinsky and Morris; in this case, ‘sanctions’ (expressed through milk prices and the power to 
exclude) and ‘trust’ (indicated by ‘reliance’). However, this finding also offers a contribution 
towards a more fine-grained understanding of the diversity – and dynamics – of reliance within 
different value chains for liquid milk, and highlights areas for further research.  
 
‘Reliance’ is widely interpreted as an indicator of trust within a value chain (see 3.6.3, and 5.2.6). 
Broadly, where buyers rely upon a small number of suppliers to meet their needs, and suppliers 
rely upon a small number of buyers, this indicates ‘high’ levels of trust. Where the opposite 
conditions apply, trust is regarded as being ‘low’ (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, p.74). However, a 
strong asymmetry was apparent in conditions of reliance within value chains for liquid milk. 
Dairy farmers, as a rule, are heavily reliant upon buyers, generally having a single buyer for 
their milk; this was true of all of the farms within the study. By contrast, buyers are typically 
supplied by dozens, if not hundreds, of farmers and their reliance upon individual farmers is 
correspondingly low. Further, one implication of these considerations regarding consolidation 
within aligned pools is that conditions of reliance (and, therefore, ‘trust’) differ between large 
aligned, small aligned, and non-aligned value chains, and the issue of reliance on both sides of the 
buyer-supplier relationship merits closer examination, presenting an avenue for further research.  
 
The findings of this study imply that farmers’ reliance upon current buyers is a function not 
only of the number of buyers that the farmer currently supplies (i.e. typically, ‘one’) and the 
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proportion of the farm’s milk that each of these buyers receives (i.e. typically ‘100%’), but that a 
more nuanced understanding of reliance can be obtained by considering the availability of 
alternative buyers, the prices paid by those buyers, and their wider contractual terms (see, e.g., 
Farmer I, 7.4.3; Farmer N, 9.3.1.1). The study found numerous examples of the influence of 
variations in milk prices and contractual terms upon farmer decision-making, and, broadly, 
farmers in non-aligned chains (characterised by low, discretionary milk prices) were much 
more willing, and able, to switch buyer (within the limits of geographical location) (cf. Farm M, 
7.4 and Farm K, 8.3).  
 
On the other side of the equation, buyers’ reliance on farmers will vary depending upon the 
proportion of the buyer’s total milk requirements that a particular farm supplies, and the 
buyer’s ability to cover any shortfall resulting from that farmer exiting the pool. This shortfall 
may be covered either by the remaining farms within the pool (depending on the number of 
farms remaining and their individual capacities for expansion); by recruiting new farms from 
outside the pool (depending on the availability of alternative farms with a proven record of 
supplying milk in the volumes and to the specifications required); or by purchasing milk from 
the spot market (which may be the cheapest and/or most straightforward option).  
 
On the face of it, consolidation within aligned pools suggests that – ceteris paribus –(particularly 
smaller) supermarkets’ reliance on farmers is greater than (particularly larger) processors’ 
reliance on farmers (as pools consolidate into fewer, larger farms, those farms represent a larger 
proportion of the buyer’s overall milk needs). Looking closer, the findings suggest that there 
may be further distinctions between aligned and non-aligned value chains, related to buyers’ 
‘balancing’ strategies (i.e. how they manage underproduction and oversupply). Broadly, 
processors might be expected to have greater flexibility with regards to managing shortfalls and 
surpluses than supermarkets (and therefore have lower reliance on individual farmers), for the 
following reasons: 
• Pledges for increased transparency within aligned value chains (exemplified by Tesco’s 
change of policy to require that “all their milk comes from full Tesco farms”) appear to 
have brought the challenge of recruiting replacement farmers into sharper focus for 
supermarkets, which may be less readily able than processors to simply purchase milk 
from the spot market in order to cover shortfalls. Having said that, the broader 
homogenisation within the sector (e.g. due to expectation and co-ordination effects 
originating from aligned value chains, discussed more fully below; Observation 4) 
tends to diminish the scale of this challenge (i.e. as the production sector becomes 
increasingly homogenous, it becomes easier to replace exiting farms).  
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• The large processors, in particular, own191 (rather than lease) processing facilities, 
permitting them greater flexibility and control regarding the management of surpluses, 
compared with smaller processors or supermarkets (which lease processing facilities or 
subcontract the processing function, and which therefore have greater economic and/or 
logistical barriers to the ad hoc use of such facilities).  
• Whereas the supermarket aligned pools considered within the study were restricted to 
liquid milk for drinking, processors often supplied a broader range of end markets192 
(SMP, whey powder, etc), therefore enjoying more direct access to those markets for the 
disposal of surpluses. 
 
A full exploration of the above dynamics was beyond the scope of this study, which did not 
gather or analyse sufficient data fully to assess buyers’ reliance on individual farmers. Similarly, 
the study did not consider in depth the effects (if any) that supermarkets’ investments in 
aligned pools (i.e. investment effects associated with research and extension, see Observation 3) 
had upon supermarkets’ reliance on farmers. 
 
However, the findings do provide considerable preliminary evidence to suggest that smaller 
supermarkets are more reliant upon individual farmers compared with other milk buyers, 
warranting further research. Such reliance was demonstrated, for example, by the clear 
willingness of Waitrose – which is supplied by approximately 50 farms193 – to co-operate, 
collaborate and negotiate with its farmers, over long time periods. Notably, Farmer K described 
his nine-year process of negotiation with Waitrose, regarding the supermarket’s demand for 
level year round production, which culminated in the supermarket conceding and inviting the 
farmer to take part in a trial for seasonal production (8.3.1.1).  
 
Further, while the purpose of this discussion is not to suggest that there is parity between 
buyers’ reliance on farmers and farmers’ reliance on buyers, nevertheless, it does imply that 
subtle shifts in the power dynamics between supermarket buyers and farmers may accrue as 
aligned pools mature. It also identifies a clear categorical distinction between farmer-
supermarket and farmer-processor relationships. One potential hypothesis for future testing is 
	
191 For example, Arla owns the “world’s largest fresh milk dairy” 
https://www.arlafoods.co.uk/overview/news--press/2014/pressrelease/world-s-largest-fresh-milk-
dairy-is-officially-opened-by-secretary-of-state-1001612/  
 
192 See Figure 5a. Also see DairyCo 2013b, p.14 
 
193 
https://www.waitrose.com/home/inspiration/about_waitrose/about_our_food/waitrose_dairy/dairy-
farming.html; accessed 14/10/18 
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that consolidation within aligned producer pools increases buyer reliance upon farmers, which 
may reduce the threat of exclusion and increase the co-operation between buyers and suppliers.  
 
One might also hypothesise that it would be against buyers’ interests to promote excessive 
consolidation (and the expansion of individual producers194) within supplier pools, as 
ultimately this trend may increase buyers’ reliance upon farmers, resulting in greater parity in 
bargaining power between producers and buyers. This points, therefore, to an inherent tension 
within the aligned-segregated pool model, which may ultimately be unsustainable from the 
supermarket’s perspective as it tends towards an ever-smaller number of increasingly-large 
producers. Supermarkets appeared to be alert to these trends and risks.  
 
Finally, the sustainability of these pools is further called into question by evidence of the 
financial cost to supermarkets of operating them. In 2016, Tesco claimed that it had paid £240m 
over market prices to farmers in its supplier pool, in the nine years that it had been operating its 
Tesco Sustainable Dairy Group (TSDG).195 Within an increasingly competitive retail 
environment, the continued viability of large aligned pools (as currently constituted) may 
depend upon the value they present to supermarkets in terms of ‘public relations’ (PR; see, e.g. 
Farmer N; 9.3.1.2). The fact that supermarkets had begun to exclude the least efficient farms 
from their supplier pools suggests that changes to the aligned / cost of production model were 
well underway, and that the cost of operating aligned pools was beginning to exceed their ‘PR’ 
value. As Farmer E suggested, Sainsbury’s had “… spent millions keeping us going, so I’m sure 
now it’s going to get to a point where there will be penalties”. 
 
As suggested above, this discussion highlights an important area for further research, namely, 
the need to develop a more complete picture of downstream influences (i.e. from end 
consumers) upon supermarkets and, ultimately, on how these affect supermarkets’ demands, 
farmers’ decision making, and the longer-term sustainability of aligned, segregated pools. 
Indeed, Tesco’s change to its ‘balancing’ policy (towards satisfying its “highest level” of 
demand from milk produced within the aligned pool) provided evidence of a clear connection 
between consumer demands for traceability, supermarkets’ demands for level production, and 
farmers’ production approaches. Consumer pressure for traceability creates risk for 
	
194 For example, a farm the size of the proposed ‘Nocton Dairies’ (see 2.3.2), with 8,100 high yielding cows, 
might be expected to produce 80 million litres of milk per annum, or 10 million more than the annual 
output of Marks & Spencer’s entire milk pool, and 80% of the annual production of the entire Waitrose 
pool (DairyCo, 2012d, p.6) 
 
195 https://www.dairyreporter.com/Article/2016/07/04/Tesco-unveils-Fair-For-Farmers-Guarantee-on-
milk  
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supermarkets as it limits their options for balancing. Supermarkets currently transfer this risk to 
their farmers through demands for level supply.  
 
Although the analytical framework did not permit a close consideration of downstream (end 
consumer) influences on buyer demands, the findings did strongly suggest that downstream 
consumers and upstream producers might have influenced buyers’ demands to differing 
degrees within aligned and non-aligned value chains. For example, the influence of end 
consumers appeared to be pronounced within aligned value chains, particularly around the 
issues of the ‘fair’ treatment of farmers (i.e. milk prices) and animal welfare (i.e. production 
standards; see Farmer F, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3.3.2; Farmer E, 9.3.3; Farmer N, 9.2). Moreover, in some 
cases supermarkets’ demands appeared to be potentially inconsistent with each other, 
ostensibly as a result of their attempts to satisfy a diversity of conflicting end consumer 
requirements. For example, Waitrose was demanding a level production profile from its 
farmers, while simultaneously demanding a minimum period of annual grazing (100 days; see 
Chapter 8).  
 
A deeper consideration of the influence of end-consumer demands might therefore enrich our 
understanding of the process by which ‘frames’ are stabilised within value chains for liquid 
milk (see below, Observation 3). 
 
Moreover, a focus upon the role of end consumers highlights the necessity for further research 
into the potentially contradictory effects of aligned pools upon the ability of producers to 
capture returns. Broadly, producers of commodities capture a small share of the value from the 
sale of products due to “the relatively undifferentiated nature of final product markets” 
(Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004 p.7). On the one hand, consumer influence within the UK milk 
market may contribute towards a ‘de-commodification’ (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004) of liquid 
milk (in the limited sense that the development of aligned supermarket pools – ostensibly in 
response to consumer demands for improved traceability, animal welfare standards, or the ‘fair’ 
treatment of farmers – may be regarded as introducing greater product differentiation into the 
liquid milk market). On the other hand, the homogenisation of production (see Observation 4) 
associated with aligned pools tends to militate against this, resulting in a less-differentiated 
production sector. 
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OBSERVATION 3: The higher levels of trust within aligned value chains, compared with non-
aligned value chains, resulted in (and from) the existence of longer, potentially more 
collaborative relationships between buyers and farmers. Such relationships provided some 
evidence of shared or mutually negotiated ‘frames’ that underpinned both buyers’ demands and 
farmers’ decision making. Farmers within aligned value chains were more likely to be 
influenced by buyers’ demands, but also had some potential to influence those demands. 
 
The study showed clearly that the higher, more stable prices (i.e. positive sanctions) paid by 
supermarkets presented a powerful incentive for farmers to secure, and retain, aligned 
contracts, in particular given the degree of price variation in the market (Observation 1). 
Farmers’ efforts to retain aligned contracts therefore resulted typically in longer relationships 
between farmers and supermarkets (e.g. Farms E, F, C, K). The analysis also suggested that 
these long relationships both resulted in (and from) stronger conditions of trust within aligned 
value chains. The tendency towards consolidation within these value chains over time 
suggested that participants’ reliance upon each other would also increase over time 
(Observation 2). Further, the analysis revealed that non-aligned farmers were often willing to 
switch buyers with relatively higher frequency than aligned farmers (Farm M, J), and attributed 
this, by contrast, to weaker sanctions (low, volatile prices) and lower levels of trust. 
 
A closer consideration of the findings also highlights not only distinctions between conditions 
of trust in aligned and non-aligned value chains, but also distinctions between the value chains 
of large and small supermarkets (see, e.g., 9.3.1.1).  
 
For the purposes of this study, ‘trust’ refers to participants’ confidence in the continuity, 
reliability and predictability of the operation of the value chain (see 5.2.6). Trust is enhanced 
(diminished) by conditions that support (threaten) such continuity, reliability or predictability. 
The study found evidence of higher trust conditions in aligned value chains, with farmers 
reporting that high, stable (i.e. predictable) prices had given them confidence in the continuity 
of the governance conditions in the chain, enabling them to invest in their businesses (7.3.1.1, 
8.3.1.1, 9.3.1.2). By contrast, non-aligned Farms I (7.4.3), M (7.4.1) and N (9.3.1.3) complained of 
the volatile or low milk prices they received, and the obstacles this presented to investment in 
their businesses. It was, further, notable that buyers valued continuity (see Farmers D and E; 
9.3.1.2). 
 
The study also revealed evidence of the influence of such trust conditions upon (and their 
interaction with) farmers’ ‘mindsets’, in particular with regard to their perspectives concerning 
the ‘fairness’ of the rules governing the operation of the value chain. Non-aligned farmers 
complained, for example, of the lack of transparency regarding the frequency with which, or 
methods by which, milk prices were calculated, whereas aligned farmers spoke of the ‘fairness’ 
of cost of production pricing.  
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It was therefore clear that the process of price determination enhanced conditions of trust within 
value chains for liquid milk. Within the value chains of larger supermarkets, cost of production 
pricing provided both confidence in the continuity or predictability of the milk price, as well as 
influencing farmers’ mindsets regarding such price mechanisms (i.e. as the pricing was 
transparent and made by reference to a formula, as opposed to being discretionary, and it 
therefore protected farmers from wider market forces; see Farmer C, 9.3.1.2). This was in spite 
of the information asymmetries inherent in this method of price determination, and the fact that 
cost of production-based prices may inevitably decline over time through the exclusion of the 
worst-performing farms (see 9.3.3.1). Indeed, it is notable that, in spite of these tendencies, 
aligned farmers described the cost of production pricing mechanism as ‘fair’ (Farmer F, 7.3.3.1; 
Farmer D, 9.3.1.2).  
 
Once again, it seems likely that these farmers’ views were also influenced by the degree of price 
variation within the market, and by the fact that the prices paid under cost of production 
contracts were considerably higher than either spot market prices or non-aligned prices 
(indeed, all the aligned farmers expressed sympathy with farmers receiving prices that were 
below the cost of production). It is therefore conceivable that – if price variability was lower, 
and/or if aligned farmers were receiving the same, or less, than non-aligned farmers – their 
views regarding the ‘fairness’ of cost of production pricing might have differed. It should also 
be noted that the study did not include any farmers that were operating towards the ‘bottom’ of 
aligned pools in terms of efficiency (i.e. for whom exclusion from the pool therefore presented a 
more imminent threat, and who might have offered a different view regarding the ‘fairness’ of 
cost of production pricing), or farmers that had been excluded from such pools.  
 
Within smaller aligned producer pools, trust derived to a greater degree from informal, 
interpersonal relationships between farmers and those individuals responsible for determining 
prices, which provided continuity, reliability and predictability by virtue of their long duration 
(see 8.3.1.1). Trust in these value chains could also be explained as resulting from buyers’ 
increased reliance upon farmers due to consolidation in these pools (see above, Observation 2). 
The potential for farmers to influence buyers’ demands appeared to be more pronounced 
within these value chains. Future research might test the hypothesis that there is a correlation 
between the diminishing size of producer pools and increasing levels of trust within them.  
 
By contrast, non-aligned farmers’ mindsets often revealed a different perspective on the 
‘fairness’ of the milk value chain broadly, and of their own contractual arrangements 
specifically. In the case of Farm N, for example, the lack of communication or engagement 
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regarding changes to the composition of, or ‘rules’ governing, the value chain, exemplified the 
low conditions of trust within the value chain (e.g. Farm N, 9.3.1.3). More broadly, non-aligned 
farmers expressed ‘frustration’ with the low prices they received (7.4.3). 
 
The finding that different levels of trust and sanctions existed between participants within 
aligned and non-aligned value chains (and the effects of these) provides an original 
contribution to the social construction of technology (SCOT) and path constitution literatures, 
as explained below. 
  
The analytical framework used in this study compared system inputs and outputs (which 
served as a proxy for ‘progress towards goals’) against buyer demands (which served as a 
proxy for ‘buyer goals’; see Chapter 4). Different degrees of ‘correspondence’ between farms’ 
progress and buyer goals were observed, with correspondence tending to differ by system type 
(see further, Observation 5). These different degrees of correspondence provided a description of 
the outcomes of the inherently contested process of system reproduction. However, the different 
sanctions and different levels of trust observed within different value chains provided an 
explanation and illumination of the different conditions under which this contested process was 
conducted within aligned and non-aligned chains (i.e. sanctions and trust provided the 
mechanisms through which buyers “… strive for closure by convincing and committing 
relevant others to their perspective… ”; Meyer and Schubert 2007 p.35). 
 
Put differently, the different conditions under which the ‘relevant’ problems of technological 
progress were defined – or within which ‘meanings’ or ‘frames’ were attributed to technologies 
by different ‘social groups’ through a process of ‘collective stabilisation and closure’ – can be 
partly explained by reference to the different degrees of trust that existed between parties 
within aligned and non-aligned value chains and the different sanctions enforced within them 
(Dosi 1982, p.148; Pinch and Bijker 1987, p.23; Meyer and Schubert 2007, p.35). Stronger positive 
sanctions resulted in longer relationships, which contributed towards conditions of higher trust.  
 
Notably, conditions of higher trust presented more numerous opportunities for communication 
and collaboration between buyers and farmers. As reliance between buyers and farmers 
increased over time – due to these longer relationships and due to consolidation within aligned 
pools – so did the opportunities for bilateral communication and collaboration. As a result, the 
definition of relevant problems – and of the meanings associated with technologies – more 
closely resembled a process of ‘mutual negotiation’ or collective stabilisation (see also 
Observation 4) between buyers and farmers within aligned value chains, when compared with 
non-aligned chains. However, it should be noted that the outcomes of such mutual negotiation 
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were increasingly constrained over time and, moreover, where benchmarking was used, 
participation within such negotiations was restricted to the best performing farms (see further 
below, 10.2). Therefore, conditions of higher trust provided a small and diminishing number of 
farmers greater influence over the direction of development of the farm, towards a narrowing 
range of outcomes. Only those farmers at the top of benchmarked pools are able to exert 
influence, over a diminishing range of alternatives.  
 
High trust conditions were exemplified by the ‘study tours’ facilitated by Waitrose for its 
farmers. Farmer K recalled one such tour, to Canada: “We went to various really high 
producing herds … I can vividly remember looking at these big Canadian Holstein cows … and 
one of the Waitrose people said ‘What do you think of these cows?’ and I said ‘Well, as far as 
I’m concerned, they are horrible!’… And the reply was: ‘I completely agree. That isn’t what we 
want our farmers to be using’… It just showed me that we were heading in the same direction 
as Waitrose.”  
 
The practice of benchmarking also reinforced such collaboration, providing a framework within 
which buyers’ demands both influenced – and were influenced by – farmers’ production 
approaches (i.e. because examples of ‘best practice’ that buyers hoped to spread across 
producer pools were developed by the best performing farms; see Observation 4). This resulted 
in conditions in which ‘meanings’ attributed to technologies were more likely to be developed 
through a process of collaboration between farmers and supermarkets, albeit the competition 
between farms engendered by benchmarking and cost-of-production pricing (and the creation 
of expectation and co-ordination effects that this created) resulted in a narrowing of frames 
around the models of those farms with the lowest production costs, meaning that, although the 
best performing farms (i.e. those with lower production costs) participated with supermarkets 
in a process of collective frame stabilisation and closure, the participation of other farms was 
marginalised (9.3.3.1; see further Observation 4, below).  
 
Notably, benchmarking therefore served as a mechanism through which buyers achieved frame 
stabilisation and closure, for example through influencing farmers’ mindsets regarding the 
benefits of competition, and supporting this through the use of sanctions (high, stable prices, 
and the threat of exclusion). 
 
By contrast, within non-aligned pools, there appeared to be fewer opportunities, or incentives, 
for farmers to influence buyer beliefs and demands, as conditions of trust were low and 
sanctions were less powerful. When non-aligned farmers’ beliefs conflicted with those of their 
buyers, they were more willing to switch buyer than to engage with buyers in attempting to 
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influence buyers’ demands (the lower milk price offering less of an incentive to retain their 
contract; cf. Farmer M, 7.4 and Farmer K, 8.3). 
 
Finally, it may be that the increased reliance and duration of relationships in aligned pools, 
outlined above, results in investment effects as the operation of these pools – including 
benchmarking and the resulting provision of research and extension services – represents an 
investment on the part of supermarkets. Such investment may increase in proportion with 
increases in the duration of relationships and levels of reliance. This provides a possible 
hypothesis for future testing. 
 
 
OBSERVATION 4: The high, stable base prices paid by the larger supermarkets were based 
upon the production costs of the farmers supplying them. This practice – together with the 
benchmarking that accompanied it – created expectation and co-ordination effects both within 
aligned producer pools, and across the wider production sector, influencing both directions and 
rates of change. 
 
Although aligned farmers suggested that benchmarking groups were ‘diverse’, it was clear that 
benchmarking and cost of production pricing created strong pressures upon farmers to emulate 
the best-performing farms in the group, meaning that large aligned producer pools (in which 
price was determined by reference to production costs) exhibited a tendency towards a 
homogenisation of production approaches over time.  
 
There was, further, evidence that the ‘best-performing’ farms within aligned pools – i.e. those 
that other farms were seeking to emulate – tended to be larger and more intensive. Notably, 
intermediate aligned farms reported experiencing pressures to introduce changes to their 
systems (i.e. changes in direction rather than rate) in order to emulate more intensive farms (in 
the words of intermediate Farmer C: “I benchmark myself against these guys on the high 
output systems, and it makes me question whether our system is going to be viable”). By 
contrast, intensive aligned farms did not report similar pressures to emulate either intermediate 
or extensive systems. 
 
When benchmarking had influenced intensive farms to introduce changes (within either aligned 
or non-aligned pools), farms were able to implement such changes within the boundaries of 
their current, intensive, systems, rather than by changing direction. For example, upon realising 
that the more extensive farms within his benchmarking group had significantly lower feed costs 
than him, Farmer I introduced ‘zero-grazing’, effectively further stabilising his system around a 
permanently housed model, through investment effects resulting from purchase of a ‘zero 
grazing’ machine (7.1). 
 
		
	
207	
The view that benchmarked, aligned pools tend towards homogenisation is further supported 
by: 
• The observation that, although supermarkets did not demand specific production 
approaches or technologies, the pressure to continually reduce production costs may, 
over time, progressively restrict the available range of options for farms’ future 
development. Farmer E, for example, had not been directed explicitly by Sainsbury’s to 
halve the number of Shorthorns within her herd. Instead, pressures to reduce her 
production costs underpinned this decision (“the supermarket … are very closely 
monitoring our costs of production … and they want to get that down … and having 
monitored cost of production with the supermarket for the last … four [years]… the 
answer is that we need to reduce that number of native breeds”). Reducing the number 
of Shorthorns in the herd – which had been a distinguishing feature of the farm for 
generations – served to make the farm more closely resemble the Holstein-based system 
(see Farmer H, 9.1) that was more typical of aligned producers.  
 
• The fact that farms within benchmarked pools could compare themselves directly 
against the best-performing farms in the pool across a range of production parameters, 
and could therefore more readily emulate the approaches of those farms (e.g. Farmers 
C and F; 9.3.3.1). Although all farmers claimed that they were constantly benchmarking 
themselves (informally) against other farmers, and that this influenced farm 
development, there was evidence that formal benchmarking within aligned pools – and 
the transparency it afforded around other farms’ production costs – accelerated such 
development through the strengthening of expectation and co-ordination effects 
(supported by the threat of exclusion). Farmer B – who had been both an aligned and a 
non-aligned supplier – exemplified this, suggesting that being on an aligned contract 
meant that he had made efficiency improvements “a bit sooner” than he would have 
otherwise (9.3.3.1). 
 
• The observation that benchmarking farms against each other was revealing areas of 
‘best practice’, which buyers aimed to promote across the supplier pool through 
research and extension. Notably, underperforming farms supplying Tesco would be 
“offered help … through consultancy” (Farmer C) to bring their production costs into 
line with the rest of the group. This provided an example of the influence of farmers 
upon buyers’ demands within aligned value chains (see Observation 3, above) as 
supermarkets’ support for (and influence upon) farms (through research and extension) 
would be informed by the approaches taken by the best-performing farms, which, as 
mentioned above, tended to be larger, more intensive operations. However, the 
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dissemination of best practice was also a key mechanism through which supermarkets 
achieved closure around technological frames, influencing the ways in which farmers 
framed the problems and solutions of dairy farming, and specifically farmers’ mindsets 
regarding the benefits of competition (7.3.3.2 and 9.3.3.1) and the ‘fairness’ of cost of 
production pricing. Sanctions and conditions of trust served as further supporting 
mechanisms through which supermarkets achieve such closure. 
 
Moreover, it may be hypothesised that the tendency towards consolidation within aligned 
pools over time (outlined above Observation 2), may serve to intensify these expectation and 
co-ordination effects amongst the remaining farmers within these pools, increasing the rate of 
farmers’ progress towards goals and/or further inhibiting future changes in direction. This 
offers a potential avenue for future research. 
  
Because of the desirability of supermarket contracts, farmers within non-aligned value chains also 
sought to emulate the performance of those within aligned producer pools (e.g. Farmer O, 
Section 7.3.3.1; Farmer N 9.3.1.1). Supermarkets therefore directly influenced the rate and 
direction of development of aligned farms and indirectly influenced the rate and direction of 
development of non-aligned farms.  
 
These findings make an original contribution to the literature on the diffusion of innovation. 
They suggest that processes of homogenisation within aligned pools, and across the wider dairy 
farming sector, cannot be attributed purely to the ‘bandwagon effects’ envisioned by diffusion 
scholars. Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, for example, based their conception of bandwagon 
effects upon a critique of ‘rational-efficiency theories’, which “… assume that organisations 
rationally choose to adopt an innovation that is diffusing based on updated information about 
the innovation’s technical efficiency or return.” (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993, p.489) They 
argued that such theories cannot explain the diffusion process unless various assumptions are 
satisfied, namely that:  
 
“To influence nonadopters’ decisions, information must flow through channels from early 
adopters to nonadopters. For this to happen, there must exist (a) information, (b) channels, (c) a 
propensity of early adopters to disseminate this information, and (d) a propensity of nonadopters 
to be influenced by it. If any of these four conditions is not met, then diffusion cannot be 
explained by rational-efficiency theories.” (ibid. p.490)  
 
 
Instead, they characterised bandwagon effects as occurring when organisations’ decisions to 
adopt an innovation result from “… the sheer number of organisations adopting an innovation 
…  rather than their individual assessments of the innovation’s efficiency or return” (ibid. p.487-
491). In other words, bandwagon effects (often discussed interchangeably with expectation and 
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co-ordination effects; Dobusch and Schußler 2012) have a ‘self-fulfilling’ quality (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999, p.13-14).  
 
Significantly, the study findings demonstrate clearly that, within value chains for liquid milk, 
farms across the sector did not adopt technologies purely because of the ‘sheer number’ of other 
farms adopting those technologies. For example, non-aligned farmers emulated farmers within 
aligned pools because aligned farmers were in receipt of the highest prices for their milk, not 
because aligned farmers comprised the majority of farmers in the sector.196 The degree of price 
variation within the market, and the considerable transparency around pricing, provided 
farmers with both the information necessary to assess the available returns to technology 
adoption and the incentive to adopt.  
 
In contrast to the determinism implied by Abrahamson and Rosenkopf’s conception of 
‘bandwagon effects’197, the findings suggest that such effects were underpinned by human 
agency or deliberate action. For example, although benchmarking provided examples of the “… 
utility resulting from others following the same path…” (i.e. co-ordination effects; Dobusch and 
Schußler 2012, p.623), the practice of benchmarking was itself a deliberate act, underpinned in 
this case by supermarkets’ desire to direct farms towards specific outcomes (namely, improved 
production efficiencies to reduce costs, and increased data collection and monitoring of animal 
welfare and environmental performance metrics to satisfy consumer demands for product 
traceability). 
 
Further, within aligned value chains for liquid milk, supermarkets provided the necessary 
channels for gathering and disseminating of information, through:  
• Benchmarking, which offered a clear means of assessing both the extent of 
technological adoption amongst producer pools and the relative efficiency of different 
technological approaches, and  
• Providing research and extension services based around the outcomes of benchmarking 
exercises.  
 
 
Supermarkets also helped to establish the parameters along which technological performance 
was to be valued or assessed in the first place. This was evidenced by the observation that 	
196 In fact, quite the reverse is the case: “because of the structure of the milk supply sector, only about 3% 
of milk producers are direct suppliers to retailers” (House of Commons 2015, p.15) 	
197 See Dobusch and Schußler p.625, citing Shapiro and Varian (1999): “Self-fulfilling expectations are one 
manifestation of positive feedback economics and bandwagon effects.” 
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aligned farmers often adopted mobility scoring, in the first instance, not because they believed 
it would improve production efficiencies, or because other farmers were doing so, but in order 
to satisfy supermarket demands.198 Indeed, farmers frequently reported that the performance 
benefits of innovation adoption had only become apparent after adoption, rather than acting as 
a driver for adoption. 
 
It is significant that Abrahamson and Rosenkopf examined bandwagon effects within 
‘collectivities’ of organisations, defining a ‘collectivity’ as “… a group of competitors such that 
each competitor knows when another competitor has adopted an innovation…” (Abrahamson 
and Rosenkopf 1993, p.488). While their analysis centred on the characteristics of organisations 
within collectivities that might result in bandwagons being joined (or not), it therefore did not 
include the contribution of powerful buyers (i.e. outside of collectivities who, moreover, help to 
define these collectivities to the extent that they determine the composition of aligned pools) 
towards such effects. However, this study offers clear evidence that powerful buyers make an 
important contribution to such effects.  
 
The above discussion highlights the key role performed by supermarkets within the value chain 
for liquid milk. Indeed, the findings serve to enrich Dewick and Foster’s depiction of retailers as 
the ‘focal actors’ within “… the milk production and distribution system…” (i.e. “… those with 
the greatest influence to drive innovation…” with the ability to “… stimulate … innovation 
from suppliers upstream.” (Dewick and Foster 2011; p.1-2) It offers a contribution towards an 
“… understanding [of] the role of ‘focal actors’…” (ibid. p.2) through presenting an explanatory 
account of the interaction between farmers and powerful buyers, which may illuminate the 
ways in which “… existing industry structures and power relationships … inhibit the 
emergence of new structures…”, or not (ibid. p.1). Notably, the emergence of new structures is 
inhibited as aligned pools tend towards homogenisation as a result of benchmarking and 
expectation and co-ordination effects.  
 
Moreover, the findings also contribute to their discussion regarding the extent to which retailers 
facilitate ‘best practice dissemination’ (ibid, p.1), for example through benchmarking. Dewick 
and Foster suggest that:  
 
“The restructuring of the milk PDS [production and distribution system] around the supply 
chains of the supermarkets has led to a change in [the] provision of knowledge and demonstrates 
another growing element of their ‘focal’ role. Thus, over the last few years, major retailers have 
developed supplier-improvement programmes for their long-term supply contracts … so a new 
mechanism for the spread of best practice has emerged.” (ibid. p.7) 	
198 Albeit these supermarket demands were themselves partly informed by evidence, from benchmarking, 
of the best practices of best performing farms (see Observation 3). 
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While Dewick and Foster argued that “… this mechanism may well be considered more 
discriminatory (or selective) – it is after all available only to those farmers supplying one or 
other of the major retailers…“ (ibid., p.7), the findings of this study suggest that the 
supermarkets’ influence in disseminating best practice extends beyond the boundaries of their 
value chains, further extending their power as ‘focal actors’. 
10.2 Distinctions between Types of Farm Systems 
The following distinctions could be observed between farms operating different production 
systems, regardless of which type of value chain they functioned in: 
 
 
OBSERVATION 5: The influence of buyer demands upon farms varied according to the farm 
system in use. This can at least partly be explained by considering the following, related, 
factors: 
• The degree of correspondence between buyer demands and system goals 
• The varying influence of sanctions upon different system types 
• The depth of changes implied by buyer demands, which varied by system type 
• The “amount of technology” used by the system, and the resulting number and intensity 
of complementarity effects (Diederen et al 2003, p.332) 
 
 
Different farm socio-technical systems progressed towards different goals, and a specific buyer 
demand would therefore correspond with these goals to varying degrees. Broadly: 
• Intensive farms progressed towards the primary goal of maximising output per 
cow/per milking robot (7.1) 
• Extensive farms’ progressed towards the primary goal of minimising production costs 
per cow/litre of milk (8.1) 
• Intermediate farms progressed towards a more diverse set of goals when compared 
with intensive and extensive farms (9.1). 
 
Related to this, the mechanisms (chiefly sanctions) that buyers used in order to secure 
compliance with specific demands influenced farms in different ways and to different extents, 
depending upon the system in use.  
 
For example, buyer demands for high (low) production were supported by high (low) milk 
prices, and corresponded closely (conflicted) with intensive farms’ progress towards the goal of 
maximising output. Intensive farms therefore responded readily to high prices by further 
intensifying production (increasing inputs per cow) and/or expansion. They responded to low 
prices by reducing herd size and/or purchased feed inputs. High, stable prices were sometimes 
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regarded by farmers as being essential for the continued functioning of both intensive and 
intermediate farms (e.g. Farmer F, Section 7.3.1.1; Farmer D Section 9.3.1.2). This was likely to 
be related to the higher variable costs associated with these systems, when compared with more 
extensive systems. As analysis of the Milkbench+ dataset revealed, mean variable costs per cow 
were £1,386.84 for Intensive farms,  £1,034.51 for intermediate farms, and £847.94 for extensive 
farms. 
 
High and low prices neither strongly corresponded, nor strongly conflicted, with the goals 
towards which extensive farms were progressing. Extensive farms typically responded to high 
prices through expansion (i.e. increasing herd size) rather than by increasing inputs per cow. 
Extensive systems were more resilient to low, volatile prices than intensive systems. In the 
words of Farmer G: “In the good years a high production system will probably make more 
money than we do, but in the bad years we will still make money”. 
  
The influence of milk prices upon the rates of technological change was more pronounced in 
intensive production systems than extensive systems. The sequence of technological changes 
enacted by farms in response to price changes also appeared to vary by farm system. Intensive 
systems reported increasing feed inputs in the first instance in response to price increases, 
before later increasing herd size, whereas extensive systems reported increasing herd size alone. 
 
Due to the diversity of goals towards which intermediate systems progressed, it was not 
possible to infer generalisations about whether high, stable and low, volatile prices 
corresponded, or conflicted, with the goals of intermediate farms as a cluster. Broadly, however, 
intermediate farms did appear to have a wider range of possible options for future 
development in response to milk price changes, being, in the words of Farmer C, “… in the 
middle of two systems.” The downside of this, however, was that intermediate farms appeared 
less able to either (a) fully capitalise upon conditions of high prices or (b) withstand low price 
conditions (e.g Farmer N, Chapter 9).  
 
With regard to the former, intermediate systems were often less able than intensive systems 
fully to capitalise on the high, stable prices paid under aligned contracts (see 10.1) and were 
incentivised, under such conditions, to intensify. With regard to the latter, intermediate farms 
on non-aligned contracts appeared to be experiencing the greatest economic hardship within 
the prevailing conditions of low milk prices, enjoying neither the low input costs of extensive 
farms, nor the scale economies of more intensive operations to support them through those 
challenging conditions (in the words of Farmer D: “The middle ground … is actually in some 
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respects the hardest place to be”). This created incentives either to intensify or extensify 
production. 
 
This finding, regarding the greater flexibility of intermediate farms to pursue different 
approaches (9.1), is consistent with – and serves to explain – trends observed by AHDB Dairy / 
DairyCo199, namely, that the majority of changes in direction amongst farmers have been from 
intermediate production systems towards either intensive or extensive production systems (as 
opposed to intensive or extensive farms moving towards more intermediate approaches). The 
relative ease with which intermediate farms were able to execute such changes can further be 
explained using the concepts of ‘depth’ of changes, ‘core activities’ (detailed below and 
previously covered in section 3.6.3) and ‘amount of technology’. 
 
‘Depth’ refers to “… the extent to which [governance] affects the core activities of individual 
parties in the chain…” as opposed to “… peripheral operations.” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001, 
p.32) The evidence gathered revealed that the depth of the changes associated with a particular 
buyer demand varied by system type, because core activities varied by system type (moreover, 
the technologies associated with such core activities were often specialised and ‘non-
transferable’; Dobusch and Schußler 2012 p.623). For example, although feeding cows was a 
core activity of all systems, changes to either feeding or breeding technologies would have a 
deeper effect upon intensive and extensive systems than upon intermediate systems, because 
the selection of breed was a more critical factor in the performance of intensive and extensive 
systems (which were aiming to maximise or minimise feed inputs per cow, respectively). 
Breeding changes could be less readily accommodated within intensive and extensive systems, 
compared with intermediate systems, because the cows used in these systems (in particular the 
high-yielding pedigree Holsteins) were specialised and non-transferable in character.  
 
Similarly, although switching to an all-year calving model (e.g. in response to buyer demands 
for level production) presented challenges for all system types, such a change was less readily 
accommodated within (i.e. would affect more deeply) extensive systems than intensive systems 
(due to the former’s greater reliance on grazing, which was a core activity for these farms). 
Notably – and returning to the discussion regarding the distinctions between aligned and non-
aligned value chains (10.1) – because level production has become a higher priority for 
supermarkets (which are seeking to source all of their annual milk requirements from within 
their supplier pools, see Observation 2), extensive systems may either (a) prove less attractive 
to supermarkets recruiting farms, compared with other systems, and/or (b) find it less 
profitable to operate within aligned value chains in the future. Such pressures may drive some 	
199 Personal communication 2/12/14 
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extensive farms to make changes to their socio-technical systems in order to meet buyer 
demands for level production (as seen in the case of Farm K), which may result in 
intensification of production. 
 
Finally (and building upon the above discussion) farms’ responses to buyer demands varied 
according to ‘the amount of technology’ they used, which showed considerable diversity 
between different dairy farm systems. Diederen et al regarded the “… amount of technology…” 
as “… the number of different technologies involved in the production process…”, suggesting, 
for example, that one would expect a higher probability of innovation adoption within 
greenhouse horticulture than in arable farming, because the former uses a larger number of 
different technologies (Diederen et al 2003, p.332).  
 
Putting to one side the observation that “… the number of different technologies involved…” 
will vary not only between different subsectors of agriculture (e.g. dairy vs arable), but also 
within subsectors (i.e. intensive and extensive dairy farms will each use a different number of 
technologies, see further below) the findings of this study suggest that the ‘amount’ of 
technology should incorporate additional considerations, and should correspond more closely 
to what Hughes termed ‘mass’ (Hughes 1983, p.15; 3.3.6). For example, herringbone milking 
parlours, rotary milking parlours and milking robots may each be regarded as a ‘single’ 
technology, and therefore would be equivalent to one another from Diederen et al’s perspective. 
However, as the findings revealed, these milking technologies each involve varying degrees of 
capital investment, knowledge and skills, and interact in diverse ways (and to varying degrees) 
with other system components, introducing different complementarity effects (discussed 
further below).  
 
The study findings therefore strongly suggest that a more complete assessment of the ‘amount’ 
of technology should incorporate more than a simple documentation of the ‘number of 
technologies’ used, but should also consider: 
• Differences in the (physical) ‘obduracy’ (Pinch and Bijker 1987, p.xxii) of these 
technologies and, related to this, distinctions between technological ‘hardware’ and 
‘software’ (with ‘software’ taken to include not only process technologies, but also the 
knowledge, skills and experience embedded in farm employees). Such distinctions 
would therefore capture differences between, for example, housing and ‘crayons’ used 
in heat detection. Housing and crayons might each be regarded as a ‘single’ technology, 
but the former has a considerably larger and more enduring physical footprint on the 
farm, is therefore more difficult to remove once introduced, and so represents a larger 
potential obstacle to farmers’ ability to respond to buyer demands. 
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• Related to this, the capital value of technologies (and the resulting investment effects 
associated with technologies), including depreciation. Again, in the example above, 
buildings are considerably more expensive than crayons, and would accordingly incur 
much stronger investment effects (albeit these investment effects would diminish over 
time as the buildings fall into disrepair and/or need replacement or improvement, 
meaning that the influence of buyer demands may also depend upon the timing of such 
demands relative to time horizons for investments in new technologies). 
 
• The complementarities (both number and intensity) associated with technologies: A 
single technology may interact with several other technologies, or with none at all. The 
evidence suggests that the former case will present a larger potential obstacle to a 
farmer’s ability to respond to buyer demands than the latter. This relates in turn to the 
issue of ‘core activities’, discussed previously. Where a technology performs a ‘core’ 
activity, it may be more likely to be characterised by a larger number of 
complementarities and/or more intense complementarities. It is conceivable that a 
single strong complementarity between two technologies that perform a core activity 
might present a greater obstacle to compliance with a buyer demand than numerous 
weak complementarities between several technologies performing peripheral activities. 
Finally, technologies involved in core activities are more likely to be related to (i.e. to 
result from and/or in) actors’ skills, knowledge and associated beliefs (see ‘complexity’, 
below, or how readily technologies can be incorporated into the system, given existing 
bodies of knowledge). 
 
While simpler metrics such as ‘numbers of technologies’ or capital expenditure offered 
a straightforward numerical measure of the ‘amount of technology’, the importance of 
incorporating the contribution made by complementarities was illustrated by the fact 
that many of the farmers interviewed cited their mobile phones as the ‘most important 
technology’ on the farm; by no means the most expensive technology, but valuable by 
virtue of performing a ‘core’ activity and through interacting with numerous other 
technologies – from receiving data regarding milk quality results, to communicating 
with (receiving text messages from) milking robots, to monitoring closed circuit TV 
images of cows – therefore resulting in complementarities. 
 
 
A return to the example of milking technologies, introduced above, demonstrates how these 
additional concepts and dimensions help to explain the distinctions between farmers’ responses 
to buyers’ demands. For example, milking robots are expensive, obdurate (installed into, and 
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requiring modifications to, housing), were involved in a ‘core’ activity, created strong 
complementarity effects with feeding, housing and breeding technologies, required the 
development (and embedding) of new knowledge and skills (e.g. both for farmers in terms of 
learning how to operate and maintain the machinery, and for cows, which ‘learn’ to be milked, 
see Farm O, 7.2), and were ‘specialised and non-transferable’ in nature. As a result, once 
introduced, milking robots presented a considerably larger barrier to directional change than 
herringbone parlours (which – although expensive, obdurate and involved in a core activity – 
lacked the same intensity of complementarity effects). Robots were therefore a more significant 
factor for farms than herringbone parlours when considering whether (or how) to comply with 
buyer demands. 
 
Although all systems exhibited complementarity effects between system components, the 
number and strength of these varied by system type, making different systems more or less 
responsive to demands requiring change. Broadly: 
• Intensive farms were characterised by the use of a ‘large amount’ of technology (in 
terms of numbers of different technologies, their capital value, and the number and 
intensity of complementarities between technologies) compared with extensive and 
intermediate systems. This potentially inhibited the ability of intensive farms to change 
direction. This was exemplified by the interactions between milking robots, permanent 
housing, intensive feeding and year round calving: complementarities between these 
technologies resulting in particularly pronounced stabilisation in intensive systems.  
 
The practice of benchmarking (which militates against diversity) within aligned value 
chains (in which more intensive farms tended to be the ‘best performing’, and which 
other farms sought, therefore, to emulate; see Observation 4) therefore tended to 
amplify this stabilising effect, and to further limit intensive systems’ scope to diversify 
or change direction within aligned pools.  
 
• Extensive systems were inhibited from moving to a very intensive system in part due to 
the high cost of the necessary capital investment in new housing and additional feed, 
and in part because of the rigidities of ‘beliefs’. On the other hand, due to their low 
inputs per cow, extensive farms could expand rapidly, although expansion beyond 
certain limits often required the introduction of new milking parlours, resulting in 
investment effects that inhibited subsequent reductions in herd size.  
 
• Intermediate systems, by contrast to intensive and extensive systems, were 
characterised by trade-offs and tensions between system components, rather than by 
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complementarities. The relatively weaker / less well-defined nature of 
complementarities within intermediate systems provided an explanation of these 
farms’ greater responsiveness to market changes, including changes in buyer demands.  
 
 
The finding that the correspondence between buyers’ demands and farms’ progress towards 
goals varied according to the farm system in use (with intermediate farms having a greater 
diversity of scope for possible directions of future development compared with intensive and 
extensive farms) further illuminates the contribution to the SCOT literature outlined already in 
Observation 3.  
 
As outlined above, aligned value chains were characterised by higher trust and therefore 
greater collaboration in the “… collective stabilisation and closure…” of technological frames 
(Meyer and Schubert 2007, p.35). The discussion above suggests, however, that the degree to 
which the outcomes of such collaborative efforts were constrained varied according to system 
type, with intermediate systems exhibiting a greater diversity of possible frames than intensive 
and extensive systems, which were more constrained. This is significant, given that aligned 
pools were characterised by a tendency towards homogenisation around an increasingly 
intensive production model. It implies that, although higher conditions of trust in aligned 
chains resulted in the potential for mutual negotiation of frames, the outcomes of such 
negotiation were increasingly constrained. While farmers in aligned chains may have had more 
opportunity to become involved in determining the outcomes of development (compared with 
those in non-aligned chains) their available range of outcomes was potentially narrower. 
Moreover, where benchmarking was used, such involvement was restricted to the best 
performing farms. 
 
An additional area for further research is the influence of consumers (see above, Observation 2) 
within this process of collective stabilisation and closure, in the light of the distinctions noted 
between different farm systems. For example, intensive farms were particularly sensitive to 
consumer concerns regarding the housing of cattle (e.g. Farmer F, Chapter 7), which influenced 
their deployment of technologies, particularly with regards to data collection and monitoring 
with regards to animal health and welfare metrics. Moreover, consumer perceptions had clearly 
influenced intermediate Farmer N’s decision not to invest in robots, due to the public’s 
perception regarding the permanent housing of dairy cows (9.2).  
 
The above discussion also highlights once again the fact that milk prices are ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
relative to market averages (as outlined above 10.1), but also relative to input costs (which vary 
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by system type). Moreover, different technological configurations mean that particular buyer 
demands may be accommodated within a diversity of systems in a variety of different ways 
(e.g. not invariably resulting in intensification). This reaffirms the broader contribution that 
analysing the influence of buyer power upon producers at the subsector level, rather than at the 
sector level, can yield more valuable insights (and avoid the risk of overlooking the diversity of 
responses of producers to given buyer demands).  
 
These observations tend to support Leiponen and Drejer’s suggestion that “… contrary to 
prevailing assumptions … [within the technological regime literature] … industries are not at 
all uniform in terms of how [the] firms [within them] innovate.” (Leiponen and Drejer 2007 
p.1221) There is, instead, a degree of ‘within-industry variation’ and ‘strategic diversity’ 
amongst firms, resulting in “… similarly behaving subsets of the industry.” (ibid. p.1222-3) Put 
differently, although dairy farming may be considered, broadly, as a “supplier-dominated” 
sector (cf Pavitt 1984), the degree of sensitivity of individual farms to downstream buyers – and 
the resulting impact upon technological decision making – may vary considerably, in particular 
according to the “… amount of technology used…” by farms, but also as a result of the wide 
degree of price variation for what is essentially a fairly uniform / homogeneous product (see 
above, Observation 1). 
 
The findings make a similar contribution towards the literature regarding the diffusion of 
agricultural innovations. Rogers, for example, suggested that “complexity” or “… the degree to 
which an innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use…” is an important factor 
influencing the diffusion of innovations (Rogers 1983, p.15). By performing analysis at the farm 
level, rather than the level of the technological artefact, the study highlighted ways in which the 
degree of complexity of a particular technology will vary from farm to farm, depending on the 
prevailing technological approach and technological configurations being used (and the 
farmer’s associated knowledge, skills, etc). For example, grazing was demonstrably more 
difficult or complex to introduce on farms that used milking robots because of the need for the 
cows to ‘learn’ to graze’ (e.g. Farm I, 7.2) and the difficulty of ensuring access to robots (Farms 
O, I, 7.2; Farmer J, 9.1), than on farms that used conventional herringbone parlours.  
 
Further, the findings may contribute towards the diffusion literature aimed at understanding 
the impact of farm heterogeneity upon innovation adoption through the use of “… decision 
theoretic models of innovation…” (i.e. “What makes a farmer adopt an innovation?” Diederen 
et al 2003). Once again, the findings imply that heterogeneity should be examined at a more 
granular level that has often been applied within such studies, which, when looking at the 
farm-level, have often focused on variables such as farm size, location, farmer education, or age 
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(Sunding and Zilberman, p.231-4) as opposed to specific production approaches or 
technological configurations. 
 
10.3 Summary 
The direction of socio-technical system reproduction as a whole was towards greater 
intensification of production across the research period (farms that were ‘intensive’ at the outset 
intensified, some extensive farms extensified, while intermediate farms more frequently tended 
towards intensification than towards extensification).  
 
Farms attempted, as far as possible, to comply with buyers’ demands within the boundaries of 
their current production systems, due to the action of positive feedbacks associated with these 
systems. When buyers’ demands corresponded closely with farms’ progress towards existing 
goals, such demands were broadly successful in influencing farms’ progress, increasing the rate 
of progress towards those goals. When there was a lack of correspondence between farms’ 
progress towards existing goals and buyers’ demands, buyer demands influenced the direction 
of farm progress only when supported by strong sanctions and/or conditions of trust within 
the value chain. The requirement for strong sanctions and/or conditions of trust increased with 
the ‘depth’ of the changes associated with buyers’ demands (i.e. the more they impacted farms’ 
‘core’ activities). Sanctions and conditions of trust could therefore be regarded as mechanisms 
through which actors (farmers and buyers) achieved collective stabilisation and closure around 
technological frames.  
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Chapter 11:  
Conclusions  
 
 
This study has provided new insights into patterns of technological change in the UK dairy 
farming sector, in particular highlighting how and to what extent powerful buyers – including 
supermarkets – have influenced farmers’ technological approaches within value chains for 
liquid milk.  
 
As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, the impact of retail market concentration upon the food 
system is a subject of considerable public interest and debate. For example, it is often suggested 
that, due to their power, supermarkets are able to capture a disproportionately large share of 
the retail price of food products, therefore exerting significant pressure upon the margins of 
suppliers and producers upstream. Larger, more intensive producers may be better able to 
withstand such market conditions (Lang & Heasman 2004). The concern, therefore, is that 
supermarket power may contribute towards a homogenisation and intensification of 
production, and a corresponding lack of diversity (and resilience) across the agricultural sector.  
 
The dairy farming sector, specifically, has witnessed considerable concentration and 
intensification since the deregulation of the UK’s milk market, following the abolition of the 
Milk Marketing Board in 1994 (Chapter 2). On the one hand, this may represent merely the 
continuation of a longer-running trend towards fewer, larger, more productive farms (Empson 
1998, p.78), which may be explained by incremental improvements in farming technologies 
(Brassley 2000; Bieleman 2005; Lampe and Sharp 2015). On the other hand, such patterns might 
be attributable to the power and influence of supermarkets – often evidenced by successive 
rounds of ‘price wars’, during which supermarkets have been accused of selling milk as a ‘loss 
leader’ (House of Commons 2004, Ev34). Some argue that this has resulted in a decline in the 
share of the retail price of milk captured by farmers, leading them to expand and/or intensify 
production (Boulton et al 2011).  
 
Complicating matters, supermarkets have responded to criticisms of such practices by 
developing dedicated supplier pools. As Chapter 5 demonstrated, post-1994, the market for 
milk has exhibited increasing complexity: the raw milk produced by dairy farmers supplies a 
huge number of different end markets and, moreover, there is a considerable diversity of 
contractual arrangements governing the relationships between farmers and buyers, a broad 
range of different pricing mechanisms, and substantial variation in the prices ultimately 
received by farmers. 
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This study has illuminated this discussion by distinguishing the influence of buyers’ demands 
from the influence of longer-run technological changes unrelated to the influence of buyer 
power. To do this, the study developed an analytical approach based around an evolutionary 
perspective of technological change (Chapters 3-4). This theoretical foundation offered potential 
advantages over ‘linear’ perspectives, in which technological change results from variations in a 
single factor input, or is driven by either ‘market pull’ or ‘science push’. Instead, change was 
regarded as being the product of interactions and feedbacks between a number of interrelated 
technological and non-technological components, comprising a ‘socio-technical system’. 
Because this perspective viewed technological change as both contingent and situated, it 
provided a means of accounting for heterogeneity in farms’ responses to prevailing market 
forces. It also served to characterise technological change within socio-technical systems as an 
inherently-contested process of ‘reproduction’, alternating between periods of relatively stable 
‘path dependent’ change, and periods of more disruptive change.  
 
To avoid potential shortcomings associated with evolutionary models – namely, their  ‘circular’ 
character (Millstone 2010, p.294) – the framework placed greatest emphasis upon interactions 
between actors (buyers and farmers) and technologies, while other components (resources and 
institutions) provided a ‘background’ against which – or ‘medium’ through which’ – these 
interactions occurred. Conceptual tools were borrowed from the global value chains (GVC) 
literature in order to enrich the analysis of these interactions. Moreover, to further illuminate 
the contested nature of reproduction, conceptual tools were incorporated into the framework 
from the literature on the social construction of technology (SCOT). 
 
This yielded a novel theoretical framework that aimed to accommodate both ‘path dependent’ 
processes and ‘deliberate’ actions, in order to provide a means of explaining not only the ways 
in which ‘normal’ technological change differed from farm-to-farm but, moreover, to explain 
variations in the influence of buyer demands upon different farms. This framework was used to 
answer the question: In which ways, and through what mechanisms, does buyer power 
influence the reproduction of farm-level socio-technical systems for the agricultural production 
of liquid milk in the UK? 
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11.1 Results Overview  
11.1.1 Empirical Contributions, Predictions and Policy Implications 
The framework was applied to the analysis of a range of case studies, revealing several novel 
insights that alternative approaches might have overlooked. Further, the observations 
regarding system change within the dairy sector across the study period, highlighted in 
Chapter 10, inform predictions about the future of the UK dairy sector and imply some policy 
responses to such possible future outcomes. 
 
11.1.1.1 The Direct and Indirect Influence of Supermarkets: Contributions 
The findings revealed clear sector-level patterns of system change  over the study period; 
broadly speaking, a move towards greater intensification of production across the research 
period (farms that were ‘intensive’ at the outset intensified, some extensive farms extensified, 
while intermediate farms more frequently tended towards intensification than towards 
extensification; see 10.1). This was consistent with DairyCo/AHDB Dairy’s suggestion that 
farms were moving away from what this study calls ‘intermediate’ systems, towards either 
‘intensive’ or ‘extensive’ models of production, rather than vice versa (see 10.2).  
 
Significantly, the study identified the influence of powerful buyers upon these patterns, 
uncovering evidence that supermarkets exerted both a direct influence upon the (‘aligned’) 
farms that supply them, and an indirect influence on other (‘non-aligned’) farms (see Sections 
7.3.3.1; 9.3.1; 10.1) and attributing this to the stronger sanctions and higher levels of trust 
present within aligned value chains (see 10.1), which were related to the degree of price 
variation and the diversity of contractual arrangements available in the market. Therefore, the 
influence of supermarkets resulted in an intensification and homogenisation of production 
amongst their direct suppliers over the study period (e.g. Farms C and E, Chapter 9), as well as 
amongst farms outside of supermarket value chains, often due to expectation and co-ordination 
effects associated with benchmarking farms on the basis of their production costs, and with 
research and extension activities based on these benchmarking exercises (10.1). 
 
11.1.1.2 The Direct and Indirect Influence of Supermarkets: Predictions 
Looking to the future, a continuation of this trend may introduce new risks to the dairy sector 
or exacerbate existing ones. Broadly, because of the greater use of purchased feed inputs within 
intensive systems, if the trend towards sector-level intensification persists then the sector’s 
resilience to economic stresses and shocks may be undermined as farms become increasingly 
exposed to movements in feed input prices. The implications of this potential outcome are 
particularly striking given the UK’s decision to exit the EU, following the referendum of 2016, 
which may exacerbate the challenges facing UK farmers, within a current climate of 
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protectionism (Lang, Millstone and Marsden 2017). Moreover, this development should be 
viewed within the broader context of the repeated ‘dairy crises’ and steadily declining farm 
numbers in the UK (see Chapters 1 and 2), which provide an indication of the economic 
challenges that the dairy sector has endured in recent decades.  
 
Of particular note are the risks resulting from the indirect effects of supermarket demands upon 
non-aligned farmers, who may seek to emulate aligned farms with a view to securing aligned 
contracts (evidenced by Tesco’s ‘waiting list’ of farms, 9.3.1.1), potentially adopting production 
models unsuited to their current contracts (see Chapter 5, footnote 41; and 11.1). The farmers 
interviewed in this study often regarded high, stable prices as being essential for the 
functioning of intensive and intermediate systems, whereas extensive systems were more 
resilient to low, volatile prices (see 10.2). Therefore, whereas technological changes 
implemented by aligned farmers (i.e. moves towards greater intensification) may be compatible 
with their supermarket contracts (which pay high, stable prices) the same changes may be less 
compatible with the contracts of non-aligned farmers (which pay lower, more volatile prices). 
Non-aligned farms that intensify production in the hope of securing an aligned contract may, in 
the absence of the high, stable price received under an aligned contract, be more exposed to the 
economic impact of input price increases (e.g. in feed or other inputs) and less resilient to future 
economic stresses and shocks.  
 
The trend towards intensification may also exacerbate environmental impacts associated with 
intensive production models (see 2.3.2) at both the sector and individual farm level, particularly 
if farms were to pursue intensification under circumstances in which such an approach is 
incompatible with the available environmental resources. For example, if local climate and 
geographical conditions are not able to support the increased waste management burden 
associated with the intensive, year-round housing of cattle, then a move to such a system may 
create a heightened risk of local environmental pollution and/or disease. The influence of 
environmental resources will be recalled from 7.2, 8.2 and 9.2, in which examples were 
provided of the ways in which, historically, farms had been constrained by prevailing local 
environmental resources and conditions. Pressure to emulate larger, intensive aligned farms 
may be challenging this pattern, driving farms to pursue approaches that are unsuited to their 
local environment (see 2.3.2).  
 
The trend towards intensification should be considered in conjunction with the study’s finding 
that intensive systems were exhibiting evidence of ‘reverse salients’, which implied that they 
were reaching the limits of further intensification (7.1). This finding suggests that there is an 
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inherent – and increasing – tension between, on the one hand, the drive towards intensification 
and, on the other hand, the biological and economic limits of the intensive model of production.  
 
 
11.1.1.3 The Direct and Indirect Influence of Supermarkets: Policy Implications 
The above observations and predictions imply that the influence of supermarket power may be 
more pervasive than might otherwise have been assumed (see, e.g. 10.1). This suggests that 
policymakers should place greater attention upon the wider impacts of supermarket power (i.e. 
beyond their impact on their direct suppliers), and should consider the consequences of 
‘expectation and co-ordination effects’ resulting from the establishment of dedicated 
supermarket-aligned producer pools, which have created a system of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ 
within the sector (10.1).  
 
Notably, reviews of the effects of the oligopolistic power of supermarkets have often considered 
asymmetries in price transmission between participants in the milk value chain but have not 
focused on the type of indirect sector-level effects, such as co-ordination and expectation effects, 
considered within this study (Smith and Thanassoulis 2008). Further, such reviews have often 
restricted their scope to relationships between supermarkets and their direct suppliers (i.e. 
processors), overlooking the implications of supermarket power for the broader supply chain. 
For example, an investigation into the groceries sector by the Competition Commission in 2008 
examined movements in farmers’ and retailers’ shares of the retail price for milk, concluding 
that increases in the latter demonstrated increases in retailers’ power relative to farmers’ power 
(Competition Commission 2008, Appendix 9.3).  
 
On the recommendation of the Competition Commission’s investigation – which had concluded 
that “some large retailers were transferring excessive risk and unexpected costs to their direct 
suppliers” (GCA 2018, p.10, emphasis added) – the UK Government introduced the Groceries 
Supply Code of Practice in 2010 (GSCOP), and established the Groceries Code Adjudicator 
(GCA) in 2013 in order to regulate relationships between supermarkets and their direct 
suppliers. However, indirect effects of supermarket power, and indirect relationships – such as 
those between supermarkets and farmers upstream from processors – were not within the scope 
of either the GSCOP or the GCA.  
 
Between 2016 and 2017 the UK government consulted on extending the GCA’s remit to cover 
indirect suppliers, such as primary producers and farmers, and to provide them with similar 
levels of protection (BEIS 2016a, b). Notably, the consultation identified “a significant pattern of 
unfair or unclear terms and conditions in contracts between producers and the processors, 
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slaughterhouses, or manufacturers that they supply. These concerns were particularly prominent in 
the dairy sector.” (HM Government 2018, p.6; emphasis added). However, it concluded that, 
“there was not enough evidence to support extending the remit of the GCA” although “some 
unfair trading practices were identified”.200 Instead, the consultation proposed introducing 
“compulsory written contracts in the dairy sector in 2018” to provide “extra transparency and 
certainty for dairy farmers.” (ibid.). At the time of writing, the government plans to consult on 
the necessary secondary legislation to implement and regulate such contracts.  
 
The explanation of indirect influences provided by this thesis represents a novel contribution to 
the field and one worthy of further examination. It also suggests that policymakers should 
consider again broadening the scope of GSCOP and the GCA’s remit and powers to address the 
relationship between supermarkets and farmers and, moreover, to address the indirect effects of 
supermarkets upon non-aligned value chains, for example, permitting farmers to refer cases to 
the GCA, and enabling both direct and indirect influences of supermarket power to be factored 
into assessments of supermarket power. 
 
The finding that supermarkets indirectly influenced non-aligned farms reveals a further 
significant policy implication concerning the ‘privatisation of extension services’. The finding 
indicates that the research and development activities sponsored by supermarkets, ostensibly 
in support of their supplier pools, may have broader reach than other analyses have suggested 
(see 10.1). Indeed, whereas some have described supermarkets as ‘focal actors’ within value 
chains (i.e. “those who have significant market power and/or can stimulate eco-innovation 
beyond the boundaries of their own organisation”; Dewick and Foster 2007, p.2) the findings of 
this study demonstrate that supermarkets in practice stimulate innovation beyond the boundaries 
of their own value chains. 
 
This raises the policy questions: who is driving the technological research agenda within the UK 
dairy sector? Who ‘frames’ the ‘problems’ of technological search and how and by whom are 
the approaches to solving these problems selected? Moreover, given that supermarkets account 
for a narrow – albeit significant201 – segment of the market, are other voices marginalised within 
this process of negotiation?  
 
This study also demonstrated clearly that the ability of supermarkets to influence farms (both 
directly and indirectly) relied heavily upon the existence of considerable price variation 	
200 https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/groceries-code-adjudicator-extending-its-remit). 
201 ‘Narrow’ in terms of their requirements (i.e. level year round supply of liquid milk); ‘significant’ in 
terms of their size (i.e. millions of customers). 	
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within the market (with supermarkets paying higher, more stable prices than other buyers; see 
7.3.1.1, 8.3.1.1, 9.3.1.2, 10.1). 
 
Significantly, this explanation runs counter to analyses focused purely on distributional 
outcomes (see above), i.e. “the gap between farmers’ prices and ... retail prices” at the sector 
level (Lang & Heasman 2004, p.149). Such arguments may exhibit a tendency towards a simple, 
linear structure (i.e. ‘supermarkets capture a disproportionate amount of the margin from the 
sale of milk, thus putting downward pressure on producers’ margins, thereby forcing the 
smallest producers out of business’). They may fail to capture fully the complexities and 
dynamics of the market (namely, as demonstrated in 5.2.3, the ways in which distributional 
outcomes vary at the farm level, as a result of the different prices paid under different contracts 
and due to the different ways in which these prices influence different production systems 
because of the different complementarity effects associated with these different systems; see 
10.2) and may therefore imply inappropriate or inadequate policy responses.  
 
Further, such linear, sector-level accounts may be readily repudiated – and dismantled – by 
supermarkets, which may contend, in their defence, that they pay consistently the highest 
prices in the market (see e.g. Figures 7a, 8a, 9a). 
 
This study offers another explanation, which may be less readily rejected, and which implies a 
different policy response. Farms that supplied supermarkets expanded and/or intensified 
because they received the highest, most stable prices (see e.g. Farms F and M, 7.3.1.1; Farm K 
8.3.1.2; and Farms C, D and E, 9.3.1.2). Due to the degree of price variation in the wider market, 
and the volatility of these prices, non-aligned farms either: scaled back production through 
reducing herd size (e.g. Farm M, 7.3.1.3; Farm N, 9.3.1.2), extensified production in order to 
reduce (typically feed) input costs (Farms B and J, 9.3.1.2), or sought – as a result of expectation 
and co-ordination effects – to emulate aligned farms in the hope of securing a supermarket 
contract (Farm O, 7.3.3.1). 
 
Although efforts have been made to improve the process of price determination within 
contracts for the sale of milk (e.g. through the voluntary code of best practice for contractual 
relationships; DairyUK 2013), this finding suggests that further policy efforts should address 
the issue of price variation within the milk market. Once again, the finding that supermarkets 
influence indirectly the production approaches of non-aligned farmers is of particular concern, 
given that cost-of-production pricing within aligned value chains has effectively ‘decoupled’ 
supermarket prices from demand (see 10.1), whereas the prices received by non-aligned farms 
remain coupled to demand (within a broad range of commodity markets). By seeking to 
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emulate the approaches of aligned farmers, non-aligned farmers may be pursuing production 
approaches that are not suited to their contractual arrangements and/or local environment (see 
above). Moreover, extreme price variation in the market meant that aligned farmers (in receipt 
of the highest prices) appeared relatively unconcerned about the decoupling of price from 
demand, or about the fact that cost-of-production pricing results in constant downward 
pressure on prices over the longer term (see e.g. Farm O 7.3.3.1; also see further below 11.1.1.4). 
 
Further, these findings – while highlighting the fact that distributional outcomes vary between 
different value chains and therefore affect farmers to differing degrees – also emphasise the 
need to examine more closely power and distributional outcomes across the entire length of 
value chains (i.e. not simply between supermarkets and farmers). Of particular interest are the 
margins captured by processors, given that processors operate across many of different value 
chains for milk (i.e. aligned liquid, non-aligned liquid and manufacturing).  
 
The fact that processors act as ‘contract processors’ within aligned chains, and that 
supermarkets ‘play processors off against one another’ (9.3.1.1; 9.3.1.2) raises the question of 
whether supermarket price wars have served to reduce processors’ margins, and whether 
processors consequently pass associated losses on to their non-aligned farmers, who effectively 
subsidise aligned farmers. This, in combination with the findings regarding the effect of price 
variation within the market, suggests that policymakers might consider whether processors 
should be obliged to pay farmers a similar price for similar products.  
  
 
11.1.1.4 The Evolution of Aligned Pools: Contributions  
Related to the above, a further significant contribution of this study concerns the inherent 
tensions within the aligned-segregated pool model (see 10.1 Observation 2). For example, in 
the absence of effective limits on production, aligned producer pools exhibited a tendency 
towards consolidation and overproduction in the longer term (with one Sainsbury’s supplier, 
for example, claiming that the supermarket now ‘buys more milk than it sells’; 9.3.1.2). This 
raises questions about the long-term sustainability of such pools as currently constituted, 
particularly given the cost to supermarkets of operating them. Indeed, the study found 
evidence that supermarkets were developing measures that might provide greater control over 
production levels, with Tesco, for example, introducing a policy of terminating the contracts of 
its worst-performing farms; an approach that, taken to its logical conclusion, would result in 
further consolidation and an ever-decreasing number of ever-larger farms within the pool. 
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Another tension within the aligned pool model (where cost of production pricing was used) 
concerned the drive to constantly reduce production costs while maintaining a level annual 
supply of milk. As discussed above, intensive farms were encountering reverse salients 
(11.1.1.1) in the form of decreasing returns to intensification (7.1; 7.3.3.1) and were often 
responding to these through increasing the component of home grown forage and grazed grass 
used on the farm, in order to reduce production costs and exposure to the volatility of price 
movements in feed inputs. However, just as greater use of purchased feed runs counter to 
reducing production costs, so greater use of grazed grass and home grown forage potentially 
runs counter to achieving a level annual profile of milk (because grass growth is not level all 
year round). 
 
 
11.1.1.5 The Evolution of Aligned Pools: Predictions  
A continuation of Tesco’s policy of eliminating its worst-performing farms seems likely to result 
in increased pressure on those remaining farms to emulate the best-performing (typically 
largest and most intensive) farms, potentially exacerbating the trend towards consolidation and 
intensification. Looking ahead, other supermarkets may introduce similar methods of limiting 
or controlling production volumes, with similar effects. 
 
However, in spite of this trend towards consolidation and intensification – and the indirect  
influence of supermarkets upon non-aligned farms, outlined above (11.1.1.1 – 11.1.1.2) – the 
analysis does not support the view that supermarket influence will drive the UK dairy sector 
inexorably towards a ‘megadairy’ system. The analytical framework considered the degree of 
‘reliance’ that parties in the value chain have upon one another (3.6.3) and implied that it might 
be against supermarkets’ interests to become increasingly reliant upon a diminishing number of 
ever-larger suppliers as this would concentrate risk in the supply chain and enhance the 
bargaining power of farmers within negotiations. It suggested that megadairies at the scale 
envisaged at Nocton in Lincolnshire (2.3.2) would represent such a sizeable proportion of a 
supermarket’s milk needs as to prove unattractive from the supermarket’s perspective (10.1, 
Observation 2).  
 
Further, megadairies would present a significant reputational risk to supermarkets, potentially 
undermining the ‘PR value’ of aligned value chains, as public statements made by 
supermarkets at the time of the Nocton application suggested.202 This PR value lies primarily in 
the greater transparency and control that aligned value chains permit, in response to increased 	
202  https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/food-and-drink/news/supermarkets-turn-noses-up-at-
megadairy-milk-2137056.html 
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consumer demand for these (see 10.1, Observation 2). With this in mind, looking ahead, it 
seems likely that retailers will: 
• Monitor and review consumer perceptions and awareness of aligned value chains, and 
assess the degree to which these value chains are serving their purpose of satisfying 
consumer demands for greater transparency and control 
• Monitor and review consumer demands, including the potential for these to change, 
particularly within the context of the UK’s decision to exit the EU (Lang, Millstone and 
Marsden 2017), and whether this necessitates changes to aligned value chains.  
 
It is likely, therefore, that, in addition to seeking to control volumes, supermarkets will maintain 
their efforts to drive down farmers’ production costs and will continually adjust the demands 
they make of farmers (e.g. around animal welfare) in response to perceived changes in 
consumer demand.  Such changes may introduce inconsistencies between supermarkets’ 
demands. For example, during the period covered by this study, Waitrose was demanding 
demanded a level production profile from its farmers, while simultaneously demanding a 
minimum period of annual grazing (10.1).	
 
A final trend associated with the evolution of aligned pools concerns the erosion of cost of 
production prices as a result of benchmarking. There are at least two possible outcomes of this 
trend. The analysis suggests that supermarkets are able to influence farmers due largely to their 
higher, more stable prices. If these prices exhibit a constant downward trend, due to 
benchmarking, then, ceteris paribus, the influence of supermarkets may diminish as alternative, 
non-aligned prices become (relatively speaking) less unattractive. Alternatively, it may be that 
processors choose to reduce their prices in response to reductions in supermarket cost of 
production prices, which could trigger a future sector-wide milk price crisis. 
 
 
11.1.1.6 The Evolution of Aligned Pools: Policy Implications  
In the light of the government’s intention to introduce compulsory written contracts in the dairy 
sector, and to consult on the secondary legislation required to implement these, policymakers 
should bear in mind the longer-term direct and indirect influences of cost of production pricing 
and benchmarking.  
 
Notably, if the intention behind compulsory contracts is to introduce greater “transparency and 
certainty” in response to “unfair or unclear terms and conditions in contracts”, (HM 
Government 2018, p.6) then policymakers might consider whether the constant downward 
trend of cost of production pricing represents a ‘fair’ outcome for farmers, in particular given 
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the considerable information asymmetries inherent in this method of price determination 
(9.3.3.1). Further, they might consider the impact of constant price erosion upon both aligned 
pools and (given the indirect influence of supermarket prices upon non-aligned pools) the 
wider sector (for example, the potential for a sector-wide milk price crash if processors choose 
to lower their prices in tandem with reductions in supermarket cost of production prices). 
 
 
11.1.1.7 Emerging Opportunities for Product Differentiation: Contributions   
The reverse salients discussed above imply that intensive systems are beginning to cut 
production costs, for example, through making greater use of grazed grass. This may be part of 
a broader recognition within the industry of (and response to) the trends towards consolidation 
and homogenisation observed above, and the associated threat to the resilience of farming 
models to feed input price movements. In parallel with this has been the emergence of farmer-
led initiatives, for example the Free Range Dairy Network, which may be viewed as a response 
to the price variation in the market discussed already (11.1.1.1) and to the dislocation between 
the on-farm production of milk and the end use to which it is put (5.2.2). Such initiatives 
represent an effort on the part of farmers to both introduce greater product differentiation, to 
shift power away from the retailers, and to move towards a new socio-technical system.  
 
It is significant, in the context of this study, that this effort to increase farmers’ power is based 
around production technologies, tying both product differentiation, and the premium 
represented by that differentiated product, to the mode of production. Again, such 
developments (and their likely outcome) should be viewed in the light of the evolving 
consumer context (e.g. will such products as ‘free range milk’ command a premium or be 
viewed as ‘too expensive’ in a post-Brexit UK?).  
 
 
11.1.1.8 Emerging Opportunities for Product Differentiation: Predictions   
Whether such initiatives gain in popularity will depend upon how effectively they are able to 
communicate with and educate consumers, a challenge that may be considerable given that (as 
this study demonstrates) there is a huge variety of possible approaches to dairy farming, 
rendering agreement upon (and understanding of) ‘free range’ standards difficult in both 
theory and practice. 
 
11.1.1.9 Emerging Opportunities for Product Differentiation: Policy Implications   
Ensuring a diverse and resilient dairy sector may require the creation of an environment in 
which a range of different production and marketing models are able to successfully co-exist. 
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Policymakers might consider working with industry to endorse or support the development of 
standards including those being pioneered by groups such as the Free Range Dairy Network, 
facilitating greater transparency around such standards and improving consumer awareness. 
 
 
11.1.1.10 Trust within Value Chains: Contributions 
Finally, the analysis also revealed the differences in conditions of trust that exist within 
aligned value chains compared with non-aligned value chains, as well as the results of these 
differences. Notably, supermarket value chains were characterised by higher conditions of 
trust, and longer, more collaborative relationships compared with the value chains of other 
buyers (cf. Farmer M, 7.4 and Farmer K, 8.3). Although this meant that farmers in aligned 
chains were more involved in determining the outcomes of technological change, they were 
selecting from a narrower available range of outcomes (due in part to the homogenisation 
within aligned pools, resulting from expectation and co-ordination effects created by 
benchmarking; e.g. Farms C and E, Chapter 9). Moreover, only those farmers at the top of 
benchmarked pools were able to exert influence over the direction of development of the farms 
within the pool, meaning that conditions of higher trust provided a small and diminishing number 
of farmers greater influence over the direction of development of the farm, towards a narrowing 
range of outcomes.  
 
 
11.1.1.11 Trust within Value Chains: Predictions 
A continuation of the trend outlined above implies that, as trust within aligned pools increases 
over time, this will result in a progressively narrowing ‘elite’ of farms within these pools. This 
may lead to alternative voices being marginalised, reducing the potential for diversity within 
these pools. 
 
However, as noted already, aligned pools in which the milk price is determined by reference to 
the cost of production are likely to witness a downward trend in milk prices over time (see 
11.1.1.5). The analysis suggested an interaction between trust and sanctions (see further below, 
11.1.2). For example, the process of price determination enhanced conditions of trust within value 
chains for liquid milk (10.1), with cost of production pricing providing both confidence in the 
continuity or predictability of the milk price, as well as influencing farmers’ mindsets regarding 
the fairness of such pricing (i.e. as the pricing was transparent and by reference to a formula). It 
seems likely that farmers’ views on the ‘fairness’ of such pricing mechanisms were influenced 
by the degree of price variation within the market, and by the fact that the prices paid under 
cost of production contracts were considerably higher than either spot market prices or non-
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aligned prices. It is conceivable that – if prices paid under aligned contracts were to fall relative 
to non-aligned prices, this might alter farmers’ perspectives of cost of production pricing and 
potentially reduce levels of trust within aligned value chains. 
 
 
11.1.1.12 Trust within Value Chains: Policy Implications 
Policymakers might question whether creating an ‘elite’ group of farmers is consistent with the 
development and maintenance of a diverse, resilient and inclusive dairy farming sector. As 
outlined already (11.1.1.3), given that the research and extension activities of supermarkets are 
driven by their best-performing farms, and that these activities influence indirectly the entire 
sector, this raises the question of whether many voices are being marginalised, as the ‘problems’ 
of technological search and selection within the dairy sector are increasing being framed by a 
diminishing group of increasingly large farms. Policymakers may therefore consider measures 
to support smaller or marginalised groups including, for example, those engaged in niche 
activities such as those outlined in 11.1.1.7 – 11.1.1.9.  
 
As outlined already (11.1.1.6), policymakers might also consider, when developing legislation 
to implement compulsory contracts, whether the constant downward trend of cost of 
production pricing represents a ‘fair’ outcome for farmers over the long term, in particular 
given the considerable information asymmetries inherent in this method of price determination.   
 
 
11.1.2 Contributions to Theory 
This study combined three different theoretical lenses (4.1) in order to provide a richer 
understanding of the dairy sector, revealing and explaining trends within the sector and 
outlining future outcomes implied by these trends (11.1.1).  
 
A ‘quasi-evolutionary’ model of technological change was developed through enriching an 
evolutionary perspective with elements drawn from the literatures on the social construction of 
technology (SCOT) and global value chains (GVC). As distinct from a ‘coupled’ or ‘circular’ 
model of technological change, this model provided a means of differentiating “more from less 
important links and interdependencies” in order to “indicate the main drivers of stability and 
change” (Millstone 2010, p.294).  
 
The framework revealed considerable variety in technological decision making at the sub-sector 
level, building upon Leiponen and Drejer’s assertion that “industries are not at all uniform in 
terms of how [the] firms [within them] innovate” (Leiponen and Drejer 2007 p.1221). Although 
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dairy farming may be considered, broadly, as a “supplier-dominated” sector (Pavitt 1984), the 
degree of sensitivity of individual farms to downstream buyers – and the resulting impact upon 
technological change – may vary considerably. The framework provided a detailed account of 
the variations in the ways that different types of farm systems responded to comparable buyer 
demands. For example, intensive and extensive systems directed their technological ‘search’ 
towards different goals (maximising output per cow/robot versus minimising inputs, 
respectively) and their responses to low/high prices differed accordingly (as did the sequence 
of these responses). 
 
In synthesising three different theoretical lenses, the study provided a contribution to the 
different bodies of theory being combined, often through the ways in which conceptual 
elements drawn from each of these bodies of theory supported or illuminated one another: 
 
• For example, within the evolutionary tradition, much emphasis has been placed upon 
examples of conflict and contestation within transitions contexts (where the locus of 
conflict is typically at the intersection of niches and regimes, see 3.4.1). However, this 
study suggests that this may be at the expense of acknowledging the extent to which 
reproduction is a contested process. Incorporating concepts from SCOT and GVC 
provides a richer depiction of processes of conflict (and opportunities for change) that 
exist within system reproduction.  
 
• Although patterns of technological change in the sector were often shown to be the 
product of collective stabilisation and closure of technological frames (i.e. a concept 
drawn from the SCOT literature), analytical/conceptual tools (‘sanctions’ and ‘trust’) 
drawn from the GVC literature provided a means of illuminating the different 
conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, such stabilisation and closure 
occurred (see 10.1). Therefore, in addition to highlighting the ways in which these 
different dimensions of value chain governance interact and support one another, the 
analysis also demonstrated that strong sanctions and high levels of trust – typical of 
aligned chains – supported a process of collective frame stabilisation. Notably, the 
presence of high, stable prices and the corresponding power to exclude (sanctions), in 
combination with the practice of collaboration and benchmarking (trust), influenced 
farmers’ mindsets regarding (or how they ‘framed’) the benefits of competition 
(depending upon whether they were inside or outside of aligned producer pools).   
 
• A SCOT perspective encourages a view of ‘technological frames’ (3.4.1) as deriving 
from ‘meanings’ attached to artefacts. Such meanings correspond broadly to ‘cognitive 
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and normative rules’ (see Table 3a, 3.4.1). GVC, by contrast, is principally concerned 
with ‘regulative’ rules. Therefore, by using a GVC perspective in combination with a 
SCOT perspective, the framework enriches the resulting analysis by illuminating the 
interplay of regulative, cognitive and normative rulesets.  	
Further, conceptual elements drawn from the SCOT literature supported and 
illuminated concepts drawn from GVC. GVC, being largely focused on regulative rules, 
potentially underplays the interaction between these rules and cognitive and normative 
rules. For example, whereas GVC regards ‘trust’ as a proxy for ‘legitimacy’, a SCOT 
approach encourages the analyst to view issues of legitimacy more critically, notably 
from the perspective of different groups of actors. Doing so reveals, for example, that 
aligned farmers viewed cost of production pricing as ‘fair’ (despite the fact that cost of 
production pricing entrenched considerable information asymmetries between buyers 
and farmers and, within benchmarked pools, resulted in a progressive reduction in the 
milk price received by the farmer; see above, 11.1.1.5). Non-aligned farmers, by contrast 
were more wary of the risks associated with passing details of their production costs to 
buyers. Significantly, it is likely that aligned farmers’ views on the fairness of cost of 
production pricing were influenced by the fact that they were receiving the highest, 
most stable prices (again, illustrating the importance of viewing regulative rules from 
the perspective of different actor groups). 
 
Therefore, one critique of GVC, highlighted by its synthesis with SCOT within this 
study, concerns the question of whether the trust concept (including the positive 
connotations invoked by that word) permits a thorough examination of the issue of 
power imbalances and exploitation within relationships between chain participants. 
Notably, relationships may be long (i.e. an indicator of trust) merely due to the lack of 
alternatives. Moreover, farmers may regard their contract as being good relative to other 
(i.e. even worse) contracts available in the market, but this is not to say that the 
relationship between farmer and buyer is ‘fair’ (indeed, aligned farmers readily 
accepted the massive information asymmetries inherent in COP pricing, ostensibly 
because they were receiving a better milk price than non-aligned farmers). Finally, 
conditions of ‘high trust’ in practice meant that only those farmers at the top of 
benchmarked pools were able to exert influence over the direction of development of 
the farms within the pool (11.1.1.10).  
 
11.2 Reflections on Methodology  
The study’s findings and contributions to knowledge should be considered in the light of the 
following limitations and qualifications. 
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Limitations of the scope of the research and research question – The study aimed to determine 
the influence of powerful buyers upon dairy farms. Given the complexity of markets for dairy 
products (see Chapter 5), it was desirable to limit the study to an analysis of the domestic liquid 
milk market, in order to more clearly detect the ‘signal’ of supermarket influence from the 
background ‘noise’ of, for example, movements in global commodity prices. Moreover, 
although many supermarkets operated dedicated, aligned pools for the procurement of liquid 
milk, they did not for the procurement of cheese and other dairy products. Restricting the study 
to a comparison between aligned and non-aligned liquid value chains therefore provided a 
more strategic focus for the research, enabling a clearer examination of supermarket power 
through the aligned/ non-aligned axis.  
 
This was, in practice, a problematic distinction. Farmers can move fluidly between value chains 
for liquid milk and manufacturing (i.e. cheese). Indeed, two of those interviewed had 
undertaken such moves and another was in search of a cheese contract. Moreover, because 
processors operate across different value chains (i.e. liquid milk, cheese, etc) this was inevitably 
reflected both in their approach to ‘balancing’ and in the demands that they made of the farms 
supplying them through liquid contracts (in terms of, for example, constituent content). Several 
non-aligned farms reported that the production of protein and butterfat was increasingly 
rewarded within liquid contracts, ostensibly because these could be directed towards the 
production of other products (e.g. cheese, powders, etc). It was, therefore, not possible to 
consider liquid value chains completely in isolation from other value chains. 
 
Limitations of analytical framework – Any analytical framework, by necessity, represents a 
simplification of reality (3.3.2, Chapter 4, 5.1). The intention is that a simplified representation 
of a complex system may offer insights into the operation of that system, and illuminate the key 
interactions within it. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that, because certain 
interactions were accorded priority status within the analysis, other (potentially significant) 
interactions may have been underemphasised. 
 
For example, because the framework emphasised the interaction between buyers’ demands and 
farms’ technological configurations, the potential significance of such variables as farmers’ 
financial position (Farmer M; 7.2), their access to credit and their succession plans, or the tenure 
status and ownership structure of farms, was not a key consideration. Given that the findings 
supported Leiponen and Drejer’s claims regarding sub-sector level heterogeneity – an insight 
drawn from the ‘strategic management’ literature – issues such as ownership structure might be 
factors to consider within future research examining such heterogeneity.  
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The analytical framework could be adapted to incorporate additional financial, labour or 
environmental variables for the purposes of future research (see below 11.3). 
 
A key limitation of the framework, and of its application, was that the influence of actors 
upstream from farmers (e.g. developers, producers and suppliers of technologies) and, in 
particular, downstream from buyers (i.e. end consumers) was given insufficient attention. 
Although it demonstrated the direct and indirect influence of supermarkets upon farmers, the 
study did not explore fully the extent to which supermarkets were themselves driven by 
consumer demands (e.g. for transparency, ‘fair pricing’ or animal welfare), or the degree to 
which the continued operation of aligned value chains relied upon their ‘PR’ value to 
supermarkets. Such factors may provide a further insight into the future direction and 
sustainability of aligned value chains. The framework may be adapted to incorporate a more 
complete analysis of upstream and downstream actors for future studies. 
 
Limitations of data and data analysis – Access to the Milkbench+ dataset was restricted to a 
limited number of data fields which did not include, for example, complete data regarding farm 
accounts (as outlined in the point above, because the analysis was centred on the interaction 
between buyer demands and farms’ technological configurations, the data fields requested from 
AHDB were those relating most closely to technologies). Moreover, interviews with farmers 
were limited to an hour and therefore concentrated on those areas of most immediate relevance 
to the analysis.  
 
‘Clusters’ of farms corresponding to a novel typology of different system types (intensive, 
intermediate, extensive) were extracted from an abridged version of AHDB’s “Milkbench+” 
dataset – which covered the period 2007-2013 – using principal component analysis and cluster 
analysis of cross sectional data for the year 2013. The shortcomings of the data include the 
inability to capture potential annual fluctuations in input variables such as rainfall, which might 
vary by region and might affect different system types to varying degrees, influencing the use 
of both housing and feeding technologies. Anomalies in such conditions may have affected the 
clusters to which farms were allocated.  
 
Basing the clusters on data averaged over the entire 2007-2013 period, rather than on the data 
for a single year (2013), might have smoothed the volatility caused by weather conditions or 
short term movements in market prices for feed inputs. However, using 2007-2013 averages 
would have resulted in a much smaller sample size as only 15 farms submitted data returns for 
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every year. Moreover, this approach would have been complicated by the fact that data for 
some variables had been retrospectively overwritten from one year to the next. 
 
Notwithstanding the above limitations, the analysis of the Milkbench+ dataset was adequate for 
the purpose of producing approximate clusters from which to shortlist farms for more in depth 
interviews. 
 
More broadly, identifying ‘boundaries’ between clusters was difficult (see Chapters 6 and 9). 
Although the distinctions between intensive and extensive farms were clear, distinguishing 
intermediate farms from both extensive and intensive farms presented a greater challenge, 
because farm systems are typically differentiated from each other by reference to scale variables 
rather than categorical variables, with the result that boundaries between clusters appeared 
indistinct or arbitrary. For example, while the cluster analysis had allocated Farm H to the 
‘intermediate’ cluster, interview data appeared to place it on the boundary between 
intermediate and extensive systems. This may be either because of the limitations of cluster 
analysis (outlined above), or because of changes that had taken place on the farm in the 
intervening period between the 2013 and the date of the interview (2016).  
 
A key limitation of the study was the absence of interview data collected from farmers who had 
exited the sector due, for example, to persistent conditions of low milk prices. Such interviews 
would have provided a means of validating some of the trends identified in the analysis, such 
as the suggestion that high, stable prices were essential for the functioning of intensive and 
intermediate farms. Moreover, the study did not include any farmers that were operating 
towards the ‘bottom’ of aligned pools in terms of efficiency (i.e. for whom exclusion from the 
pool therefore presented a more imminent threat, and who might have offered a different view 
regarding the ‘fairness’ of cost of production pricing), or farmers that had been excluded from 
such pools. Such farmers might have offered useful additional evidence of the pressures 
associated with benchmarking, and possibly a different account of the conditions of trust within 
these value chains.  
 
Finally, when deploying the concept of ‘technological frames’, farmers’ frames were inferred 
from interview data, whereas buyers’ frames had to be inferred from contract data, milk prices 
and farmers’ accounts of buyer-farmer relations. Interviews with buyers would have enriched 
the depiction of buyer frames.  
 
 
		
	
238	
11.3 Further research 
The contributions and limitations outlined above highlight several important areas for future 
research, not only within the UK value chain for liquid milk, but within global value chains for 
dairy and other agricultural products, and, more broadly, within sectors that exhibit similar 
characteristics to the UK dairy sector.  
 
For example, the approach taken within this study, its findings, and the areas for further 
research highlighted by these, may be applicable to the study of value chains in which a large 
number of producers supply a small number of powerful buyers with a homogeneous, 
commoditised product, and in which “it is supermarkets which are the most powerful actors” 
(Mylan et al 2015, p.20). This includes value chains for food commodities, for example, 
horticultural products (Gereffi et al 2005) such as fruit and vegetables (Vagneron et al 2009; 
Dolan and Humphrey 2000) or coffee (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004). The findings may equally 
apply to value chains for products such as cut flowers, which are also characterised by “the 
rising power of UK retailers” which may “exert control over supply chains” (Hughes 2000, 
p.175). 
 
Notably, some previous studies of such value chains have suggested that “retailers often put 
pressure on suppliers to reduce costs, which may lead to antagonistic and distrustful relations” 
(Mylan et al 2015, p.21). This stands in contrast to this study’s findings, namely that relations 
between supermarkets and the dairy farms that supplied them directly were characterised by 
higher conditions of trust relative to non-aligned value chains, partly as a result of price 
variation in the wider market and partly as the result of longer, more collaborative relationships 
identified in these chains. This implies that the governance of the UK dairy value chain may 
bear some unique characteristics (e.g. cost of production pricing, benchmarking etc), which may 
be compared and contrasted against the governance of other supermarket value chains (e.g. 
value chains for products such as beef – Mylan et al 2015 – in which supermarkets often operate 
dedicated supplier pools, or value chains for fresh fruit and vegetables, in which they do not).  
 
Such work may enrich the findings of, for example, Mylan et al, who identified that the “co-
ordination” of eco-innovation efforts by supermarkets varies between different supply chains, 
with supermarkets being more active in dairy supply chains than in value chains for beef or 
bread (ibid.). It may equally provide new avenues of research within the study of ‘own label 
products’ in the fresh produce sector (Fearne and Hughes 1999) or, more broadly, within the 
study of ‘private standards’ as a “mode of market governance” in other global value chains 
(Henson and Humphrey 2008; Kaplinsky 2010).  
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Looking beyond the agricultural sector, the findings (and areas for further research that they 
illuminate) may apply to the study of sectors such as the apparel / garments and textiles, which 
have been studied extensively within the GVC literature (Gereffi et al 2005), while applying the 
framework developed within this study (with its synthesis of concepts drawn from the GVC 
literature and those from an evolutionary / SCOT perspectives) may offer a contribution 
towards illuminating the insights that a GVC perspective may bring to “understanding 
trajectories” (Schmitz 2007, p.152). 
 
Specifically, areas for future research within the UK value chain for milk (which may also be 
applied more broadly to the value chains outlined above), include: 
• The impact of price variation upon innovation activities within markets for 
commoditised products, and the exploration of policy options to address such impacts.  
 
• The influence of actors upstream from farms and downstream from buyers, and in 
particular the influence of end consumers upon the ‘closure and stabilisation’ of 
technological frames.  
 
A focus upon the role of end consumers within the UK value chain for milk also 
highlights the necessity for further research into the potentially contradictory effects of 
aligned pools upon producers’ ability to capture returns. Broadly, producers of 
commodities capture a small share of the value from the sale of products due to “the 
relatively undifferentiated nature of final product markets” (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004, 
p.7). On the one hand, consumer influence within the UK milk market may contribute 
towards a ‘de-commodification’ (Kaplinsky and Fitter 2004) of liquid milk (in the 
limited sense that the development of aligned supermarket pools – ostensibly in 
response to consumer demands for improved traceability, animal welfare standards, or 
the ‘fair’ treatment of farmers – may be regarded as introducing greater product 
differentiation into the liquid milk market). On the other hand, the homogenisation of 
production (see Observation 4) associated with aligned pools – and the diffusion across 
the wider sector of best practices developed in aligned pools – tends to militate against 
this, resulting in a less-differentiated production sector. 
This raises the broader question of the impact of different degrees of product 
differentiation upon producers’ approaches towards technology adoption, which might 
be compared across diverse value chains characterised by varying degrees of product 
differentiation (e.g. milk versus coffee versus wine; Gwynne 2006). 
 
• The interactions between supermarkets and processors and between larger and smaller 
processors, and in particular the conditions of trust within the wider value chain, given 
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that processors operate across both aligned and non-aligned value chains. Of particular 
interest are the margins captured by processors, given that processors operate across 
many of different value chains for milk (i.e. aligned liquid, non-aligned liquid and 
manufacturing). There is, further, the question of whether supermarket price wars 
(and/or supermarkets’ practice of ‘playing processors off against each other’) have 
served to squeeze processors’ margins, and whether processors consequently pass these 
losses on to farmers. Notably, such research may further illuminate the ways in which 
the power of processors varies between aligned and non-aligned value chains, and may 
reveal impacts of this upon farmers, such as, for example, the potential for processors to 
pass income reductions or losses associated with aligned contracts on to their non-
aligned suppliers.  
 
• The issue of reliance on both sides of the buyer-supplier relationship. One potential 
hypothesis for future testing is that consolidation within aligned producer pools 
increases buyers’ reliance upon farmers, which may reduce the threat of exclusion and 
increase the co-operation between buyers and suppliers. One might also hypothesise 
that it would be against buyers’ interests to promote excessive consolidation (and the 
expansion of individual producers) within supplier pools, as ultimately this trend may 
increase buyers’ reliance upon farmers. 
 
• The potential relationship between the diminishing size of producer pools and 
increasing levels of trust within them, given that the study found considerable 
preliminary evidence to suggest that smaller supermarkets are more reliant upon 
individual farmers compared with other milk buyers.  
 
• The possibility that reliance and duration of relationships results in investment effects 
as the operation of supplier pools – including benchmarking and the resulting 
provision of research and extension services – represents an investment on the part of 
supermarkets. Such investment may increase in proportion with increases in the 
duration of relationships and levels of reliance. This provides a possible hypothesis for 
future testing. 
 
• Whether the tendency towards consolidation within aligned pools over time serves to 
intensify expectation and co-ordination effects amongst the remaining farmers within 
these pools, increasing the rate of farmers’ progress towards goals and/or further 
inhibiting future changes in direction. 
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• The indirect influence of supermarkets upon farmers that do not currently supply them, 
notably through research and extension activities. Such research may centre on policy 
questions including: who is driving the technological research agenda within the UK 
dairy sector? Who ‘frames’ the ‘problems’ of technological search and how and by 
whom are the approaches to solving these problems selected? Are some voices 
marginalised within this process of negotiation (see 11.1.1, above)? 
 
 
It is hoped that the approach taken within this study, and its findings, will help to illuminate 
future research into these areas and beyond.  
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APPENDIX 5A: Key Differences Between Varieties Of Concentrate Feeds 
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APPENDIX 5B: Main UK Dairy Breeds: Key Average Production Characteristics 
 BREED 
Ayrshire Brown 
Swiss 
Friesian 
(British) 
Guernsey Holstein Jersey  Montbeliarde Shorthorn 
Yield (kg)* 
 
6,640 7,431 6,727 5,834 8,432 5,744 6,820 6,079 
Fat %* 4.03 4.02 4.05 4.77 3.88 5.21 3.80 3.77 
Protein %* 3.30 3.36 3.29 3.54 3.18 3.80 3.34 3.26 
Somatic cell 
count (‘000 
cells / ml)* 
175 168 185 218 206 185 183 176 
Calving 
interval 
(days)* 
418 413 411 421 428 411 397 397 
* 2009/10 figures, source: National Milk Records Annual Production Report 2010; 
https://www.nmr.co.uk/software/annual-production-report  
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	APPENDIX 5C: Main UK Dairy Breeds: General Characteristics 
BREED GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Ayrshire  “Efficient Forage Conversion” 
 “Excellent Functional Type” 
 “Noted for strong udder formation” 
 “Health and freedom of (sic) disease and ailments” 
“Characterised by high quality, longevity, ease of management and overall good health” 
“efficiently produce large quantities of high quality milk from forage… now becoming very popular in 
organic systems” 
Source: http://www.ayrshirescs.org 
Brown Swiss “strongly built animals [with] sound feet and leg structure and well-attached udders” 
“show more insect resistance and have dark skin pigmentation around their eyes, which lessens the 
occurrence of pink eye infections” 
“renowned for their natural grazing instinct and efficient conversion of forage and the relatively flat 
lactation curve gives rise to breed’s reputation for having statistically fewer metabolic problems” 
“greater resistance to mastitis, less prone to milk fever, flatter lactations leading to less loss of condition 
after calving (with its positive effects on fertility) and the ability to average a couple of lactations more at 
the high milk yields” 
Source: http://www.brownswiss.org 
Friesian 
(British) 
“Lower maintenance costs due to feed efficiency of smaller frame cow” 
“Lower vet costs due to better fertility (lower AI costs), less lameness, less mastitis and greater resilience” 
“Lower replacement rate so more options to sell surplus stock” 
“Improved milk quality due to lower mastitis and higher butter fat and protein content.” 
“the British Friesian has developed along slightly different lines and remains a dual-purpose animal with 
the potential to produce substantial volumes of milk and produce male calves that can be fattened up to 
produce quality beef.”+ 
Sources: http://www.britishfriesian.co.uk/content/British_Friesian_Slide_Show.pdf  
+http://ukcows.com/holsteinUK/publicweb/Education/HUK_Edu_DairyCows.aspx?cmh=66 
Guernsey “The Guernsey… [is] most famous for the rich flavour of milk.” 
“Guernseys are… being added to other breed herds to improve the overall quality of the milk supply” 
Source: http://www.guernseycattle.com/about/breed-facts/  
Holstein “In the UK and many countries across the world, the Holstein is the predominant breed because of its 
ability to produce high volumes of milk efficiently.” 
Source: http://ukcows.com/holsteinUK/publicweb/Education/HUK_Edu_DairyCows.aspx?cmh=66  
Jersey “Relatively small in size - about 400 to 450kgs… Despite her small size the Jersey is renowned for its 
ease of calving, allowing it to be crossed with the larger beef breeds” 
“Renowned for the quality of… milk… In the UK milk and dairy products from both Jersey and Guernsey 
cows are increasingly being sold under the "GOLD TOP" label, which is reserved for sole use. Jersey milk 
has always been associated with luxury” 
“Jerseys thrive under both extremes of temperature - they can grow thick coats in very cold climates, 
whilst suffering form much less heat stress than the other dairy breeds in hotter regions of the world. 
Jerseys perform well under a wide range of systems” 
“Studies... show the Jersey to be less prone to many diseases than the other dairy breeds” 
Source: http://www.ukjerseys.com/breed/facts.html  
Montbeliarde “the Montbeliarde is known as the cheese maker breed in France because of the high protein levels.”  
“the Montbeliarde has... on average a 50,000 lower cell count compared with the Holstein for a similar 
level of milk production.” 
“The cows hold a better body condition in lactation which has a positive effect on fertility and health.” 
“The Montbeliarde is a long lasting breed, 25% of Montbeliarde cows are in their 5th lactation or more.” 
“There is a 20 day reduction in calving interval for the Montbeliarde compared with the Holstein in France. 
For first conception rates, the Montbeliarde is 10pts higher than the Holstein, 15pts higher on second 
lactation.” 
“originating from a mountain region [Montbeliardes] have always been bred for strong legs and feet” 
“Beef value: Pure bred Montbeliarde bull calves  can be £120 greater value than the Holstein equivalent”  
Source: http://www.montbeliardeuk.co.uk/information.html  
Norwegian 
Red 
“Keeping a balanced breeding goal for the last 40 years … has overcome the negative 
correlation between production traits and health and fertility traits. This has resulted in a world-
leading cow that has excellent production, health and fertility traits” 
“With good production capabilities and being known as the ‘problem free cow’, the Norwegian 
Red lasts longer on average than most modern dairy breeds” 
Source: https://www.norwegianred.com/Start/Norwegian-Red/about-norwegian-red/Norwegian-Red-
characteristics/  
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	BREED GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Shorthorn “Excellent mobility” 
“Excellent milk quality” 
“Excellent fertility and longevity” 
“Excellent converters of forage to milk” 
“Excellent temperament and adaptability” 
“Suitable for all types of production systems, particularly extended grazing and organic systems.” 
Source: http://www.shorthorn.co.uk/dairyshorthorn/index.php/the-breed/history-of-the-breed  
 
NB: These descriptions have been extracted from materials produced by the breeding societies 
associated with each breed and therefore may be susceptible to bias. It should be borne in mind that 
the characteristics attributed to each breed are, to some extent, the basis upon which the breed is 
being marketed. 
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	APPENDIX 6A: Comparisons between the Milkbench+ Dataset and the Wider 
Population 
 
In 2013, there were 14,2761 dairy farms in the UK. The Milkbench+ dataset for year ending 2013 
contained 421 farms. This sample size offers a margin of error of +/- 4.71% (+/- 6.19%) at a 95% 
(99%) level of confidence.2 
The following tables present the geographical distribution of farms in Milkbench+ dataset, by country 
and region, compared with the actual distribution of UK dairy farms:   
 
 
Distribution of Farms in 
Milkbench+ Dataset 
Actual distribution of dairy 
farms in 20133 
 Frequency % Frequency % 
Valid England 325 77.2 8,587 60.15 
Scotland 48 11.4 n/a n/a 
Wales 48 11.4 1,874 13.13 
Northern Ireland 0 0 n/a n/a 
 
 
 
Distribution of 
Farms in 
Milkbench+ 
Dataset (%) 
Actual 
distribution of 
dairy farms in 
2013 (%)4 
 Unknown 1.4 n/a 
East Midlands 4.3 5.6 
East of England 4.5 1.2 
Glasgow .5 n/a 
Lothian .2 n/a 
Mid and West Wales 4.8 10.9 
Mid Scotland and Fife .7 n/a 
North East England 1.2 6.0 
North East Scotland .7 n/a 
North Wales 5.2 4.2 
 North West England 11.2 18.2 
South East England 8.6 3.9 
South Scotland 8.6 n/a 
South Wales East .7 n/a 
South West England 30.6 27.8 
West Midlands 8.1 11.4 
West Scotland .7 n/a 
Yorkshire and the Humber 8.1 1.6 
  
 																																								 																					
1 http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/resources-library/market-information/farming-data/producer-
numbers/#.XB9AVRQR75o  
2 http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm 
3 http://dairy.ahdb.org.uk/market-information/farming-data/producer-numbers/uk-producer-
numbers/#.ViXrzutM7ww  
4 ibid. 
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	The Milkbench+ dataset appeared strongly representative of the broader population of dairy 
farms in terms of yields per cow. Average yield per cow in the UK in 2013 was 7,535 litres / cow / 
annum5. For the Milkbench+ dataset the mean yield per cow was 7,338.73 and the median yield 
7,474.73 per annum. The distribution of production approaches of farms within the Milkbench+ 
dataset also mirrored the findings of other, larger datasets. For example, a 2014 survey of over 3,000 
UK dairy farms revealed that 78% of farms were calving all year round, 7% were Autumn calving, 
11% were Autumn / Spring calving, and 4% were Spring calving.6 The Milkbench+ sample by 
comparison contained 76.72% all year calved herds, 7.84% Autumn calved, 7.84% multi-block, and 
7.7% Spring calved. 
  
																																								 																					
5 DairyCo 2013 “Dairy Statistics: an insider’s guide 2014” p.18 
6 http://www.nfru.co.uk/research/newsletter-nov2014.html 
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	APPENDIX 6B: Data Obtained from Milkbench+ Dataset, Related to System 
Components 
 
SOCIO-TECHNICAL 
SYSTEM INPUTS 
AND OUTPUTS 
VARIABLES SELECTED FROM MILKBENCH+ DATASET 
RESOURCES Region (‘Unknown’, East Midlands, East of England, Glasgow, Lothian, Mid 
and West Wales, Mid Scotland and Fife, North East England, North East 
Scotland, North Wales, North West England, South East England, South 
Scotland, South Wales Central, South Wales East, South Wales West, South 
West England, West Midlands, West Scotland, Yorkshire and the Humber) 
Physical  
Country (England, Scotland, Wales) 
 
If you the farm is in an NVZ (nitrate vulnerable zone), what percentage of the 
farm area is covered by the restrictions? 
Financial Imputed depreciation on dairy machinery and equipment 
Total Dairy Fixed Costs (£) 
Fixed Costs per Cow (£) 
Total Dairy Variable Costs (£) 
Variable Costs per Cow (£) 
Total machinery and power costs allocated to the dairy enterprise (£) 
Machinery and power costs allocated to the dairy enterprise per cow (£) 
 
Labour Labour hours per cow 
 
TECHOLOGIES  
Feeding 
technologies 
Do you feed a TMR? 
Average metabolisable energy (ME) in feed ration (MJ per kgDM) 
Average metabolisable energy (ME) in forage ration (MJ per kgDM) 
Total feed in DM weight (KgDM) 
Feed per Cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
Total forage in DM weight (KgDM) 
Forage per cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
Total byproducts fed in DM weight (KgDM) 
Byproducts fed per cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
Total compound feeds fed in DM weight (KgDM) 
Compound feeds per cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
 Total cereals fed in DM weight (KgDM) 
 
Cereals fed per cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
Number of full dairy grazing weeks 
Total non-grass forage crops (adjusted for DM) 
Non-grass forage crops per cow(adjusted for DM) 
Total proteins fed in DM weight (KgDM) 
proteins fed per cow DM weight (KgDM) 
Total grass silage fed in DM weight (KgDM) 
Grass silage fed per cow in DM weight (KgDM) 
 
Buildings and 
Housing 
technologies 
Housing Type (cubicles, Loose Housing, None) 
Housing Period in Weeks 
 
Breeding and 
Fertility 
technologies 
Cow Breed (Ayrshire, Channel, Crossbred, Friesian, Holstein, other) 
AI (artificial insemination) and breeding costs for the dairy herd (£) 
AI (artificial insemination) and breeding costs per cow (£) 
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	Milking 
technologies 
Type of Milking Parlour (herringbone, rotary, robots, other) 
Number of milkings per day 
 How many milking points does your parlour have? 
 
Animal husbandry 
and veterinary 
medicine 
technologies 
Bactoscan (in thousands) 
Average number of dairy cows 
Dairy stocking rate (LU / ha) 
Veterinary and medicine costs for the dairy herd (£) 
Veterinary and medicine costs per cow (£) 
Number of Dairy Cows Culled per year 
 
Production cycle 
(‘calving pattern’) 
technologies 
Calving Pattern (All Year, Spring, Autumn, Multiblock) 
 
INSTITUTIONS Farming System (Conventional, Organic) 
Type of Contract (Liquid, Cheese, Other) 
Type of Contract (aligned, Non-aligned) 
Average Milk Price (£) 
  
OUTPUTS / 
PRODUCT 
CHARACTERISTICS 
Yield per cow (litres / year) 
Butterfat percentage in milk 
Protein percentage in milk 
Somatic Cell Count (SCC) in milk (in thousands) 
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	APPENDIX 6C: Briefing Materials Provided to Interviewees 
 
 
 
 
 
 Information sheet for interviewees for the project ‘Understanding patterns of 
innovation within the UK milk production sector’ 
 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study on technological change in the UK 
dairy sector. Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary – if you do decide to do so 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and will be asked to sign a consent form. 
However, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. Before you 
decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is 
being done and what it will involve. Please read the following information carefully.  
 
This project is being undertaken by James Thomas, a Doctoral Researcher in the Science 
Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex. James is being supervised by 
Professor Erik Millstone, Professor in Science Policy at SPRU, and Dr Adrian Ely, Senior 
Lecturer at SPRU. This project aims to understand the factors influencing the adoption and 
retention of technologies by UK dairy farmers.  
 
The fieldwork will comprise interviews with dairy farmers in the UK. You have been invited 
to participate as such an individual. In the interview James will ask you a series of 
questions regarding: 
• The current production system used on your farm  
• The ways in which the different technologies you use interact, and  
• Changes in your production system, and how you arrived at your current 
production system  
 
We anticipate this will take around 1 hour and ideally would like to audio-record the 
interview so that answers can be captured accurately. There are no costs to taking part 
other than your time.    
 
All information collected about individuals will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal 
limitations), and we will not collect sensitive personal information (e.g. ethnicity, political 
views, sexual orientation, beliefs etc). Original recordings of the interviews will be kept on a 
secure, password-protected computer and will be destroyed after the project has finished. 
During the project, transcriptions of the interview will be stored separately and identified by 
a unique identifier code. If any direct quotes are used in the final project report or any 
project publications, these will be identified in accordance with your wishes (see consent 
form). If anonymity is desired, quotes will be identified through a descriptor (e.g. “Farmer 
A”). We will send you direct quotes with some surrounding text for you to approve prior to 
publication.  
 
The results of this research will be published as a PhD Thesis, a copy of which will be 
stored at the University of Sussex and made available to students of the University. It is 
also possible that the thesis may be cited or reproduced within academic publications. All 
forms of published output will be made available to project participants.  
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Please feel free to contact James Thomas if you have any questions or need further 
information at any point: Tel: 01273 812398, email: jt267@sussex.ac.uk. If you have any 
concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, you should contact: Rumy 
Hasan, School Research Ethics Officer, email: R.Hasan@sussex.ac.uk, Tel: 01273 876582 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet and we look forward to 
answering any questions you have. 
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	APPENDIX 6D: Questions Included within Semi-structured Interviews 
 
Questions in red are for aligned farms only, questions in blue are for non-aligned farms 
only, questions in black apply to all farms. 
 
 
1. The NFU describes three main production systems used in the UK as: 
‘extensively grazed’, ‘grass-based’ or ‘zero-grazed’. Is this a useful way of 
categorising different farming systems? If so, which category would you say 
your farm falls into?  
 
NB: If necessary, prompt farmers to cover the following specific areas: 
• Total feed per cow (DM) 
• Ratio of forages to concentrates 
• Proportion of concentrates comprised of compound feeds 
• housing period  
• stocking rate 
• number of cows 
• breed 
• calving pattern and interval  
• yield per cow  
• constituents  
• SCC (less important)  
• Bactoscan (less important) 
 
 
2. Can you explain why you use this farming system, as opposed to any other? 
 
3. How has your system changed since 1994? Again, prompt farmers to cover the 
specific areas (feed per cow etc) 
 
4. Can you explain when and why these changes have taken place?  What 
prompted the changes you have described in your farming system? What guided 
your decisions? What role has the market played in this? 
 
5. Can you explain to me any major investments in technologies that you have 
made on the farm (e.g. milking parlours, buildings and housing) since 1994? 
How and when did you make these? Have these investments been related to the 
changes you have described in your farming system? How? Is there a particular 
order or sequence in which you have had to make these changes? 
 
6. How would you describe your strategy with regards to your production 
system and long-term investment in technology? 
 
7. What aspects of the farm do you outsource? Why? And how long have you 
been doing this? 
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	8. When were you awarded your supermarket contract? 
 
9. Aligned contracts are in strong demand. To what do you attribute your ability 
to secure one? 
 
10. What did your production system look like at the time that you were awarded 
the contract? I may want to get an idea of this both in an objective sense (i.e. 
What were your inputs and outputs relative to today’s levels?) but also in a more 
subjective sense (i.e. At the time of the award do you feel you were ‘ahead of the 
game?’ relative to your peer group?)  
 
11. Did winning the supermarket contract result in a change to your approach? 
Has supplying a supermarket required you to change your farming approach 
in any way?) Would you be farming the way you are now if you weren’t 
supplying a supermarket? (Plus an appropriate follow up question depending on 
their response). 
 
12. Is there much knowledge sharing within your pool of farmers? Can you give 
me examples of this? 
 
13. Would you be willing to show me a copy of your current contract, and 
previous contracts? 
 
14. Has your contract required you to change your farming approach in any 
way? 
 
15. Putting the contract to one side, has your broader relationship with your milk 
buyer required you to change the way you farm? 
 
16. Is there much knowledge sharing within the pool of farmers supplying your 
milk buyer? Can you give me examples of this? 
 
17. Although you do not currently supply a supermarket, would you be 
interested in an aligned supermarket contract? Why / why not? 
 
18. What do you think supermarkets are looking for in the farms that supply 
them? [What do other farmers on aligned contracts look like?] 
 
19. Would you be willing to show me a copy of your current contract, and 
previous contracts? 
 
20. What is the single most important technology to you, as a dairy farmer? 
Why? (NB: reiterate my broad definition of “technology”)  
 
21. Are there any technologies that have revolutionised the way you produce 
milk?  
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	22. Are there any technologies used on the farm that require you to use other 
technologies with them (e.g. feeding systems that only work with proprietary 
pelleted feeds)? 
 
23. Are there any technologies used on the farm that prevent you from using 
other technologies? 
 
24. Have the changes in your farming system that you have already described 
required you to implement any new technologies? If so, is there any 
particular order or sequence in which you have had to implement these? 
 
25. Do you feel that the changes in your farming system that you have already 
described have been helped by, or hindered by, technology? 
 
26. Is there anything about your current farming system that prevents you from 
moving towards a different farming system? 
 
27. If you wanted to move from your current farming system towards another 
farming system, what would be the biggest technological changes that this 
would require? What would be the first thing you would have to change on 
the farm? 
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APPENDIX 9G: Farmer J Contract 
 
 
 
 
 
Agreement Ref : Ingredients                   Page 10 of 15                                                    July 2015 
 
4.  Production Balancing  
 
The production balancing scheme is aimed at encouraging producers to deliver a level supply of milk throughout 
the year. The scheme first needs a producer’s base daily litres to be created, this is done by dividing the total 
volume from the reference period 1st October 2012 to 30th September 2014 by the number of days in this period, 
730 days. The reference period is fixed, but in the future can be varied at Wyke Farms discretion. A 24 month 
period has been used to average any seasonal anomalies.   
 
The base daily litres figure is then multiplied by the number of days in a month to give a monthly production figure, 
to which a tolerance of +/- 5% is applied to give a monthly litreage range for base litres or “A litres”. The percentage 
tolerance will be reviewed annually at Wyke Farms discretion. If actual production falls within this range, all litres 
will be paid for according to the price schedule. If actual production falls outside of the “A Litre” range there will be 
a “B litre” adjustment to reflect Market Realisation Prices. 
 
The Market Realisation Price, (MRP) will be based on the prices that Wyke Farms buy or sell milk and milk product 
on the traded market for during the relevant month after taking account of, but not limited to, administration, 
transport, processing and foreign exchange costs.  
 
If a producer supplies excess litres beyond the “A litre” range due to over-production the over-supply will be defined 
as “B litres” and paid for at the MRP. However in April, May, June and July if the MRP is higher than the standard 
litre price then the standard litre price will be paid on the “B litres”. Any monetary surplus generated from this will 
be distributed in the month equally across the entire “A litre” supply. 
 
A producer can appeal to have their base daily litreage figure increased or decreased if they have increased or 
decreased their production over the reference milk years. They can also appeal to change their base litres if they 
are planning in the future to increase or decrease production. The results of the appeal will be determined by Wyke 
Farms. 
 
 
5. Milk Production Forecast Bonus 
 
The Producer will provide the Purchaser with regular updated information of forecast milk production on his farm.  
This information will be requested at least quarterly and must be received before the end of the calendar month 
when it is requested to qualify for the payment of the bonus of 0.50ppl for the following quarter. 
 
6. Milk Forecast Accuracy  
 
For production forecast being within 10% of the monthly volume produced a 0.50ppl bonus will be paid. 
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